How Violence Against LGBTQ+ People Motivates Prosocial Attitudes Toward LGBTQ+ Group Members

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Abstract

We present a *Fickle Prosocial Violence Response Model* (FPVR) to explain how indirect exposure to civilian-perpetrated violence against marginalized minority groups motivates prosocial attitudes toward victimized groups. Although the mass public may not sympathize with marginalized groups, they may adopt prosocial attitudes toward marginalized groups subject to civilian-perpetrated violence if the violence is salient and perceptibly illegitimate. However, the adoption of prosocial attitudes may be fickle. We find evidence consistent with the model. Studies 1-3 show high-profile violence against LGBTQ+ people increases support for LGBTQ+ rights and reduces negative attitudes toward LGBTQ+ group members. But, the adoption of prosocial attitudes is short-term. Study 4 shows less salient violence against LGBTQ+ people may not engender prosocial attitudes at the outset. Our findings suggest violent events must be sufficiently salient to initially motivate prosocial beliefs. Nevertheless, salient civilian-perpetrated violence against marginalized groups may not *sustainably* motivate prosocial beliefs toward targeted groups.

Keywords: exposure to violence; political violence; prosocial attitudes; intergroup relations; LGBTQ+ politics

Word Count: 12047

1 Introduction

Since the 1969 Stonewall Uprising, there have been numerous instances of anti-LGBTQ+ violence in the US. Despite progress on LGBTQ+ rights (Flores, 2014), anti-LGBTQ+ violence and hate crimes have increased recently[1] while several states introduced a record number of anti-LGBT+ laws in the last year.[2] Perhaps the most prominent, recent, instance of perceptibly anti-LGBTQ+ violence was the 2022 Club Q massacre, where a gunman killed 5 clubgoers at a Colorado Springs LGBTQ+ nightclub. These violent acts, while sympathy-inducing within media and amongst some political elites, may reflect heteronormative societal norms resistant to change.[3] Therefore, an open question is whether *indirect* (i.e. media observation of violence) exposure to high-profile civilian-perpetrated violence against LGBTQ+ group members motivates introspection among the mass public, shifting their attitudes prosocially toward LGBTQ+ people.

We synthesize several theoretical insights and present a *Fickle Prosocial Violence Response* (FPVR) model to explain how violence against marginalized groups may elicit prosocial attitudes toward targeted groups. Although the mass public may not strongly empathize with marginalized minority groups (Cikara et al., 2014), violence against marginalized groups may elicit prosocial attitudes if the violence is salient, perceptibly illegitimate, and the media and/or elites respond sympathetically (Iyengar, 1994; Birkland, 1998; Branscombe and Miron, 2004; Harth et al., 2008; Vossen et al., 2017). However, prosocial attitude adoption may be short-term. Social group attitudes are typically entrenched, even in light of salient events (Sears, 1993; Tuch and Weitzer, 1997; Kite et al., 2019). Immediate adoption of prosocial beliefs after violence may be counterbalanced by countervailing information in a discriminatory society (Vuletich and Payne, 2019). Elite messaging and pressure to support targeted groups may dissipate after an event loses salience (Downs, 1972), undercutting

[1] https://www.hrc.org/press-releases/new-fbi-hate-crimes-report-shows-increases-in-anti-lgbtq-attacks

[2] `https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/over-120-bills-restricting-lgbtq-rights-introduced-nationwide-2023-so-far`

[3] *Heteronormativity* is "privileging gender conformity, heterosexuality, and nuclear families over "deviant" forms of gender expression, sexuality, and family (Pollitt et al., 2021)"

sustainable prosocial attitudinal shifts (Zaller, 1992; Birkland and Lawrence, 2009).

We find evidence consistent with the *FPVR* model by using several surveys and an unexpected-event-during-survey-design. Studies 1-3 demonstrate the public adopts prosocial attitudes toward LGBTQ+ community segments and their political rights shortly after civilian violence against LGBTQ+ group members (i.e. the Pulse massacre, Matthew Shepard's murder). However, *these attitudinal shifts do not persist.* Moreover, Study 4 demonstrates the Club Q massacre had no effect on anti-gay, anti-trans, attitudes. Consistent with the *FPVR* model, we provide evidence the null effects at the outset are due to the less salient nature of the Club Q massacre vis-a-vis the Pulse massacre and Shepard's murder. We provide corroborating evidence by demonstrating less salient violent incidents against LGBTQ+ people outside those in Studies 1-4 largely do not motivate prosocial mass attitudes.

Our theory and evidence makes several contributions. First, the *FPVR* model helps explain *how* violence against marginalized groups motivates prosocial beliefs toward targeted groups among the mass public. Our model is important in light of several salient instances of civilian violence against marginalized groups in the US: Vincent Chin's 1982 murder, a Chinese man murdered due to anti-Japanese resentment; James Byrd's 1996 murder, a Black man lynched by white supremacists in Texas; the 2015 Charleston Church massacre, where a white supremacist murdered 9 Black churchgoers; the 2015 Stanford sexual assault case (*People v. Turner)*, where a Stanford undergraduate man sexually assaulted a woman; the 2019 El Paso massacre, where a white supremacist killed 23 people, mostly Latinos, to counteract a "Hispanic invasion"; the 2021 Atlanta spa shooting, where 8 people, mostly Asian women, were killed; and the 2022 Buffalo massacre, where a white supremacist killed 10 Black people because he felt non-whites were "replacing" whites. We show these high-profile violent events 1) may not serve as sustainable moments of reevaluation concerning the socio-political status of marginalized groups and 2) may not motivate prosocial attitudes at the outset if they are insufficiently salient. Thus, our model and evidence may explain why these events have not led to societal adjustment of beliefs perpetuating social inequalities.

Second, our analysis is the first to examine the attitudinal consequences of real-world *civilian* violence against *LGBTQ+ community segments* on prosocial attitudes toward LGBTQ+ people *among the mass public*. Prior research on violence and prosocial attitudes in the US focuses on state (i.e. police) violence against Black people (Tuch and Weitzer, 1997; Sigelman et al., 1997; Reny and Newman, 2021). Extending research on the attitudinal consequences of violence to the domain of civilian violence against LGBTQ+ community segments is theoretically important since prosocial attitudinal shifts toward victimized groups may be conditional on 1) whether the violence is state-imposed and 2) the targeted group.

One perspective is that the effects of *civilian* violence against LGBTQ+ group members on prosocial attitudes toward LGBTQ+ people may be *weaker* and *less temporally sustainable* than prior studies examining racialized *state* violence. The mass public may attribute *state* violence to systemic problems within reformable institutions, motivating policy preferences benefiting targeted groups (Oskooii, 2016). Civilian violence may be rationalized as a problem inherent to a troubled individual as opposed to the public's aggregate queerphobia (Ott and Aoki, 2002),[4] undercutting introspection over one's own queerphobic beliefs. Moreover, unlike racialized state violence, the violence we examine are not associated with subsequent mass protest, which may sustain the violent event's salience, facilitating long-lasting attitudinal shifts (Reny and Newman, 2021).

Conversely, the effects of violence against LGBTQ+ community segments on prosocial attitudes may be *stronger* and *sustainable* relative to the effects of racialized state violence. Racial attitudes are typically assumed to be stable (Tesler, 2015),[5] and preexisting evidence shows prosocial responses to racialized state violence are fickle (Tuch and Weitzer, 1997; Chudy and Jefferson, 2021). However, as far as data could be recorded, the public has increasingly adopted prosocial attitudes toward LGBTQ+ people over time (Flores, 2014). Therefore, the public may be inclined to engage in sustained introspection over their queer-

[4] "Queer" denotes a gender/sexual identity that does not correspond to heterosexual notions of sexuality and gender.

[5] But see Hopkins and Washington (2020)

phobia after violence against LGBTQ+ individuals.

Our evidence adjudicates between these perspectives and bolsters prior findings consistent with the consequences of racialized state violence. Even in a distinct domain like civilian violence against LGBTQ+ people, the public may adopt prosocial attitudes toward targeted groups, but only briefly.

Third, our analysis contributes to the *focusing event* literature (Birkland, 1998). Prior research shows salient events shift mass attitudes, but briefly since these events eventually lose salience (Sigelman et al., 1997; Birkland and Lawrence, 2009). Additionally, LGBTQ+ politics research demonstrates high-profile pro-LGBTQ+ court cases (Flores, 2015), Pride parades (Ayoub et al., 2021), and celebrities coming out (Miller et al., 2020), can motivate prosocial attitudes toward LGBTQ+ people. But, this research 1) places little emphasis on the sustainability of attitudinal shifts, 2) does not assess event salience variation at the outset, and 3) does not focus on the consequences of violence against LGBTQ+ people, which may *reflect*, instead of *undercut* queerphobic beliefs. We provide new evidence bolstering prior findings on brief attitudinal shifts after "focusing events" in an unexplored domain.

2 Violence and Prosociality

Preexisting theory and evidence demonstrate *direct* or *proximal* (i.e. via close social ties, like family, friends, acquaintances) violence exposure during inter-group conflict may motivate parochialism, encourage intra- but not inter-group altruism, and undercut emotional substrates facilitating inter-group prosocial behaviors and attitudes, including, positive evaluations of outgroups and support for their political rights (Rusch, 2014; Lupu and Peisakhin, 2017; Mironova and Whitt, 2018; Hadzic et al., 2020). Other evidence, building on *Post-Traumatic Growth* and *Altruism Born of Suffering Theory* (Staub and Vollhardt, 2010), shows inter-group violence can motivate prosocial, altruistic attitudes and behaviors toward outgroups (Bakke et al., 2009). Direct or proximal violence exposure may motivate inter-

group prosociality since victimization generates a basis for empathy (Sirin et al., 2021).

Although prior work suggests direct or proximal exposure to inter-group, mostly inter-ethnic, violence motivates prosociality, it is less clear how one-sided[6] *indirect* exposure to violence against LGBTQ+ people influences prosocial attitudes toward LGBTQ+ group members among dominant groups or the mass public. Hereafter, we define prosocial attitudes as positive feelings toward LGBTQ+ group members and policies facilitating their rights.

One expectation is that indirect exposure to one-sided violence may *not* motivate prosocial beliefs. Insufficient media coverage and attention to violent events may not produce agenda-setting effects that mobilize prosocial mass attitudes (Birkland, 1998). Additionally, *Social Identity Theory* (SIT) implies dominant group members garner self-esteem from minority group marginalization (Tajfel and Turner, 1982). Thus, the mass public may garner psychic benefits from indirectly observing violence against minority groups (Cikara et al., 2014). Consistent with *Inter-group Emotions Theory* (IET), these dynamics may be exacerbated by the absence of direct experiences with analogous violence facilitating empathy (Sirin et al., 2021). Moreover, the social distance between modal mass public members and, for example, LGBTQ+ people, may generate an empathy gap, undercutting the adoption of prosocial attitudes after indirect violence exposure (Cikara et al., 2014).[7] Therefore, we may observe an empirical pattern consistent with Figure 1, Panel A, where prosocial attitudes among the mass public toward a marginalized group do not change after indirect exposure to civilian violence against said group.

Another expectation is that, under some conditions, indirect exposure to violence against marginalized groups may motivate prosocial attitudes to ameliorate conditions concomitant with the violence. *Focusing Event Theory* implies salient violent incidents can mobilize mass attitudes (Birkland, 1998). These attitudes may be more likely to be mobilized prosocially if the media and elites express the violence is illegitimate and are sympathetic toward the targeted group (Zaller, 1992; Iyengar, 1994). Indeed, sympathetic messages expressed by

[6] "One-sided" refers to dominant group-perpetrated violence.

[7] For the Pulse massacre, the empathy gap may be amplified by the predominantly Latinx victims.

partisan elites after violence may help socially conservative co-partisans reconsider prejudicial attitudes (Harrison and Michelson, 2017). The media also has a powerful influence on LGBTQ+ mass attitudes. Positive LGBTQ+ media portrayals motivate support for LGBTQ+ rights cross-nationally (Ayoub and Garretson, 2017). Moreover, parasocial LGBTQ+ media contact reduces anti-LGBTQ+ prejudice and increases support for pro-LGBTQ+ policies (Miller et al., 2020).

Likewise, alternative insights from SIT and IET suggest if the mass public feels one-sided civilian violence against marginalized groups is illegitimate, it may reflect poorly on their stigmatizing beliefs, even if minority group marginalization otherwise facilitates self-esteem (Harth et al., 2008). Dominant group or mass public members may emotionally regulate these psychic costs by reacting to violence against marginalized groups with sympathy and/or empathy (Branscombe and Miron, 2004), motivating the downstream adoption of prosocial attitudes toward marginalized groups (Harth et al., 2008). These propositions are consistent with evidence demonstrating empathetic feelings in response to observing LGBTQ+ discrimination elicit support for LGBTQ+ rights (Stotzer, 2009).

Some prior research implies the adoption of prosocial attitudes toward marginalized groups after violence exposure may be durable. The mass public has become increasingly inclusive toward LGBTQ+ community segments over several decades (Flores, 2014), suggesting the public may be durably receptive to sympathetic appeals after violence against LGBTQ+ group members. Indeed, Broockman and Kalla (2016) show a perspective-taking exercise can increase support for transgender anti-discrimination policies up to 3 months. Oskooii et al. (2021) show high-profile institutionalized discrimination against religious minorities can reduce mass support for policies negatively affecting targeted groups up to a year. Therefore, we might observe an empirical pattern consistent with Figure 1, Panel B, where the public adopts increasingly prosocial attitudes after indirect exposure to civilian violence against marginalized groups, and these attitudinal shifts are durable.



Figure 1: Stylized Expectations Concerning the Effect of Violence Against Marginalized Groups on Prosocial Attitudes. Horizontal lines denote prosocial attitudes toward marginalized groups (y-axis) over time (x-axis). The dotted line characterizes violence against a marginalized group.

3 The Fickle Prosocial Violence Response (FPVR) Model

However, we develop and present a *Fickle Prosocial Violence Response* (FPVR) model, which posits perceptibly illegitimate salient civilian violence against marginalized groups can motivate prosocial attitudes toward targeted groups. *But, these attitudinal shifts may be fickle* given reductions in event salience, the dispositional qualities of social group attitudes, and countervailing information in an otherwise discriminatory society.

Issue-Attention Cycle Theory posits the public may react to dramatic events highlighting ignored social issues, like violence against LGBTQ+ group members, in an initially proactive manner. However, attitudinal shifts seeking to resolve a social ill may not be sustainable when it becomes clear resolving the problem is difficult (e.g. reevaluating queerphobic beliefs offering a privileged status) and the problem becomes less salient over time (Downs, 1972). Prior research implies sympathetic media and elite messaging after violence must persist to generate sustainable prosocial responses (Zaller, 1992).

Moreover, prosocial attitudinal responses may be short-term impression management. Illegitimate violence rejected by society, media, and elites may motivate prosocial expressions toward the targeted group among the masses to save face (Harth et al., 2008), but may not result in long-term attitudinal shifts motivated by the difficult task of dismantling hierarchical social relations (Nguyen et al., 2021). Short-term impression management may not be

capable of undermining predispositions toward marginalized groups rooted in pre-adult socialization (Sears, 1993; Kite et al., 2019). Long-term attitudinal shifts may also be undercut by countervailing pressure to adhere to queerphobic norms in an otherwise heteronormative society (Vuletich and Payne, 2019).

Framing theory may also help explain the potential absence of long-term prosocial attitudinal shifts. Story framing affects how the public assigns responsibility to an event and preferred policy and societal responses. Media outlets may adopt episodic or thematic frames in their news coverage. Episodic frames emphasize event-centered information with attention toward an individual's actions (e.g. the violent perpetrator) whereas thematic frames emphasize broader problems (e.g. queerphobia) (Iyengar, 1994). Ott and Aoki (2002) and Zahzah (2019) posit media frames of prominent instances of violence against LGBTQ+ people, such as Matthew Shepard's murder and the Pulse massacre, often emphasize the perpetrator's gratuitous violence instead of societal heteronormativity. These episodic frames may allow mass public members to simply express prosocial attitudes toward LGBTQ+ to absolve oneself of short-term guilt but lose sight of reflecting over their quotidian role facilitating a heteronormative society in the long-term (Ott and Aoki, 2002).[8]

In summary, an observable implication of the theoretical synthesis informing the *FPVR* model is that indirect exposure to *salient* and *sympathetic* messaging from media and elites after violence against LGBTQ+ group members may encourage the adoption of prosocial attitudes toward LGBTQ+ community segments. But, the adoption of prosocial attitudes toward LGBTQ+ group members may not be long-lasting. Therefore, we may observe an empirical pattern consistent with the solid line on Figure 1, Panel C. **H1:** Indirect exposure to civilian violence against LGBTQ+ group members will initially increase prosocial attitudes toward LGBTQ+ group members. **H2:** But, indirect exposure to civilian violence against LGBTQ+ community segments will not produce sustainable increases in prosocial attitudes.

[8]Moreover, if the violence is a mass shooting, conservative outlets, like Fox News, may emphasize gun rights, reducing sustained discussion of violence against LGBTQ+ group members that may motivate long-term prosocial belief adoption (Cassino, 2016).

Prior evidence corroborates the *FPVR* model. High-profile anti-Black police violence increased prosocial attitudes toward Black people, but these attitudinal shifts rebounded to the pre-violence equilibrium within weeks or months (Tuch and Weitzer, 1997; Chudy and Jefferson, 2021; Nguyen et al., 2021). Similarly, Birkland and Lawrence (2009) demonstrate Columbine immediately increased gun control support, but the increase was not sustainable.

3.1 Individual-Level Heterogeneity

Shared Marginalization. *Group Empathy Theory* posits marginalized group members who possess similar discriminatory experiences support each other (Sirin et al., 2021). Cross-group support may be more likely if the discrimination a particular group experiences is perceptibly shared (Cortland et al., 2017). Members of other subjugated groups (e.g. non-whites, women), may perceive similarities between their experiences and those of LGBTQ+ group members, especially with regard to targeted violence. Indeed, the Introduction shows women and non-whites have been historically subject to targeted violence in a conceivably similar manner as LGBTQ+ group members. Thus, group members discriminated against on other dimensions, like race and/or gender, may be more inclined to respond prosocially toward LGBTQ+ group members after indirect exposure to violence against LGBTQ+ community segments.

Political Liberalism. Relative to conservatives and moderates, liberals are less socially conservative concerning sexuality and gender and are more acceptant of marginalized social groups. Indeed, liberals are more favorable toward LGBTQ+ community segments and pro-LGBTQ+ policies (Flores, 2014). Conservatives are more likely to adopt anti-LGBTQ+ beliefs in response to threatening anti-LGBTQ+ elite rhetoric while liberals are resistant to such rhetoric (Górska and Tausch, 2022). Liberals are also more inclined to respond prosocially toward marginalized groups in response to high-profile state violence against said groups, while moderates and conservatives respond relatively apathetically (Reny and Newman, 2021). Therefore, liberals may be more likely than conservatives to adopt prosocial

attitudes toward LGBTQ+ group members in response to violence against LGBTQ+ people.

Geographic Context. Individuals living in areas with a higher composition of LGBTQ+ people may be more likely to come into contact with LGBTQ+ group members and develop relatively strong social ties with LGBTQ+ people (Tadlock et al., 2017). Harrison and Michelson (2019) identify consistent evidence contact with LGBTQ+ group members motivates prosociality toward different LGBTQ+ community segments. Given individuals living in areas with more LGBTQ+ people may be dispositionally favorable toward the LGBTQ+ community (Thompson, 2022), they may be more inclined to adopt prosocial attitudes toward LGBTQ+ community segments after high-profile civilian violence against LGBTQ+ group members. Indeed, prior research shows individuals living in LGBTQ+ geographic contexts resist exogenous anti-LGBTQ+ elite rhetoric (Górska and Tausch, 2022).

In summary, **H3a-c:** indirect exposure to civilian violence against LGBTQ+ group members will be more likely to motivate prosocial attitudes toward LGBTQ+ group members among: **a)** non-whites and women relative to whites and men; **b)** liberals relative to moderates and conservatives; **c)** individuals living in geographic contexts with more LGBTQ+ people relative to those living in contexts with less LGBTQ+ people.

3.2 Event-Level Salience Heterogeneity

The *FPVR* model implies violent events must be sufficiently *salient*, that is, covered by media and paid attention to by the public, to generate attitudinal shifts toward targeted groups (Downs, 1972; Zaller, 1992; Birkland, 1998). Indeed, prior studies demonstrating mass attitudinal shifts after US violent events are analyzing high-profile events (Tuch and Weitzer, 1997; Sigelman et al., 1997; Birkland and Lawrence, 2009; Reny and Newman, 2021). Moreover, prior research informing the *FPVR* model's assumptions suggests attitudinal shifts decay with reduced salience (Tuch and Weitzer, 1997; Birkland and Lawrence, 2009; Chudy and Jefferson, 2021; Nguyen et al., 2021). Importantly, salience *is not binary.* Violent Event A may be more salient than Violent Event B, but less salient than Violent



Figure 2: Fickle Prosocial Violence Response Model

Event C, such that Event A does not sufficiently influence mass attitudes like Event C does. Thus, we may expect to observe an empirical pattern consistent with the dashed line on Figure 1, Panel C. **H4:** Initially more salient instances of civilian violence against LGBTQ+ group members will be more likely to motivate prosocial attitudes toward LGBTQ+ people than initially less salient instances of civilian violence against LGBTQ+ group members.

4 Event 1: The Pulse Massacre

Studies 1-2 evaluate the consequences of the Pulse massacre. The massacre occurred on June 12, 2016 at the Pulse LGBTQ+ nightclub in Orlando, Florida. The massacre was perpetrated by Omar Mateen, who pledged allegiance to ISIS. Mateen killed 49 and injured 53 clubgoers with a semi-automatic rifle.[9] After taking hostages, Mateen was killed by the

[9] https://www.cnn.com/2016/06/12/us/orlando-shooter-omar-mateen/index.html

police. During the massacre, Pulse was hosting "Latin Night." 80% of victims were Latinx.[10]

The nation reacted sympathetically post-massacre. Republican Florida Governor Rick Scott expressed support for those affected while instituting a state of emergency. The Obama administration expressed condolences and ordered federal assistance to the police investigation and the community. In a press conference, Obama described the massacre as an "act of hate." Many on social media, including 2016 presidential election candidates, congresspeople, political figures, foreign leaders, and celebrities expressed condolences.

The massacre was salient. 90% of adults indicated they were closely following the incident immediately post-massacre (Figure A1). A survey during the massacre (June 10-26) suggests the public was aware of the shooting since it expressed more concerns about terrorism and gun violence post-massacre (Figure A4). Media coverage of topics related to Pulse, LGBTQ issues, and terrorism discontinuously increased post-massacre (Figure A2). Google searches related to Pulse, LGBTQ issues, and terrorism peak when the massacre occurs (Figure A3). Media coverage and Google searches related to these topics were either declining or limited pre-massacre, suggesting anticipatory effects are unlikely to drive attitudinal shifts toward LGBTQ+ issues or people post-massacre. However, coverage and searches decline to their pre-incident levels by July, implying salience is fleeting.

The massacre was not simply interpreted as a terror attack, but targeted, illegitimate, anti-LGBTQ+ violence.[11] 70-85% of adults believed the shooting was a hate crime (Figure A5).[12]

Therefore, consistent with the *FPVR* model, the mass public may respond prosocially to the perceptibly illegitimate Pulse massacre given the event's salience and concomitant

[10]The massacre's victims spanned the LGBTQ+ spectrum, but gay men may have been centered in the media post-massacre (Ramirez et al., 2018). Although this might mean the massacre was not interpreted as violence against a broader LGBTQ+ community, this is not a shortcoming with our analysis, but with how society interprets violence against LGBTQ+.

[11]Omar Mateen was not explicitly motivated by anti-LGBTQ attitudes. Mateen randomly targeted nightclubs to inflict mass casualties (see: `https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/what-really-happened-night-pulse-n882571`). However, the mass public *perceived* the massacre as an anti-LGBTQ+ hate crime regardless of Mateen's motive (Figure A5).

[12]See Appendix A.6 and A.10 for details on Figure A5 data.

sympathetic response from both the media and political elites. But, given reduced media coverage and attention to the event over time, attitudinal responses may be short-lived.

4.1 Study 1: TAPS

4.1.1 Data and Design

Study 1 uses The American Panel Survey (TAPS, Wave 55), to assess if exposure to violence against LGBTQ+ people motivates support for policies benefiting LGBTQ+ community segments. TAPS is a monthly online survey administered by the Weidenbaum Center, with national probability sampling conducted by GfK/Knowledge Networks.

The outcome is same-sex marriage support (*SSM support*). SSM is an important LGBTQ+ rights dimension and it implicates multiple LGBTQ+ community segments. Gay, lesbian, and bisexual people who want to marry a same-sex partner benefit from legalized SSM. Transgender people who have not changed their "legal" gender but seek to marry their partner in heterosexual romantic relationships, in addition to transgender people in same-gender relationships, would benefit from legalized SSM.[13] SSM approval is near-unanimous among LGBTQ+ people. 60% of LGBTQ+ people say SSM should be a priority even if it takes attention from other issues.[14] TAPS asks respondents if they "generally support or oppose same-sex marriage," with an option to indicate "no opinion."[15] We measure *SSM support* as a binary indicator equal to 1 if the respondent indicates they support SSM and 0 otherwise.

The independent variable is being interviewed after the Pulse massacre (*post-Pulse*). TAPS was fielded between 06/08/2016-07/08/2016. Pulse occurs on 06/12/2016, allowing us to implement an unexpected-event-during-survey-design (UESD) with TAPS comparing *SSM support* for respondents interviewed pre- and post-Pulse (Muñoz et al., 2020). *Post-Pulse* is a binary indicator equal to 1 if a respondent is interviewed after 06/12/2016. Since we cannot be certain respondents perceived the massacre, the *post-Pulse* coefficient is interpreted as an

[13] `https://transequality.org/issues/resources/marriage-equality-and-transgender-people`
[14] https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/2013/06/13/a-survey-of-lgbt-americans/
[15] See Section B.1 for outcome measurement details.

"intent-to-treat" (ITT) effect. However, Figures A1-A4 suggest the public was attentive to the massacre. Moreover, TAPS respondents are more likely to believe ISIS is an important issue *post-Pulse* (Figure B27), suggesting they "received the treatment" since the massacre's perpetrator pledged fealty to ISIS. If **H1** is supported, the *post-Pulse* coefficient would be *positive*.

In the absence of internal attention checks, we truncate our TAPS sample to those who completed the survey in a "reasonable duration" of time to account for online survey respondent inattentiveness, which may produce low quality responses attenuating associations of interest. See Section B.3.1 for more details and evidence truncation does not affect our empirical conclusions or TAPS' representativeness. After truncation, TAPS contains $N = 1142$ respondents, with 682 (60%) interviewed before Pulse and 460 after (40%).

We demonstrate the *post-Pulse* coefficient is insulated from bias by validating UESD identification assumptions. The first assumption is ignorability. "Treatment" should be independent of potential outcomes conditional on random sampling. Thus, respondents interviewed pre and *post-Pulse* should be compositionally similar. Figure 3, Panel A supports the assumption. Respondents interviewed *post-Pulse* are compositionally similar to respondents interviewed pre-Pulse across 20 baseline covariates except age (see Section B.4 for baseline covariate measurement), a finding consistent with multiple testing.

Excludability is another UESD identification assumption: differences between respondents interviewed pre- and *post-Pulse* should be the sole consequence of the massacre. The "treatment" is not just the massacre, but collateral media attention. However, outside the massacre, there are no punctuated moments of media attention over LGBTQ+ issues or violence against LGBTQ+ people during the month TAPS was fielded (June, Figures A2 and A3), suggesting the absence of simultaneous events motivating pro-LGBTQ+ attitudes.

Additionally, it is unlikely preexisting *SSM support* time trends are driving the result (Muñoz et al., 2020). We subset TAPS to the pre-Pulse period and assess the placebo "effect" of being interviewed after the median pre-treatment date and find null results (Table B4).



Figure 3: *SSM Support* Increases *post-Pulse*. Panel A displays respondent covariate balance pre- and *post-Pulse*. Panel B characterizes the *post-Pulse* effect on *SSM support* with and without covariate adjustment. Panel C displays falsification tests characterizing the unadjusted *post-Pulse* effect on LGBTQ+-irrelevant outcomes. Black coefficients are statistically significant, grey otherwise. Estimates use population weights. All covariates scaled between 0-1. 95% CIs displayed from HC2 robust SEs. See Tables B5, B6, and B7 for regression tables characterizing the coefficients.

4.1.2 Results

Consistent with **H1**, respondents interviewed *post-Pulse* are 13 and 10 percentage points more likely to support SSM without and with covariate adjustment ($p < 0.01$, $p < 0.05$, Figure 3, Panel B). These coefficients are 20-26% of the outcome standard deviation.

Our results are robust. Our findings are likely not driven by secular dynamics outside the massacre. Falsification tests on treatment-irrelevant outcomes such as support for increasing taxes, common core, a citizenship pathway, abortion, the Keystone pipeline, ACA repeal and emission caps are null (Figure 3, Panel C). These tests suggest chance imbalance on age does not implicate balance on policy preferences.[16] Given the close association between socially conservative religious beliefs like abortion restrictionism and SSM opposition (Uecker and Froese, 2019), the null effect of *post-Pulse* on abortion support on Figure 3 Panel C suggests our results are not driven by secular shifts in social conservatism or religiosity.[17] The results

[16]Age imbalance may not induce bias since age is unrelated to *SSM support* in TAPS, so it does not explain *joint* treatment and outcome variation (Table B6).

[17]SSM and abortion support are only moderately correlated (Pearson's $rho = 0.52$), suggesting *SSM support* is explained by other factors, like the Pulse massacre, independent of dispositional religiosity or social conservatism. Religiosity is also constant pre- and *post-Pulse* (Figure 3, Panel A), further suggesting religiosity does not drive our results.



Figure 4: The Influence of Pulse on SSM Support Attenuates Over Time. X-axis is days cut from moment of Pulse massacre after the massacre (with days after intact). Y-axis is the *post-Pulse* coefficient. 95% CIs from robust SEs. See Table B8 for regression table characterizing reported coefficients in this figure. See Section B.8.5 for control covariate coefficients.

are not driven by outcome item non-response since non-response is balanced pre- and post-Pulse (Table B3). The results are not driven by seasonal trends, Pulse's influence is unique to 2016. 3 surveys fielded in June 2012, 2013, and 2017 show the influence of being interviewed after the massacre's calendar day on *SSM support* is null (Figure B31), suggesting no secular dynamics intrinsic to the month of June that could explain our findings (e.g. Pride Month). Our findings are robust to smaller bandwidths less susceptible to secular temporal trends (Figure B32). Finally, given we are deriving intent-to-treat coefficients, we test if *post-Pulse* is heterogeneous by political interest or news consumption. We do not find heterogeneity (Section B.15). This is not concerning since 90% of the public was following the shooting (Figure A1), suggesting high treatment reception regardless of dispositional political or media interest.

4.1.3 Temporal Persistence

We test **H2** by assessing if the influence of Pulse on *SSM support* is temporally durable. We remove observations in the days immediately *post-Pulse* but not after those days, and re-analyze the influence of being surveyed *post-Pulse*. The logic is that respondents interviewed immediately *post-Pulse* may be the most susceptible to shifting attitudes toward LGBTQ+

community segments. Removing them may help us evaluate attitudinal decay by comparing respondents interviewed just before and some days after Pulse. After removing respondents interviewed between 1-10 days *post-Pulse,* the influence of being interviewed *post-Pulse* on *SSM support* is null (Figure 4).[18] Therefore, temporal attenuation is quick relative to prior studies demonstrating attitudinal shifts lasting several months to a year (Broockman and Kalla, 2016; Oskooii et al., 2021). Consistent with **H2**, the initial increase in *SSM support post-Pulse* was not durable.

4.1.4 Individual-Level Heterogeneity

We test **H3a-c** by assessing if the *post-Pulse* coefficient is larger among: a) non-whites relative to whites and women relative to men; b) liberals relative to moderates and conservatives; and c) individuals living in states with a higher proportion of LGBT-identifying people and living in counties with a higher density of same-sex couples relative to individuals who live in areas with less LGBT-identifying people and same-sex couples.[19] Inconsistent with **H3a-c**, *post-Pulse* does not appear heterogeneous by marginalized group membership, liberalism, and LGBTQ+ geographic context (Table B15). These findings suggest the massacre had a *largely homogeneous initial influence on mass attitudes.*

4.2 Study 2: PI S-IAT Data

4.2.1 Data and Design

Study 2 examines if the public adopts positive attitudes toward LGBTQ+ community segments *post-Pulse*. We use Project Implicit (PI) data on US respondents self-selecting into

[18] 1/20 covariates are imbalanced after cutting 2, 4, 6, 14, 16, 21, 22 days *post-Pulse* (Table B18), suggesting Figure 4's results are not driven by imbalance.

[19] We use 2016 Gallup data on over 1 million U.S. respondents to identify the proportion of each state's population identifying as "lesbian, gay, bisexual or transgender." (see: `https://news.gallup.com/poll/201731/lgbt-identification-rises.aspx`) We use 2010 Census data to identify same-sex couple density (the number of same-sex couple households per 1000 households in a county, see: `https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/visualization/lgbt-stats/?topic=SS&showCounties=true#density`). We merge these state and county-level covariates to the TAPS data by using respondent zipcode information.

and completing an internet survey in 2016 asking questions on their explicit and implicit attitudes toward gay people via PI's Sexuality Implicit Association Test (S-IAT, $N = 43,950$).[20] On average, 175 U.S. respondents completed the PI S-IAT survey each day during 2016.[21] For information on S-IAT sample composition and representativeness, see Section C.1.

The outcomes are the S-IAT *D-score*, *straight bias*, and *heterocentrism*. The S-IAT calculates normalized averages of how quickly respondents associate negative/positive attributes to gay/straight people relative to negative/positive attributes to straight/gay people in the form of a *D-score*. The *D-score* ranges from -2-2. Higher values suggest implicit bias against gay people (i.e. associating negative attributes to gay people) (Greenwald and Lai, 2020).[22]

Given indirect measurement, the *D-score* may be less influenced by impression management to be perceived as pro-gay post-massacre (Greenwald and Lai, 2020). Therefore, we can assess relatively quick, negative, emotional responses (i.e. System 2 responses) to gay people in addition to more deliberate evaluations of gay people (i.e. System 1 responses) (Greenwald and Lai, 2020). Although the IAT is not insulated from introspection, the modest correlation between the *D-score* and explicit bias suggests the IAT measures attitudes that are difficult to manipulate. Therefore, the *D-score* is valuable since we can demonstrate even temporary prosocial attitudinal shifts may not be impression management. The *D-score* is well-established and associated with objective covariates characterizing subordination (Ratliff and Smith, 2021).

Heterocentrism and *straight bias* are explicit anti-gay bias measures. *Heterocentrism* is the difference in 10-point feeling thermometers for straight and gay men. *Straight bias* is a 7 point measure from "I strongly prefer gay to straight people" to "I strongly prefer straight to gay people." The *D-score*, *straight bias*, and *heterocentrism* are rescaled between 0-1.

Although *heterocentrism* is explicitly about gay men, and *straight bias* is implicitly about

[20]Data available here: `https://osf.io/yjqmw/`. See `https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/education.html` for Project Implicit information.

[21]We exclude respondents interviewed after 09/08/2016 due to order effects since the S-IAT measurement changes from 188 to 200 trials by cutting a task block at that moment.

[22]See Section C.3 for more *D-score* measurement details.

gay men, the *D-score* captures attitudes toward gay men and lesbians. In effect, the *D-score* implicates gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals (and transgender people in same-gender relationships). Moreover, even if our Study 2 outcomes are limited when it comes to measuring attitudes toward the broader LGBTQ+ community (e.g. transgender people), attitudes toward gay people are correlated with attitudes toward transgender people (Norton and Herek, 2013), which may be pronounced given the massacre affected transgender people.[23] Therefore, our Study 2 outcomes implicate large LGBTQ+ community segments. Given the outcomes characterize negative attitudes, if **H1** is supported, *post-Pulse* should be *negative*.

We use a UESD with the S-IAT to evaluate how anti-gay attitudes shifted *post-Pulse*. Given the large number of individuals taking the S-IAT daily, we estimate the influence of taking the S-IAT *post-Pulse* using respondents taking the S-IAT 5-50 days pre- and post-massacre in addition to the full 2016 sample between January-September.

We validate the UESD ignorability identification assumption. Unlike Study 1, respondents are not sampled, but self-select, into the S-IAT. Therefore, sample composition may shift due to external events or secular trends. We expect respondents surveyed shortly pre- and post-massacre will be compositionally similar. However, respondents may be increasingly dissimilar in samples including respondents taking the survey well before or after the massacre. Figure C34 verifies our expectation. For 5-20 day bandwidth samples (Panels A-D), there is statistical imbalance on respondent characteristics pre- and post-Pulse on 1-2/12 baseline covariates. For 25-50 day bandwidth samples, there is imbalance on 3-7 covariates (Panels E-J). Given the 15 and 20-day bandwidth samples are only imbalanced on race, we prioritize interpreting the influence of *post-Pulse* on anti-gay attitudes using these samples. These findings suggest our coefficient estimates, particularly for the 15 and 20-day bandwidth samples, are relatively insulated from omitted variable bias.[24]

[23] `https://www.advocate.com/crime/2016/6/17/pulse-survivor-stop-being-shady-and-messy-just-love-one-another-video`

[24] Importantly, like Study 1, religiosity is constant pre- and *post-Pulse*, suggesting secular sample composition shifts in social conservatism are not driving our results.



Figure 5: Influence of *post-Pulse* on Anti-Gay Attitudes. The x-axis is the sample bandwidth. The y-axis is the *post-Pulse* coefficient. All covariates rescaled between 0-1. 95% CIs displayed from robust SEs. See Sections C.7.2 and C.7.3 for corresponding regression tables.

4.2.2 Results

Figure 5 displays *post-Pulse* ITT coefficients where the outcome is the *D-score*, *straight bias*, and *heterocentrism*. In the 15 and 20-day sample bandwidth estimates, respondents surveyed *post-Pulse* have a lower *D-score* (-0.01, $p < 0.10$) and *heterocentrism* (-0.01, $p < 0.01$), equivalent to 7% and 8% of the respective outcome standard deviations pre-Pulse. Although small, these coefficients are reasonable, likely underestimated, and substantively important vis-a-vis the target population (see Section C.6).

The massacre does not appear to statistically reduce *straight bias* except in sample bandwidths with higher covariate imbalance (e.g. 25-50 days). Given *straight bias* is highly explicit, the absence of a reliable shift in *straight bias post-Pulse* may be a function of impression management on part of respondents disposed against LGBTQ+ whose attitudes may otherwise shift in favor of LGBTQ+ through indirect bias measurement (Greenwald et al., 1998). In sum, we find additional support for **H1** in Study 2.

We conduct several robustness checks. Preexisting time trends are not driving our results (Section C.8). We rule out if systematic temporal trends near June motivate prosocial attitudes toward gay people other than the massacre (Section C.9). We rule out if our findings are due to a secular attitudinal trend in favor of marginalized groups (Section C.10). We also rule out if respondent self-selection generates sorting bias (Section C.13).



Figure 6: The Influence of *Post-Pulse* on Reducing Anti-Gay Attitudes Attenuates Over Time. X-axis is days cut from moment of Pulse massacre after the massacre (with 15 days after kept intact). Y-axis is the *post-Pulse* coefficient. All estimates from models adjusting for controls. 95% CIs from robust SEs. See Tables C33, C34, C35, and C36 for tables characterizing the displayed coefficients. See Sections C.7.8 and C.7.9 for control coefficients.

4.2.3 Temporal Persistence

We assess if the *D-score* and *heterocentrism* decrease is sustainable. Consistent with **H2**, descriptive statistics suggest anti-gay attitudes decreased *post-Pulse*, but rebounded to pre-Pulse levels around August (Figure C33). We conduct a formal test of the sustainability of attitudinal shifts *post-Pulse* and compare S-IAT respondents surveyed 15 days pre-Pulse to those surveyed 15 days after 1-72 days *post-Pulse* (leaving at least 15 days up to the end of the post-treatment sample in the 2016 S-IAT data). This exercise allows us to compare individuals surveyed prior to Pulse to those surveyed some time away from Pulse at multiple time intervals. Respondents in time intervals that cut more days *post-Pulse* are temporally further from the massacre and potentially more subject to attitudinal decay in pro-gay beliefs. Figure 6 demonstrates the *D-score* and *heterocentrism* decrease was sustained up to 40 days *post-Pulse*. However, after 40 days, *post-Pulse* attenuates toward 0.[25] Although attitudinal shifts last 40 days, these shifts are still much shorter than prior studies demonstrating long-term attitudinal shifts toward marginalized groups after external stimuli (Broockman and

[25] After cutting 40 days *post-Pulse*, there is covariate imbalance, but this does not invalidate Figure 6. After covariate adjustment, the *post-Pulse* coefficients attenuate toward zero, suggesting temporal attenuation occurred *earlier* than our results suggest (Section C.12).

Kalla, 2016; Oskooii et al., 2021). Consistent with **H2**, Study 2 suggests the massacre motivated prosocial beliefs, but not durably.

4.2.4 Individual-Level Heterogeneity

We test **H3a-c** by assessing if the *post-Pulse* coefficient is larger among non-whites, women, liberals, and individuals living in geographic contexts with more LGBTQ+ people.[26] Inconsistent with **H3a-c**, we find the massacre's influence is relatively homogeneous. *Post-pulse* is not stronger for non-whites, women, liberals, or respondents in geographic contexts with more LGBTQ+ people (Tables C50-C51).

4.3 Mitigating Bundled Treatment Concerns

It is unclear if respondents adopted prosocial beliefs toward LGBTQ+ community segments because the Pulse massacre was a terror attack or attack against Latinxs instead of perceptibly anti-LGBTQ+ violence. We mitigate these concerns with several tests and evidence outlined in detail in Section A.12. We summarize these tests and evidence here. First, other terror attacks do not motivate pro-LGBTQ+ beliefs and Pulse did not motivate antipathy toward groups stereotypically associated with radical Islamic organizations, mitigating concerns our results are driven by the massacre being a terror attack. Second, other attacks against Latinxs do not motivate pro-LGBTQ+ beliefs and Pulse did not motivate positive attitudes toward Latinxs, mitigating concerns our results are driven by the massacre being violence against Latinxs. Third, we show the public was disproportionately attentive to LGBT topics *post-Pulse* relative to terrorism- and/or Latino-related topics, implying the public primarily perceived the event as anti-LGBTQ+ violence.

Our tests do not entirely mitigate the bundled treatment problem. Our results may be due to the *combination* of circumstances associated with Pulse. Therefore, we conceptually

[26]Geographic context is measured like Study 1. We use respondent county data in the S-IAT to merge in information on LGBTQ+ geographic context.



Figure 7: Media Coverage of Gay-Related Content in 1998. Panels A/B display the number of NYT/Washington Post gay-related articles (y-axis) by month (x-axis). Panel C displays the number of gay-related articles related to Shepard or anti-gay violence by month. Dashed vertical line denotes the period Shepard is murdered.

replicate Studies 1-2 by assessing the influence of instances of violence against LGBTQ+ group member(s) in Studies 3-4 that were not terror attacks nor attacks against non-whites.

5 Event 2: Matthew Shepard's Murder

Studies 1-2 may not be externally valid. The Pulse massacre is a unique instance of violence against LGBTQ+ people. It is the deadliest instance of violence against LGBTQ+, is the second deadliest mass shooting, has predominantly Latinx victims, was ISIS-inspired terrorism, and occurred after seminal gay rights victories (e.g. same-sex marriage). Therefore, it may be prudent to assess if a distinct instance of violence against LGBTQ+ group member(s) also motivates prosocial beliefs. Consequently, we examine how the murder of Matthew Shepard, a white gay Wyoming college student, by two white men, influenced beliefs toward homosexuality during a more homophobic temporal context.

On October 6, 1998, Shepard was brutally beaten by Aaron McKinney and Russell Henderson. The incident was heavily covered by national media (Loffreda, 2001). Shepard died six days later on October 12. The murder was salient and the nation reacted sympathetically. A bipartisan group of Congresspeople condemned the murder and expressed condolences. A vigil was held outside the US capitol on October 15, where thousands of people, including

current and former Congresspeople and celebrities, paid respects to Shepard. Advocates note Shepard's murder engendered a "seismic shift in attitudes towards the LGBTQ community."[27] Indeed, a decade later, Congress passed the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd Hate Crimes Prevention Act, which expanded the power to prosecute sexuality hate crimes.

On the month of Shepard's murder, the number of gay-related news articles was 150% (NYT) and 172% (WashPo) of the Jan-Sep 1998 average (Figure 7).[28] Consistent with the *FPVR* model, media attention to Shepard's murder was immediately intense but quickly declined, suggesting attitudinal responses may be short-lived.

5.1 Study 3

5.1.1 Data and Design

To evaluate if Shepard's murder decreased anti-gay attitudes, we identify surveys with similar items characterizing attitudes toward gay people shortly before and after Shepard's murder.[29] We identify two representative CNN telephone polls asking respondents if they believe homosexuality is "morally wrong" (*moral wrong*) 4 months before and 2 days after Shepard's death (CNN Jun. 1998, $N = 1016$; CNN Oct. 1998, $N = 1036$).[30] We stack these datasets and identify overlapping controls from each survey.[31] We then compare respondents interviewed after Shepard's murder (*post-Shepard*) to those before to assess if anti-gay violence exposure decreased the belief homosexuality is morally wrong, consistent with **H1**. We focus on surveys with the *moral wrong* outcome for 3 reasons. First, it is asked on three surveys after Shepard's murder (in 1998, 2001, 2004), allowing an assessment of long-term attitudinal shifts. Second, there are multiple pre-Shepard surveys with the same item, allow-

[27] https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/two-decades-after-matthew-shepard-s-death-lgbtq-community-still-n919401

[28] See Appendix D.1 for details on media data.

[29] We use the search terms "homosexuality" OR "homosexual" OR "gay" in Roper iPoll between 1996-2000 to identify gay-related items around Shepard's murder.

[30] We found two other items that could serve as potential candidates for assessing the influence of Shepard's murder on attitudes toward LGBTQ+ group members, however, we do not use them for various reasons that we outline in Section D.4.

[31] See Section D.2 for more details on sampling methodology.

ing placebo tests to rule out if *post-Shepard* effects are due to secular progressive attitudinal trends concerning homosexuality's morality. Third, *moral wrong* implicates large LGBTQ+ community segments. Lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender people may all partake in "homosexual" behavior. Given the outcome characterizes a negative attitude toward LGBTQ+ community segments, the *post-Shepard* coefficient would be *negative* if **H1** is supported.

Our approach has shortcomings we assuage. First, given the absence of auxiliary data on attention to the murder, we cannot be certain respondents "received the treatment." Therefore, we interpret *post-Shepard* as an ITT effect. However, Figure 7 suggests the murder received significant media attention such that it might shift mass attitudes.

Second, given possible differences in sampling between the two surveys, our statistical conclusions may be due to sample composition. Balance tests between the two surveys demonstrate limited baseline covariate imbalance (Figure 8, Panel A), suggesting sample composition may not drive our results.

Third, unlike Studies 1-2, we cannot assess an immediate effect of anti-gay violence exposure even though the two surveys were fielded near Shepard's murder. There are four months between the surveys with the *moral wrong* outcome (Jun.-Oct. 1998). Therefore, our *post-Shepard* estimates may be due to intervening factors or secular progressive time trends. However, there is no anti-gay violence with the level of media coverage Shepard's murder garnered in between the field periods (Figure 7). Crowdsourced evidence suggests the last prominent instance of anti-LGBTQ+ violence prior to Shepard's murder was not between June-October 1998, but on February 1997 (the Otherside Lounge Bombing).[32] Indeed, between June-September 1998, there were *zero* New York Times articles related to anti-gay hate crimes. Conversely, on the month of Shepard's murder (October 1998), there were 17 NYT articles related to anti-gay hate crimes (Figure D39). Two other intervening factors in 1998 may explain our results: 1) President Clinton signing an executive order against sexual orientation discrimination and 2) Tammy Baldwin's House election (the first lesbian

[32]https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_violence_against_LGBT_people_in_the_United_States

congressperson). We provide evidence these events are unlikely explaining our *post-Shepard* coefficient estimates (Section D.10).

Moreover, we rule out if our results are due to secular outcome time trends by conducting a temporal placebo test and demonstrating *moral wrong* levels do not change between Apr. 1997-Jun. 1998 (Figure 8, Panel B).[33] These results suggest prominent pre-study events, such as Ellen DeGeneres' televised coming out in April 1997, are not driving our results. Despite Study 3's shortcomings, we believe the design provides sufficient complementary evidence to Studies 1–2 along with suggestive evidence our theory generalizes beyond Pulse.

5.1.2 Results

Consistent with **H1**, Figure 8, Panel B shows respondents interviewed *post-Shepard* were 10 percentage points less likely to report homosexuality is morally wrong with or without covariate adjustment, 20% of the outcome standard deviation ($p < 0.001$).

We conduct falsification tests on outcomes related to non-LGBTQ+ marginalized groups to rule out secular supportive trends toward marginalized groups driving our results (Figure 8, Panel C).[34] Only 4/18 outcomes are significant and the *post-Shepard* coefficient is not consistently in support of non-LGBTQ+ groups, suggesting no systematic secular trend driving our results (see Section D.7 for more details). Like Study 1, the null effects of *post-Shepard* on abortion support suggest our results are not driven by secular shifts in social conservatism and/or religiosity.

5.1.3 Temporal Persistence

To assess the persistence of attitudinal shifts *post-Shepard*, we identify 6 surveys between 1978-2004 where the *moral wrong* item was asked,[35] allowing us to evaluate trends in the public's belief homosexuality is morally wrong pre- and *post-Shepard*. We do not use the

[33]See Section D.2 for more details on the temporal placebo test.
[34]See Section D.8 for more details on falsification test outcomes.
[35]See Section D.5 for details on the 6 surveys.



Figure 8: Respondents Interviewed *Post-Shepard* Were Less Likely To Believe Homosexuality is Morally Wrong. Panel A characterizes balance between respondents interviewed pre- and post-Shepard's murder. Black coefficients are significant, grey otherwise. Panel B characterizes a) the influence of being interviewed on June 1998 relative to April 1997 on the belief homosexuality is morally wrong (temporal placebo) and b) the influence of being interviewed *post-Shepard* on *moral wrong*. Panel C characterizes falsification tests assessing the influence of *post-Shepard* on non-LGBTQ+ group attitudes. 95% CIs displayed from robust SEs. See Tables D57, D58, D59, and D60 for regression tables on balance tests, the temporal placebo, the *post-Shepard* coefficient estimates, and falsification tests.

CNN June 1998 poll on Figure 9 in our assessment of temporal persistence (see Section D.6 for details as to why).

Figure 9 displays event study estimates comparing *moral wrong* levels in 5 surveys between 1978-2004 to a survey fielded prior to Shepard's murder in 1994. From 1978-1994, belief in *moral wrong* is remarkably stable. Respondents surveyed in 1994 are not statistically distinct from respondents surveyed in 1992 or 1978. Consistent with our initial temporal placebo test, these findings suggest an absence of progressive attitudinal trends toward gay



Figure 9: Belief in *Moral Wrong* is Stable Between 1978-2004 With the Exception of the Moment Shepard Was Murdered. Reference study is the 1994 CNN poll. Color denotes the inclusion/exclusion of controls (age, education, gender, partisanship, race). Shaded estimate denotes Shepard's murder (Oct. 1998). All estimates use survey weights. All covariates scaled between 0-1. See Table D61 for a regression table characterizing this figure. 95% CIs displayed derived from robust SEs.

people prior to Shepard's murder. However, in October 1998, immediately after Shepard's murder, there is a statistically distinguishable decrease in *moral wrong*. But, the mass public's beliefs in *moral wrong* reverse to pre-murder levels by 2001 and 2004. Consistent with **H2**, our results suggest Shepard's murder motivated a decrease in negative beliefs concerning "homosexuals," but this decrease was not sustainable.

5.1.4 Individual-Level Heterogeneity

We test **H3a-b** by assessing if the *post-Shepard* coefficient is stronger among a) non-whites and women and b) Democrats.[36] Given the absence of a) county-level geographic data in the two 1998 CNN polls and b) state-level LGBT population information in the 1990s, we cannot test **H3c**. We find some evidence consistent with **H3a** (Table H73). Although there is no

[36]Data on liberalism is unavailable in the 1998 CNN polls, but Democratic partisanship is an appropriate proxy given its' strong association with liberalism.

post-Shepard heterogeneity by gender, non-whites are less likely to believe homosexuality is morally wrong relative to whites *post-Shepard*. Whites are 7 percentage points less likely to believe homosexuality is morally wrong *post-Shepard* whereas non-whites are 22 percentage points less likely, 44% of the pre-Shepard outcome standard deviation. Likewise, we find evidence supporting **H3b** (Table H73). The *post-Shepard* effect appears driven by Democrats. Democrats are 22 percentage points less likely to believe homosexuality is morally wrong *post-Shepard*, whereas non-Democrats are 2 percentage points less likely.

6 Event 3: The Club Q Massacre

Study 4 mitigates two shortcomings with Studies 1-3. First, Studies 1-3 all analyze initially highly salient events (i.e. high media coverage, attention). However, consistent with **H4** and the *FPVR* model, relatively initially less salient violent events may be less likely to motivate prosocial attitudes toward LGBTQ+ community segments. Study 4 allows us to evaluate the consequences of indirect exposure to a putatively high-profile, but relatively initially less salient, instance of violence against LGBTQ+ group members: the 2022 Club Q massacre. Consequently, Study 4 allows us to test **H4** and broader *FPVR* model implications related to initial event salience. Second, the outcomes in Studies 1-3 do not explicitly reference broader LGBTQ+ segments beyond gays and lesbians (e.g. transgender people). Conversely, Study 4 not only examines the same Study 2 outcomes using the 2022 PI S-IAT survey, but additional outcomes characterizing negative attitudes toward transgender people in the 2022 PI Transgender Implicit Association Test (PI T-IAT) survey.[37] Therefore, Study 4 allows us to examine the consequences of violence against LGBTQ+ group members on mass attitudes explicitly related to transgender people, a small, politicized, population (Lewis et al., 2022).

On November 19, 2022, in Colorado Springs, CO, Anderson Aldrich entered an LGBTQ+ nightclub, Club Q, and killed five clubgoers, including two trans people, while injuring 25

[37]PI started collecting transgender attitude data in 2020 (`https://osf.io/fb29q/`).

others with an AR-15-style rifle.[38] Aldrich was eventually incapacitated by clubgoers and apprehended by police. Evidence suggests the violence was bias-motivated. Aldrich pleaded "no contest" in court to two hate crime charges.[39]

The media and some elites reacted sympathetically to the violence. President Biden and Transportation Secretary Buttigieg immediately expressed condolences.[40] However, unlike the Pulse massacre and Shepard's murder, the elite response was relatively polarized. Buttigieg blamed the shooting on growing Republican anti-LGBTQ+ rhetoric.[41] Tucker Carlson and several right-wing commentators blamed the violence on purported "grooming" activity from LGBTQ+ people.[42] Republican politicians who expressed condolences were criticized for simultaneously engaging in anti-LGBTQ+ rhetoric.[43] LGBTQ+ advocates noted a rise in queerphobic posts across social media platforms post-shooting.[44]

Moreover, relative to Shepard's murder and the Pulse massacre, the Club Q massacre was less salient. First, there were less NYT articles related to the Club Q massacre two months after the event relative to Shepard's murder and the Pulse massacre (Figure E42). Second, regression discontinuity-in-time estimates suggest that although online articles on topics related to mass shootings, the LGBT community, and hate crimes discontinuously increased after Club Q, there were more online articles on topics related to mass shootings and the LGBT community after Pulse (Figures E43-E44, Table E64). Third, Google search data demonstrates there was more attention to mass shootings, LGBT people, and LGBT hate crimes immediately during Pulse relative to immediately during the Club Q massacre

[38] https://www.cnn.com/2022/11/20/us/colorado-springs-shooting-gay-nightclub

[39] https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/club-q-shooter-who-killed-5-gets-life-in-prison

[40] https://www.denver7.com/news/local-news/we-are-devastated-officials-react-to-deadly-mass-shooting-at-club-q-in-colorado-springs

[41] https://www.yahoo.com/video/pete-buttigieg-says-political-attacks-145452238.html

[42] https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/internet/right-wing-influencers-media-double-anti-lgbtq-rhetoric-wake-colorado-rcna58371

[43] https://www.durangoherald.com/articles/lauren-boebert-defends-her-past-anti-lgbtq-and-anti-trans-tweets/

[44] See: https://www.isdglobal.org/digital_dispatches/groomer-discourse-intensifies-and-neo-nazis-celebrate-in-wake-of-colorado-springs-attack/ and see: https://apnews.com/article/technology-shootings-business-social-media-colorado-75a3c597a60dca0f116d5deb6a6c1a6b

(Figure E45). Therefore, consistent with the *FPVR* model and **H4**, although Club Q was relatively high-profile, its' lower-profile status vis-a-vis Pulse and Shepard's murder suggests it may be less likely to initially shift mass attitudes.

6.1 Study 4

6.1.1 Data and Design

We use data on U.S. respondents self-selecting into the 2022 PI S-IAT ($N = 184,824$, 506 daily average respondents) and T-IAT ($N = 85,303$, 233 daily average respondents) surveys. See Section E.1 for information on S-IAT and T-IAT sample composition and representativeness.

The S-IAT outcomes are the same as Study 2's (anti-gay *D-score*, *heterocentrism*, *straight bias*). The three T-IAT outcomes are similar but slightly different. The anti-trans *D-score* is measured by assessing the speed by which respondents associate negative/positive attributes (words) to images of trans/cis celebrities. Higher values suggest respondents associated negative/positive attributes to trans people faster/slower than cis people. *Ciscentrism* measures relative warmth toward cisgender people vis-a-vis trans people. *Cis bias* is a 7-point scale measuring preferences for cisgender relative to trans people. See Section E.2 for more T-IAT outcome measurement details. Prior research finds the T-IAT outcomes are correlated with anti-trans policy preferences (Axt et al., 2021). All outcomes are rescaled between 0-1.

The main independent variable is *post-Club Q*, an indicator equal to 1 if a respondent self-selects into the S-IAT or T-IAT after November 19, 2022. The *post-Club Q* coefficients will be *negative* if prosocial attitudes increase *post-Club Q*.

We implement another UESD, estimating the influence of *post-Club Q* 5-40 days in 5-day intervals post-massacre.[45] We assess covariate balance for these bandwidth samples between respondents taking the S-IAT/T-IAT pre- and *post-Club Q* (Figures E46-E47).[46] Covariate

[45]There are no data after 40 days *post-Club Q* since the 2022 surveys end on December 2022.

[46]Baseline control covariates are measured like Study 2.



Figure 10: Influence of *post-Club Q* on Anti-Gay, Anti-Trans Attitudes. The x-axis is the bandwidth sample (1-40 days). The y-axis is the *post-Club Q* coefficient. Panels characterize different outcomes. The top/bottom 3 panels characterize estimates from the 2022 PI S-IAT/T-IAT data. Black coefficients are from models adjusting for controls, grey otherwise. 95% CIs displayed from HC2 robust SEs. See Tables E65-E66 for regression tables characterizing these estimates.

imbalance increases as sample bandwidth increases, likely due to unobservable secular trends. Therefore, we primarily interpret the 20- and 15-day bandwidth samples in the S-IAT and T-IAT respectively, where there is the least imbalance (4/12 and 1/12 covariates imbalanced respectively).

6.1.2 Results

The *post-Club Q* coefficient is null across all outcomes in the S-IAT/T-IAT 20/15-day bandwidth samples (Figure 10). Although *post-Club Q* coefficients in larger bandwidth samples suggest a decrease in the anti-trans and anti-gay *D-score* (e.g. the 40-day bandwidth samples), these estimates should be viewed skeptically given they possess high covariate imbalance and are more likely to be perturbed by unobservable secular trends (Figures E46-E47).

Consistent with the *FPVR* model and **H4**, less salient violent events like Club Q do not motivate attitudinal shifts like more salient events (e.g. Pulse or Shepard's murder).

6.1.3 Individual-Level Heterogeneity

We test **H3a-c** and assess if the *post-Club Q* coefficient is larger among a) non-whites and women, b) liberals, and c) individuals living in geographic contexts with more LGBTQ+ group members using the 20- and 15-day bandwidth samples for the S-IAT and T-IAT. We find limited heterogeneity across these characteristics (see Tables E67-E68). The only statistically significant heterogeneity we identify is that the *post-Club Q* coefficient is negative and stronger among women for the *Cis Bias* outcome (Table E68). However, we do not identify heterogeneity by gender in the S-IAT data or the other two T-IAT outcomes. Therefore, we interpret the influence of *post-Club Q* as largely homogeneous.

6.2 Evidence From Less Salient Violent Events

A limitation with Study 4 is that, although the Club Q massacre was less salient than Pulse and Shepard's murder, the null results may be due to the arguably more polarized temporal context given the recent rise of Republican anti-LGBTQ+ rhetoric and policies. Anti-LGBTQ+ laws implemented in Republican states (Figure E48) and right-wing anti-LGBTQ+ protests have increased in the past few years (Figure E49). Indeed, prior research shows LGBTQ+ mass attitudes may entrench in polarized contexts (Lewis et al., 2022). The *FPVR* model also corroborates this limitation, since sympathetic responses by bipartisan elites may be necessary to motivate prosocial mass attitudes (Figure 2).

To circumvent this limitation, we use crowdsourced data on less salient violent incidents against LGBTQ+ people between 2010-2022 and evaluate the influence of these events on prosocial attitudes.[47] We demonstrate the incidents outside of those in Studies 1-4 are significantly less salient (Figure F50). We identify 3570, 442, and 358 NYT article hits related

[47] `https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_violence_against_LGBT_people_in_the_United_States`

to the Pulse massacre, Shepard's murder, and the Club Q massacre respectively (Figure F50, Panel C). Conversely, the next most salient violent incident against LGBTQ+ group members between 2010-2022 was Mark Carson's May 2013 murder with 30 hits (Figure F50, Panel B). Consistent with **H4**, other less salient violent incidents against LGBTQ+ group members outside those in Studies 1-4 have largely null effects on mass attitudes toward gay people (Figure F51). The few significant effects are not consistently in the same substantive direction, implying a random, unsystematic, causal process.

7 Limitations and Additional Robustness Checks

Our analyses have limitations. First, one issue with our analytic approach is that we use several distinct outcomes across different time periods while assuming they measure the same concept (i.e. prosocial LGBTQ+ attitudes). We believe this is an advantage since prosocial attitudes towards LGBTQ+ group members are *multidimensional* and not correlated with each other 1-to-1 (Flores, 2014). Moreover, queerness is *fluid* and is simultaneously defined and expressed differently over time (Lewis et al., 2022). Therefore, although the meaning of our outcomes may shift over time, our theory may continue to apply across temporal domains. In sum, our empirical approach helps demonstrate our theory is justifiable and broadly applicable by showing high-profile violence against LGBTQ+ people influences distinct prosocial attitudinal dimensions (e.g. policy preferences *and* affective attitudes toward *distinct* LGBTQ+ community segments) similarly across temporal domains.

Nevertheless, our outcomes capture the same concept. If our outcomes are measuring the same concept despite differences in measurement and temporal domain across studies, they should 1) be highly correlated consistently with each other *across several time periods*, and 2) have similar correlates over time. We show these criteria are met in Section G.

Second, although we provide evidence respondents likely perceived and responded to violence against LGBTQ+ people in a manner consistent with the *FPVR* model, we cannot

be certain respondents "received the treatment." Future research should use designs encouraging stronger treatment reception (e.g. survey experiments) to assess if our analyses underestimate effects and/or temporal persistence. However, unlike designs offering stronger treatment reception, a (tragic) advantage of our design(s) is that they derive effects based on "real-world," externally valid events.

Third, our evidence has not tested all mechanisms consistent with the *FPVR* model's assumptions. Our design is advantageous in that we can assess the effects of violence on prosocial attitudes in an uncontrolled environment with plausible identification assumptions, undercutting demand effects or external invalidity. But, our data were not directly collected to test our hypotheses, making mechanism tests difficult. To the extent we can provide evidence for mechanisms outlined in the *FPVR* model (Figure 2), we show a) initial salience is necessary to motivate prosocial attitudes at the outset, b) declines in salience over time are concomitant with decay in prosocial attitudinal shifts, and c) there is limited support shared marginalization, ideology, and LGBTQ+ geographic context consistently moderates the initial adoption of prosocial attitudes.

Future research should test other *FPVR* model mechanisms (Figure 2). Psychological insights are promising. Violence exposure's influence on prosocial beliefs and their sustainability may be mediated through positive emotional responses toward marginalized groups (e.g. empathy, sympathy, anger, guilt) (Branscombe and Miron, 2004; Harth et al., 2008). Additionally, future research should assess how media frames condition the public's attitudinal responses. During Shepard's murder and Pulse, the media and elites framed the victims sympathetically (instead of unsympathetically). Concomitantly, prior research suggests the media used episodic frames focusing on perpetrator motivations instead of thematic frames emphasizing societal queerphobia (Ott and Aoki, 2002; Zahzah, 2019). It may be prudent to evaluate if framing differences condition prosocial responses and their temporal durability.

Fourth, another limitation is that we only focus on *indirect* exposure to *high-profile* violence. *Direct observation* of smaller-scale quotidian violence against LGBTQ+ group

members (e.g. observing hate crimes, assault, verbal abuse) may have a stronger, durable influence on prosocial beliefs. Future research should explore how different violence exposure types motivate prosocial beliefs.

Fifth, another limitation is that we only explore attitudinal shifts, not behavior. See Section A.11 for reasoning and evidence the lack of emphasis on behavior may not be a shortcoming.

8 Conclusion

We present a *Fickle Prosocial Violence Response* model to explain how indirect exposure to civilian violence against marginalized groups may influence prosocial attitudes toward targeted groups. Across four studies and three events, we provide evidence supporting the model and show indirect civilian violence against LGBTQ+ group members increases prosocial attitudes toward LGBTQ+ community segments. However, these prosocial responses are not temporally sustainable and less salient events do not motivate prosociality at the outset. Our core contribution is that we repeatedly demonstrate indirect exposure to salient civilian violence against marginalized groups may not sustainably undercut negative attitudes toward these groups. The *FPVR* model provides a general framework that can be tested and theoretically built upon in other domains outside anti-LGBTQ+ violence, such as violence against other marginalized groups (e.g. non-whites, immigrants, women).

Interestingly, we find limited individual-level heterogeneity in Studies 1-2 and 4, and some evidence non-whites and Democrats are more likely to adopt prosocial attitudes after Shepard's murder in Study 3.[48] The absence of heterogeneous effects in Studies 1-2 are not necessarily theoretically surprising. The *parallel publics* thesis posits salient events can generate common information exposure and therefore homogeneous attitudinal responses across population subgroups (Page and Shapiro, 2010). Relatedly, there was mainstream agreement among media and elites the Pulse massacre was tragic and reflected illegitimate

[48]We also find limited evidence of heterogenous decay in effects for Studies 1-3 (Section H).

behavior. Thus, messaging associated with the massacre was not a "group cue" that could motivate prosocial responses among some subgroups but not others (Zaller, 1992). Indeed, the effect homogeneity we identify is consistent with prior evidence showing *SSM support* moves in parallel over time across partisan and social subgroups (Coppock, 2023). Study 3's individual-level heterogeneity may be a function of temporal context. Relative to 2016, racial violence was salient in 1998. James Byrd was murdered 4 months before Shepard's murder. The Rampart LAPD scandal was also underway (involving the police beating of Ishmael Jimenez). Therefore, non-whites may have been primed to adopt prosocial attitudes toward groups facing conceivably analogous violence. Likewise, the mass public was less acceptant toward LGBTQ+ people in the 1990s. Therefore, socially conservative Republicans and independents may have been resistant to sympathetic messaging after Shepard's murder relative to liberal Democrats. Finally, Study 4's limited heterogeneity may be due to Club Q's limited salience vis-a-vis Pulse and Shepard's murder.

What would generate temporally sustainable effects? The *FPVR* model suggests sustained media attention may motivate sustained attitudinal shifts (Figure 2). Disturbingly, salient violent event *recurrence* may facilitate sustainable prosocial shifts. Additionally, the *FPVR* model posits elites play a role in making violent incidents salient. Therefore, elites who continue to strategically amplify issues related to a specific event long after occurrence may sustain attitudinal shifts (Zaller, 1992; Birkland, 1998). Moreover, perhaps *direct* or *proximal*, as opposed to *indirect*, violence exposure is necessary to durably shift mass attitudes. Prior work shows direct violence exposure produces temporally sustainable attitudinal/behavioral shifts (Lupu and Peisakhin, 2017; Mironova and Whitt, 2018; Hadzic et al., 2020). Prosocial consequences may also be temporally durable conditional on victim or perpetrator characteristics, and the scale of violence. We leave it to future research to continue to develop new theoretical insights and assess possibilities for durable effects.

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Supplemental Information

A Pulse Context

A.1 Demonstrating Pulse Was Salient



Figure A1: Survey Data Demonstrate the Pulse Massacre Was Salient. Panels A and B display how closely respondents were following the Pulse shooting in a June 2016 CBS and Kaiser poll respectively. Panel B compares attention to Pulse (x-axis) relative to other issues (y-axis). All estimates are population weighted. 95% CIs displayed from 1000 bootstrap simulations. See Section A.6 for more details on Figure A1 polls.

A.2 Media Coverage Over Time



Figure A2: Media Coverage of Topics Related to the Pulse Massacre Over Time. Panels A, C, and E display the count of Pulse-, LGBTQ-, and terrorism-related stories between January-October 2016. Panels B, D, and F display the ratio of Pulse-, LGBTQ-, and terrorism-related stories relative to the total number of stories in digital news. Loess models fit on each side of the moment the massacre occurs. Annotations denote RDiT estimates for the effect of Pulse on the article count and ratio using MSE optimal bandwidth selection (Calonico et al., 2015) (running variable degree = 1). See Appendix A.7 for more details on Figure A2 data.

A.3 Search Behavior Over Time



Figure A3: Search Behavior From Google Trends Demonstrates the Pulse Massacre Was Salient and Unexpected. Panels A, B, and C display the average search intensity for Pulse massacre-, LGBTQ-, and terrorism-related terms between January-October 2016. Vertical lines and annotations denote key events related to respective topics. See Appendix A.9 for more details on Figure A3 data.

A.4 Demonstrating Public Perceived Pulse



Figure A4: The Pulse Massacre Was Perceived by the Mass Public. Panels A-E characterize predicted values of belief country is less safe since 9/11, terror attacks are likely in the future, international terrorism is a critical threat, worry about terrorism, and worry about gun violence respectively. Panel F characterizes the the influence of Pulse (x-axis) on the aforementioned outcomes (y-axis) adjusting and not for imbalanced covariates (black = with controls, grey otherwise, see Figure A6 for balance plot). All covariates rescaled between 0-1. 95% CIs displayed derived from HC2 robust standard errors. Data are from the Chicago Council on Global Affairs Survey (June 10-26). See Section A.8 for more details on Chicago Council data. See also Table A1.

A.5 Demonstrating Public Perceived Massacre as Hate Crime



Figure A5: The Pulse Massacre Was Perceived as Targeted Anti-LGBTQ+ Violence. Panels A and B display beliefs the public felt the shooting was an anti-LGBTQ+ hate crime in a June 2016 CBS poll (Panel A) and July 2016 AP poll (Panel B). All estimates are population weighted.

A.6 Salience Data Details

CBS News June 13-14 Poll is a nationally representative adult survey ($N = 1001$). The poll used a random digit dial methodology. Interviews were conducted in English and Spanish using live interviewers. The data are weighted to reflect U.S. census figures on demographic variables. The margin of error for the weighted data is $\pm$ 4 percentage points. The item of interest on Figure A1, Panel A is: "How closely have you been following news about the recent shooting at a nightclub frequented by gays and lesbians in Orlando, Florida where at least 49 people were killed – very closely, somewhat closely, not too closely, or not at all closely?" The item of interest on Figure A5, Panel A is "Do you think the shooting at the nightclub in Orlando, Florida was (mostly a terrorist act), (mostly a hate crime against people who are gay and lesbian), or both?"

Kaiser Family Foundation June 15-21 Poll is a nationally representative adult survey ($N = 1201$). The poll used a random digit dial methodology. The item of interest on Figure A1, Panel A is: "How closely have you been following news about the recent shooting at a nightclub frequented by gays and lesbians in Orlando, Florida where at least 49 people were killed – very closely, somewhat closely, not too closely, or not at all closely?"

A.7 Media Attention Data Details

We acquired media data on the daily number of web articles related to the topics of interest from Mediacloud's Explorer Search Tool (`https://explorer.mediacloud.org/`) from January 1, 2016 to October 15, 2016 to generate Figure A2. The reason we do not include data after October 15, 2016 in our analyses is because we do not want our analyses to be perturbed by the 2016 election, which increased attention to LGBTQ-related topics due to Trump's anti-LGBTQ positions. The two measures of media attention we evaluate are the *article count* and *article ratio*. The article count is the raw number of web articles including a specific search term(s). The article ratio is the number of web articles including a specific search term(s) normalized over the total number of web articles.

We acquire article count and ratio data on three topics.

1. Pulse-related topics
2. LGBTQ-related topics
3. Terrorism-related topics.

Pulse-related topics are the article count sum and article ratio mean for queries on the terms "orlando massacre," "orlando shooting," "pulse nightclub," "pulse shooting." LGBTQ-related topics are the article count sum and article ratio mean for queries on the terms "anti-gay," "anti-lgbt," "gay marriage," "gay rights," "hate crime," and "same sex marriage." Terrorism-related topics are the article count sum and ratio mean for queries on the terms "isis," "lone wolf," "mass shooting," "terror attack," and "terrorism."

A.8 Chicago Council Study

A.8.1 Data Details

The Chicago Council on Global Affairs Poll is a nationally representative adult survey fielded between June 10-26, 2016 ($N = 2061$). The survey was conducted by GfK Knowledge Networks. The margin of sampling error for the weighted data is $\pm$ 2.4 percentage points. The data are subsetted to respondents who took between 10-60 minutes to complete the roughly 120 item survey ($N = 1704$).

A.8.2 Outcome Items

"Less Safe Since 9/11" Do you think that, as a country, we are more safe, about as safe, or less safe than we were before the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001? 1) More safe, 2) About as safe 3) Less safe. Measured binary = 1 if respondent indicates "less safe."

"Terror Attacks Likely" How likely is it that occasional acts of terrorism in the U.S. will be part of life in the future? 1) Very likely, 2) Somewhat likely, 3) Not very likely, 4) Not at all likely. Re-scaled from 0-1 with 1 = very likely.

"Terrorism = Critical Threat" Below is a list of possible threats to the vital interest of the United States in the next 10 years. For each one, please select whether you see this as a critical threat, an important but not critical threat, or not an important threat at all: International terrorism. 1) Critical threat, 2) Important but not critical threat, 3) Not an important threat. Measured binary = 1 if respondent indicates "critical threat."

"Worried (Terrorism)" Are you very worried, somewhat worried, not very worried or not worried at all that: You or someone you know will be the target of a terrorist attack. 1) Very worried, 2) Somewhat worried, 3) Not very worried, 4) Not at all worried. Re-scaled from 0-1 with 1 = very worried.

"Worried (Gun Violence)" Are you very worried, somewhat worried, not very worried or not worried at all that: You or someone you know will be the target of gun violence. 1) Very worried, 2) Somewhat worried, 3) Not very worried, 4) Not at all worried. Re-scaled from 0-1 with 1 = very worried.

A.8.3 Balance Plot



Figure A6: Covariate Balance for Survey Respondent Characteristics Before and After the Pulse Massacre in the Chicago Council on Global Affairs Survey (June 2016). Black coefficients are statistically significant, grey otherwise. All estimates use post-stratification survey weights to ensure representativeness. All covariates scaled between 0-1. 95% CIs displayed derived from HC2 robust standard errors.

A.8.4 Regression Table

Table A1: The Pulse Massacre Was Perceived by the Mass Public

	Less Safe		Terror Likely		Terror Threat		Worry (Terror)		Worry (Gun Violence)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Post-Pulse	0.10***	0.12***	0.07***	0.08***	0.03	0.05*	0.06***	0.05**	0.03*	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age		0.19*		0.09		0.24**		−0.06		−0.07
		(0.08)		(0.05)		(0.08)		(0.05)		(0.05)
White		0.10**		0.05*		0.01		−0.05**		−0.06**
		(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.02)
Woman		0.03		0.02		0.07**		0.09***		0.09***
		(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)
Child		−0.01		−0.03		−0.09**		−0.01		0.00
		(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.02)
Non-Religious		−0.07		−0.02		−0.14***		−0.08***		−0.03
		(0.04)		(0.02)		(0.04)		(0.02)		(0.02)
Income		−0.09		0.13**		0.23***		−0.02		−0.03
		(0.06)		(0.05)		(0.06)		(0.04)		(0.04)
College		−0.05		−0.03		−0.03		−0.02		0.00
		(0.04)		(0.02)		(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.02)
Unemployed		−0.01		0.01		−0.04		0.01		−0.00
		(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.02)
Rent		−0.02		0.01		0.09**		0.01		0.03
		(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.02)
Liberal		−0.08*		−0.02		−0.02		−0.04		0.03
		(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.02)
Conservative		0.16***		0.04		0.05		0.02		−0.06**
		(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.02)
Urban		−0.02		−0.02		−0.00		0.01		0.02
		(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.02)
State FE	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
R^2	0.01	0.09	0.02	0.10	0.00	0.08	0.01	0.07	0.00	0.08
N	1704	1704	836	836	1415	1415	1693	1693	1696	1696

Note: $^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$. Models 1, 3, 5, 7, 9 do not adjust for control covariates while Models 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10 do. All models use weights for representativeness. HC2 robust standard errors in parentheses.

A.9 Google Trends Data Details

We acquired Google Trends search data at the weekly level from the `gtrendsR` R package. We generate three different search intensity measures capturing interest in the Pulse nightclub shooting, LGBTQ-related issues, and terrorism-related issues. The Pulse-related issue measure is the average of the Google Trends search intensity measures for separate queries on the "pulse nightclub," "pulse shooting," "orlando massacre," and "orlando shooting." The LGBTQ-related issue measure is the average of the Google Trends search intensity measures for separate queries on "gay rights," "gay marriage," "same-sex marriage," "hate crime," "anti-gay," and "anti-lgbt." The terrorism-related issue measure is the average of the Google Trends search intensity measures for separate queries on "terrorism," "terror attack," "lone wolf," "ISIS," and "mass shooting."

The search intensity measure is the number of total searches divided by the total searches of the geography (United States) and time range (January 1, 2016-October 1, 2016) it represents to compare relative popularity. The numbers are scaled on a range of 0-100 based on a topic's proportion to all searches on all topics. For more information see `https://support.google.com/trends/answer/4365533?hl=en`

A.10 Hate Crime Perceptions Data Details

The AP/Black Youth Project July Poll is a nationally representative adult survey ($N = 1940$) fielded between July 9, 2016 and July 12, 2016 The data are weighted to reflect U.S. census figures on demographic variables. The margin of error for the weighted data is $\pm$ 4 percentage points. The item of interest on Figure A5, Panel B is: "You may recall that last month (June 2016), 49 people were shot and killed (and 53 people were injured) by 29-year-old Omar Mateen at Pulse nightclub in Orlando, Florida. From what you remember, do you think the shooting at the nightclub in Orlando, Florida was a terrorist act, a hate crime against people who are gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender, a hate crime against Latinos/Hispanics, or none of the above? Please select all that apply."

A.11 Behavioral Shifts Post-Pulse

One limitation of our main analyses is that we only explore attitudinal shifts, not behavior. Behavioral shifts may not be commensurate with attitudinal changes. However, we do not believe our lack of emphasis on behavior is a shortcoming. The fickle attitudinal shifts we identify are consistent with the *FPVR* model's proposition the mass public may engage in short-term impression management until perceptibly anti-LGBTQ+ violence is no longer salient, making them more comfortable to express their original beliefs, and implying behavioral shifts are unlikely. Nevertheless, we explore if the Pulse massacre motivated pro/anti-LGBTQ+ behaviors and find mixed evidence.

We assess if the Pulse massacre motivated three different pro/anti-LGBTQ+ behaviors: anti-LGBTQ+ hate crimes, donations to Florida-based pro-LGBTQ+ organizations, and blood donations. We find the massacre motivated an increase in anti-LGBTQ+ hate crimes, consistent with prior research suggesting violence has a contagious effect (Section A.11.1) (Towers et al., 2015); no increase in monetary donations to Orlando LGBTQ+-serving organizations (Section A.11.7); and an increase in blood donations for victims (Section A.11.8). These findings suggest the massacre motivated both pro- and anti-social *behavior*, but given we use aggregate data, we cannot determine if this is due to behavioral *changes* or *priming* of those who are predisposed to either be anti-social or pro-social toward LGBTQ+ people. Future research should continue to explore the behavioral consequences of exposure to salient civilian violence against marginalized groups in addition to attitudinal consequences.

A.11.1 Anti-LGBTQ+ Hate Crimes: Details

We evaluate if the Pulse massacre motivated anti-LGBTQ+ hate crimes, consistent with prior research suggesting mass violence may have a contagion or "copy-cat" effect (Towers et al., 2015). To assess trends in hate crimes, we use data from the FBI Uniform Crime Report on hate crimes across the United States at the daily level between January 1, 2016, and December 31, 2016. Importantly, because the Pulse massacre was understood as a terrorist attack not necessarily motivated by anti-LGBTQ+ bias, it was not classified as a hate crime, even though it was perceived by the mass public as an anti-LGBTQ+ hate crime (Figure A5). Therefore, our analyses assessing the effect of the Pulse massacre on hate crimes is not driven by the massacre itself.

Figure A7 displays anti-LGBTQ+ (Panel A), anti-Black (Panel B), anti-Jewish (Panel C), and anti-Latino (Panel D) hate crimes during 2016 at the daily-level over time. The descriptive statistics suggest anti-LGBTQ+ hate crimes increased for a brief period after the Pulse massacre, but not anti-Black, anti-Jewish, and anti-Latino hate crimes.

Regression discontinuity-in-time estimates using the Calonico et al. (2015) optimal bandwidth selection approach corroborates the descriptive statistics (Figure A8). Immediately after Pulse, there's an increase in roughly 2 daily anti-LGBTQ+ hate crimes. However, there is 0 increase in the number of daily anti-Black, anti-Jewish, or anti-Latino hate crimes. These findings are robust to a variety of kernel and polynomial specifications for the running variable (days to Pulse).

The regression discontinuity estimates characterizing are robust. They hold using a variety of bandwidths from 10-100 days (Figure A9), and many of the coefficients are larger than at least 90% of the effects from pre-treatment placebo discontinuities (Figure A10). These effects are also not driven by Pride month, since they do not manifest in years prior to Pulse (2010-2015) or years after Pulse (2017-2019) (Figure A11).

A.11.2 Anti-LGBTQ+ Hate Crimes: Descriptive Statistics



Figure A7: Descriptive Statistics Characterizing Different Hate Crimes Over Time in 2016. The x-axis is the date. The y-axis is the number of hate crimes in a given day. Dashed vertical line denotes the moment the Pulse massacre occurred (June 12). Loess lines fit on each side of the moment the Pulse massacre occurred. Panels A-D display anti-LGBTQ+, anti-Black, anti-Jewish, and anti-Latino hate crimes.

A.11.3 Anti-LGBTQ+ Hate Crimes: RDiT Estimates



Figure A8: Regression Discontinuity-in-Time *Post-Pulse* Coefficient Estimates and Hate Crimes The x-axis is the hate crime type. The y-axis is the *Post-Pulse* coefficient. Color denotes kernel and polynomial degree at use. 95% CIs displayed from robust standard errors.

A.11.4 Anti-LGBTQ+ Hate Crimes: Close to Bandwidth Estimates



Figure A9: Regression Discontinuity-in-Time *Post-Pulse* Coefficient Estimates Using Bandwidths Close to Discontinuity The x-axis is the bandwidth (in days). The y-axis is the *Post-Pulse* coefficient. Each panel denotes the kernel at use and running variable polynomial degree (0-2). 95% CIs displayed from robust standard errors.

A.11.5 Anti-LGBTQ+ Hate Crimes: Pre-Pulse Temporal Placebo



Figure A10: Comparing *Post-Pulse* Coefficient with Temporal Placebo Tests Prior to Pulse The x-axis is the temporal placebo coefficient size. Vertical line denotes true *post-Pulse* coefficient size. Annotation denotes the proportion of placebo coefficients the true coefficient is larger than. Panels denote kernel and polynomial degrees (0-2). 95% CIs displayed from robust standard errors.

A.11.6 Anti-LGBTQ+ Hate Crimes: Other Year Temporal Placebo



Figure A11: Post-June 12 Placebo Tests on Years Prior to and After Pulse. The x-axis denotes the hate crime dataset year (2010-2015, 2017-2019). The y-axis characterizes the RDiT coefficient of a placebo indicator equal to 1 after June 12, the calendar date of the Pulse massacre. Color denotes kernel and polynomial degree at use (0-2). 95% CIs displayed from robust standard errors.

A.11.7 Donations to Pro-LGBTQ+ Organizations



Figure A12: The Pulse Massacre Did Not Motivate A Differential Increase in Donations to Pro-LGBTQ+ Organizations in Florida. The y-axis is the differential effect of Pulse on the logged donations to Florida pro-LGBTQ+ organizations that are a part of the One Orlando Alliance. The x-axis is the time to treatment (tax years 2011-2020). Dashed line denotes *post-Pulse* coefficients. 95% CIs displayed.

To assess if the Pulse massacre motivated support for pro-LGBTQ+ organizations serving the Orlando LGBTQ+ community, we assess if contributions (i.e. donations) to non-profit pro-LGBTQ+ organizations serving Orlando differentially increased relative to other non-profit organizations after the Pulse massacre. We used two different datasets to conduct this assessment. First, we used tax return information on the universe of non-profits that submitted tax returns between 2011-2020 from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).[49] This data includes our outcome of interest, the amount of monetary *contributions* declared in a given tax year (inflation adjusted to 2011 U.S. dollars). We log the contributions outcome (plus 1 to ensure identification, *log(contributions + 1)*). Second, we merged this information with data we collected identifying non-profits who were serving the Orlando LGBTQ+ community and were soliciting monetary support through the One Orlando Alliance, a conglomerate of LGBTQ+ serving organizations in Central Florida that engaged in resource sharing after the Pulse massacre.[50] Consistent with the sample we derived from the IRS data, we only included One Orlando organizations who filed tax returns for each year between 2011-2020 (suggesting they existed across the entire temporal domain of the panel) and were local, not national organizations (e.g. the Human Rights Campaign, ACLU). We exclude national or-

[49]Source: `https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/form-990-series-downloads`
[50]Source: `https://oneorlandoalliance.org/our-history/`

ganizations identified on the One Orlando Alliance member list from the IRS data as well.[51] One Orlando Alliance non-profit organizations are coded 1 if they are a part of the Alliance and 0 otherwise in the IRS data (*alliance*).

Figure A12 displays event study estimates from a synthetic controls approach developed by Xu (2017) characterizing the differential effect of Pulse on One Orlando Alliance organization donation receipts. We use the synthetic controls approach to reweight pre-treatment outcome data from the set of untreated non-profit organizations to generate a counterfactual that satisfies the parallel trends assumption to derive the plausibly causal effect of Pulse on contributions to One Orlando Alliance organizations. The event study demonstrates the effect of Pulse on differential donations to Orlando LGBTQ+-serving organizations is 0, suggesting Pulse did not motivate an increase in donations or contributions to key Orlando LGBTQ+-serving organizations.

[51] See `https://oneorlandoalliance.org/our-members/` for the complete list of One Orlando Alliance affiliated organizations, the organizations included in the sample are: 1) Community Legal Services of Mid Florida, 2) Equality Florida, 3) Family Equality, 4) Hope & Help, 5) Hope Community Center, 6) Legal Aid Society of the Orange County Bar Association, 7) Mental Health Organization of Central Florida, 8) Miracle of Love, 9) Orlando Gay Chorus, 10) Planned Parenthood of Southwest and Central Florida 11) Victim Service Center of Central Florida.

A.11.8 Blood Donations



Figure A13: The Pulse Massacre Increased Search Interest in Donating Blood.

Given we do not possess direct data on blood donations for victims of the Pulse massacre, we use Google Trends data to identify the intensity of search interest in "blood donation" over time for the year 2016. Figure A13 clearly demonstrates search interest in "blood donation" substantially increases during the week of the Pulse massacre, but quickly drops off in the following weeks. Although search interest in "blood donation" may not necessarily translate into real-world behavioral action to donate blood, we are confident that our Google Trends analysis provides a rough proxy of real-world blood donation behavior due to qualitative accounts of blood donation after the Pulse massacre. According to the Orlando Sentinel,[52] Orlando hospitals who took in Pulse massacre victims "never had a shortage of blood and no victim experienced a delay in getting the right type of blood." This is because "Thousands of people began donating blood, throughout Florida and even in other states, starting hours after the June 12 shooting. The donations far exceeded the blood needed for the shooting." Moreover, "In the week after the attack, OneBlood took in 28,000 pints of blood; the agency's average weekly volume is about 18,000 pints...It was the biggest response since the Sept. 11 terror attacks in 2001."

The search intensity measure is the number of total searches concerning blood donations divided by the total searches of the geography (United States) and time range (January 1, 2016-December 31, 2016) it represents to compare relative popularity. The numbers are scaled on a range of 0-100 based on a topic's proportion to all searches on all topics. For more information see `https://support.google.com/trends/answer/4365533?hl=en`

[52]Source: `https://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/pulse-orlando-nightclub-shooting/os-oneblood-ceo-pulse-20160629-story.html`

A.12 Ruling Out Bundled Treatment Concerns With Placebo and Falsification Tests

One potential shortcoming of the two studies (Studies 1, 2) assessing the effects of *post-Pulse* on attitudes toward LGBTQ+ community segments is that the treatment is "bundled" in the sense that the Pulse massacre was perceived by the mass public as not only an anti-LGBTQ+ hate crime, but a terrorist attack in addition to an anti-Latino hate crime. Indeed, a plurality of the mass public perceived the shooting as *both* a terrorist attack and LGBTQ+ hate crime (Figure A5, Panel A). In addition, nearly 20% of the mass public perceived the shooting as a Latino hate crime (Figure A5, Panel B). Therefore, inconsistent with our theory, our findings may be driven by the fact the Pulse massacre was either a terrorist attack or anti-Latino hate crime.

We rule these possibilities out in several ways. First, we assess the effects of two prominent "Islamic" terrorist attacks on attitudes toward LGBTQ+ community segments: the April 2013 Boston bombing and the December 2015 San Bernardino shooting (Gunaratna and Haynal, 2013; Fitzpatrick, 2018). These incidents were highly salient to the mass public. Roughly 80% of the public reported they were following the Boston Bombing closely immediately after the bombing (higher than other salient issue at the moment of the bombing: the Gun Control Debate, Immigration Policy Debate, Texas Fertilizer Explosion, Poison Letters to Obama, Syrian Chemical Weapons, and Flight Delays, see Figure A15). The public also rated the San Bernardino attack the second most important issue or two of 2015, beating the Gay Marriage Decision, the Republican primary, and the Iran Deal (Figure A17). If pro-LGBTQ+ beliefs manifest after these terrorist attacks, then our findings may not be driven primarily by the perception of anti-LGBTQ+ violence, but rather the perception of a terrorist attack motivated by radical beliefs associated with Islam.

Figures A16 and A18 display coefficients characterizing the influence of the Boston bombing and the San Bernardino shooting on the *D-score*, *straight bias*, and *heterocentrism* outcomes using Project Implicit Sexuality IAT data from 2013 and 2015 respectively (5-50 day bandwidths from the moment of the event of interest).[53] With the exception of late-term effects for the *D-score* outcome in the 2015 data assessing the influence of the San Bernardino shooting, these events have had a null influence on the various outcomes of interest. Although the *D-score* appears to decrease after the San Bernardino shooting, *heterocentrism* does not decrease as well in a manner similar to the *post-Pulse* effects. Moreover, the *D-score* decreases 30 days from the San Bernardino shooting, as opposed to just 15 days from the Pulse shooting. Therefore, the results characterizing the effect of the San Bernardino shooting are more likely to be a function of unobserved secular temporal trends unrelated to the shooting relative to the results characterizing the effect of Pulse. Indeed, the samples at use 30 days from the San Bernardino shooting are imbalanced on several covariates, including ideology (Figure A19). Moreover, we provide additional evidence that terror attacks associated with Islam do not systematically motivate pro-gay attitudes. We assess the effect of several Islamic extremist terror attacks between 2009-2020 on the *D-score*, *heterocentrism*, and *straight bias* outcomes. We do not find consistent, systematic evidence that these attacks

[53] All outcomes for the Boston and San Bernardino attack analyses are measured similarly as those in the main text for Study 2. The Boston and San Bernardino attack analyses also adjust for the same covariates outlined in Study 2.

motivated pro-gay attitudes (Figure A20). In the aggregate, these findings imply the fact the Pulse massacre was a terrorist attack inspired by ISIS is not the main channel driving our results.

Second, we demonstrate that the effects are not motivated by negative attitudes toward Muslims/Islam in response to terror attacks associated with extremist Islamic organizations. For instance, the American mass public may seek to distinguish themselves from an Islamic/Muslim ideology that is perceptibly socially conservative on the dimension of sexuality and/or queerness in response to terror attacks (i.e. "pinkwashing," see Meyer (2020)). Consequently, the mass public may adopt prosocial beliefs toward segments of the LGBTQ+ community after the Pulse massacre as a function of concomitant animosity toward Muslims. If this mechanism explains our findings, then we may expect the mass public to adopt negative attitudes and/or behaviors toward Muslims and/or their political rights after the Pulse massacre.

We provide three pieces of evidence this mechanism may not be operative. Relative to respondents interviewed before Pulse, respondents interviewed after Pulse in the Project Implicit Arab IAT data do not adopt negative attitudes toward Arabs (Section C.10), an ethnic group strongly associated with Islam (d'Urso, 2022). In addition, we use two nationally representative ABC News telephone surveys fielded shortly before and after the Pulse massacre to demonstrate members of the mass public interviewed after the Pulse massacre are not more likely to support banning Muslims from entering the United States (i.e. the "Muslim Ban", see Figure A23). Finally, we use day-level hate crime data from the FBI Uniform Crime Report between January 1, 2016-December 31, 2016 to assess if the Pulse massacre motivated anti-Muslim or anti-Arab hate crimes. Behaviorally, the mass public may engage in anti-Muslim or anti-Arab hate crimes in response to terror attacks associated with extremist Islamic/Muslim organizations (Welch, 2006). We assess the discontinuous effect of the Pulse massacre on the daily number of anti-Muslim/anti-Arab hate crimes, and find the Pulse massacre did not result in an increase in anti-Muslim/anti-Arab hate crimes (Figure A24).

These empirical findings suggest our results are not driven by a heightened animosity toward Muslims in response to terror attacks associated with Islam among the mass public. Instead, these findings provide further support for our claim that the mass public perceived the Pulse massacre as an instance of anti-LGBTQ+ violence, and adopted prosocial attitudes toward segments of the LGBTQ+ community accordingly, at least briefly.

Third, we assess the effect of a prominent anti-Latino hate crime on attitudes toward LGBTQ+ community segments: the August 2019 El Paso Shooting (Leander et al., 2020). According to Google Trends, this incident was the most prominent hate crime of 2019, with the exception of the Jussie Smollett debacle in January/February 2019 (Figure A21). Again, if pro-LGBTQ+ beliefs manifest after the 2019 El Paso shooting, then our findings may not be driven via the channel of anti-LGBTQ+ violence, but anti-Latino violence. To assess the influence of the El Paso Shooting on pro-LGBTQ+ beliefs, we use UCLA Nationscape data from the Democracy Fund Voter Study Group (5-50 day bandwidths from the El Paso shooting),[54] a large non-probability survey fielded each week by Lucid between July 2019-February 2021 weighted to national government population estimates.

[54]See `https://www.voterstudygroup.org/data/nationscape` for details



Figure A14: Google Search Intensity Across Different Search Terms. The x-axis is week. The y-axis is relative Google Search intensity between search terms for "LGBT," "terrorism" and "latino". Dashed vertical line denotes the moment of the Pulse massacre.

The outcomes of interest in the Nationscape data are *LGBT unfavorability* (1 = "very unfavorable" or "somewhat unfavorable," 0 = "somewhat favorable," "very favorable," or "haven't heard enough") and *no trans military* (1 = "disagree" to allowing transgender people to serve in the military," 0 = "agree" or "not sure"). Therefore, negative coefficients characterizing being interviewed *after* the 2019 El Paso shooting suggest the mass public is adopting relatively positive attitudes toward LGBT people and the notion trans people may serve in the military.

For bandwidths between 5-50 days before and after the El Paso shooting, we do not find respondents interviewed after the shooting hold more favorable attitudes toward LGBT and the notion trans people may serve in the military (Figure A22). These findings imply the fact the Pulse massacre was an instance of violence against predominantly Latinx people is not the main channel driving our results. Instead, these findings suggest our main results assessing the effect of the Pulse massacre are driven by the perception the event was anti-LGBTQ+ violence.

Moreover, if the massacre motivated prosocial beliefs toward LGBTQ+ community segments because it was also an instance of violence against Latinxs, we may expect the massacre to motivate prosocial beliefs toward Latinxs. However, using an additional unexpected-event-during-survey design with the 2016 General Social Survey, we do not find that the massacre motivated reductions in old-fashioned ethno-racism toward Hispanics (Figure A26), a well-established measure of ethno-racism (Tesler, 2013). We also do not find the massacre increased support for a pathway to citizenship for undocumented immigrants in the TAPS survey (Figure 3, Panel C). A pathway to citizenship disparately benefits Latinxs given two-thirds of Latinxs are either immigrants or children of immigrants. These findings further suggest our results are driven by the fact the massacre was perceived as anti-LGBTQ+ violence, not anti-Latinx violence.

Additionally, we provide evidence that the mass public was particularly attentive to LGBT topics relative to issues related to terrorism or Latinos. Google Trends data shows

that the relative search intensity for "lgbt" was much higher and pronounced the moment of the Pulse massacre than "terrorism" or "latino (Figure A14)." These findings further imply the Pulse massacre primarily motivated prosocial attitudes toward LGBTQ+ community segments through the perception of violence against LGBTQ+ people.

Lastly, our second Event in the main text suggests bundled treatment considerations are moot (i.e. Matthew Shepard's murder). Shepard's murder was unequivocally understood as an anti-gay hate crime by the mass public and political elites. Unlike Pulse, it was not simultaneously a terrorist attack or an instance of violence against Latinx people. Contemporary hate crime laws in the United States are even named after Matthew Shepard. Shepard's murder was not a terror attack nor an attack against a member of a politically non-dominant ethno-racial group. However, we find a similar pattern of results to the Pulse massacre, where positive attitudes toward gay people increase immediately after his murder, but dissipate in the long-run.

A.12.1 Terror Attack: Boston Bombing (2013)



Figure A15: Salience of Boston Bombing. The x-axis the the proportion of respondents following each issue closely, the y-axis is the respective issue. Panel A is data from the April 18 Pew Survey. Panel B is data from the April 25 Pew Survey. 95% CIs displayed from 1000 bootstrap simulations. All estimates use survey population weights.



Figure A16: Influence of Boston Bombing on Anti-Gay Attitudes. The x-axis is the bandwidth (in days) used from the PI S-IAT data. The y-axis is the post-event coefficient. Annotations denote sample size (in thousands) corresponding to each respective coefficient estimate along the bandwidth size. All covariates rescaled between 0-1. 95% CIs displayed from HC2 robust standard errors.

A.12.2 Terror Attack: San Bernardino (2015)



Figure A17: Salience of San Bernardino Shooting. The x-axis the the proportion of respondents indicating each issue was the most important (or two) of 2015, the y-axis is the respective issue. Data are from the NBC/Wall Street Journal December 2015 poll.



Figure A18: Influence of San Bernardino Shooting on Anti-Gay Attitudes. The x-axis is the bandwidth (in days) used from the PI S-IAT data. The y-axis is the post-event coefficient. Annotations denote sample size (in thousands) corresponding to each respective coefficient estimate along the bandwidth size. All covariates rescaled between 0-1. 95% CIs displayed from HC2 robust standard errors.



Figure A19: Balance on IAT Taker Composition Before and After the San Bernardino Shooting. Each panel characterizes covariate balance for different bandwidths (see plot title). The x-axis is the *post-shooting* coefficient derived from separate regression models regressing a baseline covariate (y-axis) on *post-shooting*.

A.12.3 Terror Attack: Other Events



Figure A20: Influence of Other Terror Attacks on Anti-Gay Attitudes. Each panel characterizes the effects of terror attacks on anti-gay attitudes for 15 and 20-day bandwidth samples. The x-axis is the post-attack coefficient, the y-axis is the event. Color denotes outcome at use. Terror attack data are sourced from the following crowdsourced list: `https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Terrorism_in_the_United_States#Islamist_extremism`. PI S-IAT datasets on self-selected U.S. adults are used from each year that each attack occurs within. 95% CIs displayed from robust SEs.

A.12.4 Anti-Latino Attack: El Paso (2019)



Figure A21: Salience of El Paso Shooting As A Hate Crime. The x-axis is the date (in weeks), the y-axis is the Google search hit intensity for "hate crime." From left to right, dashed vertical lines denote Jussie Smollett reporting a hate crime, his indictment for faking the hate crime, and the El Paso shooting.



Figure A22: Influence of El Paso shooting on Anti-LGBTQ+ Attitudes. The x-axis is the bandwidth (in days) used from the Nationscape data. The y-axis is the post-event coefficient. Annotations denote sample size (in thousands) corresponding to each respective coefficient estimate along the bandwidth size. Differences in sample sizes across outcomes are not due to non-random missingness, but rather the random omission of the *no trans military* outcome item in the Nationscape data for respondents in the weekly subsamples. All covariates rescaled between 0-1. 95% CIs displayed from HC2 robust standard errors. All estimates use survey poulation weights.

A.12.5 Muslim Ban Falsification



Figure A23: Influence of Pulse Massacre on Support for Muslim Ban. Panel A characterizes covariate balance between the ABC News May 2016 and ABC News June 2016 surveys. Panel B characterizes the influence of being interviewed in the June 2016 survey on support for the Muslim Ban with and without control covariates (i.e. the balance covariates). All covariates rescaled between 0-1. 95% CIs displayed from HC2 robust standard errors. All estimates use survey poulation weights.

Details: To assess the influence of Pulse on attitudes toward the Muslim Ban, we stacked two different ABC News Telephone Polls fielded shortly before and after the Pulse massacre. The first ABC survey was fielded between May 16-19, 2016 ($N = 1005$), less than one month before the massacre. The second ABC survey was fielded between June 20-23, 2016 ($N = 1001$), just a week after the massacre. The outcome of interest is support for the Muslim Ban. The two surveys ask respondents if they "would support or oppose a temporary ban on Muslims who are not U.S. citizens from entering the United States?" The outcome is coded 1 if the respondent indicates "support, strongly" or "support, somewhat," 0 if the respondent indicates "oppose, somewhat" or "oppose, strongly." We assess the effect of being interviewed *post-Pulse* relative to pre-Pulse. If respondents are inclined to restrict the rights of Muslims *post-Pulse*, then the *post-Pulse* coefficient with respect to the Muslim Ban outcome would be positive. We also adjust for a number of covariates (age, woman, white, college education, income, liberal ideology, Democrat, and state-level indicators for Texas, California, New York, Florida, and Pennsylvania), that we also assess balance for, suggesting that respondents interviewed before and after Pulse in the ABC polls are compositionally similar (Figure A23, Panel A). We do not find evidence respondents interviewed after Pulse are more likely to support the Muslim Ban (Figure A23, Panel B). With or without covariate adjustment, the post-Pulse coefficients being either 0 or near-zero, and statistically insignificant.

A.12.6 Muslim Hate Crime Falsification



Figure A24: Discontinuous Effect of Pulse Massacre on Anti-Muslim/Anti-Arab Hate Crimes. Panel A characterizes daily anti-Muslim/Arab hate crimes over time in 2016. Solid lines are loess models fit to each side of the moment of the Pulse massacre occurs. The dashed vertical line characterizes the moment the Pulse massacre occurs. Panel B characterizes regression discontinuity-in-time (RDiT) coefficient estimates (y-axis) of the effect of the Pulse massacre on anti-Muslim/Arab hate crimes across kernel/polynomial specifications (x-axis). Bandwidth selection is data-driven, mean-squared optimal (see Calonico et al. (2015)). 95% CIs displayed derived from robust SEs.

A.12.7 Latino Old-Fashioned Ethno-Racism: Balance Tests



Figure A25: Balance Tests Between Respondents Interviewed Before and After the Pulse Massacre (GSS '16) The x-axis is the *post-Pulse* coefficient, the y-axis is the balance covariate. Each panel characterizes the bandwidth (5-50 days, then full sample) and sample size for each bandwidth sample. Black coefficients are statistically significant, grey otherwise. All estimates are population-weighted. Data is from the 2016 General Social Survey. 95% CIs displayed derived from robust SEs.

A.12.8 Latino Old-Fashioned Ethno-Racism: Effects of Pulse



Figure A26: Effect of Pulse on Old Fashioned Ethno-Racism (GSS '16). The x-axis is the bandwidth sample at use (in days), the y-axis is the *post-Pulse* coefficient. The outcome for Panel A is a binary indicator if the respondent indicates they favor intermarriage with a Latino for a familial relative, the outcome for Panel B is a binary indicator if the respondent indicates they oppose intermarriage with a Latino for a familial relative. Black coefficients are from models adjusting for age, gender, race, college-education, income, partisanship, and ideology, grey otherwise. Data is from the 2016 General Social Survey. 95% CIs displayed derived from robust SEs.

B Study 1: TAPS

B.1 Outcome Measurement

To measure support for same-sex marriage, we use an item in the June 2016 TAPS survey asking respondents if "you generally support or oppose same-sex marriage." with options to choose: 1) Support; 2) Oppose; and 3) No opinion.

B.2 Manipulation Check



Figure B27: Belief ISIS = Most Important Issue Increases After Pulse. All estimates use post-stratification survey weights to ensure representativeness. All covariates scaled between 0-1. 95% CIs displayed derived from HC2 robust standard errors.

B.3 Insensitivity to Truncation

B.3.1 Discussion

Online survey respondent inattentiveness produces low quality responses that attenuate associations of interest (Read et al., 2021). Attention is critical for question comprehension and retrieval of relevant information from memory to form a judgement (Krosnick and Alwin, 1987). Our design depends upon respondents cognitively making connections between violence against marginalized groups they observe in mass media and their policy preferences implicating said groups. Prior research suggests very quick and very slow survey response times are associated with lower attention and quality responses (Malhotra, 2008; Read et al., 2021). In TAPS, the minimum response time was 3 minutes, insufficient to process a ∼250 item survey. Furthermore, the maximum response time is 34,586 minutes, raising the possibility some respondents were multi-tasking, distracted, or intermittently engaging the survey with low effort. Thus, in the absence of internal attention checks, we truncate the sample to respondents who completed the survey in a "reasonable duration" of time, defined as those who took between 15-60 minutes to complete the survey. Our truncation is consistent with the rule of thumb by Roßmann (2010), who suggest removing respondents below 60% the median completion time.

The final TAPS data contain $N = 1142$ respondents, with 682 (60%) interviewed before Pulse and 460 after (40%). Truncation is unlikely to undercut generalizability. There are limited differences between inattentive and attentive TAPS respondents (Figure B28, Panel A). Additionally, the truncated sample is compositionally similar to the full TAPS sample and the "gold standard" in election studies, the 2016 ANES (Figure B28, Panel B, Table B2). Although our truncation is arbitrary, we follow best practices (Greszki et al., 2015), and show the results are insensitive to using the initial raw data or alternative response time cut-offs for "reasonable duration (Figure B28, Panel C)."[55]

[55]Another benefit of the truncated data is the reduction in imbalance between respondents interviewed before and after the massacre. The truncated sample is imbalanced on 1/20 baseline covariates, whereas the full sample is imbalanced on 3/20 covariates.

B.3.2 Analyses

Table B2: Comparison Between truncated TAPS June '16 Sample and ANES '16 Sample

Covariate	TAPS Jun. '16	ANES '16	Diff.	T-test p-value
Woman	0.51	0.51	0.01	0.73
White	0.78	0.78	0.01	0.71
Age (18-29)	0.20	0.18	0.03	0.03
Age (30-44)	0.24	0.23	0.00	0.76
Age (45-59)	0.29	0.32	-0.02	0.13
Age (60+)	0.26	0.27	-0.01	0.55
College	0.31	0.29	0.02	0.16
Liberal	0.39	0.41	-0.02	0.32
California	0.10	0.09	0.01	0.49
New York	0.05	0.04	0.01	0.36
Florida	0.05	0.06	-0.01	0.22
Pennsylvania	0.05	0.05	-0.00	0.93
Texas	0.07	0.08	-0.01	0.18

Figure B28 displays estimates using different types of data truncation. The x-axis displays the kinds of respondents that are removed. For instance, >15, <60 means that respondents who took more than 15 minutes and less than 60 minutes are included in the sample, and those who took less than 15 minutes and more than 60 minutes are excluded from the sample.

The truncated estimates operate in a manner consistent with the notion that respondents who take the survey either too quickly or too slowly are less attentive. Respondents who take the survey too quickly may not have sufficient time to make cognitive connections between their political context and their expressed attitudes on particular issues. Respondents who take the survey for too long may be intermittently attentive to the survey or are not taking the survey as seriously as they otherwise should, again, undercutting cognitive connections between their politicla context and their expressed attitudes on particular issues (Malhotra, 2008; Read et al., 2021). We find that removing respondents who take too long to take the survey increases the size of the coefficient estimates, consistent with research on how inattention attenuates coefficient estimates. However, we do not find that removing speeders increases the size of the coefficient estimates (for example, respondents who take less than 15 minutes to take the survey, the threshold we use for the results in the main text).

We do not believe this to be a problem, given *most speeders are not engaging in egregious levels of speeding* and true speeders are a *very small proportion of the sample*, which would suggest speeders have an inconsequential effect on coefficient size. In the TAPS data, of the speeding population (that is, those who take the survey in less than 15 minutes), over 80% take the survey in more than 10 minutes. This is fast for a large survey, but not egregiously fast. The other 20% (only 21 respondents), took the survey in less than 10 minutes. Therefore, the number of serious speeders may not be large enough to affect *post-Pulse* coefficient estimates. But, dropping slow respondents based on our cutoff leads to 352 dropped respondents, who may be particularly inattentive to the survey given that the median "slow respondent" took 1421 minutes (24 hours) to respond to the survey.

Regardless, the results are *insensitive to truncation*. Across the different truncated estimates adjusting for controls on Figure B28, 15/16 are statistically significant at $p < 0.10$,



Figure B28: Truncated Estimates. Panel A displays balance between removed respondents (who finished the survey in less than 15 minutes, more than 60) and respondents that were not removed. Panel B displays balance between the full and the truncated sample. Panel C displays coefficients characterizing the influence of *post-Pulse* on *SSM support* based on various samples removing respondents who took more than or less than a particular number of minutes (defined on the x-axis). For Panels A-B, black coefficients are statistically significant, grey otherwise. For Panel C, black coefficients are derived from regression models including baseline control covariates (i.e. the balance covariates), grey coefficients are derived from regression modeels that do not include control covariates.

and 8/16 are statistically significant at $p < 0.05$. Importantly, the results hold without truncating the data at all at $p < 0.10$ (Figure B28, Panel C). The findings on temporal persistence are also the same without truncating the data (Figure B29). In addition, the *post-Pulse* effect may not be biased given the TAPS survey, when weighted, is compositionally similar to the 2016 ANES, the gold standard in representative surveys. Prior evidence suggests the maintenance of a representative sample composition mitigates the prospect for coefficient effect bias after truncating data to attentive respondents (Alvarez et al., 2019).

Moreover, one might think the larger effects sizes we derive using the truncated sample may be due to cognitive difficulties or lifestyle factors. The one difference between the truncated and full sample is that the truncated sample includes *less* youth. Prior work shows younger people are less attentive (Alvarez et al., 2019), but they also tend to be more pro-LGBTQ+, so that should ostensibly attenuate effect estimates from a substantive basis but increase effect estimates from the basis of increasing attention. Likewise, if the problem



Figure B29: The Influence of Pulse on SSM Support Attenuates Over Time (Using Full TAPS Sample).

was cognition, then the truncated sample, which is older, should have smaller effects, given older people tend to be more likely to experience cognitive decline (Murman, 2015). We do not observe smaller effects using the older, truncated sample, suggesting cognitive decline may not bias our coefficient estimates. Therefore, we feel confident our truncation exercise is removing respondents inattentive to survey content.

B.4 Baseline Covariate Measurement

Age is a 4 category index from 0-3 characterizing respondents aged 18-29, 30-44, 45-59, 60+. Scaled between 0-1.

White is a binary indicator equal to 1 if the respondent indicates that "white" is a race they currently identify as.

Woman is a binary indicator equal to 1 if the respondent indicates they are "female" in response to a question asking if they are female or male.

Child is a binary indicator equal to 1 if the respondent indicates they have children in response to an item asking if they have biological or adopted children.

Non-religious is a binary indicator equal to 1 if the respondent indicates they are "not religious" in response to an item asking if they consider themself Christian, Jewish, Muslim, Buddhist, Hindu, or another religion.

Married is a binary indicator equal to 1 if the respondent did not indicate they were divorced, widowed, separated from their partner, or never married.

Income is a 0-5 scale of the respondents self-reported household income from $<$ \$10,000, \$10-29,999, \$30-49,999, \$50-79,999, \$80-99,999, \$100,000 or more. Scaled between 0-1.

College is a binary indicator equal to 1 if the respondent reports the highest level of school they have completed is at or above a bachelor's degree.

Unemployment is a binary indicator equal to 1 if the respondent reports they are not working at a job for pay.

Union is a binary indicator equal to 1 if the respondent reports they or someone in their household is a member of a labor union.

Rent is a binary indicator equal to 1 if the respondent reports they rent when asked if they rent or own their home.

Internet Access is a binary indicator equal to 1 if the respondent reports they have household internet access.

Internet Mode is a binary indicator equal to 1 if the respondent was recruited via an online mechanism instead of mail, call-in, or outbound calls.

Liberal is a binary indicator equal to 1 if the respondent indicates they are "slightly liberal," "liberal," or "very liberal" in addition to indicating that they are "liberal if they had to choose" in an additional question conditional on indicating "don't know" or "moderate" in the initial question.

Metro is a binary indicator equal to 1 if the respondent lives in a zipcode that is a metropolitan area.

State indicators (Florida, Texas, California, New York, Pennsylvania) are equal to 1 if the respondent self-reports they live in the respective states.

B.5 SSM Support By Interview Date



Figure B30: Support for Same Sex Marriage (y-axis) Across Interview Dates (x-axis). Vertical line is the moment the Pulse nightclub shooting occurred. Loess models are fit on each side of the moment the Pulse shooting occurred and are weighted based on the interview date sample size. Larger circles denote more interviews on a given date. All covariates re-scaled between 0-1.

B.6 Outcome Item Non-response Balance

Table B3: Outcome Item Non-response is Balanced Between Pre and Post-Pulse Periods

	SSM Item Non-Response
Post-Pulse	0.008
	(0.005)
R^2	0.003
N	1142

Note: $^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$. HC2 robust standard errors in parentheses.

B.7 Ruling Out Pre-Treatment Time Trends

Table B4: The Effect of Pulse On SSM Support is Not Driven by Pre-Treatment Time Trends

	SSM Support
Post-Pulse Placebo	−0.035
	(0.063)
R^2	0.001
N	679

Note: $^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$. HC2 robust standard errors in parentheses.

B.8 Regression Tables

B.8.1 Balance Plot

Table B5: Balance Plot for TAPS data.

Outcome	Post-Pulse Coef.	SE	p	N
Age	-0.18	0.03	0.00	1142
White	-0.06	0.04	0.17	1142
Woman	0.04	0.05	0.42	1142
Non-religious	0.06	0.04	0.16	1142
Married	0.04	0.03	0.13	1142
Child	-0.06	0.05	0.18	1142
Income	-0.02	0.03	0.48	1142
College	-0.06	0.03	0.07	1140
Unemployment	-0.05	0.05	0.27	1142
Union	0.01	0.03	0.69	1142
Rent	0.04	0.04	0.39	1142
Internet Access	-0.01	0.04	0.79	1142
Internet Mode	0.01	0.05	0.80	1142
Liberal	0.06	0.05	0.18	1142
Metro	0.01	0.04	0.78	1142
Florida	0.01	0.02	0.62	1142
Texas	0.02	0.03	0.56	1142
California	-0.03	0.03	0.18	1142
New York	0.03	0.02	0.17	1142
Pennsylvania	-0.01	0.02	0.66	1142

HC2 robust SEs displayed. Each coefficient is from a separate regression where the outcome is on the left hand side of the linear regression and the *post-Pulse* indicator is on the right hand side of the regression.

B.8.2 Post-Pulse Influence on SSM Support

Table B6: Support for Same Sex Marriage Increases After Pulse

	SSM Support	
	(1)	(2)
Post-Pulse	0.13**	0.10*
	(0.05)	(0.04)
Age		0.02
		(0.07)
White		0.20***
		(0.05)
Woman		0.05
		(0.04)
Non-religious		0.25***
		(0.06)
Married		−0.01
		(0.05)
Child		−0.09
		(0.05)
Income		0.03
		(0.07)
College		0.11**
		(0.04)
Unemployed		−0.03
		(0.05)
Union		−0.05
		(0.05)
Renter		0.03
		(0.06)
Internet Access		−0.02
		(0.05)
Internet Mode		0.01
		(0.04)
Liberal		0.38***
		(0.04)
Metro Area		0.06
		(0.05)
State FE	N	Y
R^2	0.02	0.35
N	1134	1132

Note: $^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$. HC2 robust standard errors in parentheses.

B.8.3 Falsification Tests

Table B7: LGBTQ-Irrelevant Attitudes Do Not Change Post-Pulse

	Increase Taxes	Common Core	Citizen Pathway	Abortion	Build Keystone	Repeal ACA	Cap Emissions
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Post-Pulse	−0.02	0.02	0.01	0.05	−0.02	−0.06	−0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
R^2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
N	1135	1138	1137	1132	1136	1137	1135

Note: $^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$. HC2 robust standard errors in parentheses.

B.8.4 Temporal Persistence

Table B8: Table Characterizing Post-Pulse Coefficients Cutting Days Immediately After the Pulse Massacre

Post-Pulse Coef.	SE	p-value	N	Days Cut	Controls
0.13	0.05	0.01	1111	1	No
0.14	0.05	0.01	1020	2	No
0.15	0.05	0.01	980	3	No
0.15	0.05	0.01	956	4	No
0.17	0.06	0.00	927	5	No
0.16	0.06	0.01	907	6	No
0.16	0.06	0.01	888	7	No
0.17	0.06	0.01	878	8	No
0.14	0.07	0.04	842	9	No
0.09	0.07	0.20	818	10	No
0.04	0.08	0.59	799	11	No
0.05	0.08	0.55	791	12	No
0.03	0.08	0.72	787	13	No
0.01	0.08	0.93	780	14	No
-0.00	0.08	1.00	775	15	No
-0.03	0.08	0.66	762	16	No
0.01	0.09	0.87	753	17	No
0.07	0.09	0.47	744	18	No
0.05	0.09	0.57	737	19	No
0.01	0.10	0.92	725	20	No
0.08	0.11	0.43	717	21	No
0.09	0.12	0.46	708	22	No
0.05	0.14	0.72	701	23	No
-0.10	0.19	0.58	688	24	No
0.10	0.04	0.02	1109	1	Yes
0.12	0.05	0.01	1018	2	Yes
0.13	0.05	0.01	979	3	Yes
0.13	0.05	0.02	955	4	Yes
0.14	0.05	0.01	926	5	Yes
0.15	0.06	0.01	906	6	Yes
0.14	0.06	0.02	887	7	Yes
0.14	0.06	0.02	877	8	Yes
0.12	0.07	0.08	841	9	Yes
0.05	0.06	0.40	817	10	Yes
-0.02	0.06	0.76	798	11	Yes
-0.03	0.06	0.68	790	12	Yes
-0.04	0.06	0.51	786	13	Yes
-0.04	0.06	0.49	779	14	Yes
-0.05	0.07	0.47	774	15	Yes
-0.08	0.07	0.25	761	16	Yes
-0.08	0.08	0.34	752	17	Yes
0.02	0.05	0.71	743	18	Yes
0.01	0.05	0.82	736	19	Yes
0.00	0.06	0.97	724	20	Yes
0.04	0.07	0.51	716	21	Yes
0.07	0.07	0.34	707	22	Yes
0.05	0.07	0.48	700	23	Yes
0.05	0.10	0.58	687	24	Yes

B.8.5 Temporal Persistence (Control Coefficients)

Table B9: Control Coefficients For Models Characterizing Temporal Durability of Post-Pulse Effect (Part 1)

cov_names	est	se	pv	days_out	N
Age	0.02	0.07	0.74	1	1109
White	0.20	0.05	0.00	1	1109
Woman	0.05	0.04	0.22	1	1109
Nonreligious	0.25	0.06	0.00	1	1109
Married	-0.02	0.05	0.71	1	1109
Child	-0.10	0.05	0.05	1	1109
Income	0.02	0.07	0.78	1	1109
College	0.11	0.04	0.00	1	1109
Unemployed	-0.03	0.05	0.48	1	1109
Union	-0.05	0.05	0.36	1	1109
Renter	0.03	0.06	0.67	1	1109
Internet Access	-0.02	0.05	0.72	1	1109
Internet Mode	0.01	0.04	0.89	1	1109
Liberal	0.37	0.04	0.00	1	1109
Metro Area	0.07	0.05	0.18	1	1109
Florida	0.22	0.11	0.05	1	1109
Texas	-0.06	0.07	0.36	1	1109
California	0.16	0.09	0.07	1	1109
New York	0.22	0.08	0.01	1	1109
Pennsylvania	0.03	0.12	0.77	1	1109
Age	0.04	0.08	0.64	2	1018
White	0.20	0.06	0.00	2	1018
Woman	0.04	0.04	0.32	2	1018
Nonreligious	0.24	0.06	0.00	2	1018
Married	-0.01	0.05	0.83	2	1018
Child	-0.08	0.05	0.11	2	1018
Income	0.05	0.08	0.55	2	1018
College	0.11	0.04	0.01	2	1018
Unemployed	-0.02	0.05	0.67	2	1018
Union	-0.05	0.05	0.35	2	1018
Renter	0.05	0.07	0.47	2	1018
Internet Access	-0.04	0.05	0.50	2	1018
Internet Mode	0.00	0.04	0.95	2	1018
Liberal	0.37	0.05	0.00	2	1018
Metro Area	0.08	0.05	0.14	2	1018
Florida	0.18	0.12	0.14	2	1018
Texas	-0.08	0.07	0.29	2	1018
California	0.15	0.10	0.13	2	1018
New York	0.18	0.09	0.04	2	1018
Pennsylvania	0.05	0.13	0.71	2	1018
Age	0.04	0.08	0.62	3	979
White	0.20	0.06	0.00	3	979
Woman	0.04	0.04	0.31	3	979
Nonreligious	0.24	0.07	0.00	3	979
Married	-0.01	0.05	0.80	3	979
Child	-0.08	0.05	0.12	3	979
Income	0.05	0.08	0.54	3	979
College	0.11	0.04	0.01	3	979
Unemployed	-0.02	0.05	0.69	3	979
Union	-0.05	0.06	0.37	3	979
Renter	0.04	0.07	0.51	3	979
Internet Access	-0.04	0.05	0.40	3	979
Internet Mode	0.01	0.04	0.87	3	979
Liberal	0.36	0.05	0.00	3	979
Metro Area	0.07	0.05	0.19	3	979
Florida	0.19	0.13	0.13	3	979
Texas	-0.07	0.08	0.34	3	979
California	0.15	0.10	0.14	3	979
New York	0.17	0.09	0.07	3	979
Pennsylvania	0.02	0.13	0.86	3	979
Age	0.04	0.08	0.64	4	955
White	0.21	0.06	0.00	4	955
Woman	0.05	0.04	0.28	4	955
Nonreligious	0.25	0.07	0.00	4	955
Married	-0.01	0.06	0.79	4	955
Child	-0.08	0.05	0.13	4	955
Income	0.06	0.08	0.48	4	955
College	0.11	0.04	0.01	4	955
Unemployed	-0.02	0.05	0.74	4	955
Union	-0.05	0.06	0.35	4	955
Renter	0.04	0.07	0.51	4	955
Internet Access	-0.05	0.05	0.40	4	955
Internet Mode	0.01	0.04	0.87	4	955
Liberal	0.35	0.05	0.00	4	955
Metro Area	0.07	0.06	0.21	4	955
Florida	0.18	0.13	0.15	4	955
Texas	-0.09	0.08	0.26	4	955
California	0.15	0.10	0.16	4	955
New York	0.17	0.09	0.06	4	955
Pennsylvania	0.02	0.13	0.88	4	955
Age	0.05	0.08	0.52	5	926
White	0.21	0.06	0.00	5	926
Woman	0.06	0.04	0.17	5	926
Nonreligious	0.25	0.07	0.00	5	926
Married	-0.01	0.06	0.89	5	926
Child	-0.07	0.05	0.19	5	926
Income	0.06	0.08	0.48	5	926
College	0.11	0.04	0.01	5	926
Unemployed	-0.01	0.05	0.81	5	926
Union	-0.06	0.06	0.30	5	926
Renter	0.06	0.07	0.37	5	926
Internet Access	-0.04	0.05	0.44	5	926
Internet Mode	0.01	0.04	0.89	5	926
Liberal	0.36	0.05	0.00	5	926
Metro Area	0.07	0.06	0.25	5	926
Florida	0.18	0.13	0.16	5	926
Texas	-0.08	0.08	0.32	5	926
California	0.16	0.10	0.13	5	926
New York	0.16	0.10	0.08	5	926
Pennsylvania	0.00	0.13	0.99	5	926
Age	0.06	0.08	0.47	6	906
White	0.22	0.06	0.00	6	906
Woman	0.07	0.05	0.13	6	906
Nonreligious	0.24	0.07	0.00	6	906
Married	-0.01	0.06	0.82	6	906
Child	-0.07	0.05	0.19	6	906
Income	0.07	0.08	0.41	6	906
College	0.12	0.04	0.01	6	906
Unemployed	-0.01	0.05	0.89	6	906
Union	-0.06	0.06	0.30	6	906
Renter	0.06	0.07	0.42	6	906
Internet Access	-0.04	0.06	0.47	6	906
Internet Mode	0.01	0.04	0.80	6	906
Liberal	0.36	0.05	0.00	6	906
Metro Area	0.06	0.06	0.28	6	906
Florida	0.19	0.13	0.14	6	906
Texas	-0.08	0.08	0.32	6	906
California	0.16	0.11	0.12	6	906
New York	0.17	0.10	0.09	6	906
Pennsylvania	-0.01	0.14	0.95	6	906
Age	0.05	0.08	0.55	7	887
White	0.21	0.06	0.00	7	887
Woman	0.06	0.05	0.19	7	887
Nonreligious	0.24	0.07	0.00	7	887
Married	-0.01	0.06	0.82	7	887
Child	-0.06	0.05	0.27	7	887
Income	0.05	0.08	0.56	7	887
College	0.12	0.04	0.00	7	887
Unemployed	-0.00	0.05	0.95	7	887
Union	-0.07	0.06	0.23	7	887
Renter	0.05	0.07	0.46	7	887
Internet Access	-0.04	0.06	0.53	7	887
Internet Mode	0.02	0.04	0.58	7	887
Liberal	0.36	0.05	0.00	7	887
Metro Area	0.07	0.06	0.24	7	887
Florida	0.19	0.13	0.13	7	887
Texas	-0.07	0.08	0.42	7	887
California	0.16	0.11	0.14	7	887
New York	0.18	0.10	0.06	7	887
Pennsylvania	-0.01	0.14	0.94	7	887
Age	0.05	0.08	0.53	8	877
White	0.21	0.07	0.00	8	877
Woman	0.06	0.05	0.20	8	877
Nonreligious	0.24	0.07	0.00	8	877
Married	-0.02	0.06	0.80	8	877
Child	-0.06	0.06	0.27	8	877
Income	0.04	0.09	0.61	8	877
College	0.12	0.04	0.00	8	877
Unemployed	-0.01	0.05	0.92	8	877
Union	-0.07	0.06	0.22	8	877

Table B10: Control Coefficients For Models Characterizing Temporal Durability of Post-Pulse Effect (Part 2)

cov_names	est	se	pv	days_out	N
Renter	0.05	0.07	0.47	8	877
Internet Access	-0.04	0.06	0.52	8	877
Internet Mode	0.03	0.04	0.55	8	877
Liberal	0.36	0.05	0.00	8	877
Metro Area	0.07	0.06	0.23	8	877
Florida	0.19	0.13	0.14	8	877
Texas	-0.07	0.08	0.41	8	877
California	0.16	0.11	0.14	8	877
New York	0.18	0.10	0.06	8	877
Pennsylvania	-0.01	0.14	0.94	8	877
Age	0.06	0.09	0.49	9	841
White	0.21	0.07	0.00	9	841
Woman	0.08	0.05	0.11	9	841
Nonreligious	0.23	0.07	0.00	9	841
Married	-0.00	0.06	0.99	9	841
Child	-0.07	0.06	0.19	9	841
Income	0.03	0.09	0.70	9	841
College	0.13	0.04	0.00	9	841
Unemployed	-0.00	0.06	0.97	9	841
Union	-0.09	0.06	0.13	9	841
Renter	0.04	0.07	0.56	9	841
Internet Access	-0.04	0.06	0.53	9	841
Internet Mode	0.02	0.04	0.70	9	841
Liberal	0.36	0.05	0.00	9	841
Metro Area	0.05	0.06	0.45	9	841
Florida	0.24	0.13	0.07	9	841
Texas	-0.04	0.08	0.58	9	841
California	0.19	0.11	0.09	9	841
New York	0.20	0.10	0.04	9	841
Pennsylvania	0.00	0.16	0.99	9	841
Age	0.02	0.08	0.84	10	817
White	0.24	0.06	0.00	10	817
Woman	0.06	0.04	0.21	10	817
Nonreligious	0.22	0.08	0.00	10	817
Married	-0.02	0.06	0.72	10	817
Child	-0.09	0.06	0.14	10	817
Income	0.03	0.09	0.76	10	817
College	0.14	0.04	0.00	10	817
Unemployed	0.03	0.05	0.54	10	817
Union	-0.09	0.06	0.13	10	817
Renter	-0.00	0.06	1.00	10	817
Internet Access	0.01	0.05	0.78	10	817
Internet Mode	0.05	0.04	0.23	10	817
Liberal	0.38	0.05	0.00	10	817
Metro Area	0.03	0.06	0.64	10	817
Florida	0.26	0.14	0.05	10	817
Texas	-0.01	0.07	0.89	10	817
California	0.19	0.11	0.10	10	817
New York	0.23	0.09	0.01	10	817
Pennsylvania	0.03	0.16	0.87	10	817
Age	0.03	0.08	0.74	11	798
White	0.24	0.06	0.00	11	798
Woman	0.07	0.04	0.09	11	798
Nonreligious	0.22	0.08	0.00	11	798
Married	-0.03	0.06	0.55	11	798
Child	-0.09	0.06	0.12	11	798
Income	0.05	0.09	0.57	11	798
College	0.13	0.04	0.00	11	798
Unemployed	0.03	0.05	0.62	11	798
Union	-0.06	0.06	0.26	11	798
Renter	0.01	0.07	0.84	11	798
Internet Access	-0.01	0.05	0.85	11	798
Internet Mode	0.05	0.04	0.25	11	798
Liberal	0.39	0.05	0.00	11	798
Metro Area	0.07	0.05	0.19	11	798
Florida	0.23	0.15	0.14	11	798
Texas	-0.02	0.07	0.83	11	798
California	0.19	0.11	0.08	11	798
New York	0.26	0.10	0.01	11	798
Pennsylvania	0.04	0.17	0.81	11	798
Age	0.02	0.08	0.84	12	790
White	0.23	0.06	0.00	12	790
Woman	0.07	0.04	0.10	12	790
Nonreligious	0.22	0.08	0.00	12	790
Married	-0.03	0.06	0.62	12	790
Child	-0.10	0.06	0.09	12	790
Income	0.05	0.09	0.56	12	790
College	0.14	0.04	0.00	12	790
Unemployed	0.02	0.05	0.65	12	790
Union	-0.08	0.06	0.18	12	790
Renter	0.00	0.07	0.99	12	790
Internet Access	-0.01	0.05	0.88	12	790
Internet Mode	0.05	0.04	0.24	12	790
Liberal	0.38	0.05	0.00	12	790
Metro Area	0.07	0.05	0.20	12	790
Florida	0.23	0.16	0.15	12	790
Texas	-0.01	0.07	0.83	12	790
California	0.19	0.11	0.08	12	790
New York	0.26	0.10	0.01	12	790
Pennsylvania	0.05	0.17	0.79	12	790
Age	0.04	0.08	0.57	13	786
White	0.23	0.06	0.00	13	786
Woman	0.07	0.04	0.10	13	786
Nonreligious	0.23	0.08	0.00	13	786
Married	-0.03	0.06	0.62	13	786
Child	-0.12	0.06	0.04	13	786
Income	0.07	0.09	0.44	13	786
College	0.14	0.04	0.00	13	786
Unemployed	0.03	0.05	0.56	13	786
Union	-0.07	0.06	0.24	13	786
Renter	0.02	0.07	0.82	13	786
Internet Access	-0.02	0.05	0.71	13	786
Internet Mode	0.05	0.04	0.26	13	786
Liberal	0.37	0.05	0.00	13	786
Metro Area	0.06	0.05	0.28	13	786
Florida	0.23	0.15	0.14	13	786
Texas	-0.00	0.07	0.97	13	786
California	0.20	0.11	0.06	13	786
New York	0.27	0.10	0.01	13	786
Pennsylvania	0.05	0.17	0.76	13	786
Age	0.04	0.08	0.58	14	779
White	0.24	0.06	0.00	14	779
Woman	0.08	0.04	0.07	14	779
Nonreligious	0.22	0.08	0.00	14	779
Married	-0.03	0.06	0.65	14	779
Child	-0.11	0.06	0.06	14	779
Income	0.07	0.09	0.43	14	779
College	0.14	0.04	0.00	14	779
Unemployed	0.03	0.05	0.63	14	779
Union	-0.06	0.06	0.26	14	779
Renter	0.02	0.07	0.80	14	779
Internet Access	-0.02	0.05	0.75	14	779
Internet Mode	0.04	0.04	0.30	14	779
Liberal	0.38	0.05	0.00	14	779
Metro Area	0.06	0.05	0.26	14	779
Florida	0.22	0.16	0.17	14	779
Texas	-0.00	0.07	0.95	14	779
California	0.20	0.11	0.05	14	779
New York	0.22	0.10	0.04	14	779
Pennsylvania	0.05	0.17	0.78	14	779
Age	0.05	0.08	0.56	15	774
White	0.23	0.07	0.00	15	774
Woman	0.08	0.04	0.07	15	774
Nonreligious	0.23	0.08	0.00	15	774
Married	-0.03	0.06	0.63	15	774
Child	-0.11	0.06	0.05	15	774
Income	0.07	0.09	0.45	15	774
College	0.14	0.04	0.00	15	774
Unemployed	0.02	0.05	0.64	15	774
Union	-0.06	0.06	0.29	15	774
Renter	0.02	0.07	0.81	15	774
Internet Access	-0.02	0.05	0.70	15	774
Internet Mode	0.05	0.04	0.24	15	774
Liberal	0.37	0.05	0.00	15	774
Metro Area	0.06	0.05	0.28	15	774
Florida	0.22	0.16	0.17	15	774
Texas	-0.00	0.07	0.95	15	774
California	0.20	0.11	0.05	15	774
New York	0.20	0.11	0.07	15	774
Pennsylvania	0.05	0.17	0.77	15	774

Table B11: Control Coefficients For Models Characterizing Temporal Durability of Post-Pulse Effect (Part 3)

cov_names	est	se	pv	days_out	N
Age	0.06	0.08	0.46	16	761
White	0.25	0.06	0.00	16	761
Woman	0.08	0.04	0.08	16	761
Nonreligious	0.20	0.07	0.01	16	761
Married	-0.03	0.06	0.57	16	761
Child	-0.09	0.06	0.11	16	761
Income	0.04	0.09	0.65	16	761
College	0.15	0.05	0.00	16	761
Unemployed	0.01	0.06	0.86	16	761
Union	-0.05	0.06	0.39	16	761
Renter	0.03	0.07	0.65	16	761
Internet Access	-0.03	0.05	0.59	16	761
Internet Mode	0.05	0.04	0.24	16	761
Liberal	0.38	0.05	0.00	16	761
Metro Area	0.06	0.06	0.24	16	761
Florida	0.16	0.17	0.34	16	761
Texas	0.00	0.07	0.95	16	761
California	0.22	0.10	0.03	16	761
New York	0.21	0.11	0.06	16	761
Pennsylvania	0.06	0.17	0.72	16	761
Age	0.04	0.08	0.62	17	752
White	0.27	0.06	0.00	17	752
Woman	0.08	0.04	0.08	17	752
Nonreligious	0.21	0.07	0.00	17	752
Married	-0.04	0.06	0.49	17	752
Child	-0.11	0.06	0.07	17	752
Income	0.02	0.09	0.80	17	752
College	0.15	0.05	0.00	17	752
Unemployed	0.01	0.06	0.80	17	752
Union	-0.03	0.06	0.64	17	752
Renter	0.03	0.07	0.73	17	752
Internet Access	-0.02	0.05	0.64	17	752
Internet Mode	0.04	0.04	0.31	17	752
Liberal	0.38	0.05	0.00	17	752
Metro Area	0.05	0.06	0.39	17	752
Florida	0.17	0.17	0.32	17	752
Texas	0.05	0.06	0.38	17	752
California	0.22	0.10	0.03	17	752
New York	0.21	0.11	0.05	17	752
Pennsylvania	0.06	0.17	0.71	17	752
Age	-0.00	0.07	0.98	18	743
White	0.28	0.06	0.00	18	743
Woman	0.09	0.04	0.04	18	743
Nonreligious	0.17	0.06	0.01	18	743
Married	-0.05	0.06	0.36	18	743
Child	-0.15	0.05	0.00	18	743
Income	0.09	0.08	0.26	18	743
College	0.13	0.04	0.00	18	743
Unemployed	0.05	0.05	0.34	18	743
Union	-0.05	0.05	0.36	18	743
Renter	0.01	0.07	0.87	18	743
Internet Access	-0.00	0.05	0.93	18	743
Internet Mode	0.05	0.04	0.25	18	743
Liberal	0.40	0.05	0.00	18	743
Metro Area	0.04	0.05	0.43	18	743
Florida	0.19	0.17	0.25	18	743
Texas	0.08	0.06	0.21	18	743
California	0.29	0.07	0.00	18	743
New York	0.19	0.11	0.09	18	743
Pennsylvania	0.06	0.17	0.73	18	743
Age	0.01	0.07	0.86	19	736
White	0.28	0.06	0.00	19	736
Woman	0.10	0.04	0.02	19	736
Nonreligious	0.18	0.06	0.00	19	736
Married	-0.06	0.06	0.33	19	736
Child	-0.15	0.05	0.01	19	736
Income	0.10	0.08	0.19	19	736
College	0.14	0.04	0.00	19	736
Unemployed	0.04	0.05	0.41	19	736
Union	-0.05	0.05	0.38	19	736
Renter	0.02	0.07	0.75	19	736
Internet Access	0.01	0.05	0.90	19	736
Internet Mode	0.05	0.04	0.19	19	736
Liberal	0.39	0.05	0.00	19	736
Metro Area	0.04	0.05	0.46	19	736
Florida	0.21	0.17	0.22	19	736
Texas	0.08	0.06	0.20	19	736
California	0.29	0.07	0.00	19	736
New York	0.19	0.11	0.09	19	736
Pennsylvania	0.06	0.17	0.73	19	736
Age	0.02	0.07	0.75	20	724
White	0.29	0.06	0.00	20	724
Woman	0.09	0.04	0.03	20	724
Nonreligious	0.16	0.06	0.01	20	724
Married	-0.06	0.06	0.31	20	724
Child	-0.15	0.05	0.01	20	724
Income	0.10	0.08	0.22	20	724
College	0.13	0.04	0.00	20	724
Unemployed	0.03	0.05	0.54	20	724
Union	-0.05	0.05	0.39	20	724
Renter	0.02	0.07	0.76	20	724
Internet Access	0.00	0.05	0.94	20	724
Internet Mode	0.05	0.04	0.24	20	724
Liberal	0.40	0.05	0.00	20	724
Metro Area	0.04	0.06	0.52	20	724
Florida	0.22	0.17	0.21	20	724
Texas	0.09	0.06	0.14	20	724
California	0.31	0.07	0.00	20	724
New York	0.20	0.11	0.08	20	724
Pennsylvania	0.07	0.17	0.70	20	724
Age	0.02	0.07	0.75	21	716
White	0.28	0.06	0.00	21	716
Woman	0.09	0.04	0.03	21	716
Nonreligious	0.15	0.06	0.02	21	716
Married	-0.07	0.06	0.25	21	716
Child	-0.15	0.06	0.01	21	716
Income	0.11	0.08	0.19	21	716
College	0.12	0.04	0.00	21	716
Unemployed	0.03	0.05	0.58	21	716
Union	-0.02	0.06	0.67	21	716
Renter	0.02	0.07	0.79	21	716
Internet Access	0.00	0.05	0.96	21	716
Internet Mode	0.04	0.04	0.28	21	716
Liberal	0.40	0.05	0.00	21	716
Metro Area	0.04	0.06	0.51	21	716
Florida	0.22	0.17	0.21	21	716
Texas	0.09	0.06	0.17	21	716
California	0.31	0.08	0.00	21	716
New York	0.27	0.09	0.00	21	716
Pennsylvania	0.06	0.17	0.73	21	716
Age	0.03	0.07	0.68	22	707
White	0.28	0.06	0.00	22	707
Woman	0.09	0.04	0.03	22	707
Nonreligious	0.15	0.06	0.01	22	707
Married	-0.07	0.06	0.26	22	707
Child	-0.15	0.06	0.01	22	707
Income	0.11	0.08	0.20	22	707
College	0.12	0.04	0.00	22	707
Unemployed	0.02	0.05	0.68	22	707
Union	-0.03	0.06	0.66	22	707
Renter	0.02	0.07	0.81	22	707
Internet Access	0.00	0.05	0.98	22	707
Internet Mode	0.04	0.04	0.33	22	707
Liberal	0.40	0.05	0.00	22	707
Metro Area	0.03	0.06	0.56	22	707
Florida	0.22	0.17	0.22	22	707
Texas	0.10	0.06	0.14	22	707
California	0.31	0.08	0.00	22	707
New York	0.27	0.10	0.00	22	707
Pennsylvania	0.05	0.17	0.78	22	707
Age	0.04	0.07	0.63	23	700
White	0.27	0.06	0.00	23	700
Woman	0.09	0.04	0.03	23	700
Nonreligious	0.14	0.06	0.03	23	700
Married	-0.07	0.06	0.28	23	700
Child	-0.15	0.06	0.01	23	700
Income	0.10	0.08	0.20	23	700
College	0.12	0.04	0.00	23	700
Unemployed	0.02	0.05	0.69	23	700
Union	-0.02	0.06	0.68	23	700

Table B12: Control Coefficients For Models Characterizing Temporal Durability of Post-Pulse Effect (Part 4)

covariates	est	se	pv	daysOut	N
Union	-0.02	0.06	0.68	23	700
Renter	0.02	0.07	0.75	23	700
Internet Access	0.00	0.05	0.97	23	700
Internet Mode	0.04	0.04	0.32	23	700
Liberal	0.41	0.05	0.00	23	700
Metro Area	0.03	0.06	0.56	23	700
Florida	0.22	0.18	0.21	23	700
Texas	0.11	0.06	0.10	23	700
California	0.31	0.08	0.00	23	700
New York	0.27	0.09	0.00	23	700
Pennsylvania	0.02	0.17	0.93	23	700
Age	0.03	0.08	0.70	24	687
White	0.27	0.06	0.00	24	687
Woman	0.09	0.04	0.03	24	687
Nonreligious	0.13	0.07	0.04	24	687
Married	-0.07	0.06	0.25	24	687
Child	-0.14	0.06	0.02	24	687
Income	0.11	0.08	0.20	24	687
College	0.13	0.04	0.01	24	687
Unemployed	0.03	0.05	0.62	24	687
Union	-0.01	0.06	0.83	24	687
Renter	0.02	0.07	0.80	24	687
Internet Access	-0.00	0.05	0.98	24	687
Internet Mode	0.04	0.04	0.36	24	687
Liberal	0.40	0.05	0.00	24	687
Metro Area	0.04	0.06	0.53	24	687
Florida	0.23	0.18	0.20	24	687
Texas	0.10	0.07	0.15	24	687
California	0.31	0.08	0.00	24	687
New York	0.31	0.09	0.00	24	687
Pennsylvania	0.02	0.18	0.90	24	687

B.9 Temporal Placebo Tests



Figure B31: The Effect of Pulse is Unique to 2016. The x-axis is the survey at use. The y-axis is the coefficient for a binary indicator if the respondent was interviewed the calendar day after the Pulse massacre in 2012, 2013, 2016, and 2017 respectively. The outcome for all studies/models is support for same sex marriage. Color denotes the inclusion/exclusion of adjustment for baseline covariates between respondents interviewed before and after the calendar day of the Pulse massacre. All covariates rescaled between 0-1. 95% CIs displayed from HC2 robust standard errors.

B.9.1 Temporal Placebo Test Survey Information

Pew 2012: The 2012 Pew Voter Attitude Survey obtained telephone interviews with a nationally representative sample of $N = 2013$ adults living in the United States. The interviews were conducted by Princeton Survey Research Associates International between June 7, 2012 to June 17, 2012. The margin of sampling error for the complete set of weighted data is $\pm$ 2.6 percentage points. The same sex marriage outcome asks respondents if they "strongly favor, favor, oppose or strongly oppose allowing gays and lesbians to marry legally." The outcome is coded 1 if the respondent indicates strongly favor or favor, 0 otherwise.

CNN 2013: The 2013 CNN poll is a nationally representative survey using landline and cell phone sampling ($N = 1014$). The poll was in the field between June 11, 2013 and June 13, 2013. The same sex marriage outcome asks respondents if they "think marriages between gay and lesbian couples should or should not be recognized by the law as valid, with the same rights as traditional marriages?" The outcome is coded 1 if the respondent indicates gay and lesbian couples should be recognized by the law, and 0 otherwise.

Pew 2017: The 2017 Pew Political Landscape Survey was in the field between June 8, 2017 and June 18, 2017. It is a nationally representative survey of 2504 respondents. Interviews were conducted via landline and cell phone. The survey was conducted by Princeton Survey Research Associates International. The margin of error is $\pm$ 1.6 percentage points. The same sex marriage outcome asks respondents if they "strongly favor, favwor, oppose or strongly oppose allowing gays and lesbians to marry legally." The outcome is coded 1 if the respondent indicates strongly favor or favor, 0 otherwise.

B.10 Alternative Bandwidths

B.11 Ordinal Outcome Re-estimation

Table B13: Findings Are Robust To Using Ordinal Outcome

	SSM Support (Ordinal)	
	(1)	(2)
Post-Pulse	0.102^{*}	$0.068^{\dagger}$
	(0.044)	(0.038)
R^2	0.012	0.351
N	1134	1132
Controls	N	Y

Note: $^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$. All covariates re-scaled between 0-1. HC2 robust standard errors in parentheses.



Figure B32: The Effect of Pulse is Robust to Alternate Bandwidths. The x-axis is the bandwidth (in days) for the pre and post Pulse period. The y-axis is the coefficient for a binary indicator if the respondent was interviewed after the Pulse nightclub shooting. Color denotes the inclusion/exclusion of control covariates adjusting for covariate imbalance between respondents interviewed before and after the Pulse nightclub shooting. Annotations denote sample size for each estimate in addition to the number of imbalanced covariates. All covariates re-scaled between 0-1. 95% CIs displayed from HC2 robust standard errors.

B.12 Insensitivity to Weighting

Table B14: Support for Same Sex Marriage Increases After Pulse (Unweighted Estimates)

	SSM Support	
	(1)	(2)
Post-Pulse	0.07^{*}	$0.05^{\dagger}$
	(0.03)	(0.03)
Age		-0.09^{*}
		(0.04)
White		0.18^{***}
		(0.04)
Woman		0.08^{**}
		(0.03)
Non-religious		0.21^{***}
		(0.03)
Married		-0.01
		(0.03)
Child		-0.08^{*}
		(0.03)
Income		$0.09^{\dagger}$
		(0.05)
College		0.10^{***}
		(0.03)
Unemployed		-0.01
		(0.03)
Union		0.02
		(0.03)
Renter		-0.00
		(0.04)
Internet Access		0.04
		(0.03)
Internet Mode		0.00
		(0.02)
Liberal		0.44^{***}
		(0.03)
Metro Area		0.09^{**}
		(0.03)
R^2	0.00	0.38
N	1134	1132

Note: $^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$. All covariates re-scaled between 0-1. HC2 robust standard errors in parentheses.

B.13 Evaluating Individual-Level Heterogeneity

Table B15: Assessing Heterogeneous Influence of *Post-Pulse* (Study 1)

	SSM Support				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Post-Pulse	0.08	0.14**	0.10	0.11	0.13
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.12)	(0.07)
Post-Pulse x Non-White	0.07				
	(0.10)				
Post-Pulse x Woman		−0.08			
		(0.08)			
Post-Pulse x Liberal			−0.01		
			(0.08)		
Post-Pulse x % LGBTQ (State)				−0.09	
				(0.58)	
Post-Pulse x SS Couple Density					−0.19
					(0.34)
Non-White	−0.24***				
	(0.07)				
Woman	0.05	0.09	0.05	0.05	0.05
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Liberal	0.38***	0.38***	0.38***	0.38***	0.38***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
% LGBT (State)				0.31	
				(0.40)	
SS Couple Per Capita (County)					0.22
					(0.17)
R^2	0.35	0.36	0.35	0.36	0.36
Num. obs.	1132	1132	1132	1132	1132
N Clusters				50	585

Note: ***$p < 0.001$; **$p < 0.01$; *$p < 0.05$. All models adjust for age, white (if not assessing heterogeneity by non-white), woman, religiosity, marital status, parental status, income, college education, unemployed status, union member, renter status, internet access, internet mode, liberal, metropolitan residence and Florida, Texas, California, New York, and Pennsylvania residence. HC2 robust SEs in parentheses but clustered at state and county-level for Models 4-5.

B.14 Evaluating Mechanisms

Table B16: Evaluating Different Mechanisms That Motivate SSM Support Post-Pulse

	SSM Support							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Post-Pulse x Black	0.11							
	(0.12)							
Post-Pulse x Latino		−0.03						
		(0.11)						
Post-Pulse x Woman			−0.09					
			(0.08)					
Post-Pulse x % LGBTQ (State)				−0.02				
				(0.77)				
Post-Pulse x SS Couple Density					−0.20			
					(0.34)			
Post-Pulse x Political Interest						0.03		
						(0.08)		
Post-Pulse x News Freq.							−0.02	
							(0.08)	
Post-Pulse x Liberal								0.01
								(0.08)
R^2	0.37	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.35
N	1132	1132	1132	1132	1132	1132	1132	1132

Note: $^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$. All models are fully specified, this table only presents the interaction between the *post-pulse* indicator and mechanisms that may explain the adoption of SSM support. HC2 robust standard errors in parentheses. SEs in Models 4, 5 are clustered at the state and county-level respectively. All variables are scaled between 0-1. All estimates are population-weighted.

B.15 Heterogeneity By Political Interest and Media Consumption

B.15.1 Measurement of Political Interest and Media Consumption

Political Interest: How interested would you say you are in politics and current affairs? 1) very interested, 2) somewhat interested, 3) not very interested, 4) not at all interested. Coded as a binary indicator equal to 1 if respondent puts "very interested," 0 otherwise (45% say "very interested," 55% say otherwise).

News Consumption: How frequently do you pay attention to news about national and international issues? 1) every day, 2) several times a week, 3) once a week, 4) several times a month, 5) once a month, 6) less often, 7) never. Coded as a binary indicator equal to 1 if respondent puts "every day," 0 otherwise (59% say "every day", 41% say otherwise).

Interest Scale: The *interest scale* is an additive index from 0-2 of the news consumption and *political interest* measures discussed above (0 = 32% of the sample, 1 = 32% of the sample, 2 = 36% of the sample).

B.15.2 Results

Table B17: Evaluating Heterogenous Influence of Post-Pulse Conditional on Political Interest and News Consumption

	SSM Support					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Post-Pulse x Political Interest	0.00	0.03				
	(0.09)	(0.08)				
Post-Pulse x News Consumption			−0.11	−0.02		
			(0.09)	(0.08)		
Post-Pulse x Interest Scale					−0.04	0.00
					(0.06)	(0.05)
Controls	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
R^2	0.02	0.36	0.03	0.36	0.02	0.36
N	1134	1132	1134	1132	1134	1132

Note: $^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$. Models alternate between excluding/including control covariates. This table only presents the interaction between the *post-pulse* indicator and *political interest*, *news consumption*, and the *interest scale*. HC2 robust standard errors in parentheses. All covariates are scaled between 0-1. All estimates are population-weighted.

Here we assess the heterogenous influence of being interviewed *post-Pulse* on *SSM support* among TAPS respondents conditional on political interest and news consumption. We conduct this test to assess if those who are attuned to media and politics are differentially more likely to support the rights of segments of the LGBTQ+ community in response to exposure to violence against LGBTQ+ (Reny and Newman, 2021).

Table B17 demonstrates that the influence of being interviewed *post-Pulse* on *SSM support* is not heterogeneous with respect to *political interest*, *news consumption* levels, or the *interest scale*.

We do not think the absence of heterogeneity poses a problem for the validity of our results. Consistent with prior research, the *political interest* and *news consumption* measures capture a *general* disposition towards consuming media and politics that is relatively stable (Prior, 2010). But that general disposition may be abrogated in the context of high-salience events. This is to say, even those segments of the mass public who do not necessarily pay attention to salient political/media events may have internalized information about the Pulse massacre. This is corroborated by our evidence on Figure A1, which demonstrates that 86% (Kaiser Poll, June 15-21, 2016) to 89% (CBS News Poll, June 13-14, 2016) of the mass public was closely following the shooting. Therefore, nearly all of the mass public was closely following the Pulse massacre, implying high levels of potential treatment reception regardless of one's generalized *political interest* or level of *news consumption*.

B.16 Balance Tests After Removing Days After Pulse Event

Table B18: Covariate Balance Tests After Cutting Days Immediately After Pulse Massacre

Days Cut	# Imbalanced Covariates (out of 20)	Imbalanced Covariates
1	2/20	Age, College
2	1/20	Age
3	2/20	Age, Child
4	1/20	Age
5	2/20	Age, Child
6	1/20	Age
7	2/20	Age, College
8	2/20	Age, College
9	3/20	Age, Married, College
10	3/20	Age, Child, College
11	3/20	Age, Child, College
12	2/20	Age, College
13	3/20	Age, Child, College
14	1/20	Age
15	2/20	Age, Child
16	1/20	Age
17	2/20	Age, Metro
18	3/20	Age, Married, Metro
19	2/20	Age, Married
20	2/20	Union, Internet Access
21	1/20	Internet Access
22	1/20	Internet Access
23	3/20	Married, Internet Access, Florida
24	5/20	Non-religious, College, Internet Access, Florida, California

B.17 Heterogeneity by Conservatism

B.17.1 Full Sample

Table B19: Heterogenous Effect of *Post-Pulse* on *SSM Support* Conditional on Conservatism

	SSM Support	
	(1)	(2)
Post-Pulse x Conservative	0.01	0.00
	(0.09)	(0.08)
Post-Pulse	0.10	0.10†
	(0.06)	(0.06)
Age		0.02
		(0.07)
White		0.20***
		(0.05)
Woman		0.04
		(0.04)
Non-religious		0.24***
		(0.06)
Married		−0.02
		(0.05)
Child		−0.09†
		(0.05)
Income		0.06
		(0.07)
College		0.11**
		(0.04)
Unemployed		−0.03
		(0.05)
Union		−0.05
		(0.05)
Renter		0.01
		(0.06)
Internet Access		−0.03
		(0.05)
Internet Mode		0.02
		(0.04)
Conservative	−0.39***	−0.15*
	(0.05)	(0.06)
Liberal		0.28***
		(0.06)
Metro Area		0.05
		(0.05)
R^2	0.16	0.37
N	1134	1132

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$

B.17.2 After Cutting Days Immediately *Post-Pulse*

Table B20: Heterogenous Effects of *Post-Pulse* Conditional on Conservatism For Different Samples Where Days *Post-Pulse* Are Cut

Variable	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Days Cut	N	Controls
Post-Pulse	0.02	0.08	0.85	10	817	Yes
Post-Pulse x Conservative	0.10	0.13	0.44	10	817	Yes
Post-Pulse	-0.03	0.08	0.69	11	798	Yes
Post-Pulse x Conservative	0.04	0.12	0.75	11	798	Yes
Post-Pulse	-0.05	0.08	0.53	12	790	Yes
Post-Pulse x Conservative	0.08	0.12	0.51	12	790	Yes
Post-Pulse	-0.07	0.08	0.39	13	786	Yes
Post-Pulse x Conservative	0.09	0.12	0.46	13	786	Yes
Post-Pulse	-0.08	0.09	0.38	14	779	Yes
Post-Pulse x Conservative	0.09	0.12	0.46	14	779	Yes
Post-Pulse	-0.09	0.09	0.33	15	774	Yes
Post-Pulse x Conservative	0.11	0.13	0.39	15	774	Yes
Post-Pulse	-0.11	0.09	0.23	16	761	Yes
Post-Pulse x Conservative	0.06	0.13	0.64	16	761	Yes
Post-Pulse	-0.09	0.10	0.39	17	752	Yes
Post-Pulse x Conservative	0.03	0.14	0.81	17	752	Yes
Post-Pulse	0.04	0.07	0.59	18	743	Yes
Post-Pulse x Conservative	-0.08	0.12	0.48	18	743	Yes
Post-Pulse	0.01	0.07	0.87	19	736	Yes
Post-Pulse x Conservative	-0.03	0.12	0.79	19	736	Yes
Post-Pulse	0.00	0.07	0.95	20	724	Yes
Post-Pulse x Conservative	-0.03	0.13	0.82	20	724	Yes
Post-Pulse	0.08	0.08	0.32	21	716	Yes
Post-Pulse x Conservative	-0.09	0.14	0.55	21	716	Yes
Post-Pulse	0.10	0.09	0.23	22	707	Yes
Post-Pulse x Conservative	-0.09	0.16	0.59	22	707	Yes
Post-Pulse	0.11	0.09	0.21	23	700	Yes
Post-Pulse x Conservative	-0.20	0.13	0.13	23	700	Yes
Post-Pulse	0.15	0.17	0.38	24	687	Yes
Post-Pulse x Conservative	-0.28	0.20	0.16	24	687	Yes

B.18 Heterogeneity by Gun Control Opposition

B.18.1 Full Sample

Table B21: Heterogenous Effect of *Post-Pulse* on *SSM Support* Conditional on Gun Control Opposition

	(1)	(2)
Post-Pulse x Oppose Gun Control	−0.04	−0.07
	(0.09)	(0.08)
Post-Pulse	0.12*	0.12*
	(0.06)	(0.06)
Oppose Gun Control	−0.30***	−0.08
	(0.06)	(0.05)
Age		0.02
		(0.07)
White		0.21***
		(0.05)
Woman		0.03
		(0.04)
Non-religious		0.24***
		(0.06)
Married		−0.01
		(0.05)
Child		−0.09†
		(0.05)
Income		0.04
		(0.07)
College		0.10*
		(0.04)
Unemployed		−0.03
		(0.05)
Union		−0.04
		(0.05)
Renter		0.02
		(0.06)
Internet Access		−0.03
		(0.04)
Internet Mode		0.01
		(0.04)
Liberal		0.33***
		(0.05)
Metro Area		0.05
		(0.05)
R^2	0.12	0.36
Num. obs.	1134	1132

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$

B.18.2 After Cutting Days Immediately *Post-Pulse*

Table B22: Heterogenous Effects of *Post-Pulse* Conditional on Gun Control Opposition For Different Samples Where Days *Post-Pulse* Are Cut

Variable	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Days Cut	N	Controls
Post-Pulse	0.05	0.09	0.55	10	817	Yes
Post-Pulse x Oppose Gun Control	-0.02	0.12	0.83	10	817	Yes
Post-Pulse	-0.04	0.09	0.66	11	798	Yes
Post-Pulse x Oppose Gun Control	0.05	0.12	0.67	11	798	Yes
Post-Pulse	-0.06	0.09	0.49	12	790	Yes
Post-Pulse x Oppose Gun Control	0.09	0.12	0.45	12	790	Yes
Post-Pulse	-0.09	0.09	0.35	13	786	Yes
Post-Pulse x Oppose Gun Control	0.11	0.12	0.36	13	786	Yes
Post-Pulse	-0.09	0.09	0.35	14	779	Yes
Post-Pulse x Oppose Gun Control	0.11	0.13	0.39	14	779	Yes
Post-Pulse	-0.10	0.10	0.30	15	774	Yes
Post-Pulse x Oppose Gun Control	0.13	0.13	0.32	15	774	Yes
Post-Pulse	-0.13	0.10	0.21	16	761	Yes
Post-Pulse x Oppose Gun Control	0.12	0.13	0.37	16	761	Yes
Post-Pulse	-0.10	0.12	0.40	17	752	Yes
Post-Pulse x Oppose Gun Control	0.06	0.15	0.67	17	752	Yes
Post-Pulse	0.03	0.07	0.72	18	743	Yes
Post-Pulse x Oppose Gun Control	-0.02	0.11	0.88	18	743	Yes
Post-Pulse	0.01	0.07	0.90	19	736	Yes
Post-Pulse x Oppose Gun Control	0.01	0.11	0.94	19	736	Yes
Post-Pulse	-0.04	0.08	0.63	20	724	Yes
Post-Pulse x Oppose Gun Control	0.09	0.12	0.44	20	724	Yes
Post-Pulse	-0.01	0.07	0.93	21	716	Yes
Post-Pulse x Oppose Gun Control	0.13	0.15	0.39	21	716	Yes
Post-Pulse	0.00	0.08	0.98	22	707	Yes
Post-Pulse x Oppose Gun Control	0.16	0.16	0.31	22	707	Yes
Post-Pulse	0.05	0.08	0.55	23	700	Yes
Post-Pulse x Oppose Gun Control	-0.02	0.17	0.92	23	700	Yes
Post-Pulse	0.07	0.11	0.50	24	687	Yes
Post-Pulse x Oppose Gun Control	-0.05	0.23	0.83	24	687	Yes

B.19 Heterogeneity by Predicted SSM Support

Table B23: Assessing The Heterogenous Effect of Post-Pulse Conditional On Predicted Support For Same-Sex Marriage If Post-Pulse Indicator Is Equal To 0

	SSM Support (1)
Post-Pulse x SSM Support (Predicted)	−0.03
	(0.11)
Post-Pulse	$0.11^{\dagger}$
	(0.06)
SSM Support (Predicted)	1.01^{***}
	(0.06)
Controls?	N
R^2	0.36
N	1132

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$

C Study 2: PI S-IAT

C.1 Representativeness Discussion

The PI data are not population representative. The sample contains more youth (68% aged 18-29 vs. 18%), women (65% vs. 51%), liberals (57% vs. 41%), college educated (44% vs. 29%), and non-whites (36% vs. 22%) than TAPS. However, although the PI sample is disproportionately composed of respondent attributes associated with pro-LGBTQ+ attitudes, the empirical conclusions we draw from the PI sample may translate to a representative population. Prior research demonstrates non-representative internet samples respond similarly to external stimuli as representative samples (Coppock, 2019). If Study 2 corroborates results from a nationally representative sample (Study 1), we may have confidence Study 2's findings are generalizable.

C.2 Baseline Covariate Measurement

Age: Self-reported age, rescaled between 0-1.

Woman: 1 if respondent indicates they are "female," 0 otherwise.

White: 1 if respondent indicates they are "white," 0 otherwise.

College: 1 if respondent indicates the highest level of education they have is a "bachelor's degree," "some graduate school," a "master's degree," a "J.D.," a "M.D.," a "PhD," an other "advanced degree" or a "M.B.A." 0 otherwise.

Liberal: 1 if respondent indicates their political identity is "slightly liberal," "moderately liberal," or "strongly liberal." 0 otherwise.

Religious: 1 if respondent indicates they are not "not at all religious," 0 otherwise

Non-Metro: 1 if respondent is not from a "nonmetropolitian area," 0 otherwise.

California/Pennsylvania/New York/Florida/Illinois: 1 if respondent indicates their state of residence is California/Pennsylvania/New York/Florida/Illinois, 0 otherwise.

C.3 D-Score Details

The S-IAT acquires respondents mean *compatible response latency* (CRL) and *incompatible response latency* (IRL) (in milliseconds). The CRL is an average of how quickly a respondent associates "good" (e.g. happy, terrific) and "bad" (e.g. evil, rotten) words in addition to "gay" (e.g. homosexual, woman/woman image) or "straight" (e.g. heterosexual, man/woman image) words/images to a left or right-sided bin that characterize associations designed to be easy for people who prefer straight to gay people (e.g. gay/bad, straight/good). The IRL measures the same thing but where the left or right-sided bins characterize associations designed to be difficult for people who prefer straight to gay people (e.g. gay/good, straight/bad). The S-IAT assumes implicitly biased respondents will be faster making congruent than incongruent associations. Consequently, the *D-score* is the $IRL - CRL$ difference divided by the within-individual standard deviation of response latencies calculated across the compatible and incompatible trials. The *D-score* ranges from -2-2, with higher values suggesting implicit bias against gay people .

C.4 Anti-Gay Attitudes Over Time



Figure C33: Anti-Gay Attitudes (y-axis) Over Time (x-axis, in days) Between 2016-01-01 and 2016-09-07. Dashed vertical line is the moment the Pulse nightclub massacre occurred. Loess models are fit on each side of the moment Pulse occurred. All covariates re-scaled between 0-1.

C.5 Balance Tests



Figure C34: Balance on IAT Taker Composition Before and After the Massacre. Each panel characterizes covariate balance for different bandwidths (see plot title, with sample size). The x-axis is the *post-Pulse* coefficient derived from separate regression models regressing a baseline covariate (y-axis) on *post-Pulse*. Black coefficients are statistically significant, grey otherwise. See Section C.7.1 for regression tables characterizing these balance plots.

C.6 Explaining Coefficients = Meaningful

Figure 5 displays *post-Pulse* intent-to-treat coefficients where the outcome is the daily *D-score*, *straight bias*, and *heterocentrism*. Honing in on 15 and 20-day sample bandwidth estimates, respondents surveyed *post-Pulse* have a lower *D-score* (-0.01, $p < 0.10$) and *heterocentrism* (-0.01, $p < 0.01$), equivalent to roughly 7% and 8% of the respective outcome standard deviations pre-Pulse. Although these coefficients are small, they are reasonable and likely underestimated. First, prior research shows affective attitudes toward marginalized groups tend to be stable, so small attitudinal shifts may be meaningful (Sears, 1993; Vuletich and Payne, 2019).

Second, the *D-score* is indirectly measured, so it is less subject to impression management. Thus, small coefficients may be meaningful because the mass public may have difficulties shifting automatic attitudes toward LGBTQ+ community segments.

Third, conversely, *heterocentrism* is an explicit outcome asking respondents to indicate they favor straight to gay people. Thus, the measure may be subject to impression management where individuals who would otherwise adopt genuinely more prosocial beliefs toward LGBTQ+ group members may already be self-reporting disingenuous prosocial beliefs prior to the massacre on the basis of social desirability. These dynamics may generate ceiling effects on external stimuli that would otherwise motivate prosocial attitudes.

Fourth, coefficients may be smaller since we are estimating an intent-to-treat effect with a relatively youthful PI S-IAT sample relative to TAPS in Study 1. Youth pay less attention to media (Neundorf et al., 2013). Therefore, they may be less likely to shift their attitudes in response to media context changes, which could attenuate ITT effects. In summary, the "true" ITT effect may be much larger than what we identify in Study 2 if we had a representative adult population.

Fifth, we cannot truncate to attentive respondents in Study 2 like Study 1 due to the absence of auxiliary interview length data.[56] Inattentiveness may produce underestimates of the *post-Pulse* coefficient. Fifth, the coefficients are still meaningful from a relative basis. The *post-Pulse* coefficients for the *D-score* and *heterocentrism* outcomes are roughly 10% of the political liberalism coefficient, one of the most prognostic covariates determining prosocial attitudes toward LGBTQ+ people (Flores, 2014).

Sixth, Studies 1 and 3 suggest that violence against LGBTQ+ people can motivate relatively large ITT effects on prosocial attitudes toward LGBTQ+ group members (20% of the outcome standard deviation for Study 1, a 10 percentage point increase in support same-sex marriage; 20% of the outcome standard deviation for Study 3, a 10 percentage point decrease in reporting homosexuality is immoral). Statistically, multiple testing of the same hypothesis will generate variation in effects (Gelman, 2015). This means that the small effect in Study 2 may be a function of statistical and/or sampling variation instead of the "true" effect if we had a survey of the entire US adult population. Therefore, on balance, we have two studies with relatively large effects, and one study with relatively small effects. In the aggregate, we believe these findings imply that violence against LGBTQ+ people can have a meaningful initial impact on mass attitudes. We also believe Study 2, even in identifying smaller effect sizes, is still important because it provides additional evidence congruent with

[56]Study 3's coefficients, which are substantively larger, are from a telephone survey, where respondents are typically more attentive.

Studies 1 and 3.

Seventh, even if prosocial attitudinal shifts *post-Pulse* are small in Study 2, our target population is all US adult Americans, which could suggest substantively important effects. For instance, there are roughly 260 million adult Americans. If *heterocentrism* decreases by 0.01 on a scale from 0-1 (the *post-Pulse* effect size we identify), that could mean nearly 3 million Americans go from the maximum level of *heterocentrism* to the lowest level of *heterocentrism* while the other 257 million Americans do not shift their attitudes, a meaningful effect as far as the adult mass public is concerned. More reasonably, it could also mean *heterocentrism* decreases by one-fifth of the 0-1 scale for 15 million Americans while staying constant for the other 245 million Americans, again, a substantively meaningful effect given 15 million people are holding measurably lower levels of *heterocentrism*.

Eighth, we caution against demands for large effects in political science research. Often, large effect sizes are a function of limited statistical power, which could result in Type 1 errors. Small effect sizes are likely more reasonable, replicable, realistic, and externally valid in helping to explain human behavior (Arel-Bundock et al., 2022). Indeed, it is no surprise smaller effect sizes stem from Study 2 ($N = 3674, 4956$) relative to Studies 1 ($N = 1132$) and 3 ($N = 2052$) since Study 2 has a larger sample size.

C.7 Regression Tables

C.7.1 Balance Tests

Table C24: Balance Tests (Part 1)

Outcome	Post-Pulse Coef.	SE	p	Bandwidth	N
Age	-0.01	0.01	0.42	5 days	1501
Age	-0.01	0.01	0.35	10 days	2665
Age	-0.00	0.00	0.46	15 days	3674
Age	-0.00	0.00	0.92	20 days	4956
Age	0.00	0.00	0.56	25 days	5991
Age	0.01	0.00	0.00	30 days	7778
Age	0.01	0.00	0.00	35 days	9419
Age	0.01	0.00	0.00	40 days	10857
Age	0.02	0.00	0.00	45 days	12198
Age	0.03	0.00	0.00	50 days	14209
Woman	0.01	0.02	0.66	5 days	1501
Woman	0.02	0.02	0.25	10 days	2665
Woman	0.03	0.02	0.06	15 days	3674
Woman	0.02	0.01	0.14	20 days	4956
Woman	0.02	0.01	0.12	25 days	5991
Woman	0.02	0.01	0.14	30 days	7778
Woman	-0.00	0.01	0.92	35 days	9419
Woman	0.00	0.01	0.98	40 days	10857
Woman	-0.00	0.01	0.98	45 days	12198
Woman	-0.01	0.01	0.31	50 days	14209
White	-0.06	0.02	0.02	5 days	1501
White	-0.05	0.02	0.00	10 days	2665
White	-0.05	0.02	0.00	15 days	3674
White	-0.03	0.01	0.02	20 days	4956
White	-0.04	0.01	0.00	25 days	5991
White	-0.00	0.01	0.64	30 days	7778
White	-0.01	0.01	0.52	35 days	9419
White	-0.01	0.01	0.32	40 days	10857
White	-0.01	0.01	0.25	45 days	12198
White	0.00	0.01	0.89	50 days	14209
College	-0.01	0.03	0.84	5 days	1501
College	-0.02	0.02	0.33	10 days	2665
College	-0.02	0.02	0.15	15 days	3674
College	-0.01	0.01	0.52	20 days	4956
College	0.03	0.01	0.04	25 days	5991
College	0.06	0.01	0.00	30 days	7778
College	0.09	0.01	0.00	35 days	9419
College	0.13	0.01	0.00	40 days	10857
College	0.15	0.01	0.00	45 days	12198
College	0.19	0.01	0.00	50 days	14209
Liberal	0.02	0.03	0.43	5 days	1501
Liberal	0.03	0.02	0.15	10 days	2665
Liberal	0.02	0.02	0.20	15 days	3674
Liberal	0.02	0.01	0.20	20 days	4956
Liberal	0.03	0.01	0.03	25 days	5991
Liberal	0.05	0.01	0.00	30 days	7778
Liberal	0.07	0.01	0.00	35 days	9419
Liberal	0.07	0.01	0.00	40 days	10857
Liberal	0.07	0.01	0.00	45 days	12198
Liberal	0.09	0.01	0.00	50 days	14209
Religious	0.00	0.02	0.88	5 days	1501
Religious	-0.00	0.02	0.94	10 days	2665
Religious	0.00	0.02	0.90	15 days	3674
Religious	-0.01	0.01	0.59	20 days	4956
Religious	-0.01	0.01	0.67	25 days	5991
Religious	-0.01	0.01	0.35	30 days	7778
Religious	-0.02	0.01	0.09	35 days	9419
Religious	-0.02	0.01	0.02	40 days	10857
Religious	-0.02	0.01	0.03	45 days	12198
Religious	-0.03	0.01	0.00	50 days	14209

HC2 Robust SEs presented.

Table C25: Balance Tests (Part 2)

Outcome	Post-Pulse Coef.	SE	p	Bandwidth	N
Pennsylvania	0.00	0.01	0.88	5 days	1501
Pennsylvania	0.00	0.01	0.54	10 days	2665
Pennsylvania	0.00	0.01	0.77	15 days	3674
Pennsylvania	0.01	0.01	0.29	20 days	4956
Pennsylvania	0.00	0.00	0.68	25 days	5991
Pennsylvania	-0.00	0.00	0.89	30 days	7778
Pennsylvania	-0.01	0.00	0.09	35 days	9419
Pennsylvania	-0.00	0.00	0.26	40 days	10857
Pennsylvania	-0.00	0.00	0.29	45 days	12198
Pennsylvania	-0.00	0.00	0.77	50 days	14209
New York	0.01	0.01	0.40	5 days	1501
New York	0.00	0.01	0.78	10 days	2665
New York	0.00	0.01	0.86	15 days	3674
New York	-0.00	0.01	0.96	20 days	4956
New York	0.00	0.01	0.80	25 days	5991
New York	-0.00	0.00	0.99	30 days	7778
New York	0.00	0.00	0.29	35 days	9419
New York	0.01	0.00	0.08	40 days	10857
New York	0.01	0.00	0.20	45 days	12198
New York	0.01	0.00	0.14	50 days	14209
Florida	0.03	0.01	0.01	5 days	1501
Florida	0.03	0.01	0.00	10 days	2665
Florida	0.01	0.01	0.19	15 days	3674
Florida	0.01	0.01	0.39	20 days	4956
Florida	0.01	0.01	0.05	25 days	5991
Florida	0.01	0.00	0.10	30 days	7778
Florida	0.01	0.00	0.01	35 days	9419
Florida	0.01	0.00	0.01	40 days	10857
Florida	0.01	0.00	0.00	45 days	12198
Florida	0.01	0.00	0.00	50 days	14209
Illinois	-0.01	0.01	0.56	5 days	1501
Illinois	0.00	0.01	0.95	10 days	2665
Illinois	0.00	0.01	0.62	15 days	3674
Illinois	-0.00	0.01	0.88	20 days	4956
Illinois	-0.00	0.00	0.81	25 days	5991
Illinois	0.00	0.00	0.61	30 days	7778
Illinois	0.00	0.00	0.65	35 days	9419
Illinois	-0.01	0.00	0.08	40 days	10857
Illinois	-0.01	0.00	0.03	45 days	12198
Illinois	-0.01	0.00	0.01	50 days	14209

HC2 Robust SEs presented.

C.7.2 Influence of Pulse on Anti-Gay Attitudes

Table C26: Influence of Pulse on Anti-Gay Attitudes

Outcome	Post-Pulse Coef.	SE	p	Bandwidth	N	Controls
A. D-Score	-0.003	0.007	0.710	5	1487	No
A. D-Score	-0.009	0.006	0.089	10	2639	No
A. D-Score	-0.009	0.005	0.051	15	3638	No
A. D-Score	-0.008	0.004	0.035	20	4907	No
A. D-Score	-0.008	0.004	0.037	25	5925	No
A. D-Score	-0.011	0.003	0.001	30	7689	No
A. D-Score	-0.017	0.003	0.000	35	9313	No
A. D-Score	-0.017	0.003	0.000	40	10735	No
A. D-Score	-0.018	0.003	0.000	45	12057	No
A. D-Score	-0.022	0.002	0.000	50	14051	No
A. D-Score	-0.020	0.002	0.000	Full	41900	No
A. D-Score	-0.002	0.007	0.757	5	1487	Yes
A. D-Score	-0.009	0.005	0.093	10	2639	Yes
A. D-Score	-0.009	0.004	0.055	15	3638	Yes
A. D-Score	-0.007	0.004	0.056	20	4907	Yes
A. D-Score	-0.006	0.003	0.098	25	5925	Yes
A. D-Score	-0.007	0.003	0.026	30	7689	Yes
A. D-Score	-0.012	0.003	0.000	35	9313	Yes
A. D-Score	-0.012	0.003	0.000	40	10735	Yes
A. D-Score	-0.012	0.002	0.000	45	12057	Yes
A. D-Score	-0.014	0.002	0.000	50	14051	Yes
A. D-Score	-0.014	0.002	0.000	Full	41900	Yes
B. Straight Bias	0.000	0.010	0.962	5	1453	No
B. Straight Bias	-0.010	0.008	0.173	10	2584	No
B. Straight Bias	-0.009	0.006	0.182	15	3562	No
B. Straight Bias	-0.008	0.006	0.143	20	4799	No
B. Straight Bias	-0.011	0.005	0.029	25	5794	No
B. Straight Bias	-0.014	0.004	0.001	30	7511	No
B. Straight Bias	-0.020	0.004	0.000	35	9111	No
B. Straight Bias	-0.019	0.004	0.000	40	10519	No
B. Straight Bias	-0.017	0.004	0.000	45	11827	No
B. Straight Bias	-0.022	0.003	0.000	50	13780	No
B. Straight Bias	-0.021	0.002	0.000	Full	42738	No
B. Straight Bias	0.004	0.010	0.694	5	1453	Yes
B. Straight Bias	-0.005	0.007	0.439	10	2584	Yes
B. Straight Bias	-0.006	0.006	0.332	15	3562	Yes
B. Straight Bias	-0.005	0.005	0.310	20	4799	Yes
B. Straight Bias	-0.008	0.005	0.107	25	5794	Yes
B. Straight Bias	-0.008	0.004	0.042	30	7511	Yes
B. Straight Bias	-0.012	0.004	0.001	35	9111	Yes
B. Straight Bias	-0.011	0.003	0.001	40	10519	Yes
B. Straight Bias	-0.010	0.003	0.002	45	11827	Yes
B. Straight Bias	-0.012	0.003	0.000	50	13780	Yes
B. Straight Bias	-0.012	0.002	0.000	Full	42738	Yes
C. Heterocentrism	-0.011	0.007	0.125	5	1489	No
C. Heterocentrism	-0.015	0.005	0.005	10	2643	No
C. Heterocentrism	-0.014	0.004	0.002	15	3645	No
C. Heterocentrism	-0.013	0.004	0.001	20	4920	No
C. Heterocentrism	-0.013	0.003	0.000	25	5946	No
C. Heterocentrism	-0.016	0.003	0.000	30	7720	No
C. Heterocentrism	-0.020	0.003	0.000	35	9342	No
C. Heterocentrism	-0.020	0.002	0.000	40	10772	No
C. Heterocentrism	-0.019	0.002	0.000	45	12106	No
C. Heterocentrism	-0.022	0.002	0.000	50	14093	No
C. Heterocentrism	-0.021	0.001	0.000	Full	43639	No
C. Heterocentrism	-0.010	0.007	0.129	5	1489	Yes
C. Heterocentrism	-0.013	0.005	0.008	10	2643	Yes
C. Heterocentrism	-0.012	0.004	0.002	15	3645	Yes
C. Heterocentrism	-0.011	0.003	0.001	20	4920	Yes
C. Heterocentrism	-0.010	0.003	0.001	25	5946	Yes
C. Heterocentrism	-0.012	0.003	0.000	30	7720	Yes
C. Heterocentrism	-0.014	0.002	0.000	35	9342	Yes
C. Heterocentrism	-0.014	0.002	0.000	40	10772	Yes
C. Heterocentrism	-0.013	0.002	0.000	45	12106	Yes
C. Heterocentrism	-0.014	0.002	0.000	50	14093	Yes
C. Heterocentrism	-0.013	0.001	0.000	Full	43639	Yes

HC2 Robust SEs presented.

C.7.3 Influence of Control Covariates on Anti-Gay Attitudes

Table C27: Influence of Control Covariates on Heterocentrism (Part 1)

Control	Control Coef.	SE	p	Bandwidth	Outcome	N
Liberal	-0.082	0.007	0.000	5.000	Heterocentrism	1489
Age	0.017	0.022	0.447	5.000	Heterocentrism	1489
White	-0.010	0.007	0.170	5.000	Heterocentrism	1489
Woman	-0.004	0.007	0.583	5.000	Heterocentrism	1489
College	-0.018	0.008	0.017	5.000	Heterocentrism	1489
Religious	0.042	0.008	0.000	5.000	Heterocentrism	1489
Nonmetro	0.004	0.014	0.748	5.000	Heterocentrism	1489
California	-0.000	0.011	0.969	5.000	Heterocentrism	1489
Pennsylvania	0.020	0.016	0.232	5.000	Heterocentrism	1489
New York	0.006	0.013	0.649	5.000	Heterocentrism	1489
Florida	-0.007	0.014	0.617	5.000	Heterocentrism	1489
Illinois	-0.022	0.021	0.289	5.000	Heterocentrism	1489
Liberal	-0.088	0.005	0.000	10.000	Heterocentrism	2643
Age	0.045	0.018	0.010	10.000	Heterocentrism	2643
White	-0.012	0.005	0.027	10.000	Heterocentrism	2643
Woman	-0.004	0.005	0.408	10.000	Heterocentrism	2643
College	-0.006	0.006	0.277	10.000	Heterocentrism	2643
Religious	0.040	0.006	0.000	10.000	Heterocentrism	2643
Nonmetro	0.006	0.009	0.456	10.000	Heterocentrism	2643
California	-0.003	0.008	0.725	10.000	Heterocentrism	2643
Pennsylvania	0.018	0.013	0.177	10.000	Heterocentrism	2643
New York	0.008	0.010	0.415	10.000	Heterocentrism	2643
Florida	-0.011	0.010	0.267	10.000	Heterocentrism	2643
Illinois	-0.016	0.015	0.283	10.000	Heterocentrism	2643
Liberal	-0.084	0.004	0.000	15.000	Heterocentrism	3645
Age	0.048	0.015	0.001	15.000	Heterocentrism	3645
White	-0.009	0.005	0.054	15.000	Heterocentrism	3645
Woman	-0.005	0.004	0.221	15.000	Heterocentrism	3645
College	-0.008	0.005	0.079	15.000	Heterocentrism	3645
Religious	0.044	0.005	0.000	15.000	Heterocentrism	3645
Nonmetro	0.007	0.007	0.333	15.000	Heterocentrism	3645
California	-0.002	0.006	0.768	15.000	Heterocentrism	3645
Pennsylvania	0.013	0.010	0.202	15.000	Heterocentrism	3645
New York	0.005	0.009	0.552	15.000	Heterocentrism	3645
Florida	0.001	0.008	0.927	15.000	Heterocentrism	3645
Illinois	-0.015	0.012	0.209	15.000	Heterocentrism	3645
Liberal	-0.083	0.004	0.000	20.000	Heterocentrism	4920
Age	0.043	0.013	0.001	20.000	Heterocentrism	4920
White	-0.009	0.004	0.022	20.000	Heterocentrism	4920
Woman	-0.008	0.004	0.030	20.000	Heterocentrism	4920
College	-0.004	0.004	0.275	20.000	Heterocentrism	4920
Religious	0.044	0.004	0.000	20.000	Heterocentrism	4920
Nonmetro	-0.002	0.006	0.702	20.000	Heterocentrism	4920
California	-0.009	0.005	0.085	20.000	Heterocentrism	4920
Pennsylvania	0.006	0.009	0.519	20.000	Heterocentrism	4920
New York	-0.005	0.008	0.533	20.000	Heterocentrism	4920
Florida	0.004	0.007	0.624	20.000	Heterocentrism	4920
Illinois	-0.009	0.009	0.338	20.000	Heterocentrism	4920
Liberal	-0.081	0.003	0.000	25.000	Heterocentrism	5946
Age	0.045	0.011	0.000	25.000	Heterocentrism	5946
White	-0.012	0.004	0.000	25.000	Heterocentrism	5946
Woman	-0.008	0.003	0.021	25.000	Heterocentrism	5946
College	-0.003	0.004	0.341	25.000	Heterocentrism	5946
Religious	0.043	0.004	0.000	25.000	Heterocentrism	5946
Nonmetro	0.001	0.006	0.859	25.000	Heterocentrism	5946
California	-0.010	0.005	0.029	25.000	Heterocentrism	5946
Pennsylvania	0.001	0.008	0.946	25.000	Heterocentrism	5946
New York	-0.011	0.007	0.138	25.000	Heterocentrism	5946
Florida	0.004	0.007	0.591	25.000	Heterocentrism	5946
Illinois	-0.003	0.008	0.706	25.000	Heterocentrism	5946
Liberal	-0.081	0.003	0.000	30.000	Heterocentrism	7720
Age	0.046	0.010	0.000	30.000	Heterocentrism	7720
White	-0.016	0.003	0.000	30.000	Heterocentrism	7720
Woman	-0.012	0.003	0.000	30.000	Heterocentrism	7720
College	-0.003	0.003	0.273	30.000	Heterocentrism	7720
Religious	0.042	0.003	0.000	30.000	Heterocentrism	7720

HC2 Robust SEs presented.

Table C28: Influence of Control Covariates on Heterocentrism (Part 2)

Control	Control Coef.	SE	p	Bandwidth	Outcome	N
Religious	0.042	0.003	0.000	30.000	Heterocentrism	7720
Nonmetro	-0.001	0.005	0.864	30.000	Heterocentrism	7720
California	-0.011	0.004	0.008	30.000	Heterocentrism	7720
Pennsylvania	-0.004	0.007	0.596	30.000	Heterocentrism	7720
New York	-0.014	0.006	0.026	30.000	Heterocentrism	7720
Florida	0.001	0.007	0.828	30.000	Heterocentrism	7720
Illinois	-0.009	0.008	0.257	30.000	Heterocentrism	7720
Liberal	-0.078	0.003	0.000	35.000	Heterocentrism	9342
Age	0.045	0.009	0.000	35.000	Heterocentrism	9342
White	-0.016	0.003	0.000	35.000	Heterocentrism	9342
Woman	-0.012	0.003	0.000	35.000	Heterocentrism	9342
College	-0.003	0.003	0.213	35.000	Heterocentrism	9342
Religious	0.043	0.003	0.000	35.000	Heterocentrism	9342
Nonmetro	0.001	0.005	0.829	35.000	Heterocentrism	9342
California	-0.012	0.004	0.002	35.000	Heterocentrism	9342
Pennsylvania	-0.004	0.006	0.482	35.000	Heterocentrism	9342
New York	-0.016	0.006	0.004	35.000	Heterocentrism	9342
Florida	0.001	0.006	0.823	35.000	Heterocentrism	9342
Illinois	-0.010	0.007	0.139	35.000	Heterocentrism	9342
Liberal	-0.077	0.002	0.000	40.000	Heterocentrism	10772
Age	0.045	0.008	0.000	40.000	Heterocentrism	10772
White	-0.016	0.003	0.000	40.000	Heterocentrism	10772
Woman	-0.013	0.002	0.000	40.000	Heterocentrism	10772
College	-0.004	0.003	0.086	40.000	Heterocentrism	10772
Religious	0.043	0.003	0.000	40.000	Heterocentrism	10772
Nonmetro	0.006	0.004	0.199	40.000	Heterocentrism	10772
California	-0.011	0.004	0.003	40.000	Heterocentrism	10772
Pennsylvania	-0.005	0.006	0.421	40.000	Heterocentrism	10772
New York	-0.016	0.005	0.001	40.000	Heterocentrism	10772
Florida	0.001	0.006	0.897	40.000	Heterocentrism	10772
Illinois	-0.008	0.006	0.225	40.000	Heterocentrism	10772
Liberal	-0.077	0.002	0.000	45.000	Heterocentrism	12106
Age	0.045	0.008	0.000	45.000	Heterocentrism	12106
White	-0.016	0.002	0.000	45.000	Heterocentrism	12106
Woman	-0.013	0.002	0.000	45.000	Heterocentrism	12106
College	-0.004	0.002	0.124	45.000	Heterocentrism	12106
Religious	0.044	0.003	0.000	45.000	Heterocentrism	12106
Nonmetro	0.005	0.004	0.204	45.000	Heterocentrism	12106
California	-0.012	0.003	0.001	45.000	Heterocentrism	12106
Pennsylvania	-0.004	0.006	0.519	45.000	Heterocentrism	12106
New York	-0.018	0.005	0.000	45.000	Heterocentrism	12106
Florida	0.004	0.006	0.513	45.000	Heterocentrism	12106
Illinois	-0.010	0.006	0.102	45.000	Heterocentrism	12106
Liberal	-0.078	0.002	0.000	50.000	Heterocentrism	14093
Age	0.047	0.007	0.000	50.000	Heterocentrism	14093
White	-0.017	0.002	0.000	50.000	Heterocentrism	14093
Woman	-0.013	0.002	0.000	50.000	Heterocentrism	14093
College	-0.005	0.002	0.044	50.000	Heterocentrism	14093
Religious	0.043	0.002	0.000	50.000	Heterocentrism	14093
Nonmetro	0.004	0.004	0.257	50.000	Heterocentrism	14093
California	-0.011	0.003	0.001	50.000	Heterocentrism	14093
Pennsylvania	-0.002	0.006	0.769	50.000	Heterocentrism	14093
New York	-0.017	0.004	0.000	50.000	Heterocentrism	14093
Florida	0.002	0.005	0.654	50.000	Heterocentrism	14093
Illinois	-0.008	0.005	0.166	50.000	Heterocentrism	14093
Liberal	-0.080	0.001	0.000	200.000	Heterocentrism	43639
Age	0.030	0.005	0.000	200.000	Heterocentrism	43639
White	-0.012	0.001	0.000	200.000	Heterocentrism	43639
Woman	-0.015	0.001	0.000	200.000	Heterocentrism	43639
College	-0.005	0.001	0.000	200.000	Heterocentrism	43639
Religious	0.047	0.001	0.000	200.000	Heterocentrism	43639
Nonmetro	0.012	0.002	0.000	200.000	Heterocentrism	43639
California	-0.012	0.002	0.000	200.000	Heterocentrism	43639
Pennsylvania	-0.001	0.003	0.714	200.000	Heterocentrism	43639
New York	-0.012	0.002	0.000	200.000	Heterocentrism	43639
Florida	-0.002	0.003	0.592	200.000	Heterocentrism	43639
Illinois	-0.002	0.003	0.553	200.000	Heterocentrism	43639

HC2 Robust SEs presented.

Table C29: Influence of Control Covariates on Straight Bias (Part 1)

Control	Control Coef.	SE	p	Bandwidth	Outcome	N
Liberal	-0.106	0.011	0.000	5.000	Straight Bias	1453
Age	0.040	0.033	0.229	5.000	Straight Bias	1453
White	-0.011	0.011	0.299	5.000	Straight Bias	1453
Woman	-0.027	0.011	0.018	5.000	Straight Bias	1453
College	-0.014	0.011	0.197	5.000	Straight Bias	1453
Religious	0.072	0.012	0.000	5.000	Straight Bias	1453
Nonmetro	0.025	0.022	0.267	5.000	Straight Bias	1453
California	0.001	0.016	0.943	5.000	Straight Bias	1453
Pennsylvania	-0.003	0.025	0.896	5.000	Straight Bias	1453
New York	-0.010	0.017	0.558	5.000	Straight Bias	1453
Florida	-0.020	0.021	0.344	5.000	Straight Bias	1453
Illinois	-0.026	0.023	0.261	5.000	Straight Bias	1453
Liberal	-0.109	0.008	0.000	10.000	Straight Bias	2584
Age	0.074	0.026	0.005	10.000	Straight Bias	2584
White	-0.009	0.008	0.252	10.000	Straight Bias	2584
Woman	-0.030	0.008	0.000	10.000	Straight Bias	2584
College	-0.006	0.008	0.481	10.000	Straight Bias	2584
Religious	0.073	0.009	0.000	10.000	Straight Bias	2584
Nonmetro	0.018	0.014	0.200	10.000	Straight Bias	2584
California	0.002	0.011	0.835	10.000	Straight Bias	2584
Pennsylvania	-0.005	0.019	0.794	10.000	Straight Bias	2584
New York	-0.012	0.013	0.356	10.000	Straight Bias	2584
Florida	-0.031	0.015	0.040	10.000	Straight Bias	2584
Illinois	-0.005	0.019	0.802	10.000	Straight Bias	2584
Liberal	-0.103	0.006	0.000	15.000	Straight Bias	3562
Age	0.060	0.023	0.007	15.000	Straight Bias	3562
White	-0.011	0.007	0.097	15.000	Straight Bias	3562
Woman	-0.034	0.007	0.000	15.000	Straight Bias	3562
College	-0.004	0.007	0.560	15.000	Straight Bias	3562
Religious	0.075	0.007	0.000	15.000	Straight Bias	3562
Nonmetro	0.017	0.011	0.132	15.000	Straight Bias	3562
California	0.000	0.009	0.981	15.000	Straight Bias	3562
Pennsylvania	-0.006	0.015	0.693	15.000	Straight Bias	3562
New York	-0.014	0.012	0.223	15.000	Straight Bias	3562
Florida	-0.010	0.013	0.430	15.000	Straight Bias	3562
Illinois	-0.010	0.017	0.559	15.000	Straight Bias	3562
Liberal	-0.108	0.006	0.000	20.000	Straight Bias	4799
Age	0.052	0.020	0.008	20.000	Straight Bias	4799
White	-0.011	0.006	0.056	20.000	Straight Bias	4799
Woman	-0.035	0.006	0.000	20.000	Straight Bias	4799
College	0.001	0.006	0.804	20.000	Straight Bias	4799
Religious	0.074	0.006	0.000	20.000	Straight Bias	4799
Nonmetro	0.009	0.010	0.352	20.000	Straight Bias	4799
California	-0.001	0.008	0.949	20.000	Straight Bias	4799
Pennsylvania	-0.012	0.013	0.368	20.000	Straight Bias	4799
New York	-0.022	0.011	0.042	20.000	Straight Bias	4799
Florida	0.004	0.011	0.701	20.000	Straight Bias	4799
Illinois	-0.014	0.015	0.324	20.000	Straight Bias	4799
Liberal	-0.111	0.005	0.000	25.000	Straight Bias	5794
Age	0.048	0.018	0.007	25.000	Straight Bias	5794
White	-0.014	0.005	0.007	25.000	Straight Bias	5794
Woman	-0.031	0.005	0.000	25.000	Straight Bias	5794
College	0.002	0.005	0.666	25.000	Straight Bias	5794
Religious	0.076	0.006	0.000	25.000	Straight Bias	5794
Nonmetro	0.008	0.009	0.370	25.000	Straight Bias	5794
California	-0.003	0.007	0.641	25.000	Straight Bias	5794
Pennsylvania	-0.002	0.013	0.878	25.000	Straight Bias	5794
New York	-0.024	0.010	0.019	25.000	Straight Bias	5794
Florida	0.002	0.010	0.828	25.000	Straight Bias	5794
Illinois	-0.003	0.013	0.831	25.000	Straight Bias	5794
Liberal	-0.111	0.004	0.000	30.000	Straight Bias	7511
Age	0.052	0.015	0.001	30.000	Straight Bias	7511
White	-0.016	0.005	0.001	30.000	Straight Bias	7511
Woman	-0.037	0.005	0.000	30.000	Straight Bias	7511
College	0.003	0.005	0.477	30.000	Straight Bias	7511
Religious	0.072	0.005	0.000	30.000	Straight Bias	7511

HC2 Robust SEs presented.

Table C30: Influence of Control Covariates on Straight Bias (Part 2)

Control	Control Coef.	SE	p	Bandwidth	Outcome	N
Religious	0.072	0.005	0.000	30.000	Straight Bias	7511
Nonmetro	0.004	0.008	0.605	30.000	Straight Bias	7511
California	-0.004	0.006	0.532	30.000	Straight Bias	7511
Pennsylvania	-0.005	0.011	0.658	30.000	Straight Bias	7511
New York	-0.026	0.009	0.004	30.000	Straight Bias	7511
Florida	0.002	0.009	0.803	30.000	Straight Bias	7511
Illinois	-0.003	0.012	0.812	30.000	Straight Bias	7511
Liberal	-0.109	0.004	0.000	35.000	Straight Bias	9111
Age	0.051	0.014	0.000	35.000	Straight Bias	9111
White	-0.016	0.004	0.000	35.000	Straight Bias	9111
Woman	-0.037	0.004	0.000	35.000	Straight Bias	9111
College	0.002	0.004	0.643	35.000	Straight Bias	9111
Religious	0.073	0.004	0.000	35.000	Straight Bias	9111
Nonmetro	0.008	0.007	0.238	35.000	Straight Bias	9111
California	-0.003	0.006	0.613	35.000	Straight Bias	9111
Pennsylvania	-0.005	0.010	0.642	35.000	Straight Bias	9111
New York	-0.029	0.008	0.001	35.000	Straight Bias	9111
Florida	0.002	0.009	0.805	35.000	Straight Bias	9111
Illinois	-0.004	0.011	0.699	35.000	Straight Bias	9111
Liberal	-0.109	0.004	0.000	40.000	Straight Bias	10519
Age	0.057	0.013	0.000	40.000	Straight Bias	10519
White	-0.017	0.004	0.000	40.000	Straight Bias	10519
Woman	-0.037	0.004	0.000	40.000	Straight Bias	10519
College	0.002	0.004	0.681	40.000	Straight Bias	10519
Religious	0.074	0.004	0.000	40.000	Straight Bias	10519
Nonmetro	0.014	0.006	0.031	40.000	Straight Bias	10519
California	-0.003	0.005	0.631	40.000	Straight Bias	10519
Pennsylvania	-0.003	0.009	0.704	40.000	Straight Bias	10519
New York	-0.028	0.008	0.000	40.000	Straight Bias	10519
Florida	0.002	0.008	0.817	40.000	Straight Bias	10519
Illinois	-0.002	0.010	0.875	40.000	Straight Bias	10519
Liberal	-0.111	0.004	0.000	45.000	Straight Bias	11827
Age	0.057	0.012	0.000	45.000	Straight Bias	11827
White	-0.017	0.004	0.000	45.000	Straight Bias	11827
Woman	-0.038	0.004	0.000	45.000	Straight Bias	11827
College	0.004	0.004	0.332	45.000	Straight Bias	11827
Religious	0.074	0.004	0.000	45.000	Straight Bias	11827
Nonmetro	0.012	0.006	0.041	45.000	Straight Bias	11827
California	-0.007	0.005	0.191	45.000	Straight Bias	11827
Pennsylvania	-0.005	0.009	0.594	45.000	Straight Bias	11827
New York	-0.032	0.007	0.000	45.000	Straight Bias	11827
Florida	0.005	0.008	0.549	45.000	Straight Bias	11827
Illinois	-0.009	0.009	0.315	45.000	Straight Bias	11827
Liberal	-0.115	0.003	0.000	50.000	Straight Bias	13780
Age	0.064	0.011	0.000	50.000	Straight Bias	13780
White	-0.018	0.003	0.000	50.000	Straight Bias	13780
Woman	-0.039	0.003	0.000	50.000	Straight Bias	13780
College	0.001	0.003	0.838	50.000	Straight Bias	13780
Religious	0.070	0.004	0.000	50.000	Straight Bias	13780
Nonmetro	0.010	0.006	0.081	50.000	Straight Bias	13780
California	-0.007	0.005	0.129	50.000	Straight Bias	13780
Pennsylvania	-0.002	0.008	0.837	50.000	Straight Bias	13780
New York	-0.031	0.007	0.000	50.000	Straight Bias	13780
Florida	0.003	0.008	0.747	50.000	Straight Bias	13780
Illinois	-0.004	0.009	0.620	50.000	Straight Bias	13780
Liberal	-0.113	0.002	0.000	200.000	Straight Bias	42738
Age	0.056	0.007	0.000	200.000	Straight Bias	42738
White	-0.013	0.002	0.000	200.000	Straight Bias	42738
Woman	-0.045	0.002	0.000	200.000	Straight Bias	42738
College	-0.001	0.002	0.563	200.000	Straight Bias	42738
Religious	0.076	0.002	0.000	200.000	Straight Bias	42738
Nonmetro	0.010	0.003	0.001	200.000	Straight Bias	42738
California	-0.013	0.003	0.000	200.000	Straight Bias	42738
Pennsylvania	-0.002	0.004	0.589	200.000	Straight Bias	42738
New York	-0.023	0.004	0.000	200.000	Straight Bias	42738
Florida	-0.005	0.005	0.332	200.000	Straight Bias	42738
Illinois	-0.005	0.004	0.271	200.000	Straight Bias	42738

HC2 Robust SEs presented.

Table C31: Influence of Control Covariates on D-Score (Part 1)

Control	Control Coef.	SE	p	Bandwidth	Outcome	N
Liberal	-0.071	0.008	0.000	5.000	D-Score	1487
Age	0.020	0.026	0.441	5.000	D-Score	1487
White	-0.019	0.008	0.013	5.000	D-Score	1487
Woman	-0.021	0.008	0.009	5.000	D-Score	1487
College	-0.017	0.008	0.033	5.000	D-Score	1487
Religious	0.033	0.008	0.000	5.000	D-Score	1487
Nonmetro	0.015	0.013	0.274	5.000	D-Score	1487
California	-0.025	0.012	0.040	5.000	D-Score	1487
Pennsylvania	0.017	0.019	0.388	5.000	D-Score	1487
New York	-0.006	0.014	0.683	5.000	D-Score	1487
Florida	-0.005	0.014	0.728	5.000	D-Score	1487
Illinois	0.014	0.020	0.501	5.000	D-Score	1487
Liberal	-0.071	0.006	0.000	10.000	D-Score	2639
Age	0.056	0.020	0.005	10.000	D-Score	2639
White	-0.020	0.006	0.001	10.000	D-Score	2639
Woman	-0.021	0.006	0.000	10.000	D-Score	2639
College	-0.013	0.006	0.026	10.000	D-Score	2639
Religious	0.035	0.006	0.000	10.000	D-Score	2639
Nonmetro	0.012	0.010	0.234	10.000	D-Score	2639
California	-0.016	0.009	0.073	10.000	D-Score	2639
Pennsylvania	0.013	0.015	0.372	10.000	D-Score	2639
New York	-0.012	0.011	0.285	10.000	D-Score	2639
Florida	0.018	0.011	0.103	10.000	D-Score	2639
Illinois	0.013	0.015	0.385	10.000	D-Score	2639
Liberal	-0.071	0.005	0.000	15.000	D-Score	3638
Age	0.065	0.017	0.000	15.000	D-Score	3638
White	-0.020	0.005	0.000	15.000	D-Score	3638
Woman	-0.019	0.005	0.000	15.000	D-Score	3638
College	-0.015	0.005	0.003	15.000	D-Score	3638
Religious	0.036	0.005	0.000	15.000	D-Score	3638
Nonmetro	0.009	0.008	0.286	15.000	D-Score	3638
California	-0.015	0.007	0.041	15.000	D-Score	3638
Pennsylvania	0.015	0.012	0.198	15.000	D-Score	3638
New York	-0.010	0.010	0.324	15.000	D-Score	3638
Florida	0.016	0.009	0.089	15.000	D-Score	3638
Illinois	0.001	0.014	0.955	15.000	D-Score	3638
Liberal	-0.071	0.004	0.000	20.000	D-Score	4907
Age	0.062	0.014	0.000	20.000	D-Score	4907
White	-0.015	0.004	0.000	20.000	D-Score	4907
Woman	-0.018	0.004	0.000	20.000	D-Score	4907
College	-0.014	0.004	0.001	20.000	D-Score	4907
Religious	0.038	0.004	0.000	20.000	D-Score	4907
Nonmetro	0.004	0.007	0.585	20.000	D-Score	4907
California	-0.006	0.006	0.351	20.000	D-Score	4907
Pennsylvania	0.017	0.011	0.109	20.000	D-Score	4907
New York	-0.011	0.009	0.186	20.000	D-Score	4907
Florida	0.014	0.008	0.077	20.000	D-Score	4907
Illinois	-0.005	0.011	0.634	20.000	D-Score	4907
Liberal	-0.072	0.004	0.000	25.000	D-Score	5925
Age	0.066	0.013	0.000	25.000	D-Score	5925
White	-0.017	0.004	0.000	25.000	D-Score	5925
Woman	-0.019	0.004	0.000	25.000	D-Score	5925
College	-0.011	0.004	0.004	25.000	D-Score	5925
Religious	0.038	0.004	0.000	25.000	D-Score	5925
Nonmetro	0.010	0.007	0.120	25.000	D-Score	5925
California	-0.004	0.005	0.517	25.000	D-Score	5925
Pennsylvania	0.016	0.010	0.111	25.000	D-Score	5925
New York	-0.009	0.008	0.277	25.000	D-Score	5925
Florida	0.012	0.007	0.119	25.000	D-Score	5925
Illinois	0.002	0.009	0.849	25.000	D-Score	5925
Liberal	-0.073	0.003	0.000	30.000	D-Score	7689
Age	0.068	0.011	0.000	30.000	D-Score	7689
White	-0.016	0.003	0.000	30.000	D-Score	7689
Woman	-0.021	0.003	0.000	30.000	D-Score	7689
College	-0.011	0.003	0.001	30.000	D-Score	7689
Religious	0.037	0.003	0.000	30.000	D-Score	7689

HC2 Robust SEs presented.

Table C32: Influence of Control Covariates on D-Score (Part 2)

Control	Control Coef.	SE	p	Bandwidth	Outcome	N
Religious	0.072	0.005	0.000	30.000	D-Score	7511
Nonmetro	0.004	0.008	0.605	30.000	D-Score	7511
California	-0.004	0.006	0.532	30.000	D-Score	7511
Pennsylvania	-0.005	0.011	0.658	30.000	D-Score	7511
New York	-0.026	0.009	0.004	30.000	D-Score	7511
Florida	0.002	0.009	0.803	30.000	D-Score	7511
Illinois	-0.003	0.012	0.812	30.000	D-Score	7511
Liberal	-0.109	0.004	0.000	35.000	D-Score	9111
Age	0.051	0.014	0.000	35.000	D-Score	9111
White	-0.016	0.004	0.000	35.000	D-Score	9111
Woman	-0.037	0.004	0.000	35.000	D-Score	9111
College	0.002	0.004	0.643	35.000	D-Score	9111
Religious	0.073	0.004	0.000	35.000	D-Score	9111
Nonmetro	0.008	0.007	0.238	35.000	D-Score	9111
California	-0.003	0.006	0.613	35.000	D-Score	9111
Pennsylvania	-0.005	0.010	0.642	35.000	D-Score	9111
New York	-0.029	0.008	0.001	35.000	D-Score	9111
Florida	0.002	0.009	0.805	35.000	D-Score	9111
Illinois	-0.004	0.011	0.699	35.000	D-Score	9111
Liberal	-0.109	0.004	0.000	40.000	D-Score	10519
Age	0.057	0.013	0.000	40.000	D-Score	10519
White	-0.017	0.004	0.000	40.000	D-Score	10519
Woman	-0.037	0.004	0.000	40.000	D-Score	10519
College	0.002	0.004	0.681	40.000	D-Score	10519
Religious	0.074	0.004	0.000	40.000	D-Score	10519
Nonmetro	0.014	0.006	0.031	40.000	D-Score	10519
California	-0.003	0.005	0.631	40.000	D-Score	10519
Pennsylvania	-0.003	0.009	0.704	40.000	D-Score	10519
New York	-0.028	0.008	0.000	40.000	D-Score	10519
Florida	0.002	0.008	0.817	40.000	D-Score	10519
Illinois	-0.002	0.010	0.875	40.000	D-Score	10519
Liberal	-0.111	0.004	0.000	45.000	D-Score	11827
Age	0.057	0.012	0.000	45.000	D-Score	11827
White	-0.017	0.004	0.000	45.000	D-Score	11827
Woman	-0.038	0.004	0.000	45.000	D-Score	11827
College	0.004	0.004	0.332	45.000	D-Score	11827
Religious	0.074	0.004	0.000	45.000	D-Score	11827
Nonmetro	0.012	0.006	0.041	45.000	D-Score	11827
California	-0.007	0.005	0.191	45.000	D-Score	11827
Pennsylvania	-0.005	0.009	0.594	45.000	D-Score	11827
New York	-0.032	0.007	0.000	45.000	D-Score	11827
Florida	0.005	0.008	0.549	45.000	D-Score	11827
Illinois	-0.009	0.009	0.315	45.000	D-Score	11827
Liberal	-0.115	0.003	0.000	50.000	D-Score	13780
Age	0.064	0.011	0.000	50.000	D-Score	13780
White	-0.018	0.003	0.000	50.000	D-Score	13780
Woman	-0.039	0.003	0.000	50.000	D-Score	13780
College	0.001	0.003	0.838	50.000	D-Score	13780
Religious	0.070	0.004	0.000	50.000	D-Score	13780
Nonmetro	0.010	0.006	0.081	50.000	D-Score	13780
California	-0.007	0.005	0.129	50.000	D-Score	13780
Pennsylvania	-0.002	0.008	0.837	50.000	D-Score	13780
New York	-0.031	0.007	0.000	50.000	D-Score	13780
Florida	0.003	0.008	0.747	50.000	D-Score	13780
Illinois	-0.004	0.009	0.620	50.000	D-Score	13780
Liberal	-0.113	0.002	0.000	200.000	D-Score	42738
Age	0.056	0.007	0.000	200.000	D-Score	42738
White	-0.013	0.002	0.000	200.000	D-Score	42738
Woman	-0.045	0.002	0.000	200.000	D-Score	42738
College	-0.001	0.002	0.563	200.000	D-Score	42738
Religious	0.076	0.002	0.000	200.000	D-Score	42738
Nonmetro	0.010	0.003	0.001	200.000	D-Score	42738
California	-0.013	0.003	0.000	200.000	D-Score	42738
Pennsylvania	-0.002	0.004	0.589	200.000	D-Score	42738
New York	-0.023	0.004	0.000	200.000	D-Score	42738
Florida	-0.005	0.005	0.332	200.000	D-Score	42738
Illinois	-0.005	0.004	0.271	200.000	D-Score	42738

HC2 Robust SEs presented.

C.7.4 Temporal Durability (D-Score, No Controls)

Table C33: Coefficients Characterizing Temporal Durability of Post-Pulse Effect (D-Score, No Controls)

Post-Pulse Coef.	SE	p-value	Outcome	Controls?	Days From Pulse Event	N
-0.00	0.01	0.94	A. D-Score	No	1.00	2030
-0.01	0.01	0.46	A. D-Score	No	2.00	2195
-0.01	0.01	0.08	A. D-Score	No	3.00	2198
-0.01	0.01	0.03	A. D-Score	No	4.00	2275
-0.02	0.01	0.01	A. D-Score	No	5.00	2440
-0.02	0.01	0.00	A. D-Score	No	6.00	2567
-0.01	0.01	0.01	A. D-Score	No	7.00	2609
-0.02	0.01	0.00	A. D-Score	No	8.00	2790
-0.02	0.01	0.00	A. D-Score	No	9.00	2862
-0.01	0.01	0.04	A. D-Score	No	10.00	2821
-0.01	0.01	0.02	A. D-Score	No	11.00	2768
-0.01	0.01	0.06	A. D-Score	No	12.00	2871
-0.02	0.01	0.00	A. D-Score	No	13.00	3198
-0.02	0.00	0.00	A. D-Score	No	14.00	3507
-0.02	0.00	0.00	A. D-Score	No	15.00	3662
-0.02	0.00	0.00	A. D-Score	No	16.00	3747
-0.02	0.00	0.00	A. D-Score	No	17.00	3791
-0.02	0.00	0.00	A. D-Score	No	18.00	3833
-0.02	0.00	0.00	A. D-Score	No	19.00	3845
-0.02	0.00	0.00	A. D-Score	No	20.00	3818
-0.02	0.00	0.00	A. D-Score	No	21.00	3856
-0.02	0.00	0.00	A. D-Score	No	22.00	3934
-0.02	0.00	0.00	A. D-Score	No	23.00	3989
-0.03	0.00	0.00	A. D-Score	No	24.00	3982
-0.03	0.00	0.00	A. D-Score	No	25.00	3948
-0.03	0.00	0.00	A. D-Score	No	26.00	3785
-0.02	0.00	0.00	A. D-Score	No	27.00	3638
-0.02	0.00	0.00	A. D-Score	No	28.00	3532
-0.02	0.00	0.00	A. D-Score	No	29.00	3445
-0.02	0.00	0.00	A. D-Score	No	30.00	3299
-0.03	0.00	0.00	A. D-Score	No	31.00	3327
-0.03	0.00	0.00	A. D-Score	No	32.00	3389
-0.03	0.00	0.00	A. D-Score	No	33.00	3383
-0.03	0.00	0.00	A. D-Score	No	34.00	3334
-0.03	0.00	0.00	A. D-Score	No	35.00	3371
-0.03	0.00	0.00	A. D-Score	No	36.00	3388
-0.03	0.00	0.00	A. D-Score	No	37.00	3361
-0.03	0.00	0.00	A. D-Score	No	38.00	3357
-0.03	0.00	0.00	A. D-Score	No	39.00	3400
-0.03	0.00	0.00	A. D-Score	No	40.00	3379
-0.03	0.00	0.00	A. D-Score	No	41.00	3367
-0.03	0.01	0.00	A. D-Score	No	42.00	3343
-0.03	0.00	0.00	A. D-Score	No	43.00	3379
-0.03	0.01	0.00	A. D-Score	No	44.00	3368
-0.03	0.01	0.00	A. D-Score	No	45.00	3356
-0.03	0.01	0.00	A. D-Score	No	46.00	3129
-0.02	0.01	0.00	A. D-Score	No	47.00	2864
-0.02	0.01	0.00	A. D-Score	No	48.00	2705
-0.01	0.01	0.01	A. D-Score	No	49.00	2635
-0.01	0.01	0.01	A. D-Score	No	50.00	2548
-0.02	0.01	0.01	A. D-Score	No	51.00	2449
-0.01	0.01	0.02	A. D-Score	No	52.00	2344
-0.01	0.01	0.04	A. D-Score	No	53.00	2236
-0.02	0.01	0.02	A. D-Score	No	54.00	2068
-0.02	0.01	0.04	A. D-Score	No	55.00	2000
-0.02	0.01	0.05	A. D-Score	No	56.00	1970
-0.02	0.01	0.05	A. D-Score	No	57.00	1934
-0.02	0.01	0.07	A. D-Score	No	58.00	1917
-0.01	0.01	0.21	A. D-Score	No	59.00	1919
-0.00	0.01	0.61	A. D-Score	No	60.00	1943
-0.01	0.01	0.42	A. D-Score	No	61.00	2036
-0.01	0.01	0.30	A. D-Score	No	62.00	2098
-0.00	0.01	0.54	A. D-Score	No	63.00	2192
-0.01	0.01	0.37	A. D-Score	No	64.00	2351
-0.01	0.01	0.09	A. D-Score	No	65.00	2515
-0.01	0.01	0.07	A. D-Score	No	66.00	2672
-0.01	0.01	0.09	A. D-Score	No	67.00	2829
-0.01	0.01	0.14	A. D-Score	No	68.00	3007
-0.01	0.01	0.23	A. D-Score	No	69.00	3137
-0.00	0.00	0.41	A. D-Score	No	70.00	3351
-0.00	0.00	0.55	A. D-Score	No	71.00	3598
-0.00	0.00	0.41	A. D-Score	No	72.00	3975

HC2 robust SEs displayed

C.7.5 Temporal Durability (D-Score, With Controls)

Table C34: Coefficients Characterizing Temporal Durability of Post-Pulse Effect (D-Score, With Controls)

Post-Pulse Coef.	SE	p-value	Outcome	Controls?	Days From Pulse Event	N
0.00	0.01	0.72	A. D-Score	Yes	1.00	2030
-0.00	0.01	0.68	A. D-Score	Yes	2.00	2195
-0.01	0.01	0.08	A. D-Score	Yes	3.00	2198
-0.01	0.01	0.05	A. D-Score	Yes	4.00	2275
-0.01	0.01	0.03	A. D-Score	Yes	5.00	2440
-0.02	0.01	0.01	A. D-Score	Yes	6.00	2567
-0.01	0.01	0.02	A. D-Score	Yes	7.00	2609
-0.01	0.01	0.01	A. D-Score	Yes	8.00	2790
-0.01	0.01	0.01	A. D-Score	Yes	9.00	2862
-0.01	0.01	0.08	A. D-Score	Yes	10.00	2821
-0.01	0.01	0.02	A. D-Score	Yes	11.00	2768
-0.01	0.01	0.10	A. D-Score	Yes	12.00	2871
-0.01	0.00	0.01	A. D-Score	Yes	13.00	3198
-0.01	0.00	0.00	A. D-Score	Yes	14.00	3507
-0.01	0.00	0.01	A. D-Score	Yes	15.00	3662
-0.01	0.00	0.01	A. D-Score	Yes	16.00	3747
-0.01	0.00	0.00	A. D-Score	Yes	17.00	3791
-0.01	0.00	0.00	A. D-Score	Yes	18.00	3833
-0.02	0.00	0.00	A. D-Score	Yes	19.00	3845
-0.02	0.00	0.00	A. D-Score	Yes	20.00	3818
-0.02	0.00	0.00	A. D-Score	Yes	21.00	3856
-0.02	0.00	0.00	A. D-Score	Yes	22.00	3934
-0.02	0.00	0.00	A. D-Score	Yes	23.00	3989
-0.02	0.00	0.00	A. D-Score	Yes	24.00	3982
-0.02	0.00	0.00	A. D-Score	Yes	25.00	3948
-0.02	0.00	0.00	A. D-Score	Yes	26.00	3785
-0.02	0.00	0.00	A. D-Score	Yes	27.00	3638
-0.02	0.00	0.00	A. D-Score	Yes	28.00	3532
-0.02	0.00	0.00	A. D-Score	Yes	29.00	3445
-0.02	0.00	0.00	A. D-Score	Yes	30.00	3299
-0.02	0.00	0.00	A. D-Score	Yes	31.00	3327
-0.02	0.00	0.00	A. D-Score	Yes	32.00	3389
-0.02	0.00	0.00	A. D-Score	Yes	33.00	3383
-0.02	0.00	0.00	A. D-Score	Yes	34.00	3334
-0.02	0.00	0.00	A. D-Score	Yes	35.00	3371
-0.02	0.00	0.00	A. D-Score	Yes	36.00	3388
-0.02	0.00	0.00	A. D-Score	Yes	37.00	3361
-0.02	0.00	0.00	A. D-Score	Yes	38.00	3357
-0.02	0.00	0.00	A. D-Score	Yes	39.00	3400
-0.02	0.00	0.00	A. D-Score	Yes	40.00	3379
-0.02	0.00	0.00	A. D-Score	Yes	41.00	3367
-0.02	0.00	0.00	A. D-Score	Yes	42.00	3343
-0.02	0.00	0.00	A. D-Score	Yes	43.00	3379
-0.02	0.00	0.00	A. D-Score	Yes	44.00	3368
-0.02	0.00	0.00	A. D-Score	Yes	45.00	3356
-0.02	0.01	0.00	A. D-Score	Yes	46.00	3129
-0.01	0.01	0.04	A. D-Score	Yes	47.00	2864
-0.01	0.01	0.13	A. D-Score	Yes	48.00	2705
-0.01	0.01	0.21	A. D-Score	Yes	49.00	2635
-0.01	0.01	0.21	A. D-Score	Yes	50.00	2548
-0.01	0.01	0.15	A. D-Score	Yes	51.00	2449
-0.01	0.01	0.23	A. D-Score	Yes	52.00	2344
-0.01	0.01	0.21	A. D-Score	Yes	53.00	2236
-0.01	0.01	0.10	A. D-Score	Yes	54.00	2068
-0.01	0.01	0.14	A. D-Score	Yes	55.00	2000
-0.01	0.01	0.12	A. D-Score	Yes	56.00	1970
-0.02	0.01	0.09	A. D-Score	Yes	57.00	1934
-0.01	0.01	0.14	A. D-Score	Yes	58.00	1917
-0.01	0.01	0.43	A. D-Score	Yes	59.00	1919
-0.00	0.01	0.88	A. D-Score	Yes	60.00	1943
-0.00	0.01	0.76	A. D-Score	Yes	61.00	2036
-0.00	0.01	0.64	A. D-Score	Yes	62.00	2098
-0.00	0.01	0.97	A. D-Score	Yes	63.00	2192
-0.00	0.01	0.70	A. D-Score	Yes	64.00	2351
-0.01	0.01	0.28	A. D-Score	Yes	65.00	2515
-0.01	0.01	0.29	A. D-Score	Yes	66.00	2672
-0.01	0.01	0.32	A. D-Score	Yes	67.00	2829
-0.01	0.00	0.30	A. D-Score	Yes	68.00	3007
-0.00	0.00	0.36	A. D-Score	Yes	69.00	3137
-0.00	0.00	0.32	A. D-Score	Yes	70.00	3351
-0.00	0.00	0.41	A. D-Score	Yes	71.00	3598
-0.01	0.00	0.15	A. D-Score	Yes	72.00	3975

HC2 robust SEs displayed

C.7.6 Temporal Durability (Heterocentrism, No Controls)

Table C35: Coefficients Characterizing Temporal Durability of Post-Pulse Effect (Heterocentrism, No Controls)

Post-Pulse Coef.	SE	p-value	Outcome	Controls?	Days From Pulse Event	N
-0.01	0.01	0.09	B. Heterocentrism	No	1.00	2025
-0.02	0.01	0.00	B. Heterocentrism	No	2.00	2191
-0.02	0.01	0.00	B. Heterocentrism	No	3.00	2196
-0.02	0.01	0.01	B. Heterocentrism	No	4.00	2276
-0.02	0.01	0.01	B. Heterocentrism	No	5.00	2440
-0.02	0.01	0.00	B. Heterocentrism	No	6.00	2572
-0.01	0.01	0.01	B. Heterocentrism	No	7.00	2613
-0.01	0.01	0.01	B. Heterocentrism	No	8.00	2792
-0.01	0.00	0.00	B. Heterocentrism	No	9.00	2864
-0.01	0.00	0.01	B. Heterocentrism	No	10.00	2822
-0.01	0.00	0.01	B. Heterocentrism	No	11.00	2770
-0.01	0.00	0.03	B. Heterocentrism	No	12.00	2874
-0.01	0.00	0.00	B. Heterocentrism	No	13.00	3198
-0.02	0.00	0.00	B. Heterocentrism	No	14.00	3513
-0.02	0.00	0.00	B. Heterocentrism	No	15.00	3670
-0.02	0.00	0.00	B. Heterocentrism	No	16.00	3754
-0.02	0.00	0.00	B. Heterocentrism	No	17.00	3802
-0.02	0.00	0.00	B. Heterocentrism	No	18.00	3843
-0.02	0.00	0.00	B. Heterocentrism	No	19.00	3854
-0.02	0.00	0.00	B. Heterocentrism	No	20.00	3827
-0.02	0.00	0.00	B. Heterocentrism	No	21.00	3864
-0.02	0.00	0.00	B. Heterocentrism	No	22.00	3941
-0.02	0.00	0.00	B. Heterocentrism	No	23.00	3995
-0.02	0.00	0.00	B. Heterocentrism	No	24.00	3988
-0.02	0.00	0.00	B. Heterocentrism	No	25.00	3950
-0.03	0.00	0.00	B. Heterocentrism	No	26.00	3788
-0.02	0.00	0.00	B. Heterocentrism	No	27.00	3641
-0.02	0.00	0.00	B. Heterocentrism	No	28.00	3533
-0.02	0.00	0.00	B. Heterocentrism	No	29.00	3443
-0.02	0.00	0.00	B. Heterocentrism	No	30.00	3296
-0.02	0.00	0.00	B. Heterocentrism	No	31.00	3327
-0.02	0.00	0.00	B. Heterocentrism	No	32.00	3382
-0.02	0.00	0.00	B. Heterocentrism	No	33.00	3373
-0.02	0.00	0.00	B. Heterocentrism	No	34.00	3323
-0.02	0.00	0.00	B. Heterocentrism	No	35.00	3360
-0.02	0.00	0.00	B. Heterocentrism	No	36.00	3376
-0.02	0.00	0.00	B. Heterocentrism	No	37.00	3347
-0.02	0.00	0.00	B. Heterocentrism	No	38.00	3345
-0.02	0.00	0.00	B. Heterocentrism	No	39.00	3386
-0.02	0.00	0.00	B. Heterocentrism	No	40.00	3365
-0.02	0.00	0.00	B. Heterocentrism	No	41.00	3352
-0.02	0.00	0.00	B. Heterocentrism	No	42.00	3329
-0.02	0.00	0.00	B. Heterocentrism	No	43.00	3364
-0.02	0.00	0.00	B. Heterocentrism	No	44.00	3354
-0.02	0.00	0.00	B. Heterocentrism	No	45.00	3348
-0.02	0.00	0.00	B. Heterocentrism	No	46.00	3213
-0.02	0.00	0.00	B. Heterocentrism	No	47.00	3022
-0.02	0.00	0.00	B. Heterocentrism	No	48.00	2912
-0.02	0.00	0.00	B. Heterocentrism	No	49.00	2885
-0.02	0.00	0.00	B. Heterocentrism	No	50.00	2900
-0.02	0.00	0.00	B. Heterocentrism	No	51.00	2915
-0.02	0.00	0.00	B. Heterocentrism	No	52.00	2921
-0.02	0.00	0.00	B. Heterocentrism	No	53.00	2901
-0.02	0.00	0.00	B. Heterocentrism	No	54.00	2802
-0.02	0.00	0.00	B. Heterocentrism	No	55.00	2770
-0.02	0.00	0.00	B. Heterocentrism	No	56.00	2801
-0.02	0.00	0.00	B. Heterocentrism	No	57.00	2882
-0.02	0.00	0.00	B. Heterocentrism	No	58.00	2917
-0.02	0.00	0.00	B. Heterocentrism	No	59.00	2920
-0.02	0.00	0.00	B. Heterocentrism	No	60.00	2936
-0.01	0.00	0.00	B. Heterocentrism	No	61.00	2936
-0.02	0.00	0.00	B. Heterocentrism	No	62.00	2925
-0.01	0.00	0.00	B. Heterocentrism	No	63.00	2974
-0.01	0.00	0.00	B. Heterocentrism	No	64.00	3092
-0.01	0.00	0.01	B. Heterocentrism	No	65.00	3156
-0.01	0.00	0.02	B. Heterocentrism	No	66.00	3201
-0.01	0.00	0.05	B. Heterocentrism	No	67.00	3255
-0.01	0.00	0.04	B. Heterocentrism	No	68.00	3344
-0.01	0.00	0.15	B. Heterocentrism	No	69.00	3408
-0.00	0.00	0.40	B. Heterocentrism	No	70.00	3587
-0.00	0.00	0.48	B. Heterocentrism	No	71.00	3776
-0.00	0.00	0.87	B. Heterocentrism	No	72.00	4037

HC2 robust SEs displayed

C.7.7 Temporal Durability (Heterocentrism, With Controls)

Table C36: Coefficients Characterizing Temporal Durability of Post-Pulse Effect (Heterocentrism, With Controls)

Post-Pulse Coef.	SE	p-value	Outcome	Controls?	Days From Pulse Event	N
-0.01	0.01	0.20	B. Heterocentrism	Yes	1.00	2025
-0.01	0.01	0.01	B. Heterocentrism	Yes	2.00	2191
-0.02	0.01	0.01	B. Heterocentrism	Yes	3.00	2196
-0.01	0.01	0.02	B. Heterocentrism	Yes	4.00	2276
-0.01	0.01	0.04	B. Heterocentrism	Yes	5.00	2440
-0.01	0.01	0.01	B. Heterocentrism	Yes	6.00	2572
-0.01	0.00	0.01	B. Heterocentrism	Yes	7.00	2613
-0.01	0.00	0.01	B. Heterocentrism	Yes	8.00	2792
-0.01	0.00	0.01	B. Heterocentrism	Yes	9.00	2864
-0.01	0.00	0.04	B. Heterocentrism	Yes	10.00	2822
-0.01	0.00	0.01	B. Heterocentrism	Yes	11.00	2770
-0.01	0.00	0.05	B. Heterocentrism	Yes	12.00	2874
-0.01	0.00	0.02	B. Heterocentrism	Yes	13.00	3198
-0.01	0.00	0.00	B. Heterocentrism	Yes	14.00	3513
-0.01	0.00	0.00	B. Heterocentrism	Yes	15.00	3670
-0.01	0.00	0.00	B. Heterocentrism	Yes	16.00	3754
-0.01	0.00	0.00	B. Heterocentrism	Yes	17.00	3802
-0.01	0.00	0.00	B. Heterocentrism	Yes	18.00	3843
-0.01	0.00	0.00	B. Heterocentrism	Yes	19.00	3854
-0.01	0.00	0.00	B. Heterocentrism	Yes	20.00	3827
-0.01	0.00	0.00	B. Heterocentrism	Yes	21.00	3864
-0.02	0.00	0.00	B. Heterocentrism	Yes	22.00	3941
-0.02	0.00	0.00	B. Heterocentrism	Yes	23.00	3995
-0.02	0.00	0.00	B. Heterocentrism	Yes	24.00	3988
-0.02	0.00	0.00	B. Heterocentrism	Yes	25.00	3950
-0.02	0.00	0.00	B. Heterocentrism	Yes	26.00	3788
-0.02	0.00	0.00	B. Heterocentrism	Yes	27.00	3641
-0.02	0.00	0.00	B. Heterocentrism	Yes	28.00	3533
-0.01	0.00	0.00	B. Heterocentrism	Yes	29.00	3443
-0.01	0.00	0.00	B. Heterocentrism	Yes	30.00	3296
-0.01	0.00	0.00	B. Heterocentrism	Yes	31.00	3327
-0.02	0.00	0.00	B. Heterocentrism	Yes	32.00	3382
-0.01	0.00	0.00	B. Heterocentrism	Yes	33.00	3373
-0.01	0.00	0.00	B. Heterocentrism	Yes	34.00	3323
-0.02	0.00	0.00	B. Heterocentrism	Yes	35.00	3360
-0.01	0.00	0.00	B. Heterocentrism	Yes	36.00	3376
-0.01	0.00	0.00	B. Heterocentrism	Yes	37.00	3347
-0.01	0.00	0.00	B. Heterocentrism	Yes	38.00	3345
-0.01	0.00	0.02	B. Heterocentrism	Yes	39.00	3386
-0.01	0.00	0.02	B. Heterocentrism	Yes	40.00	3365
-0.01	0.00	0.01	B. Heterocentrism	Yes	41.00	3352
-0.01	0.00	0.01	B. Heterocentrism	Yes	42.00	3329
-0.01	0.00	0.01	B. Heterocentrism	Yes	43.00	3364
-0.01	0.00	0.01	B. Heterocentrism	Yes	44.00	3354
-0.01	0.00	0.00	B. Heterocentrism	Yes	45.00	3348
-0.01	0.00	0.01	B. Heterocentrism	Yes	46.00	3213
-0.01	0.00	0.10	B. Heterocentrism	Yes	47.00	3022
-0.01	0.00	0.12	B. Heterocentrism	Yes	48.00	2912
-0.01	0.00	0.15	B. Heterocentrism	Yes	49.00	2885
-0.01	0.00	0.21	B. Heterocentrism	Yes	50.00	2900
-0.01	0.00	0.14	B. Heterocentrism	Yes	51.00	2915
-0.01	0.00	0.07	B. Heterocentrism	Yes	52.00	2921
-0.01	0.00	0.10	B. Heterocentrism	Yes	53.00	2901
-0.01	0.00	0.02	B. Heterocentrism	Yes	54.00	2802
-0.01	0.00	0.02	B. Heterocentrism	Yes	55.00	2770
-0.01	0.00	0.02	B. Heterocentrism	Yes	56.00	2801
-0.01	0.00	0.03	B. Heterocentrism	Yes	57.00	2882
-0.01	0.00	0.05	B. Heterocentrism	Yes	58.00	2917
-0.01	0.00	0.03	B. Heterocentrism	Yes	59.00	2920
-0.01	0.00	0.09	B. Heterocentrism	Yes	60.00	2936
-0.01	0.00	0.17	B. Heterocentrism	Yes	61.00	2936
-0.01	0.00	0.05	B. Heterocentrism	Yes	62.00	2925
-0.01	0.00	0.11	B. Heterocentrism	Yes	63.00	2974
-0.01	0.00	0.07	B. Heterocentrism	Yes	64.00	3092
-0.01	0.00	0.15	B. Heterocentrism	Yes	65.00	3156
-0.00	0.00	0.27	B. Heterocentrism	Yes	66.00	3201
-0.00	0.00	0.34	B. Heterocentrism	Yes	67.00	3255
-0.01	0.00	0.13	B. Heterocentrism	Yes	68.00	3344
-0.00	0.00	0.25	B. Heterocentrism	Yes	69.00	3408
-0.00	0.00	0.34	B. Heterocentrism	Yes	70.00	3587
-0.00	0.00	0.31	B. Heterocentrism	Yes	71.00	3776
-0.00	0.00	0.37	B. Heterocentrism	Yes	72.00	4037

HC2 robust SEs displayed

C.7.8 Temporal Durability (D-Score Outcome, Control Coefficients)

Table C37: Control Coefficients For Models Characterizing Temporal Durability of Post-Pulse Effect (D-Score, With Controls, Part 1)

covar_name	est	se	pv	nobs	days_out
Liberal	-0.08	0.01	0.00	2030	1
Age	0.01	0.02	0.51	2030	1
White	-0.02	0.01	0.01	2030	1
Woman	-0.03	0.01	0.00	2030	1
College	-0.01	0.01	0.05	2030	1
Religious	0.03	0.01	0.00	2030	1
Non-Metro	0.01	0.01	0.42	2030	1
California	-0.01	0.01	0.23	2030	1
Pennsylvania	0.03	0.02	0.10	2030	1
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.56	2030	1
Florida	0.01	0.01	0.63	2030	1
Illinois	0.01	0.02	0.63	2030	1
Liberal	-0.07	0.01	0.00	2195	2
Age	0.01	0.02	0.69	2195	2
White	-0.01	0.01	0.03	2195	2
Woman	-0.02	0.01	0.00	2195	2
College	-0.01	0.01	0.03	2195	2
Religious	0.03	0.01	0.00	2195	2
Non-Metro	0.01	0.01	0.22	2195	2
California	-0.01	0.01	0.15	2195	2
Pennsylvania	0.03	0.02	0.07	2195	2
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.25	2195	2
Florida	-0.00	0.01	0.91	2195	2
Illinois	0.01	0.02	0.46	2195	2
Liberal	-0.07	0.01	0.00	2198	3
Age	0.04	0.02	0.09	2198	3
White	-0.02	0.01	0.00	2198	3
Woman	-0.02	0.01	0.00	2198	3
College	-0.01	0.01	0.03	2198	3
Religious	0.04	0.01	0.00	2198	3
Non-Metro	0.01	0.01	0.26	2198	3
California	-0.01	0.01	0.21	2198	3
Pennsylvania	0.03	0.02	0.06	2198	3
New York	-0.02	0.01	0.09	2198	3
Florida	-0.00	0.01	0.88	2198	3
Illinois	-0.00	0.02	0.97	2198	3
Liberal	-0.07	0.01	0.00	2275	4
Age	0.05	0.02	0.02	2275	4
White	-0.02	0.01	0.00	2275	4
Woman	-0.02	0.01	0.00	2275	4
College	-0.01	0.01	0.02	2275	4
Religious	0.04	0.01	0.00	2275	4
Non-Metro	0.01	0.01	0.15	2275	4
California	-0.01	0.01	0.16	2275	4
Pennsylvania	0.03	0.02	0.05	2275	4
New York	-0.02	0.01	0.09	2275	4
Florida	0.01	0.01	0.62	2275	4
Illinois	-0.01	0.02	0.75	2275	4
Liberal	-0.07	0.01	0.00	2440	5
Age	0.06	0.02	0.00	2440	5
White	-0.02	0.01	0.01	2440	5
Woman	-0.02	0.01	0.00	2440	5
College	-0.01	0.01	0.09	2440	5
Religious	0.04	0.01	0.00	2440	5
Non-Metro	0.01	0.01	0.25	2440	5
California	-0.01	0.01	0.30	2440	5
Pennsylvania	0.02	0.01	0.18	2440	5
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.33	2440	5
Florida	0.01	0.01	0.30	2440	5
Illinois	-0.01	0.02	0.72	2440	5
Liberal	-0.07	0.01	0.00	2567	6
Age	0.06	0.02	0.00	2567	6
White	-0.01	0.01	0.01	2567	6
Woman	-0.02	0.01	0.00	2567	6
College	-0.01	0.01	0.02	2567	6
Religious	0.04	0.01	0.00	2567	6
Non-Metro	0.01	0.01	0.45	2567	6
California	-0.00	0.01	0.60	2567	6
Pennsylvania	0.02	0.01	0.19	2567	6
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.34	2567	6
Florida	0.01	0.01	0.31	2567	6
Illinois	-0.00	0.02	0.77	2567	6
Liberal	-0.07	0.01	0.00	2609	7
Age	0.07	0.02	0.00	2609	7
White	-0.02	0.01	0.01	2609	7
Woman	-0.02	0.01	0.00	2609	7
College	-0.02	0.01	0.01	2609	7
Religious	0.04	0.01	0.00	2609	7
Non-Metro	0.00	0.01	0.69	2609	7
California	-0.01	0.01	0.38	2609	7
Pennsylvania	0.02	0.01	0.24	2609	7
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.34	2609	7
Florida	0.02	0.01	0.19	2609	7
Illinois	-0.01	0.02	0.75	2609	7
Liberal	-0.07	0.01	0.00	2790	8
Age	0.06	0.02	0.00	2790	8
White	-0.01	0.01	0.01	2790	8
Woman	-0.02	0.01	0.00	2790	8
College	-0.01	0.01	0.08	2790	8
Religious	0.04	0.01	0.00	2790	8
Non-Metro	0.00	0.01	0.94	2790	8
California	-0.01	0.01	0.43	2790	8
Pennsylvania	0.02	0.01	0.23	2790	8
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.28	2790	8
Florida	0.01	0.01	0.33	2790	8
Illinois	-0.01	0.02	0.59	2790	8
Liberal	-0.08	0.01	0.00	2862	9
Age	0.06	0.02	0.00	2862	9
White	-0.01	0.01	0.02	2862	9
Woman	-0.02	0.01	0.00	2862	9
College	-0.01	0.01	0.03	2862	9
Religious	0.03	0.01	0.00	2862	9
Non-Metro	-0.00	0.01	0.80	2862	9
California	-0.00	0.01	0.99	2862	9
Pennsylvania	0.02	0.01	0.11	2862	9
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.57	2862	9
Florida	0.00	0.01	0.84	2862	9
Illinois	0.00	0.01	0.99	2862	9
Liberal	-0.08	0.01	0.00	2821	10
Age	0.05	0.02	0.01	2821	10
White	-0.01	0.01	0.02	2821	10
Woman	-0.02	0.01	0.00	2821	10
College	-0.01	0.01	0.06	2821	10
Religious	0.03	0.01	0.00	2821	10
Non-Metro	0.00	0.01	0.84	2821	10
California	0.00	0.01	0.81	2821	10
Pennsylvania	0.02	0.01	0.08	2821	10
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.60	2821	10
Florida	-0.00	0.01	0.92	2821	10
Illinois	-0.01	0.01	0.68	2821	10
Liberal	-0.08	0.01	0.00	2768	11
Age	0.05	0.02	0.01	2768	11
White	-0.01	0.01	0.03	2768	11
Woman	-0.02	0.01	0.00	2768	11
College	-0.01	0.01	0.02	2768	11
Religious	0.03	0.01	0.00	2768	11
Non-Metro	0.00	0.01	0.85	2768	11
California	0.00	0.01	0.52	2768	11
Pennsylvania	0.03	0.01	0.01	2768	11
New York	-0.00	0.01	0.77	2768	11
Florida	0.00	0.01	0.93	2768	11
Illinois	0.00	0.01	0.88	2768	11
Liberal	-0.08	0.01	0.00	2871	12
Age	0.04	0.02	0.02	2871	12
White	-0.01	0.01	0.01	2871	12
Woman	-0.02	0.01	0.00	2871	12
College	-0.01	0.01	0.04	2871	12
Religious	0.04	0.01	0.00	2871	12
Non-Metro	0.00	0.01	0.98	2871	12
California	0.00	0.01	0.84	2871	12
Pennsylvania	0.03	0.02	0.09	2871	12
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.53	2871	12
Florida	-0.00	0.01	0.90	2871	12
Illinois	0.01	0.01	0.62	2871	12
Liberal	-0.09	0.00	0.00	3198	13
Age	0.03	0.02	0.05	3198	13
White	-0.01	0.01	0.01	3198	13
Woman	-0.02	0.01	0.00	3198	13
College	-0.01	0.01	0.17	3198	13
Religious	0.04	0.01	0.00	3198	13

Table C38: Control Coefficients For Models Characterizing Temporal Durability of Post-Pulse Effect (D-Score, With Controls, Part 2)

covar_name	est	se	pv	nobs	days_cut
Non-Metro	0.00	0.01	0.67	3198	13
California	0.01	0.01	0.47	3198	13
Pennsylvania	0.02	0.01	0.14	3198	13
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.33	3198	13
Florida	0.00	0.01	0.89	3198	13
Illinois	0.00	0.01	0.71	3198	13
Liberal	-0.08	0.00	0.00	3507	14
Age	0.04	0.02	0.02	3507	14
White	-0.02	0.00	0.00	3507	14
Woman	-0.03	0.00	0.00	3507	14
College	-0.01	0.00	0.09	3507	14
Religious	0.04	0.01	0.00	3507	14
Non-Metro	0.01	0.01	0.46	3507	14
California	0.00	0.01	0.48	3507	14
Pennsylvania	0.02	0.01	0.13	3507	14
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.24	3507	14
Florida	-0.00	0.01	0.98	3507	14
Illinois	0.01	0.01	0.55	3507	14
Liberal	-0.08	0.00	0.00	3662	15
Age	0.04	0.02	0.01	3662	15
White	-0.01	0.00	0.00	3662	15
Woman	-0.03	0.00	0.00	3662	15
College	-0.01	0.00	0.04	3662	15
Religious	0.03	0.00	0.00	3662	15
Non-Metro	0.01	0.01	0.35	3662	15
California	0.01	0.01	0.40	3662	15
Pennsylvania	0.02	0.01	0.21	3662	15
New York	-0.02	0.01	0.12	3662	15
Florida	-0.00	0.01	0.92	3662	15
Illinois	0.00	0.01	0.85	3662	15
Liberal	-0.08	0.00	0.00	3747	16
Age	0.05	0.02	0.00	3747	16
White	-0.02	0.00	0.00	3747	16
Woman	-0.03	0.00	0.00	3747	16
College	-0.01	0.00	0.08	3747	16
Religious	0.04	0.00	0.00	3747	16
Non-Metro	0.01	0.01	0.25	3747	16
California	0.00	0.01	0.49	3747	16
Pennsylvania	0.02	0.01	0.07	3747	16
New York	-0.02	0.01	0.16	3747	16
Florida	0.00	0.01	0.95	3747	16
Illinois	0.00	0.01	0.95	3747	16
Liberal	-0.08	0.00	0.00	3791	17
Age	0.05	0.02	0.00	3791	17
White	-0.02	0.00	0.00	3791	17
Woman	-0.02	0.00	0.00	3791	17
College	-0.01	0.00	0.03	3791	17
Religious	0.04	0.00	0.00	3791	17
Non-Metro	0.01	0.01	0.24	3791	17
California	0.00	0.01	0.75	3791	17
Pennsylvania	0.02	0.01	0.09	3791	17
New York	-0.02	0.01	0.12	3791	17
Florida	0.00	0.01	0.88	3791	17
Illinois	-0.00	0.01	0.96	3791	17
Liberal	-0.08	0.00	0.00	3833	18
Age	0.05	0.02	0.00	3833	18
White	-0.02	0.00	0.00	3833	18
Woman	-0.02	0.00	0.00	3833	18
College	-0.01	0.00	0.06	3833	18
Religious	0.03	0.00	0.00	3833	18
Non-Metro	0.01	0.01	0.18	3833	18
California	0.00	0.01	0.70	3833	18
Pennsylvania	0.02	0.01	0.09	3833	18
New York	-0.02	0.01	0.03	3833	18
Florida	-0.00	0.01	0.79	3833	18
Illinois	-0.01	0.01	0.63	3833	18
Liberal	-0.08	0.00	0.00	3845	19
Age	0.05	0.02	0.00	3845	19
White	-0.02	0.00	0.00	3845	19
Woman	-0.02	0.00	0.00	3845	19
College	-0.01	0.00	0.14	3845	19
Religious	0.03	0.00	0.00	3845	19
Non-Metro	0.01	0.01	0.13	3845	19
California	-0.00	0.01	0.76	3845	19
Pennsylvania	0.02	0.01	0.20	3845	19
New York	-0.02	0.01	0.03	3845	19
Florida	-0.00	0.01	0.72	3845	19
Illinois	-0.00	0.01	0.78	3845	19
Liberal	-0.08	0.00	0.00	3818	20
Age	0.04	0.02	0.01	3818	20
White	-0.02	0.00	0.00	3818	20
Woman	-0.02	0.00	0.00	3818	20
College	-0.01	0.00	0.16	3818	20
Religious	0.03	0.00	0.00	3818	20
Non-Metro	0.01	0.01	0.10	3818	20
California	-0.00	0.01	0.58	3818	20
Pennsylvania	0.02	0.01	0.14	3818	20
New York	-0.02	0.01	0.04	3818	20
Florida	-0.00	0.01	0.71	3818	20
Illinois	-0.00	0.01	0.94	3818	20
Liberal	-0.08	0.00	0.00	3856	21
Age	0.04	0.02	0.01	3856	21
White	-0.02	0.00	0.00	3856	21
Woman	-0.02	0.00	0.00	3856	21
College	-0.01	0.00	0.10	3856	21
Religious	0.03	0.00	0.00	3856	21
Non-Metro	0.01	0.01	0.17	3856	21
California	-0.01	0.01	0.45	3856	21
Pennsylvania	0.02	0.01	0.14	3856	21
New York	-0.02	0.01	0.02	3856	21
Florida	-0.01	0.01	0.54	3856	21
Illinois	0.00	0.01	0.92	3856	21
Liberal	-0.08	0.00	0.00	3934	22
Age	0.04	0.02	0.01	3934	22
White	-0.02	0.00	0.00	3934	22
Woman	-0.02	0.00	0.00	3934	22
College	-0.01	0.00	0.14	3934	22
Religious	0.03	0.00	0.00	3934	22
Non-Metro	0.01	0.01	0.12	3934	22
California	-0.01	0.01	0.39	3934	22
Pennsylvania	0.02	0.01	0.19	3934	22
New York	-0.03	0.01	0.00	3934	22
Florida	-0.01	0.01	0.50	3934	22
Illinois	-0.00	0.01	0.90	3934	22
Liberal	-0.08	0.00	0.00	3989	23
Age	0.04	0.02	0.01	3989	23
White	-0.02	0.00	0.00	3989	23
Woman	-0.02	0.00	0.00	3989	23
College	-0.01	0.00	0.27	3989	23
Religious	0.03	0.00	0.00	3989	23
Non-Metro	0.01	0.01	0.07	3989	23
California	-0.00	0.01	0.52	3989	23
Pennsylvania	0.02	0.01	0.20	3989	23
New York	-0.03	0.01	0.01	3989	23
Florida	-0.01	0.01	0.44	3989	23
Illinois	-0.00	0.01	0.72	3989	23
Liberal	-0.08	0.00	0.00	3982	24
Age	0.04	0.02	0.00	3982	24
White	-0.02	0.00	0.00	3982	24
Woman	-0.02	0.00	0.00	3982	24
College	-0.01	0.00	0.28	3982	24
Religious	0.03	0.00	0.00	3982	24
Non-Metro	0.02	0.01	0.03	3982	24
California	-0.01	0.01	0.38	3982	24
Pennsylvania	0.02	0.01	0.14	3982	24
New York	-0.03	0.01	0.01	3982	24
Florida	-0.01	0.01	0.32	3982	24
Illinois	-0.01	0.01	0.69	3982	24
Liberal	-0.08	0.00	0.00	3948	25
Age	0.04	0.02	0.00	3948	25
White	-0.02	0.00	0.00	3948	25
Woman	-0.02	0.00	0.00	3948	25
College	-0.01	0.00	0.27	3948	25
Religious	0.03	0.00	0.00	3948	25
Non-Metro	0.02	0.01	0.03	3948	25
California	-0.01	0.01	0.32	3948	25
Pennsylvania	0.02	0.01	0.07	3948	25
New York	-0.03	0.01	0.00	3948	25
Florida	-0.01	0.01	0.34	3948	25
Illinois	-0.01	0.01	0.45	3948	25

Table C39: Control Coefficients For Models Characterizing Temporal Durability of Post-Pulse Effect (D-Score, With Controls, Part 3)

covar_name	est	se	pv	nobs	days_cut
Liberal	-0.08	0.00	0.00	3785	26
Age	0.05	0.02	0.00	3785	26
White	-0.02	0.00	0.00	3785	26
Woman	-0.02	0.00	0.00	3785	26
College	-0.01	0.00	0.13	3785	26
Religious	0.03	0.00	0.00	3785	26
Non-Metro	0.02	0.01	0.03	3785	26
California	-0.01	0.01	0.19	3785	26
Pennsylvania	0.02	0.01	0.05	3785	26
New York	-0.03	0.01	0.00	3785	26
Florida	-0.01	0.01	0.33	3785	26
Illinois	-0.01	0.01	0.33	3785	26
Liberal	-0.07	0.00	0.00	3638	27
Age	0.05	0.02	0.00	3638	27
White	-0.02	0.00	0.00	3638	27
Woman	-0.02	0.00	0.00	3638	27
College	-0.01	0.01	0.13	3638	27
Religious	0.03	0.01	0.00	3638	27
Non-Metro	0.02	0.01	0.02	3638	27
California	-0.01	0.01	0.10	3638	27
Pennsylvania	0.02	0.01	0.04	3638	27
New York	-0.03	0.01	0.01	3638	27
Florida	-0.01	0.01	0.39	3638	27
Illinois	-0.01	0.01	0.36	3638	27
Liberal	-0.07	0.00	0.00	3532	28
Age	0.04	0.02	0.01	3532	28
White	-0.02	0.00	0.00	3532	28
Woman	-0.02	0.00	0.00	3532	28
College	-0.01	0.01	0.24	3532	28
Religious	0.03	0.01	0.00	3532	28
Non-Metro	0.02	0.01	0.02	3532	28
California	-0.01	0.01	0.09	3532	28
Pennsylvania	0.03	0.01	0.03	3532	28
New York	-0.02	0.01	0.01	3532	28
Florida	-0.01	0.01	0.38	3532	28
Illinois	-0.01	0.01	0.29	3532	28
Liberal	-0.08	0.00	0.00	3445	29
Age	0.04	0.02	0.02	3445	29
White	-0.02	0.01	0.00	3445	29
Woman	-0.02	0.00	0.00	3445	29
College	-0.01	0.01	0.27	3445	29
Religious	0.03	0.01	0.00	3445	29
Non-Metro	0.02	0.01	0.01	3445	29
California	-0.01	0.01	0.10	3445	29
Pennsylvania	0.03	0.01	0.04	3445	29
New York	-0.03	0.01	0.01	3445	29
Florida	-0.01	0.01	0.36	3445	29
Illinois	-0.01	0.01	0.34	3445	29
Liberal	-0.08	0.01	0.00	3299	30
Age	0.03	0.02	0.05	3299	30
White	-0.02	0.01	0.00	3299	30
Woman	-0.02	0.00	0.00	3299	30
College	-0.00	0.01	0.40	3299	30
Religious	0.03	0.01	0.00	3299	30
Non-Metro	0.02	0.01	0.00	3299	30
California	-0.01	0.01	0.11	3299	30
Pennsylvania	0.03	0.01	0.01	3299	30
New York	-0.02	0.01	0.06	3299	30
Florida	-0.01	0.01	0.25	3299	30
Illinois	-0.01	0.01	0.67	3299	30
Liberal	-0.08	0.01	0.00	3327	31
Age	0.04	0.02	0.02	3327	31
White	-0.02	0.01	0.00	3327	31
Woman	-0.02	0.00	0.00	3327	31
College	-0.01	0.01	0.15	3327	31
Religious	0.03	0.01	0.00	3327	31
Non-Metro	0.02	0.01	0.01	3327	31
California	-0.01	0.01	0.14	3327	31
Pennsylvania	0.03	0.01	0.03	3327	31
New York	-0.02	0.01	0.08	3327	31
Florida	-0.01	0.01	0.22	3327	31
Illinois	0.00	0.01	0.93	3327	31
Liberal	-0.08	0.01	0.00	3389	32
Age	0.04	0.02	0.03	3389	32
White	-0.02	0.01	0.00	3389	32
Woman	-0.02	0.00	0.00	3389	32
College	-0.01	0.01	0.14	3389	32
Religious	0.03	0.01	0.00	3389	32
Non-Metro	0.02	0.01	0.01	3389	32
California	-0.01	0.01	0.30	3389	32
Pennsylvania	0.02	0.01	0.10	3389	32
New York	-0.02	0.01	0.05	3389	32
Florida	-0.02	0.01	0.18	3389	32
Illinois	0.00	0.01	0.91	3389	32
Liberal	-0.08	0.01	0.00	3383	33
Age	0.04	0.02	0.03	3383	33
White	-0.02	0.01	0.00	3383	33
Woman	-0.03	0.00	0.00	3383	33
College	-0.01	0.01	0.08	3383	33
Religious	0.04	0.01	0.00	3383	33
Non-Metro	0.02	0.01	0.01	3383	33
California	-0.01	0.01	0.30	3383	33
Pennsylvania	0.02	0.01	0.09	3383	33
New York	-0.02	0.01	0.08	3383	33
Florida	-0.01	0.01	0.55	3383	33
Illinois	0.00	0.01	0.98	3383	33
Liberal	-0.08	0.01	0.00	3334	34
Age	0.04	0.02	0.03	3334	34
White	-0.02	0.01	0.00	3334	34
Woman	-0.03	0.00	0.00	3334	34
College	-0.01	0.01	0.07	3334	34
Religious	0.04	0.01	0.00	3334	34
Non-Metro	0.02	0.01	0.01	3334	34
California	-0.01	0.01	0.41	3334	34
Pennsylvania	0.02	0.01	0.05	3334	34
New York	-0.02	0.01	0.08	3334	34
Florida	-0.01	0.01	0.53	3334	34
Illinois	-0.01	0.01	0.73	3334	34
Liberal	-0.08	0.01	0.00	3371	35
Age	0.04	0.02	0.02	3371	35
White	-0.02	0.01	0.00	3371	35
Woman	-0.03	0.00	0.00	3371	35
College	-0.01	0.01	0.08	3371	35
Religious	0.04	0.01	0.00	3371	35
Non-Metro	0.02	0.01	0.02	3371	35
California	-0.00	0.01	0.60	3371	35
Pennsylvania	0.02	0.01	0.09	3371	35
New York	-0.02	0.01	0.08	3371	35
Florida	-0.01	0.01	0.63	3371	35
Illinois	-0.01	0.01	0.60	3371	35
Liberal	-0.08	0.01	0.00	3388	36
Age	0.04	0.02	0.02	3388	36
White	-0.02	0.01	0.00	3388	36
Woman	-0.03	0.00	0.00	3388	36
College	-0.01	0.01	0.11	3388	36
Religious	0.04	0.01	0.00	3388	36
Non-Metro	0.02	0.01	0.01	3388	36
California	-0.01	0.01	0.47	3388	36
Pennsylvania	0.02	0.01	0.18	3388	36
New York	-0.02	0.01	0.07	3388	36
Florida	-0.00	0.01	0.79	3388	36
Illinois	-0.01	0.01	0.54	3388	36
Liberal	-0.08	0.01	0.00	3361	37
Age	0.04	0.02	0.01	3361	37
White	-0.02	0.01	0.00	3361	37
Woman	-0.03	0.00	0.00	3361	37
College	-0.01	0.01	0.09	3361	37
Religious	0.04	0.01	0.00	3361	37
Non-Metro	0.02	0.01	0.02	3361	37
California	-0.01	0.01	0.37	3361	37
Pennsylvania	0.02	0.01	0.09	3361	37
New York	-0.02	0.01	0.15	3361	37
Florida	-0.00	0.01	0.73	3361	37
Illinois	-0.01	0.01	0.57	3361	37
Liberal	-0.08	0.01	0.00	3357	38
Age	0.05	0.02	0.01	3357	38
White	-0.01	0.01	0.00	3357	38
Woman	-0.03	0.00	0.00	3357	38
College	-0.01	0.01	0.04	3357	38
Religious	0.04	0.01	0.00	3357	38

Table C40: Control Coefficients For Models Characterizing Temporal Durability of Post-Pulse Effect (D-Score, With Controls, Part 4)

covar_name	est	se	pv	nobs	days_cut
Non-Metro	0.02	0.01	0.05	3357	38
California	-0.01	0.01	0.28	3357	38
Pennsylvania	0.02	0.01	0.15	3357	38
New York	-0.02	0.01	0.11	3357	38
Florida	-0.00	0.01	0.81	3357	38
Illinois	-0.01	0.01	0.58	3357	38
Liberal	-0.08	0.01	0.00	3400	39
Age	0.04	0.02	0.02	3400	39
White	-0.01	0.01	0.01	3400	39
Woman	-0.03	0.00	0.00	3400	39
College	-0.01	0.01	0.04	3400	39
Religious	0.04	0.01	0.00	3400	39
Non-Metro	0.01	0.01	0.07	3400	39
California	-0.00	0.01	0.68	3400	39
Pennsylvania	0.03	0.01	0.06	3400	39
New York	-0.02	0.01	0.13	3400	39
Florida	-0.00	0.01	0.96	3400	39
Illinois	0.01	0.01	0.24	3400	39
Liberal	-0.08	0.01	0.00	3379	40
Age	0.04	0.02	0.01	3379	40
White	-0.01	0.01	0.01	3379	40
Woman	-0.03	0.00	0.00	3379	40
College	-0.01	0.01	0.04	3379	40
Religious	0.04	0.01	0.00	3379	40
Non-Metro	0.01	0.01	0.14	3379	40
California	-0.00	0.01	0.56	3379	40
Pennsylvania	0.02	0.01	0.12	3379	40
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.17	3379	40
Florida	0.00	0.01	0.87	3379	40
Illinois	0.01	0.01	0.24	3379	40
Liberal	-0.08	0.01	0.00	3367	41
Age	0.04	0.02	0.02	3367	41
White	-0.01	0.01	0.01	3367	41
Woman	-0.03	0.00	0.00	3367	41
College	-0.01	0.01	0.04	3367	41
Religious	0.04	0.01	0.00	3367	41
Non-Metro	0.01	0.01	0.13	3367	41
California	-0.00	0.01	0.49	3367	41
Pennsylvania	0.02	0.01	0.11	3367	41
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.19	3367	41
Florida	0.00	0.01	0.93	3367	41
Illinois	0.01	0.01	0.25	3367	41
Liberal	-0.08	0.01	0.00	3343	42
Age	0.05	0.02	0.01	3343	42
White	-0.01	0.01	0.01	3343	42
Woman	-0.03	0.00	0.00	3343	42
College	-0.01	0.01	0.02	3343	42
Religious	0.04	0.01	0.00	3343	42
Non-Metro	0.01	0.01	0.20	3343	42
California	-0.00	0.01	0.56	3343	42
Pennsylvania	0.02	0.01	0.16	3343	42
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.23	3343	42
Florida	-0.00	0.01	0.97	3343	42
Illinois	0.01	0.01	0.22	3343	42
Liberal	-0.08	0.01	0.00	3379	43
Age	0.04	0.02	0.01	3379	43
White	-0.01	0.01	0.02	3379	43
Woman	-0.03	0.00	0.00	3379	43
College	-0.01	0.01	0.03	3379	43
Religious	0.04	0.01	0.00	3379	43
Non-Metro	0.01	0.01	0.35	3379	43
California	-0.01	0.01	0.39	3379	43
Pennsylvania	0.01	0.01	0.37	3379	43
New York	-0.02	0.01	0.15	3379	43
Florida	-0.00	0.01	0.87	3379	43
Illinois	0.02	0.01	0.15	3379	43
Liberal	-0.08	0.01	0.00	3368	44
Age	0.04	0.02	0.01	3368	44
White	-0.01	0.01	0.02	3368	44
Woman	-0.03	0.00	0.00	3368	44
College	-0.01	0.01	0.02	3368	44
Religious	0.04	0.01	0.00	3368	44
Non-Metro	0.00	0.01	0.73	3368	44
California	-0.01	0.01	0.31	3368	44
Pennsylvania	0.01	0.01	0.56	3368	44
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.22	3368	44
Florida	-0.00	0.01	0.79	3368	44
Illinois	0.01	0.01	0.19	3368	44
Liberal	-0.08	0.01	0.00	3356	45
Age	0.04	0.02	0.02	3356	45
White	-0.01	0.01	0.01	3356	45
Woman	-0.03	0.00	0.00	3356	45
College	-0.01	0.01	0.02	3356	45
Religious	0.04	0.01	0.00	3356	45
Non-Metro	-0.00	0.01	0.86	3356	45
California	-0.01	0.01	0.33	3356	45
Pennsylvania	0.01	0.01	0.58	3356	45
New York	-0.02	0.01	0.09	3356	45
Florida	-0.00	0.01	0.72	3356	45
Illinois	0.01	0.01	0.18	3356	45
Liberal	-0.08	0.01	0.00	3129	46
Age	0.03	0.02	0.12	3129	46
White	-0.01	0.01	0.01	3129	46
Woman	-0.03	0.01	0.00	3129	46
College	-0.01	0.01	0.03	3129	46
Religious	0.04	0.01	0.00	3129	46
Non-Metro	-0.00	0.01	0.93	3129	46
California	-0.01	0.01	0.29	3129	46
Pennsylvania	0.01	0.02	0.51	3129	46
New York	-0.02	0.01	0.08	3129	46
Florida	-0.00	0.01	0.67	3129	46
Illinois	0.01	0.01	0.27	3129	46
Liberal	-0.08	0.01	0.00	2864	47
Age	0.03	0.02	0.08	2864	47
White	-0.01	0.01	0.05	2864	47
Woman	-0.03	0.01	0.00	2864	47
College	-0.01	0.01	0.03	2864	47
Religious	0.03	0.01	0.00	2864	47
Non-Metro	-0.00	0.01	0.93	2864	47
California	-0.01	0.01	0.22	2864	47
Pennsylvania	0.02	0.02	0.32	2864	47
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.20	2864	47
Florida	-0.00	0.01	0.72	2864	47
Illinois	0.01	0.01	0.35	2864	47
Liberal	-0.08	0.01	0.00	2705	48
Age	0.03	0.02	0.07	2705	48
White	-0.01	0.01	0.04	2705	48
Woman	-0.03	0.01	0.00	2705	48
College	-0.01	0.01	0.02	2705	48
Religious	0.03	0.01	0.00	2705	48
Non-Metro	-0.00	0.01	0.77	2705	48
California	-0.01	0.01	0.23	2705	48
Pennsylvania	0.02	0.02	0.32	2705	48
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.22	2705	48
Florida	-0.01	0.01	0.55	2705	48
Illinois	0.01	0.01	0.28	2705	48
Liberal	-0.08	0.01	0.00	2635	49
Age	0.04	0.02	0.06	2635	49
White	-0.01	0.01	0.07	2635	49
Woman	-0.03	0.01	0.00	2635	49
College	-0.02	0.01	0.01	2635	49
Religious	0.03	0.01	0.00	2635	49
Non-Metro	-0.00	0.01	0.76	2635	49
California	-0.01	0.01	0.26	2635	49
Pennsylvania	0.02	0.02	0.33	2635	49
New York	-0.02	0.01	0.19	2635	49
Florida	-0.01	0.01	0.61	2635	49
Illinois	0.01	0.01	0.24	2635	49
Liberal	-0.08	0.01	0.00	2548	50
Age	0.04	0.02	0.05	2548	50
White	-0.01	0.01	0.07	2548	50
Woman	-0.03	0.01	0.00	2548	50
College	-0.02	0.01	0.01	2548	50
Religious	0.03	0.01	0.00	2548	50
Non-Metro	-0.00	0.01	0.75	2548	50
California	-0.01	0.01	0.19	2548	50
Pennsylvania	0.02	0.02	0.28	2548	50
New York	-0.02	0.01	0.19	2548	50
Florida	-0.01	0.01	0.56	2548	50
Illinois	0.01	0.01	0.18	2548	50

Table C41: Control Coefficients For Models Characterizing Temporal Durability of Post-Pulse Effect (D-Score, With Controls, Part 5)

covar_name	est	se	pv	nobs	days_cut
Liberal	-0.08	0.01	0.00	2449	51
Age	0.04	0.02	0.07	2449	51
White	-0.01	0.01	0.08	2449	51
Woman	-0.03	0.01	0.00	2449	51
College	-0.02	0.01	0.01	2449	51
Religious	0.03	0.01	0.00	2449	51
Non-Metro	-0.00	0.01	0.69	2449	51
California	-0.01	0.01	0.32	2449	51
Pennsylvania	0.02	0.02	0.20	2449	51
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.22	2449	51
Florida	-0.01	0.01	0.56	2449	51
Illinois	0.02	0.01	0.14	2449	51
Liberal	-0.08	0.01	0.00	2344	52
Age	0.03	0.02	0.09	2344	52
White	-0.01	0.01	0.09	2344	52
Woman	-0.03	0.01	0.00	2344	52
College	-0.02	0.01	0.01	2344	52
Religious	0.03	0.01	0.00	2344	52
Non-Metro	-0.01	0.01	0.61	2344	52
California	-0.01	0.01	0.50	2344	52
Pennsylvania	0.02	0.02	0.33	2344	52
New York	-0.02	0.01	0.18	2344	52
Florida	-0.00	0.01	0.74	2344	52
Illinois	0.02	0.01	0.17	2344	52
Liberal	-0.08	0.01	0.00	2236	53
Age	0.03	0.02	0.17	2236	53
White	-0.01	0.01	0.05	2236	53
Woman	-0.03	0.01	0.00	2236	53
College	-0.02	0.01	0.01	2236	53
Religious	0.03	0.01	0.00	2236	53
Non-Metro	-0.00	0.01	0.71	2236	53
California	-0.01	0.01	0.42	2236	53
Pennsylvania	0.02	0.02	0.19	2236	53
New York	-0.02	0.01	0.11	2236	53
Florida	-0.01	0.01	0.70	2236	53
Illinois	0.02	0.01	0.15	2236	53
Liberal	-0.08	0.01	0.00	2068	54
Age	0.03	0.02	0.13	2068	54
White	-0.01	0.01	0.05	2068	54
Woman	-0.03	0.01	0.00	2068	54
College	-0.02	0.01	0.01	2068	54
Religious	0.03	0.01	0.00	2068	54
Non-Metro	-0.00	0.01	0.65	2068	54
California	-0.01	0.01	0.27	2068	54
Pennsylvania	0.02	0.02	0.35	2068	54
New York	-0.02	0.01	0.11	2068	54
Florida	-0.01	0.01	0.60	2068	54
Illinois	0.01	0.01	0.71	2068	54
Liberal	-0.08	0.01	0.00	2000	55
Age	0.03	0.02	0.21	2000	55
White	-0.01	0.01	0.05	2000	55
Woman	-0.02	0.01	0.00	2000	55
College	-0.02	0.01	0.02	2000	55
Religious	0.03	0.01	0.00	2000	55
Non-Metro	-0.00	0.01	0.75	2000	55
California	-0.01	0.01	0.36	2000	55
Pennsylvania	0.02	0.02	0.29	2000	55
New York	-0.02	0.01	0.20	2000	55
Florida	-0.01	0.01	0.43	2000	55
Illinois	0.01	0.01	0.55	2000	55
Liberal	-0.08	0.01	0.00	1970	56
Age	0.03	0.02	0.20	1970	56
White	-0.01	0.01	0.05	1970	56
Woman	-0.02	0.01	0.00	1970	56
College	-0.01	0.01	0.03	1970	56
Religious	0.03	0.01	0.00	1970	56
Non-Metro	-0.00	0.01	0.65	1970	56
California	-0.01	0.01	0.39	1970	56
Pennsylvania	0.02	0.02	0.28	1970	56
New York	-0.02	0.01	0.21	1970	56
Florida	-0.01	0.01	0.43	1970	56
Illinois	0.01	0.02	0.46	1970	56
Liberal	-0.08	0.01	0.00	1934	57
Age	0.02	0.02	0.35	1934	57
White	-0.01	0.01	0.06	1934	57
Woman	-0.02	0.01	0.00	1934	57
College	-0.01	0.01	0.07	1934	57
Religious	0.03	0.01	0.00	1934	57
Non-Metro	-0.00	0.01	0.75	1934	57
California	-0.01	0.01	0.38	1934	57
Pennsylvania	0.02	0.02	0.29	1934	57
New York	-0.02	0.01	0.17	1934	57
Florida	-0.01	0.01	0.39	1934	57
Illinois	0.01	0.02	0.49	1934	57
Liberal	-0.08	0.01	0.00	1917	58
Age	0.02	0.02	0.36	1917	58
White	-0.02	0.01	0.02	1917	58
Woman	-0.02	0.01	0.00	1917	58
College	-0.02	0.01	0.02	1917	58
Religious	0.03	0.01	0.00	1917	58
Non-Metro	-0.00	0.01	0.87	1917	58
California	-0.01	0.01	0.59	1917	58
Pennsylvania	0.03	0.02	0.07	1917	58
New York	-0.02	0.01	0.20	1917	58
Florida	-0.01	0.01	0.41	1917	58
Illinois	0.01	0.02	0.68	1917	58
Liberal	-0.08	0.01	0.00	1919	59
Age	0.03	0.02	0.25	1919	59
White	-0.02	0.01	0.01	1919	59
Woman	-0.02	0.01	0.00	1919	59
College	-0.02	0.01	0.01	1919	59
Religious	0.03	0.01	0.00	1919	59
Non-Metro	-0.00	0.01	0.93	1919	59
California	-0.01	0.01	0.47	1919	59
Pennsylvania	0.04	0.02	0.02	1919	59
New York	-0.02	0.01	0.08	1919	59
Florida	-0.01	0.01	0.48	1919	59
Illinois	0.00	0.02	0.84	1919	59
Liberal	-0.08	0.01	0.00	1943	60
Age	0.02	0.02	0.26	1943	60
White	-0.02	0.01	0.01	1943	60
Woman	-0.02	0.01	0.00	1943	60
College	-0.02	0.01	0.02	1943	60
Religious	0.03	0.01	0.00	1943	60
Non-Metro	0.00	0.01	0.82	1943	60
California	-0.01	0.01	0.32	1943	60
Pennsylvania	0.04	0.02	0.02	1943	60
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.28	1943	60
Florida	-0.00	0.01	0.71	1943	60
Illinois	-0.01	0.02	0.55	1943	60
Liberal	-0.08	0.01	0.00	2036	61
Age	0.03	0.02	0.14	2036	61
White	-0.01	0.01	0.02	2036	61
Woman	-0.03	0.01	0.00	2036	61
College	-0.02	0.01	0.01	2036	61
Religious	0.03	0.01	0.00	2036	61
Non-Metro	0.00	0.01	0.70	2036	61
California	-0.01	0.01	0.34	2036	61
Pennsylvania	0.05	0.02	0.01	2036	61
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.27	2036	61
Florida	-0.00	0.01	0.84	2036	61
Illinois	-0.00	0.02	0.83	2036	61
Liberal	-0.08	0.01	0.00	2098	62
Age	0.03	0.02	0.12	2098	62
White	-0.01	0.01	0.02	2098	62
Woman	-0.02	0.01	0.00	2098	62
College	-0.02	0.01	0.01	2098	62
Religious	0.03	0.01	0.00	2098	62
Non-Metro	0.00	0.01	0.72	2098	62
California	-0.01	0.01	0.30	2098	62
Pennsylvania	0.05	0.02	0.01	2098	62
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.41	2098	62
Florida	-0.00	0.01	0.81	2098	62
Illinois	-0.00	0.02	0.95	2098	62
Liberal	-0.08	0.01	0.00	2192	63
Age	0.03	0.02	0.19	2192	63
White	-0.01	0.01	0.03	2192	63
Woman	-0.02	0.01	0.00	2192	63
College	-0.01	0.01	0.02	2192	63
Religious	0.03	0.01	0.00	2192	63

Table C42: Control Coefficients For Models Characterizing Temporal Durability of Post-Pulse Effect (D-Score, With Controls, Part 6)

covar_name	est	se	pv	nobs	days_cut
Non-Metro	0.00	0.01	0.78	2192	63
California	-0.01	0.01	0.27	2192	63
Pennsylvania	0.05	0.02	0.00	2192	63
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.41	2192	63
Florida	-0.01	0.01	0.65	2192	63
Illinois	-0.01	0.02	0.62	2192	63
Liberal	-0.08	0.01	0.00	2351	64
Age	0.03	0.02	0.11	2351	64
White	-0.01	0.01	0.08	2351	64
Woman	-0.02	0.01	0.00	2351	64
College	-0.02	0.01	0.01	2351	64
Religious	0.03	0.01	0.00	2351	64
Non-Metro	-0.00	0.01	0.90	2351	64
California	-0.01	0.01	0.26	2351	64
Pennsylvania	0.04	0.02	0.04	2351	64
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.63	2351	64
Florida	-0.01	0.01	0.50	2351	64
Illinois	-0.01	0.02	0.74	2351	64
Liberal	-0.08	0.01	0.00	2515	65
Age	0.04	0.02	0.03	2515	65
White	-0.01	0.01	0.11	2515	65
Woman	-0.02	0.01	0.00	2515	65
College	-0.02	0.01	0.00	2515	65
Religious	0.03	0.01	0.00	2515	65
Non-Metro	-0.00	0.01	1.00	2515	65
California	-0.01	0.01	0.43	2515	65
Pennsylvania	0.03	0.02	0.07	2515	65
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.66	2515	65
Florida	-0.01	0.01	0.40	2515	65
Illinois	-0.01	0.02	0.72	2515	65
Liberal	-0.08	0.01	0.00	2672	66
Age	0.05	0.02	0.01	2672	66
White	-0.01	0.01	0.04	2672	66
Woman	-0.02	0.01	0.00	2672	66
College	-0.02	0.01	0.00	2672	66
Religious	0.03	0.01	0.00	2672	66
Non-Metro	0.00	0.01	0.71	2672	66
California	-0.01	0.01	0.39	2672	66
Pennsylvania	0.04	0.02	0.03	2672	66
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.54	2672	66
Florida	-0.01	0.01	0.34	2672	66
Illinois	-0.00	0.02	0.83	2672	66
Liberal	-0.08	0.01	0.00	2829	67
Age	0.06	0.02	0.00	2829	67
White	-0.01	0.01	0.06	2829	67
Woman	-0.02	0.01	0.00	2829	67
College	-0.02	0.01	0.00	2829	67
Religious	0.03	0.01	0.00	2829	67
Non-Metro	0.00	0.01	0.87	2829	67
California	-0.01	0.01	0.40	2829	67
Pennsylvania	0.04	0.02	0.03	2829	67
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.46	2829	67
Florida	-0.01	0.01	0.38	2829	67
Illinois	-0.01	0.02	0.46	2829	67
Liberal	-0.08	0.01	0.00	3007	68
Age	0.06	0.02	0.00	3007	68
White	-0.01	0.01	0.07	3007	68
Woman	-0.02	0.01	0.00	3007	68
College	-0.02	0.01	0.00	3007	68
Religious	0.03	0.01	0.00	3007	68
Non-Metro	0.01	0.01	0.46	3007	68
California	-0.01	0.01	0.37	3007	68
Pennsylvania	0.04	0.02	0.02	3007	68
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.44	3007	68
Florida	-0.01	0.01	0.34	3007	68
Illinois	-0.01	0.01	0.53	3007	68
Liberal	-0.08	0.01	0.00	3137	69
Age	0.06	0.02	0.00	3137	69
White	-0.01	0.01	0.06	3137	69
Woman	-0.02	0.01	0.00	3137	69
College	-0.02	0.01	0.00	3137	69
Religious	0.03	0.01	0.00	3137	69
Non-Metro	0.01	0.01	0.42	3137	69
California	-0.01	0.01	0.24	3137	69
Pennsylvania	0.04	0.02	0.02	3137	69
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.45	3137	69
Florida	-0.01	0.01	0.26	3137	69
Illinois	-0.01	0.01	0.42	3137	69
Liberal	-0.08	0.00	0.00	3351	70
Age	0.05	0.02	0.00	3351	70
White	-0.01	0.00	0.06	3351	70
Woman	-0.02	0.00	0.00	3351	70
College	-0.02	0.00	0.00	3351	70
Religious	0.03	0.01	0.00	3351	70
Non-Metro	0.01	0.01	0.33	3351	70
California	-0.01	0.01	0.19	3351	70
Pennsylvania	0.03	0.02	0.04	3351	70
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.58	3351	70
Florida	-0.01	0.01	0.21	3351	70
Illinois	-0.01	0.01	0.37	3351	70
Liberal	-0.08	0.00	0.00	3598	71
Age	0.05	0.02	0.00	3598	71
White	-0.01	0.00	0.05	3598	71
Woman	-0.02	0.00	0.00	3598	71
College	-0.02	0.00	0.00	3598	71
Religious	0.03	0.00	0.00	3598	71
Non-Metro	0.01	0.01	0.16	3598	71
California	-0.01	0.01	0.20	3598	71
Pennsylvania	0.03	0.02	0.04	3598	71
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.57	3598	71
Florida	-0.01	0.01	0.17	3598	71
Illinois	-0.01	0.01	0.44	3598	71
Liberal	-0.08	0.00	0.00	3975	72
Age	0.05	0.02	0.00	3975	72
White	-0.01	0.00	0.04	3975	72
Woman	-0.02	0.00	0.00	3975	72
College	-0.02	0.00	0.00	3975	72
Religious	0.04	0.00	0.00	3975	72
Non-Metro	0.01	0.01	0.11	3975	72
California	-0.01	0.01	0.16	3975	72
Pennsylvania	0.02	0.01	0.17	3975	72
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.47	3975	72
Florida	-0.01	0.01	0.15	3975	72
Illinois	-0.00	0.01	0.93	3975	72

C.7.9 Temporal Durability (Heterocentrism Outcome, Control Coefficients)

Table C43: Control Coefficients For Models Characterizing Temporal Durability of Post-Pulse Effect (Heterocentrism, With Controls, Part 1)

covar_name	est	se	pv	nobs	days_out
Liberal	-0.08	0.01	0.00	2025	1
Age	0.01	0.02	0.46	2025	1
White	-0.00	0.01	0.47	2025	1
Woman	-0.01	0.01	0.12	2025	1
College	-0.01	0.01	0.06	2025	1
Religious	0.04	0.01	0.00	2025	1
Non-Metro	0.01	0.01	0.13	2025	1
California	-0.00	0.01	0.70	2025	1
Pennsylvania	0.02	0.01	0.06	2025	1
New York	0.00	0.01	0.70	2025	1
Florida	0.00	0.01	0.92	2025	1
Illinois	0.00	0.02	0.80	2025	1
Liberal	-0.08	0.01	0.00	2191	2
Age	0.01	0.02	0.55	2191	2
White	-0.00	0.01	0.44	2191	2
Woman	-0.01	0.01	0.17	2191	2
College	-0.01	0.01	0.15	2191	2
Religious	0.04	0.01	0.00	2191	2
Non-Metro	0.02	0.01	0.04	2191	2
California	-0.00	0.01	0.72	2191	2
Pennsylvania	0.02	0.01	0.18	2191	2
New York	-0.00	0.01	0.88	2191	2
Florida	-0.00	0.01	0.64	2191	2
Illinois	0.01	0.02	0.61	2191	2
Liberal	-0.09	0.01	0.00	2196	3
Age	0.03	0.02	0.08	2196	3
White	-0.01	0.01	0.12	2196	3
Woman	-0.01	0.01	0.11	2196	3
College	-0.01	0.01	0.36	2196	3
Religious	0.05	0.01	0.00	2196	3
Non-Metro	0.02	0.01	0.08	2196	3
California	-0.01	0.01	0.54	2196	3
Pennsylvania	0.02	0.01	0.12	2196	3
New York	-0.00	0.01	0.75	2196	3
Florida	-0.01	0.01	0.25	2196	3
Illinois	0.00	0.02	0.77	2196	3
Liberal	-0.09	0.01	0.00	2276	4
Age	0.05	0.02	0.02	2276	4
White	-0.01	0.01	0.09	2276	4
Woman	-0.01	0.01	0.12	2276	4
College	-0.01	0.01	0.36	2276	4
Religious	0.04	0.01	0.00	2276	4
Non-Metro	0.02	0.01	0.06	2276	4
California	-0.01	0.01	0.51	2276	4
Pennsylvania	0.01	0.01	0.30	2276	4
New York	0.01	0.01	0.64	2276	4
Florida	-0.01	0.01	0.28	2276	4
Illinois	0.00	0.02	0.80	2276	4
Liberal	-0.09	0.01	0.00	2440	5
Age	0.05	0.02	0.01	2440	5
White	-0.01	0.01	0.10	2440	5
Woman	-0.01	0.01	0.04	2440	5
College	-0.00	0.01	0.62	2440	5
Religious	0.05	0.01	0.00	2440	5
Non-Metro	0.01	0.01	0.10	2440	5
California	-0.00	0.01	0.91	2440	5
Pennsylvania	0.02	0.01	0.09	2440	5
New York	0.01	0.01	0.61	2440	5
Florida	-0.00	0.01	0.62	2440	5
Illinois	-0.00	0.02	0.88	2440	5
Liberal	-0.09	0.01	0.00	2572	6
Age	0.04	0.02	0.01	2572	6
White	-0.01	0.01	0.23	2572	6
Woman	-0.01	0.01	0.05	2572	6
College	-0.01	0.01	0.39	2572	6
Religious	0.04	0.01	0.00	2572	6
Non-Metro	0.01	0.01	0.45	2572	6
California	-0.00	0.01	0.92	2572	6
Pennsylvania	0.02	0.01	0.15	2572	6
New York	0.01	0.01	0.60	2572	6
Florida	-0.00	0.01	0.83	2572	6
Illinois	-0.00	0.01	0.84	2572	6
Liberal	-0.08	0.01	0.00	2613	7
Age	0.04	0.02	0.02	2613	7
White	-0.01	0.01	0.36	2613	7
Woman	-0.01	0.01	0.04	2613	7
College	-0.01	0.01	0.16	2613	7
Religious	0.04	0.01	0.00	2613	7
Non-Metro	0.01	0.01	0.36	2613	7
California	0.00	0.01	0.93	2613	7
Pennsylvania	0.01	0.01	0.22	2613	7
New York	0.01	0.01	0.50	2613	7
Florida	0.01	0.01	0.36	2613	7
Illinois	-0.00	0.01	0.88	2613	7
Liberal	-0.08	0.00	0.00	2792	8
Age	0.04	0.02	0.05	2792	8
White	-0.00	0.01	0.35	2792	8
Woman	-0.01	0.00	0.01	2792	8
College	-0.00	0.01	0.51	2792	8
Religious	0.04	0.01	0.00	2792	8
Non-Metro	0.00	0.01	0.63	2792	8
California	-0.00	0.01	0.76	2792	8
Pennsylvania	0.01	0.01	0.23	2792	8
New York	0.00	0.01	0.72	2792	8
Florida	0.01	0.01	0.51	2792	8
Illinois	-0.00	0.01	0.86	2792	8
Liberal	-0.08	0.00	0.00	2864	9
Age	0.04	0.02	0.02	2864	9
White	-0.00	0.01	0.54	2864	9
Woman	-0.01	0.00	0.01	2864	9
College	-0.00	0.01	0.54	2864	9
Religious	0.04	0.01	0.00	2864	9
Non-Metro	0.00	0.01	0.92	2864	9
California	-0.00	0.01	0.77	2864	9
Pennsylvania	0.01	0.01	0.13	2864	9
New York	-0.00	0.01	0.71	2864	9
Florida	0.01	0.01	0.54	2864	9
Illinois	0.00	0.01	0.92	2864	9
Liberal	-0.08	0.00	0.00	2822	10
Age	0.04	0.02	0.02	2822	10
White	-0.00	0.01	0.75	2822	10
Woman	-0.01	0.00	0.01	2822	10
College	-0.01	0.01	0.22	2822	10
Religious	0.04	0.01	0.00	2822	10
Non-Metro	0.00	0.01	0.84	2822	10
California	-0.00	0.01	0.79	2822	10
Pennsylvania	0.01	0.01	0.21	2822	10
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.47	2822	10
Florida	0.01	0.01	0.27	2822	10
Illinois	0.00	0.01	0.89	2822	10
Liberal	-0.08	0.00	0.00	2770	11
Age	0.04	0.02	0.03	2770	11
White	-0.00	0.01	0.63	2770	11
Woman	-0.01	0.00	0.01	2770	11
College	-0.01	0.01	0.12	2770	11
Religious	0.04	0.01	0.00	2770	11
Non-Metro	0.00	0.01	0.62	2770	11
California	-0.00	0.01	0.58	2770	11
Pennsylvania	0.01	0.01	0.23	2770	11
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.53	2770	11
Florida	0.01	0.01	0.45	2770	11
Illinois	0.01	0.01	0.34	2770	11
Liberal	-0.08	0.00	0.00	2874	12
Age	0.04	0.02	0.01	2874	12
White	-0.00	0.01	0.41	2874	12
Woman	-0.01	0.00	0.01	2874	12
College	-0.01	0.01	0.32	2874	12
Religious	0.04	0.01	0.00	2874	12
Non-Metro	0.01	0.01	0.19	2874	12
California	-0.01	0.01	0.45	2874	12
Pennsylvania	0.01	0.01	0.30	2874	12
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.24	2874	12
Florida	0.01	0.01	0.52	2874	12
Illinois	0.01	0.01	0.22	2874	12
Liberal	-0.08	0.00	0.00	3198	13
Age	0.04	0.02	0.00	3198	13
White	-0.01	0.00	0.08	3198	13
Woman	-0.01	0.00	0.00	3198	13
College	-0.00	0.00	0.39	3198	13
Religious	0.04	0.01	0.00	3198	13

Table C44: Control Coefficients For Models Characterizing Temporal Durability of Post-Pulse Effect (Heterocentrism, With Controls, Part 2)

covar_name	est	se	pv	nobs	days_cut
Non-Metro	0.01	0.01	0.12	3198	13
California	-0.01	0.01	0.26	3198	13
Pennsylvania	0.00	0.01	0.98	3198	13
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.26	3198	13
Florida	0.01	0.01	0.44	3198	13
Illinois	0.01	0.01	0.56	3198	13
Liberal	-0.08	0.00	0.00	3513	14
Age	0.05	0.01	0.00	3513	14
White	-0.01	0.00	0.01	3513	14
Woman	-0.01	0.00	0.00	3513	14
College	-0.00	0.00	0.37	3513	14
Religious	0.04	0.00	0.00	3513	14
Non-Metro	0.01	0.01	0.21	3513	14
California	-0.01	0.01	0.15	3513	14
Pennsylvania	0.00	0.01	0.94	3513	14
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.13	3513	14
Florida	0.01	0.01	0.53	3513	14
Illinois	0.00	0.01	0.68	3513	14
Liberal	-0.08	0.00	0.00	3670	15
Age	0.05	0.01	0.00	3670	15
White	-0.01	0.00	0.01	3670	15
Woman	-0.02	0.00	0.00	3670	15
College	-0.00	0.00	0.35	3670	15
Religious	0.04	0.00	0.00	3670	15
Non-Metro	0.01	0.01	0.14	3670	15
California	-0.01	0.01	0.09	3670	15
Pennsylvania	0.00	0.01	0.88	3670	15
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.14	3670	15
Florida	0.00	0.01	0.56	3670	15
Illinois	0.01	0.01	0.55	3670	15
Liberal	-0.08	0.00	0.00	3754	16
Age	0.05	0.01	0.00	3754	16
White	-0.01	0.00	0.00	3754	16
Woman	-0.01	0.00	0.00	3754	16
College	-0.01	0.00	0.19	3754	16
Religious	0.04	0.00	0.00	3754	16
Non-Metro	0.01	0.01	0.12	3754	16
California	-0.01	0.01	0.06	3754	16
Pennsylvania	0.00	0.01	0.67	3754	16
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.10	3754	16
Florida	0.01	0.01	0.54	3754	16
Illinois	0.01	0.01	0.32	3754	16
Liberal	-0.07	0.00	0.00	3802	17
Age	0.05	0.01	0.00	3802	17
White	-0.01	0.00	0.00	3802	17
Woman	-0.01	0.00	0.00	3802	17
College	-0.01	0.00	0.19	3802	17
Religious	0.04	0.00	0.00	3802	17
Non-Metro	0.01	0.01	0.11	3802	17
California	-0.01	0.01	0.19	3802	17
Pennsylvania	0.00	0.01	0.63	3802	17
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.12	3802	17
Florida	0.00	0.01	0.72	3802	17
Illinois	0.00	0.01	0.73	3802	17
Liberal	-0.08	0.00	0.00	3843	18
Age	0.05	0.01	0.00	3843	18
White	-0.01	0.00	0.00	3843	18
Woman	-0.02	0.00	0.00	3843	18
College	-0.01	0.00	0.25	3843	18
Religious	0.04	0.00	0.00	3843	18
Non-Metro	0.01	0.01	0.05	3843	18
California	-0.01	0.01	0.25	3843	18
Pennsylvania	0.01	0.01	0.54	3843	18
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.07	3843	18
Florida	0.00	0.01	0.73	3843	18
Illinois	-0.00	0.01	0.79	3843	18
Liberal	-0.08	0.00	0.00	3854	19
Age	0.05	0.01	0.00	3854	19
White	-0.01	0.00	0.00	3854	19
Woman	-0.01	0.00	0.00	3854	19
College	-0.00	0.00	0.31	3854	19
Religious	0.04	0.00	0.00	3854	19
Non-Metro	0.01	0.01	0.07	3854	19
California	-0.01	0.01	0.32	3854	19
Pennsylvania	0.00	0.01	0.79	3854	19
New York	-0.02	0.01	0.06	3854	19
Florida	0.00	0.01	0.69	3854	19
Illinois	0.00	0.01	0.87	3854	19
Liberal	-0.08	0.00	0.00	3827	20
Age	0.05	0.01	0.00	3827	20
White	-0.01	0.00	0.00	3827	20
Woman	-0.01	0.00	0.00	3827	20
College	-0.00	0.00	0.51	3827	20
Religious	0.04	0.00	0.00	3827	20
Non-Metro	0.01	0.01	0.04	3827	20
California	-0.01	0.01	0.27	3827	20
Pennsylvania	0.00	0.01	0.70	3827	20
New York	-0.02	0.01	0.05	3827	20
Florida	0.00	0.01	0.89	3827	20
Illinois	0.00	0.01	0.91	3827	20
Liberal	-0.08	0.00	0.00	3864	21
Age	0.05	0.01	0.00	3864	21
White	-0.01	0.00	0.00	3864	21
Woman	-0.01	0.00	0.00	3864	21
College	-0.00	0.00	0.52	3864	21
Religious	0.04	0.00	0.00	3864	21
Non-Metro	0.01	0.01	0.05	3864	21
California	-0.01	0.01	0.21	3864	21
Pennsylvania	0.00	0.01	0.69	3864	21
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.07	3864	21
Florida	-0.00	0.01	0.92	3864	21
Illinois	0.00	0.01	0.90	3864	21
Liberal	-0.08	0.00	0.00	3941	22
Age	0.05	0.01	0.00	3941	22
White	-0.01	0.00	0.00	3941	22
Woman	-0.01	0.00	0.00	3941	22
College	-0.00	0.00	0.68	3941	22
Religious	0.04	0.00	0.00	3941	22
Non-Metro	0.01	0.01	0.06	3941	22
California	-0.01	0.01	0.19	3941	22
Pennsylvania	0.01	0.01	0.56	3941	22
New York	-0.02	0.01	0.06	3941	22
Florida	-0.00	0.01	0.95	3941	22
Illinois	0.00	0.01	0.94	3941	22
Liberal	-0.08	0.00	0.00	3995	23
Age	0.05	0.01	0.00	3995	23
White	-0.01	0.00	0.00	3995	23
Woman	-0.01	0.00	0.00	3995	23
College	0.00	0.00	0.99	3995	23
Religious	0.04	0.00	0.00	3995	23
Non-Metro	0.01	0.01	0.04	3995	23
California	-0.01	0.01	0.28	3995	23
Pennsylvania	0.00	0.01	0.88	3995	23
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.10	3995	23
Florida	0.00	0.01	0.93	3995	23
Illinois	-0.00	0.01	0.84	3995	23
Liberal	-0.07	0.00	0.00	3988	24
Age	0.05	0.01	0.00	3988	24
White	-0.01	0.00	0.00	3988	24
Woman	-0.01	0.00	0.00	3988	24
College	0.00	0.00	0.87	3988	24
Religious	0.04	0.00	0.00	3988	24
Non-Metro	0.02	0.01	0.01	3988	24
California	-0.01	0.01	0.19	3988	24
Pennsylvania	-0.00	0.01	0.96	3988	24
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.10	3988	24
Florida	-0.00	0.01	0.94	3988	24
Illinois	-0.00	0.01	0.78	3988	24
Liberal	-0.07	0.00	0.00	3950	25
Age	0.05	0.01	0.00	3950	25
White	-0.01	0.00	0.00	3950	25
Woman	-0.01	0.00	0.00	3950	25
College	-0.00	0.00	0.69	3950	25
Religious	0.04	0.00	0.00	3950	25
Non-Metro	0.02	0.01	0.01	3950	25
California	-0.01	0.01	0.32	3950	25
Pennsylvania	-0.00	0.01	0.81	3950	25
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.20	3950	25
Florida	-0.00	0.01	0.97	3950	25
Illinois	-0.00	0.01	0.72	3950	25

Table C45: Control Coefficients For Models Characterizing Temporal Durability of Post-Pulse Effect (Heterocentrism, With Controls, Part 3)

covar_name	est	se	pv	nobs	days_cut
Liberal	-0.07	0.00	0.00	3788	26
Age	0.04	0.01	0.00	3788	26
White	-0.01	0.00	0.00	3788	26
Woman	-0.01	0.00	0.00	3788	26
College	-0.00	0.00	0.56	3788	26
Religious	0.04	0.00	0.00	3788	26
Non-Metro	0.01	0.01	0.03	3788	26
California	-0.01	0.01	0.28	3788	26
Pennsylvania	-0.00	0.01	1.00	3788	26
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.21	3788	26
Florida	0.00	0.01	0.97	3788	26
Illinois	-0.01	0.01	0.65	3788	26
Liberal	-0.07	0.00	0.00	3641	27
Age	0.04	0.01	0.00	3641	27
White	-0.01	0.00	0.01	3641	27
Woman	-0.01	0.00	0.00	3641	27
College	-0.00	0.00	0.60	3641	27
Religious	0.04	0.00	0.00	3641	27
Non-Metro	0.01	0.01	0.05	3641	27
California	-0.01	0.01	0.27	3641	27
Pennsylvania	0.00	0.01	0.67	3641	27
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.20	3641	27
Florida	-0.00	0.01	0.89	3641	27
Illinois	0.00	0.01	0.96	3641	27
Liberal	-0.07	0.00	0.00	3533	28
Age	0.04	0.01	0.01	3533	28
White	-0.01	0.00	0.03	3533	28
Woman	-0.01	0.00	0.00	3533	28
College	-0.00	0.00	0.66	3533	28
Religious	0.04	0.00	0.00	3533	28
Non-Metro	0.01	0.01	0.08	3533	28
California	-0.01	0.01	0.43	3533	28
Pennsylvania	0.00	0.01	0.68	3533	28
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.32	3533	28
Florida	-0.00	0.01	0.90	3533	28
Illinois	0.00	0.01	0.99	3533	28
Liberal	-0.08	0.00	0.00	3443	29
Age	0.04	0.01	0.01	3443	29
White	-0.01	0.00	0.04	3443	29
Woman	-0.01	0.00	0.03	3443	29
College	-0.00	0.00	0.75	3443	29
Religious	0.04	0.00	0.00	3443	29
Non-Metro	0.01	0.01	0.03	3443	29
California	-0.01	0.01	0.29	3443	29
Pennsylvania	0.00	0.01	0.69	3443	29
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.25	3443	29
Florida	-0.00	0.01	0.64	3443	29
Illinois	0.00	0.01	0.85	3443	29
Liberal	-0.08	0.00	0.00	3296	30
Age	0.03	0.01	0.02	3296	30
White	-0.01	0.00	0.08	3296	30
Woman	-0.01	0.00	0.05	3296	30
College	-0.00	0.00	0.74	3296	30
Religious	0.04	0.00	0.00	3296	30
Non-Metro	0.01	0.01	0.05	3296	30
California	-0.01	0.01	0.26	3296	30
Pennsylvania	0.00	0.01	0.69	3296	30
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.30	3296	30
Florida	-0.01	0.01	0.45	3296	30
Illinois	-0.00	0.01	0.98	3296	30
Liberal	-0.08	0.00	0.00	3327	31
Age	0.04	0.01	0.00	3327	31
White	-0.01	0.00	0.08	3327	31
Woman	-0.01	0.00	0.09	3327	31
College	-0.00	0.00	0.68	3327	31
Religious	0.05	0.01	0.00	3327	31
Non-Metro	0.01	0.01	0.15	3327	31
California	-0.01	0.01	0.21	3327	31
Pennsylvania	0.00	0.01	0.86	3327	31
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.35	3327	31
Florida	-0.00	0.01	0.79	3327	31
Illinois	-0.01	0.01	0.70	3327	31
Liberal	-0.08	0.00	0.00	3382	32
Age	0.04	0.01	0.01	3382	32
White	-0.01	0.00	0.02	3382	32
Woman	-0.01	0.00	0.18	3382	32
College	-0.00	0.00	0.93	3382	32
Religious	0.04	0.00	0.00	3382	32
Non-Metro	0.01	0.01	0.10	3382	32
California	-0.01	0.01	0.19	3382	32
Pennsylvania	-0.00	0.01	0.84	3382	32
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.48	3382	32
Florida	-0.00	0.01	0.90	3382	32
Illinois	0.00	0.01	0.80	3382	32
Liberal	-0.08	0.00	0.00	3373	33
Age	0.04	0.01	0.01	3373	33
White	-0.01	0.00	0.00	3373	33
Woman	-0.00	0.00	0.43	3373	33
College	-0.00	0.00	0.67	3373	33
Religious	0.04	0.01	0.00	3373	33
Non-Metro	0.01	0.01	0.14	3373	33
California	-0.01	0.01	0.09	3373	33
Pennsylvania	-0.00	0.01	0.68	3373	33
New York	-0.00	0.01	0.62	3373	33
Florida	-0.00	0.01	0.80	3373	33
Illinois	0.00	0.01	0.89	3373	33
Liberal	-0.08	0.00	0.00	3323	34
Age	0.04	0.01	0.01	3323	34
White	-0.02	0.00	0.00	3323	34
Woman	-0.01	0.00	0.23	3323	34
College	-0.00	0.00	0.69	3323	34
Religious	0.04	0.01	0.00	3323	34
Non-Metro	0.01	0.01	0.09	3323	34
California	-0.01	0.01	0.06	3323	34
Pennsylvania	-0.00	0.01	0.87	3323	34
New York	-0.00	0.01	0.60	3323	34
Florida	-0.00	0.01	0.75	3323	34
Illinois	-0.00	0.01	0.82	3323	34
Liberal	-0.08	0.00	0.00	3360	35
Age	0.04	0.01	0.00	3360	35
White	-0.02	0.00	0.00	3360	35
Woman	-0.00	0.00	0.28	3360	35
College	-0.00	0.00	0.62	3360	35
Religious	0.04	0.01	0.00	3360	35
Non-Metro	0.01	0.01	0.09	3360	35
California	-0.01	0.01	0.09	3360	35
Pennsylvania	-0.00	0.01	0.96	3360	35
New York	-0.00	0.01	0.71	3360	35
Florida	-0.00	0.01	0.81	3360	35
Illinois	-0.00	0.01	0.85	3360	35
Liberal	-0.08	0.00	0.00	3376	36
Age	0.04	0.01	0.00	3376	36
White	-0.02	0.00	0.00	3376	36
Woman	-0.00	0.00	0.61	3376	36
College	-0.00	0.00	0.37	3376	36
Religious	0.04	0.01	0.00	3376	36
Non-Metro	0.01	0.01	0.06	3376	36
California	-0.01	0.01	0.11	3376	36
Pennsylvania	-0.00	0.01	0.85	3376	36
New York	-0.00	0.01	0.61	3376	36
Florida	-0.00	0.01	0.86	3376	36
Illinois	-0.01	0.01	0.67	3376	36
Liberal	-0.08	0.00	0.00	3347	37
Age	0.04	0.01	0.00	3347	37
White	-0.02	0.00	0.00	3347	37
Woman	-0.00	0.00	0.69	3347	37
College	-0.01	0.00	0.26	3347	37
Religious	0.04	0.01	0.00	3347	37
Non-Metro	0.01	0.01	0.05	3347	37
California	-0.01	0.01	0.14	3347	37
Pennsylvania	-0.00	0.01	0.82	3347	37
New York	-0.00	0.01	0.78	3347	37
Florida	-0.00	0.01	0.86	3347	37
Illinois	-0.01	0.01	0.64	3347	37
Liberal	-0.08	0.00	0.00	3345	38
Age	0.04	0.01	0.00	3345	38
White	-0.02	0.00	0.00	3345	38
Woman	0.00	0.00	0.93	3345	38
College	-0.01	0.00	0.17	3345	38
Religious	0.04	0.00	0.00	3345	38

Table C46: Control Coefficients For Models Characterizing Temporal Durability of Post-Pulse Effect (Heterocentrism, With Controls, Part 4)

covar_name	est	se	pv	nobs	days_cut
Non-Metro	0.01	0.01	0.09	3345	38
California	-0.01	0.01	0.09	3345	38
Pennsylvania	-0.00	0.01	0.85	3345	38
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.52	3345	38
Florida	-0.00	0.01	0.82	3345	38
Illinois	-0.01	0.01	0.54	3345	38
Liberal	-0.08	0.00	0.00	3386	39
Age	0.04	0.01	0.01	3386	39
White	-0.01	0.00	0.00	3386	39
Woman	0.00	0.00	0.92	3386	39
College	-0.01	0.00	0.15	3386	39
Religious	0.04	0.00	0.00	3386	39
Non-Metro	0.01	0.01	0.18	3386	39
California	-0.01	0.01	0.36	3386	39
Pennsylvania	-0.00	0.01	1.00	3386	39
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.41	3386	39
Florida	-0.00	0.01	0.87	3386	39
Illinois	-0.00	0.01	0.96	3386	39
Liberal	-0.08	0.00	0.00	3365	40
Age	0.04	0.01	0.01	3365	40
White	-0.02	0.00	0.00	3365	40
Woman	0.00	0.00	0.92	3365	40
College	-0.01	0.00	0.25	3365	40
Religious	0.04	0.00	0.00	3365	40
Non-Metro	0.01	0.01	0.23	3365	40
California	-0.01	0.01	0.33	3365	40
Pennsylvania	0.00	0.01	0.85	3365	40
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.33	3365	40
Florida	-0.00	0.01	0.81	3365	40
Illinois	-0.00	0.01	0.89	3365	40
Liberal	-0.08	0.00	0.00	3352	41
Age	0.04	0.01	0.01	3352	41
White	-0.02	0.00	0.00	3352	41
Woman	-0.00	0.00	0.90	3352	41
College	-0.01	0.00	0.27	3352	41
Religious	0.04	0.00	0.00	3352	41
Non-Metro	0.01	0.01	0.11	3352	41
California	-0.01	0.01	0.35	3352	41
Pennsylvania	0.00	0.01	0.84	3352	41
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.29	3352	41
Florida	-0.00	0.01	0.75	3352	41
Illinois	-0.00	0.01	0.94	3352	41
Liberal	-0.08	0.00	0.00	3329	42
Age	0.04	0.01	0.00	3329	42
White	-0.01	0.00	0.00	3329	42
Woman	0.00	0.00	0.84	3329	42
College	-0.01	0.00	0.21	3329	42
Religious	0.04	0.01	0.00	3329	42
Non-Metro	0.01	0.01	0.06	3329	42
California	-0.00	0.01	0.51	3329	42
Pennsylvania	0.00	0.01	0.76	3329	42
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.37	3329	42
Florida	-0.00	0.01	0.83	3329	42
Illinois	0.00	0.01	1.00	3329	42
Liberal	-0.08	0.00	0.00	3364	43
Age	0.04	0.01	0.00	3364	43
White	-0.02	0.00	0.00	3364	43
Woman	0.00	0.00	0.87	3364	43
College	-0.01	0.00	0.17	3364	43
Religious	0.04	0.00	0.00	3364	43
Non-Metro	0.01	0.01	0.10	3364	43
California	-0.01	0.01	0.38	3364	43
Pennsylvania	0.01	0.01	0.61	3364	43
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.27	3364	43
Florida	-0.00	0.01	0.74	3364	43
Illinois	-0.00	0.01	0.96	3364	43
Liberal	-0.08	0.00	0.00	3354	44
Age	0.03	0.01	0.02	3354	44
White	-0.01	0.00	0.00	3354	44
Woman	-0.00	0.00	0.83	3354	44
College	-0.01	0.00	0.22	3354	44
Religious	0.04	0.00	0.00	3354	44
Non-Metro	0.01	0.01	0.04	3354	44
California	-0.00	0.01	0.46	3354	44
Pennsylvania	0.00	0.01	0.72	3354	44
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.36	3354	44
Florida	-0.00	0.01	0.76	3354	44
Illinois	-0.00	0.01	0.77	3354	44
Liberal	-0.08	0.00	0.00	3348	45
Age	0.03	0.01	0.02	3348	45
White	-0.01	0.00	0.00	3348	45
Woman	0.00	0.00	0.88	3348	45
College	-0.01	0.00	0.21	3348	45
Religious	0.04	0.01	0.00	3348	45
Non-Metro	0.01	0.01	0.06	3348	45
California	-0.00	0.01	0.71	3348	45
Pennsylvania	0.00	0.01	0.61	3348	45
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.28	3348	45
Florida	-0.00	0.01	0.82	3348	45
Illinois	-0.00	0.01	0.96	3348	45
Liberal	-0.08	0.00	0.00	3213	46
Age	0.02	0.01	0.11	3213	46
White	-0.01	0.00	0.00	3213	46
Woman	0.00	0.00	0.99	3213	46
College	-0.01	0.01	0.26	3213	46
Religious	0.04	0.01	0.00	3213	46
Non-Metro	0.02	0.01	0.02	3213	46
California	-0.00	0.01	0.90	3213	46
Pennsylvania	0.01	0.01	0.48	3213	46
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.33	3213	46
Florida	-0.01	0.01	0.48	3213	46
Illinois	0.00	0.01	0.73	3213	46
Liberal	-0.08	0.00	0.00	3022	47
Age	0.03	0.01	0.03	3022	47
White	-0.01	0.00	0.02	3022	47
Woman	-0.00	0.00	0.88	3022	47
College	-0.01	0.01	0.06	3022	47
Religious	0.03	0.01	0.00	3022	47
Non-Metro	0.02	0.01	0.02	3022	47
California	-0.00	0.01	0.84	3022	47
Pennsylvania	0.01	0.01	0.32	3022	47
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.21	3022	47
Florida	-0.01	0.01	0.62	3022	47
Illinois	0.00	0.01	0.80	3022	47
Liberal	-0.08	0.00	0.00	2912	48
Age	0.03	0.01	0.09	2912	48
White	-0.01	0.00	0.07	2912	48
Woman	-0.00	0.00	0.63	2912	48
College	-0.01	0.01	0.05	2912	48
Religious	0.04	0.01	0.00	2912	48
Non-Metro	0.02	0.01	0.01	2912	48
California	-0.00	0.01	0.95	2912	48
Pennsylvania	0.02	0.01	0.06	2912	48
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.24	2912	48
Florida	-0.00	0.01	0.76	2912	48
Illinois	0.00	0.01	0.68	2912	48
Liberal	-0.08	0.00	0.00	2885	49
Age	0.03	0.01	0.09	2885	49
White	-0.01	0.00	0.14	2885	49
Woman	-0.00	0.00	0.73	2885	49
College	-0.01	0.01	0.03	2885	49
Religious	0.04	0.01	0.00	2885	49
Non-Metro	0.02	0.01	0.01	2885	49
California	-0.00	0.01	0.99	2885	49
Pennsylvania	0.02	0.01	0.08	2885	49
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.31	2885	49
Florida	-0.00	0.01	0.73	2885	49
Illinois	0.01	0.01	0.46	2885	49
Liberal	-0.08	0.00	0.00	2900	50
Age	0.02	0.02	0.23	2900	50
White	-0.01	0.00	0.14	2900	50
Woman	-0.00	0.00	0.77	2900	50
College	-0.01	0.01	0.04	2900	50
Religious	0.04	0.01	0.00	2900	50
Non-Metro	0.02	0.01	0.01	2900	50
California	-0.00	0.01	0.75	2900	50
Pennsylvania	0.02	0.01	0.07	2900	50
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.25	2900	50
Florida	-0.01	0.01	0.61	2900	50
Illinois	0.00	0.01	0.65	2900	50

Table C47: Control Coefficients For Models Characterizing Temporal Durability of Post-Pulse Effect (Heterocentrism, With Controls, Part 5)

covar_name	est	se	pv	nobs	days_cut
Liberal	-0.08	0.00	0.00	2915	51
Age	0.02	0.01	0.19	2915	51
White	-0.01	0.00	0.11	2915	51
Woman	-0.00	0.00	0.37	2915	51
College	-0.01	0.01	0.10	2915	51
Religious	0.04	0.01	0.00	2915	51
Non-Metro	0.02	0.01	0.01	2915	51
California	-0.00	0.01	0.59	2915	51
Pennsylvania	0.02	0.01	0.05	2915	51
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.26	2915	51
Florida	-0.00	0.01	0.65	2915	51
Illinois	0.01	0.01	0.50	2915	51
Liberal	-0.08	0.00	0.00	2921	52
Age	0.02	0.01	0.16	2921	52
White	-0.01	0.00	0.21	2921	52
Woman	-0.00	0.00	0.28	2921	52
College	-0.01	0.01	0.13	2921	52
Religious	0.04	0.01	0.00	2921	52
Non-Metro	0.02	0.01	0.02	2921	52
California	-0.00	0.01	0.74	2921	52
Pennsylvania	0.01	0.01	0.08	2921	52
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.24	2921	52
Florida	-0.00	0.01	0.67	2921	52
Illinois	0.01	0.01	0.54	2921	52
Liberal	-0.08	0.00	0.00	2901	53
Age	0.02	0.01	0.25	2901	53
White	-0.01	0.00	0.30	2901	53
Woman	-0.01	0.00	0.17	2901	53
College	-0.01	0.01	0.12	2901	53
Religious	0.04	0.01	0.00	2901	53
Non-Metro	0.02	0.01	0.01	2901	53
California	-0.00	0.01	0.74	2901	53
Pennsylvania	0.02	0.01	0.02	2901	53
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.28	2901	53
Florida	-0.00	0.01	0.59	2901	53
Illinois	0.00	0.01	0.55	2901	53
Liberal	-0.08	0.00	0.00	2802	54
Age	0.02	0.01	0.19	2802	54
White	-0.01	0.00	0.20	2802	54
Woman	-0.01	0.00	0.08	2802	54
College	-0.01	0.01	0.14	2802	54
Religious	0.04	0.01	0.00	2802	54
Non-Metro	0.02	0.01	0.01	2802	54
California	-0.01	0.01	0.37	2802	54
Pennsylvania	0.02	0.01	0.02	2802	54
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.41	2802	54
Florida	-0.01	0.01	0.47	2802	54
Illinois	0.00	0.01	0.72	2802	54
Liberal	-0.08	0.00	0.00	2770	55
Age	0.02	0.02	0.27	2770	55
White	-0.01	0.01	0.21	2770	55
Woman	-0.01	0.00	0.07	2770	55
College	-0.01	0.01	0.12	2770	55
Religious	0.04	0.01	0.00	2770	55
Non-Metro	0.02	0.01	0.01	2770	55
California	-0.01	0.01	0.29	2770	55
Pennsylvania	0.02	0.01	0.01	2770	55
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.42	2770	55
Florida	-0.01	0.01	0.53	2770	55
Illinois	0.00	0.01	0.66	2770	55
Liberal	-0.08	0.00	0.00	2801	56
Age	0.02	0.02	0.19	2801	56
White	-0.01	0.00	0.19	2801	56
Woman	-0.01	0.00	0.09	2801	56
College	-0.01	0.01	0.14	2801	56
Religious	0.03	0.01	0.00	2801	56
Non-Metro	0.02	0.01	0.01	2801	56
California	-0.01	0.01	0.25	2801	56
Pennsylvania	0.02	0.01	0.02	2801	56
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.47	2801	56
Florida	-0.01	0.01	0.56	2801	56
Illinois	0.00	0.01	0.74	2801	56
Liberal	-0.08	0.00	0.00	2882	57
Age	0.01	0.01	0.38	2882	57
White	-0.01	0.00	0.24	2882	57
Woman	-0.01	0.00	0.06	2882	57
College	-0.01	0.01	0.26	2882	57
Religious	0.03	0.01	0.00	2882	57
Non-Metro	0.02	0.01	0.01	2882	57
California	-0.01	0.01	0.17	2882	57
Pennsylvania	0.02	0.01	0.03	2882	57
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.54	2882	57
Florida	-0.00	0.01	0.60	2882	57
Illinois	0.00	0.01	0.62	2882	57
Liberal	-0.08	0.00	0.00	2917	58
Age	0.02	0.01	0.22	2917	58
White	-0.01	0.00	0.20	2917	58
Woman	-0.01	0.00	0.08	2917	58
College	-0.01	0.01	0.16	2917	58
Religious	0.03	0.01	0.00	2917	58
Non-Metro	0.02	0.01	0.00	2917	58
California	-0.01	0.01	0.26	2917	58
Pennsylvania	0.01	0.01	0.08	2917	58
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.51	2917	58
Florida	-0.00	0.01	0.76	2917	58
Illinois	0.01	0.01	0.57	2917	58
Liberal	-0.08	0.00	0.00	2920	59
Age	0.03	0.01	0.05	2920	59
White	-0.01	0.00	0.15	2920	59
Woman	-0.01	0.00	0.13	2920	59
College	-0.01	0.01	0.10	2920	59
Religious	0.04	0.01	0.00	2920	59
Non-Metro	0.02	0.01	0.01	2920	59
California	-0.00	0.01	0.53	2920	59
Pennsylvania	0.02	0.01	0.06	2920	59
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.24	2920	59
Florida	-0.00	0.01	0.75	2920	59
Illinois	0.01	0.01	0.30	2920	59
Liberal	-0.08	0.00	0.00	2936	60
Age	0.03	0.01	0.03	2936	60
White	-0.01	0.00	0.13	2936	60
Woman	-0.01	0.00	0.10	2936	60
College	-0.01	0.01	0.17	2936	60
Religious	0.03	0.01	0.00	2936	60
Non-Metro	0.02	0.01	0.01	2936	60
California	-0.00	0.01	0.59	2936	60
Pennsylvania	0.02	0.01	0.07	2936	60
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.40	2936	60
Florida	0.00	0.01	0.98	2936	60
Illinois	0.00	0.01	0.86	2936	60
Liberal	-0.08	0.00	0.00	2936	61
Age	0.03	0.01	0.03	2936	61
White	-0.00	0.00	0.32	2936	61
Woman	-0.01	0.00	0.07	2936	61
College	-0.01	0.01	0.08	2936	61
Religious	0.04	0.01	0.00	2936	61
Non-Metro	0.02	0.01	0.01	2936	61
California	-0.00	0.01	0.71	2936	61
Pennsylvania	0.02	0.01	0.07	2936	61
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.28	2936	61
Florida	0.00	0.01	0.80	2936	61
Illinois	0.00	0.01	0.97	2936	61
Liberal	-0.08	0.00	0.00	2925	62
Age	0.03	0.01	0.04	2925	62
White	-0.01	0.00	0.27	2925	62
Woman	-0.01	0.00	0.07	2925	62
College	-0.01	0.01	0.11	2925	62
Religious	0.03	0.01	0.00	2925	62
Non-Metro	0.02	0.01	0.01	2925	62
California	-0.00	0.01	0.50	2925	62
Pennsylvania	0.02	0.01	0.06	2925	62
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.34	2925	62
Florida	-0.00	0.01	0.98	2925	62
Illinois	0.00	0.01	0.96	2925	62
Liberal	-0.08	0.00	0.00	2974	63
Age	0.03	0.01	0.03	2974	63
White	-0.01	0.00	0.24	2974	63
Woman	-0.01	0.00	0.17	2974	63
College	-0.01	0.01	0.28	2974	63
Religious	0.04	0.01	0.00	2974	63

Table C48: Control Coefficients For Models Characterizing Temporal Durability of Post-Pulse Effect (Heterocentrism, With Controls, Part 6)

covar_name	est	se	pv	nobs	days_cut
Non-Metro	0.02	0.01	0.01	2974	63
California	-0.01	0.01	0.38	2974	63
Pennsylvania	0.02	0.01	0.09	2974	63
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.24	2974	63
Florida	-0.00	0.01	0.74	2974	63
Illinois	-0.00	0.01	0.85	2974	63
Liberal	-0.08	0.00	0.00	3092	64
Age	0.03	0.01	0.03	3092	64
White	-0.01	0.00	0.20	3092	64
Woman	-0.01	0.00	0.23	3092	64
College	-0.00	0.01	0.47	3092	64
Religious	0.03	0.01	0.00	3092	64
Non-Metro	0.02	0.01	0.02	3092	64
California	-0.01	0.01	0.46	3092	64
Pennsylvania	0.01	0.01	0.16	3092	64
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.27	3092	64
Florida	-0.00	0.01	0.58	3092	64
Illinois	-0.00	0.01	0.72	3092	64
Liberal	-0.08	0.00	0.00	3156	65
Age	0.04	0.01	0.01	3156	65
White	-0.01	0.00	0.21	3156	65
Woman	-0.00	0.00	0.32	3156	65
College	-0.00	0.01	0.43	3156	65
Religious	0.03	0.01	0.00	3156	65
Non-Metro	0.02	0.01	0.03	3156	65
California	-0.00	0.01	0.76	3156	65
Pennsylvania	0.01	0.01	0.24	3156	65
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.27	3156	65
Florida	-0.00	0.01	0.57	3156	65
Illinois	-0.00	0.01	0.84	3156	65
Liberal	-0.08	0.00	0.00	3201	66
Age	0.03	0.01	0.02	3201	66
White	-0.01	0.00	0.20	3201	66
Woman	-0.00	0.00	0.31	3201	66
College	-0.00	0.00	0.37	3201	66
Religious	0.03	0.01	0.00	3201	66
Non-Metro	0.01	0.01	0.08	3201	66
California	-0.00	0.01	0.96	3201	66
Pennsylvania	0.01	0.01	0.25	3201	66
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.34	3201	66
Florida	-0.00	0.01	0.65	3201	66
Illinois	-0.01	0.01	0.59	3201	66
Liberal	-0.08	0.00	0.00	3255	67
Age	0.03	0.01	0.02	3255	67
White	-0.01	0.00	0.15	3255	67
Woman	-0.01	0.00	0.21	3255	67
College	-0.01	0.00	0.25	3255	67
Religious	0.04	0.01	0.00	3255	67
Non-Metro	0.02	0.01	0.03	3255	67
California	-0.00	0.01	0.67	3255	67
Pennsylvania	0.01	0.01	0.19	3255	67
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.30	3255	67
Florida	-0.00	0.01	0.70	3255	67
Illinois	-0.01	0.01	0.50	3255	67
Liberal	-0.08	0.00	0.00	3344	68
Age	0.03	0.01	0.02	3344	68
White	-0.01	0.00	0.21	3344	68
Woman	-0.01	0.00	0.19	3344	68
College	-0.01	0.00	0.17	3344	68
Religious	0.04	0.00	0.00	3344	68
Non-Metro	0.02	0.01	0.02	3344	68
California	-0.00	0.01	0.66	3344	68
Pennsylvania	0.01	0.01	0.44	3344	68
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.43	3344	68
Florida	-0.01	0.01	0.42	3344	68
Illinois	-0.00	0.01	0.86	3344	68
Liberal	-0.08	0.00	0.00	3408	69
Age	0.03	0.01	0.04	3408	69
White	-0.01	0.00	0.17	3408	69
Woman	-0.01	0.00	0.09	3408	69
College	-0.01	0.00	0.09	3408	69
Religious	0.04	0.00	0.00	3408	69
Non-Metro	0.02	0.01	0.03	3408	69
California	-0.00	0.01	0.46	3408	69
Pennsylvania	0.01	0.01	0.36	3408	69
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.30	3408	69
Florida	-0.01	0.01	0.41	3408	69
Illinois	-0.00	0.01	0.83	3408	69
Liberal	-0.08	0.00	0.00	3587	70
Age	0.03	0.01	0.07	3587	70
White	-0.01	0.00	0.24	3587	70
Woman	-0.01	0.00	0.03	3587	70
College	-0.01	0.00	0.14	3587	70
Religious	0.04	0.00	0.00	3587	70
Non-Metro	0.02	0.01	0.01	3587	70
California	-0.01	0.01	0.36	3587	70
Pennsylvania	0.01	0.01	0.47	3587	70
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.21	3587	70
Florida	-0.01	0.01	0.21	3587	70
Illinois	0.00	0.01	0.77	3587	70
Liberal	-0.08	0.00	0.00	3776	71
Age	0.03	0.01	0.08	3776	71
White	-0.01	0.00	0.21	3776	71
Woman	-0.01	0.00	0.02	3776	71
College	-0.01	0.00	0.14	3776	71
Religious	0.04	0.00	0.00	3776	71
Non-Metro	0.02	0.01	0.00	3776	71
California	-0.01	0.01	0.37	3776	71
Pennsylvania	0.01	0.01	0.57	3776	71
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.19	3776	71
Florida	-0.01	0.01	0.17	3776	71
Illinois	0.01	0.01	0.66	3776	71
Liberal	-0.08	0.00	0.00	4037	72
Age	0.02	0.01	0.09	4037	72
White	-0.00	0.00	0.31	4037	72
Woman	-0.01	0.00	0.02	4037	72
College	-0.01	0.00	0.04	4037	72
Religious	0.04	0.00	0.00	4037	72
Non-Metro	0.02	0.01	0.00	4037	72
California	-0.01	0.01	0.37	4037	72
Pennsylvania	-0.01	0.01	0.52	4037	72
New York	-0.01	0.01	0.09	4037	72
Florida	-0.02	0.01	0.06	4037	72
Illinois	0.01	0.01	0.49	4037	72

C.8 Temporal Placebo Tests

Here, we show preexisting time trends are not driving our results. We estimate the influence of taking the PI S-IAT 15 and 20 days pre-Pulse relative to 16-30 and 21-40 days pre-Pulse on the *D-score* and *heterocentrism*. We also estimate the influence of taking the PI S-IAT after (2016-03-07 to 2016-06-11) relative to before (2016-01-01 to 2016-03-06) the median pre-treatment date. These placebo estimates are null, suggesting secular pro-gay time trends do not explain our findings (Figure C35).



Figure C35: Comparing True *post-Pulse* Coefficient to Placebo Coefficients To Rule Out Pre-Treatment Temporal Trends That Motivate Pro-Gay Attitudes. The x-axis is the type of estimate. True (15 days) is the true *post-Pulse* coefficient using a 15-day bandwidth. True (20 days) is the same with a 20-day bandwidth. Placebo 1 estimates the influence of taking the IAT in the 15 days prior to the Pulse massacre relative to the 16-30 days prior to the Pulse massacre. Placebo 2 estimates the influence of taking the IAT in the 20 days prior to the Pulse massacre relative to the 21-40 days prior to the Pulse massacre. Placebo 3 estimates the influence of taking the IAT after the median pre-treatment day (2016-03-07 to 2016-06-12) relative to the days before the median pre-treatment day (2016-01-01 to 2016-03-06). The y-axis is the coefficient. The left/right panel characterizes the influence of the true and placebo coefficients on the *D-score* and *heterocentrism*. 95% CIs displayed from HC2 robust SEs.

C.9 Prior and Post Year Temporal Placebo

Here, we attempt to rule out if systematic temporal trends near June motivate prosocial attitudes toward gay people other than the massacre. Thus, we assess the influence of placebo estimates comparing *D-score* and *heterocentrism* 15 and 20 days before and after June 12, the massacre calendar day, during the years 2010-2015 and 2017-2018. We find no consistent influence of these placebo estimates on the *D-score* and *heterocentrism* (Figure C36).



Figure C36: Temporal Placebo Tests Using IAT Data From Non-2016 Years. The x-axis is the IAT dataset at use (by year). The y-axis is the coefficient characterizing the influence of taking the IAT after June 12 (the calendar day of the Pulse nightclub shooting occurred). Panels A and B refer to estimates assessing the influence of the post-June 12th placebo on the *D-Score* and *Heterocentrism* outcomes. The top/bottom two panels are estimates using a 15/20 day bandwidth. 95% CIs displayed derived from HC2 robust standard errors.

C.10 Falsification Tests on Treatment-Irrelevant Group Attitudes

Here, we demonstrate our findings may not be due to a secular attitudinal trend in favor of marginalized groups through several falsification tests assessing if attitudes toward Black people, Asians, the differently-abled, Arabs, darker-skin people, and women shifts *post-Pulse* using the 15 and 20-day bandwidth samples.[57] Across 28 statistical tests, only 3 are significant (Section C.10), suggesting our findings are not driven by secular liberal attitudinal trends toward marginalized groups.

Table C49: Falsification Test on Treatment-Irrelevant Group Attitudes

Post-Pulse Coef.	SE	p	N	Outcome	Dataset	Bandwidth
-0.000	0.005	0.949	11310.000	D-Score	Black/White IAT	15 days
-0.003	0.003	0.377	10960.000	White Bias	Black/White IAT	15 days
-0.006	0.003	0.043	11039.000	Ethnocentrism	Black/White IAT	15 days
0.012	0.015	0.434	1279.000	D-Score	Asian/European IAT	15 days
0.011	0.011	0.320	1234.000	White Bias	Asian/European IAT	15 days
0.006	0.014	0.670	1509.000	D-Score	Disabled/Abled IAT	15 days
-0.002	0.008	0.765	1484.000	Abled Bias	Disabled/Abled IAT	15 days
-0.009	0.009	0.319	1500.000	Abledcentrism	Disabled/Abled IAT	15 days
-0.013	0.013	0.327	1331.000	D-Score	Arab/Non-Arab IAT	15 days
-0.003	0.009	0.766	1267.000	Non-Arab Bias	Arab/Non-Arab IAT	15 days
-0.002	0.010	0.808	1310.000	Ethnocentrism	Arab/Non-Arab IAT	15 days
-0.014	0.009	0.145	3064.000	D-Score	Dark Skin/Light Skin IAT	15 days
-0.001	0.007	0.898	4550.000	D-Score	Man/Woman (Career) IAT	15 days
0.004	0.010	0.702	2339.000	D-Score	Man/Woman (Science) IAT	15 days
-0.003	0.004	0.429	15506.000	D-Score	Black/White IAT	20 days
-0.006	0.003	0.013	15037.000	White Bias	Black/White IAT	20 days
-0.008	0.003	0.004	15151.000	Ethnocentrism	Black/White IAT	20 days
0.008	0.013	0.518	1735.000	D-Score	Asian/European IAT	20 days
0.011	0.009	0.218	1670.000	White Bias	Asian/European IAT	20 days
0.010	0.012	0.399	1972.000	D-Score	Disabled/Abled IAT	20 days
0.005	0.007	0.481	1938.000	Abled Bias	Disabled/Abled IAT	20 days
-0.003	0.008	0.736	1959.000	Abledcentrism	Disabled/Abled IAT	20 days
0.005	0.012	0.638	1745.000	D-Score	Arab/Non-Arab IAT	20 days
0.005	0.008	0.532	1663.000	Non-Arab Bias	Arab/Non-Arab IAT	20 days
0.005	0.009	0.543	1717.000	Ethnocentrism	Arab/Non-Arab IAT	20 days
-0.009	0.008	0.249	4213.000	D-Score	Dark Skin/Light Skin IAT	20 days
-0.003	0.006	0.604	6624.000	D-Score	Man/Woman (Career) IAT	20 days
0.007	0.008	0.416	3371.000	D-Score	Man/Woman (Science) IAT	20 days

This table characterizes falsification tests assessing the influence of taking an IAT *post-Pulse* on groups that are potentially unrelated to LGBTQ+. Not all datasets include the respective *D-score*, *bias*, and dominant group-centrism outcomes (hence their missingness in some IAT datasets). HC2 robust SEs displayed.

[57] Falsification test data comes from separate Project Implicit surveys co-currently available to take in addition to the anti-gay attitude survey.

C.11 Evaluating Individual-Level Heterogeneity

Table C50: Assessing Heterogenous Influence of *Post-Pulse* (Study 2, Part 1)

	D Score		Heterocentrism		D Score		Heterocentrism		D Score		Heterocentrism	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Post-Pulse	$-0.01^{\dagger}$	$-0.01^{\dagger}$	-0.02^{**}	-0.01^{**}	-0.02^{*}	-0.01	-0.02^{**}	-0.02^{**}	-0.01^{*}	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Post-Pulse x Non-White	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00								
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)								
Post-Pulse x Woman					0.02	0.01	$0.02^{\dagger}$	0.01				
					(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)				
Post-Pulse x Liberal									0.01	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
									(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Non-White	0.02^{*}	0.01^{*}	0.00	0.01								
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)								
Woman	-0.02^{***}	-0.02^{***}	-0.01	-0.01^{*}	-0.03^{***}	-0.02^{***}	-0.01^{*}	-0.01^{*}	-0.02^{***}	-0.02^{***}	-0.01	-0.01^{*}
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Liberal	-0.07^{***}	-0.07^{***}	-0.08^{***}	-0.08^{***}	-0.07^{***}	-0.07^{***}	-0.08^{***}	-0.08^{***}	-0.07^{***}	-0.07^{***}	-0.08^{***}	-0.08^{***}
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Bandwidth	15 Days	20 Days	15 Days	20 Days	15 Days	20 Days	15 Days	20 Days	15 Days	20 Days	15 Days	20 Days
R^2	0.12	0.12	0.16	0.16	0.12	0.12	0.17	0.16	0.12	0.12	0.16	0.16
N	3638	4907	3645	4920	3638	4907	3645	4920	3638	4907	3645	4920

Note: $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$. All models adjust for age, white (when not assessing heterogeneity by non-white), woman, college education, religious, metropolitan residence, ideology, California, Pennsylvania, Florida, and Illinois state residence. All covariates rescaled between 0-1. HC2 robust SEs in parentheses.

Table C51: Assessing Heterogenous Influence of *Post-Pulse* (Study 2, Part 2)

	D Score		Heterocentrism		D Score		Heterocentrism	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Post-Pulse	0.03	0.01	0.01	-0.01	-0.00	-0.00	-0.02^{*}	-0.02^{**}
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Post-Pulse x % LGBT (State)	-0.07	-0.04	-0.05	-0.00				
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.07)	(0.07)				
Post-Pulse x SS Couple Density (County)					-0.02	-0.02	0.05	0.04
					(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
% LGBT (State)	-0.01	-0.02	-0.00	-0.02				
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.04)				
SS Couple Density (County)					-0.03	$-0.04^{\dagger}$	-0.09^{**}	-0.08^{**}
					(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Bandwidth	15 Days	20 Days	15 Days	20 Days	15 Days	20 Days	15 Days	20 Days
R^2	0.12	0.12	0.17	0.16	0.12	0.12	0.17	0.16
N	3638	4907	3645	4920	3638	4907	3645	4920
N Clusters	52	52	52	52	739	848	738	848

Note: $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$. All models adjust for age, white, woman, college education, religious, metropolitan residence, ideology, California, Pennsylvania, Florida, and Illinois state residence. Models 1-4 adjust for an interaction between *post-pulse* and an indicator for state residence missingness. Models 5-8 adjust for an interaction between *post-pulse* and an indicator for county residence missingness. All covariates rescaled between 0-1. HC2 robust SEs in parentheses but clustered at state and county-level for Models 1-4 and 5-8 respectively.

C.12 Balance Tests After Removing Days After Pulse Event

Table C52: Covariate Balance Tests After Cutting Days Immediately After Pulse Massacre

Days Cut	# Imbalanced Covariates	Imbalanced Covariates
1	0/12	
2	1/12	Florida
3	2/12	White, Florida
4	3/12	Liberal, White, Florida
5	2/12	Liberal, White
6	1/12	White
7	2/12	White, Woman
8	2/12	White, California
9	5/12	White, California, New York, Florida, Illinois
10	3/12	California, New York, Illinois
11	3/12	California, New York, Illinois
12	3/12	California, New York, Illinois
13	4/12	Liberal, California, New York, Illinois
14	4/12	Liberal, College, New York, Illinois
15	7/12	Liberal, Age, College, Religious, New York, Florida, Illinois
16	6/12	Liberal, Age, College, New York, Florida, Illinois
17	5/12	Liberal, Age, College, New York, Illinois
18	4/12	Liberal, Age, College, Illinois
19	5/12	Liberal, Age, Woman, College, Illinois
20	6/12	Liberal, Age, Woman, College, Florida, Illinois
21	5/12	Liberal, Age, Woman, College, Florida
22	5/12	Liberal, Age, Woman, College, Florida
23	6/12	Liberal, Age, Woman, College, Religious, Florida
24	4/12	Liberal, Woman, College, Florida
25	6/12	Liberal, Age, Woman, College, Religious, Florida
26	6/12	Liberal, Age, Woman, College, Religious, Florida
27	6/12	Liberal, Woman, College, Religious, Non-metro, Florida
28	5/12	Liberal, Woman, College, Non-metro, Florida
29	5/12	Liberal, Woman, College, Non-metro, Florida
30	5/12	Liberal, Woman, College, Non-metro, Florida
31	6/12	Liberal, Woman, College, Religious, Non-metro, Florida
32	5/12	Liberal, Woman, College, Religious, Florida
33	5/12	Liberal, Woman, College, Religious, Florida
34	5/12	Liberal, Woman, College, Religious, Florida
35	5/12	Liberal, Woman, College, Religious, Florida
36	5/12	Liberal, Woman, College, Religious, Florida
37	5/12	Liberal, Woman, College, Religious, Florida
38	5/12	Liberal, Woman, College, Religious, Florida
39	6/12	Liberal, Woman, College, Religious, Florida, Illinois
40	6/12	Liberal, Woman, College, Religious, Florida, Illinois
41	6/12	Liberal, Woman, College, Religious, Florida, Illinois
42	6/12	Liberal, Woman, College, Religious, Florida, Illinois
43	6/12	Liberal, Woman, College, Religious, Florida, Illinois
44	6/12	Liberal, Woman, College, Religious, Florida, Illinois
45	6/12	Liberal, Woman, College, Religious, Florida, Illinois
46	5/12	Liberal, Woman, College, Florida, Illinois
47	5/12	Liberal, Woman, College, Florida, Illinois
48	5/12	Liberal, Woman, College, Florida, Illinois
49	5/12	Liberal, Woman, College, Florida, Illinois
50	5/12	Liberal, Woman, College, Florida, Illinois
51	6/12	Liberal, Woman, College, Pennsylvania, Florida, Illinois
52	6/12	Liberal, Woman, College, Pennsylvania, Florida, Illinois
53	6/12	Liberal, Woman, College, Pennsylvania, Florida, Illinois
54	8/12	Liberal, Age, Woman, College, Pennsylvania, New York, Florida, Illinois
55	7/12	Liberal, Woman, College, Pennsylvania, New York, Florida, Illinois
56	7/12	Liberal, Woman, College, Pennsylvania, New York, Florida, Illinois
57	7/12	Liberal, Woman, College, Pennsylvania, New York, Florida, Illinois
58	7/12	Liberal, Woman, College, Pennsylvania, New York, Florida, Illinois
59	8/12	Liberal, Woman, College, Religious, Pennsylvania, New York, Florida, Illinois
60	7/12	Liberal, Woman, College, Pennsylvania, New York, Florida, Illinois
61	6/12	Liberal, Woman, College, Pennsylvania, Florida, Illinois
62	6/12	Liberal, Woman, College, Pennsylvania, New York, Illinois
63	4/12	Liberal, Woman, College, Illinois
64	6/12	Liberal, Woman, College, Non-metro, New York, Illinois
65	5/12	Liberal, Age, Woman, College, Illinois
66	6/12	Liberal, Age, Woman, College, New York, Florida
67	5/12	Liberal, Age, Woman, College, Florida
68	4/12	Age, Woman, College, Florida
69	4/12	Age, College, Pennsylvania, Florida
70	5/12	Age, White, College, New York, Florida
71	5/12	Age, White, New York, Florida, Illinois
72	7/12	Age, White, College, Religious, New York, Florida, Illinois

C.13 Sorting Test

Given respondents self-select into the S-IAT, we may be concerned systematic sorting induces bias (e.g. pro-gay people taking the survey *post-Pulse*). We do not believe sorting is a concern. If more pro-gay individuals were taking the survey *post-Pulse*, *post-Pulse* respondents would be younger, more liberal, less religious, and more college-educated, but they are not (Figure C34, Panels C-D). Second, if sorting were operative, we may expect more respondents taking the S-IAT *post-Pulse*. We conduct a difference-in-means comparing the number of daily respondents *post-Pulse* relative to pre-Pulse, and do not statistically find more respondents took the S-IAT *post-Pulse* (Table C53).

Table C53: Effect of Pulse On Number of Project Implicit Sexuality IAT Survey Participants

	# Of Participants	
	(1)	(2)
Intercept	111.47***	118.60***
	(12.97)	(10.76)
Post-Pulse	22.00	10.60
	(17.21)	(14.09)
Bandwidth	15-day	20-day
R^2	0.06	0.01
Num. obs.	30	40

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

C.14 Heterogeneity By Conservatism

C.14.1 15, 20-Day Bandwidth Sample

Table C54: Heterogenous Effect of *Post-Pulse* on Anti-Gay Attitudes Condtional On Conservatism

	D-Score		Heterocentrism	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Post-Pulse x Conservative	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Post-Pulse	−0.01	−0.01*	−0.01***	−0.01***
	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Conservative	0.03**	0.02**	0.05***	0.05***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Age	0.06***	0.06***	0.04**	0.04**
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
White	−0.02***	−0.02***	−0.01**	−0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Woman	−0.02***	−0.02***	−0.00	−0.01
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
College-Educated	−0.02**	−0.01***	−0.01*	−0.01
	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Religious	0.03***	0.03***	0.04***	0.04***
	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Non-Metro	0.01	0.00	0.01	−0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Liberal	−0.06***	−0.06***	−0.06***	−0.06***
	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
California	−0.02*	−0.01	−0.00	−0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Pennsylvania	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
New York	−0.01	−0.01	0.01	−0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Florida	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Illinois	0.00	−0.00	−0.01	−0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Bandwidth (in Days)	15	20	15	20
R^2	0.12	0.12	0.18	0.18
Num. obs.	3638	4907	3645	4920

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

C.14.2 15, 20-Day Bandwidth Sample, Comparing Pre-Pulse Respondents To Respondents Interviewed in 15 Days After 72 Days Post-Pulse

Table C55: Heterogenous Effect of *Post-Pulse* on Anti-Gay Attitudes Condtional On Conservatism (Comparing Respondents Interviewed 15 Days Before The Pulse Massacre To Those Interviewed 15 Days After 72 Days From the Pulse Massacre)

	D-Score	**Heterocentrism**
	(1)	(2)
Post-Pulse x Conservative	0.01	−0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Post-Pulse	−0.01	−0.00
	(0.01)	(0.00)
Conservative	0.02*	0.05***
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Age	0.05**	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.01)
White	−0.01*	−0.01*
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Woman	−0.02***	−0.01
	(0.00)	(0.00)
College-Educated	−0.02***	−0.01*
	(0.01)	(0.00)
Religious	0.03***	0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.00)
Non-Metro	0.01	0.02**
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Liberal	−0.07***	−0.06***
	(0.01)	(0.00)
California	−0.01	−0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Pennsylvania	0.03*	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.01)
New York	−0.01	−0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Florida	−0.01	−0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Illinois	−0.01	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Bandwidth (in Days)	15	15
R^2	0.14	0.17
Num. obs.	3351	3587

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

C.15 Heterogeneity By Predicted Outcomes Assuming No Exposure to Pulse

Table C56: Assessing The Heterogenous Effect of Post-Pulse Conditional On Predicted D-Score and Heterocentrism If Post-Pulse Indicator Is Equal To 0

	D-Score	**Heterocentrism**	**D-Score**	**Heterocentrism**
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Post-Pulse x D-Score (Predicted)	0.01		0.07	
	(0.09)		(0.08)	
Post-Pulse x Heterocentrism (Predicted)		0.04		0.04
		(0.08)		(0.07)
Post-Pulse	−0.02	−0.03	−0.05	−0.03
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
D-Score	0.99***		0.96***	
	(0.07)		(0.06)	
SSM Support (Predicted)		0.98***		0.98***
		(0.06)		(0.05)
Bandwidth (in Days)	15	15	20	20
Controls?	N	N	N	N
R^2	0.12	0.16	0.12	0.16
Num. obs.	3638	3645	4907	4920

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$

D Study 3: Matthew Shepard

D.1 Media Data Details

We collect data on the number of gay-related newspaper articles in the New York Times and Washington Post. Data on the number of gay-related NYT newspaper articles per month are from the NYT article API. We use the `rtimes` package to query data from the NYT article API. Gay-related NYT newspaper articles include the terms "homosexual" or "gay" in their text (Figure 7, Panel A). Shepard-related articles are gay-related NYT newspaper articles with the terms "wyoming," "shepard," "student," "laramie," "beat," "beaten," "bias," and "hate (Figure 7, Panel C)."

Data on the number of gay-related Washington Post articles per month are acquired from the ProQuest Washington Post historical newspaper database (Figure 7, Panel B). Gay-related articles are those that include the terms "homosexual," "gay," or "homosexuality" in their text.

D.2 Homosexuality = Morally Wrong Outcome

D.2.1 Study Details

The two studies we use to assess if the belief homosexuality is immoral decreased after Shepard's murder are the CNN/USA Today Jun 22-23 1998 poll and CNN/TIME Oct 14-15, 1998 poll. Both are nationally representative adult telephone surveys ($N = 1016$, $N = 1036$) and are population weighted to census demographic benchmarks. The CNN/USA Today poll was implemented by The Gallup Organization, and the CNN/TIME poll was implemented by Yankelovic Partners, Inc.

These two polls have largely similar sampling strategies (Voss et al., 1995). They are random digit dialing telephone polls. Their lists come from the same sample provider despite being implemented by different organizations (Survey Sampling Inc, SSI). Phone numbers are randomly selected based on a county's contribution to the total number of telephone households (e.g. if a county contains 20% of the national population, a telephone number will be randomly selected from that county with a probability of 20%). The key difference between the two organizations is weighting. Gallup weighs their data to Census statistics along sex, race, Census region, age and education. Yankelovic weighs their data to Census statistics along Census region, sex, race, education, and marital status. Therefore, Gallup weighs on age unlike Yankelovic, but Yankelovic weighs on marital status unlike Gallup. We do not believe differences in weighting generate a significant problem for inference. First, across 20 baseline covariates, only 2/20 are statistically imbalanced between the two samples, suggesting the Yankelovic and Gallup sampling strategies produce relatively similar samples despite weighting differences (Figure 8, Panel A). Second, after adjusting for imbalance between the two surveys, the *post-Shepard* coefficient is stable, suggesting sampling/compositional differences may not serve as a strong source of bias (Figure 8, Panel B).

The outcome item of interest from the CNN/USA Today Jun 1998 poll is "do you personally believe homosexual behavior is morally wrong or is not morally wrong" with response choices of 1) Yes, morally wrong and 2) No, not morally wrong. The outcome is binary, equal to 1 if the respondent indicates "Yes, morally wrong." The outcome item of interest from

the CNN/TIME Oct 1998 poll is "do you personally think that homosexual relationships between consenting adults is morally wrong, or not a moral issue?" with response choices of 1) Yes, morally wrong and 2) Not a moral issue. The outcome is binary, equal to 1 if the respondent indicates "Yes, morally wrong." The weights, outcome, and baseline covariates are then stacked amongst each other across the two polls, with respondents from the CNN Oct. 1998 poll being defined as *post-Shepard* respondents (measured as a binary indicator equal to 1 if the respondent is from the October 1998 poll, 0 otherwise) and respondents from the CNN Jun. 1998 poll being defined as pre-Shepard respondents.

Although a benefit of these outcome items across the two surveys is they ask about the immorality of homosexuality very closely to the moment Matthew Shepard was murdered, they are worded slightly different from one another in that the post-Shepard survey references "homosexual relationships between consenting adults" while the pre-Shepard survey references "homosexual behavior." Therefore, it is plausible the decrease in support for the belief homosexuality is morally wrong may be a function of the specification that the homosexual behavior referenced in the post-Shepard survey relates specifically to behavior among *consenting adults.* Consequently, we re-estimate our findings with a different pre-Shepard survey from 1994 with a similar item wording. Consistent with the main findings, we find that respondents interviewed after Shepard's murder were less likely to believe homosexual relationships between consenting adults is morally wrong (see Figure 9). A shortcoming of the re-estimation is that our findings may be the result of secular time trends or intervening factors outside Shepard's murder. These alternative explanations are unlikely. First, the temporal placebo test comparing attitudes regarding "homosexual behavior" between April 1997-June 1998 on Figure 8, Panel B is statistically null. These findings suggest attitudes regarding the immorality of homosexuality were not trending in a liberal direction between 1994 to 1998 prior to Shepard's murder. Second, belief in the notion that "homosexual relationships between consenting adults" are "morally wrong" is *remarkably stable* between 1978-2004, with the exception of respondents interviewed in the few days after Matthew Shepard was murdered (Figure 9). These empirical findings suggest that item wording does not drive our main results and that Shepard's murder shifted anti-gay attitudes and not other temporal intervening factors.

D.2.2 Temporal Placebo Details

To conduct a temporal placebo test ruling out secular trends that may drive our finding that respondents interviewed after Shepard's murder were less likely to to believe homosexuality is morally wrong, we use a third survey, the Gallup Apr 11-13 1997 poll. The Gallup Apr 1997 poll is a nationally representative telephone survey ($N = 1003$) and is population weighted to census demographic benchmarks. The Gallup Apr 1997 poll includes an item asking respondents if they "personally believe homosexual behavior is morally wrong or is not morally wrong" with responses 1) Yes, morally wrong and 2) No, not morally wrong. We then compare the average level of support for belief homosexual behavior is morally wrong between the Gallup Apr. 1997 poll and CNN Jun. 1998 poll.

D.3 Regression Tables

D.3.1 Balance Test (Moral Wrong)

Table D57: Post-Shepard Balance Test (Moral Wrong, CNN Jun '98/Oct '98)

Outcome	Post-Shepard Coef.	SE	p	N
White	-0.08	0.02	0.00	2052
Woman	-0.01	0.02	0.79	2052
College	0.02	0.02	0.26	2052
Age (18-24)	0.01	0.02	0.48	2052
Age (25-29)	0.01	0.02	0.63	2052
Age (30-34)	-0.02	0.01	0.14	2052
Age (35-39)	-0.02	0.01	0.30	2052
Age (40-49)	0.00	0.02	0.98	2052
Age (50-64)	0.01	0.02	0.73	2052
Age (65+)	-0.02	0.02	0.27	2052
Income (20-50k)	-0.02	0.02	0.52	2052
Income (50-75k)	0.00	0.02	0.84	2052
Income (75k+)	-0.05	0.01	0.00	2052
Democrat	0.02	0.02	0.44	2052
Registered	-0.02	0.02	0.45	2052
Texas	0.00	0.01	0.98	2052
California	-0.01	0.02	0.37	2052
New York	0.01	0.01	0.60	2052
Florida	0.01	0.01	0.49	2052
Pennsylvania	0.01	0.01	0.51	2052

D.3.2 Temporal Placebo Test (Moral Wrong)

Table D58: Temporal Placebo Tests

	Moral Wrong
	(1)
Post-Placebo	−0.00
	(0.02)
R^2	0.00
N	2019
Surveys	Gallup Apr '97/CNN Jun '98

Note: $^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$. HC2 robust standard errors in parentheses.

D.3.3 Influence of Shepard's Murder on Attitudes Concerning Homosexuality

Table D59: Respondents Interviewed Post-Shepard Are Less Likely To Believe Homosexuality is Morally Wrong

	Moral Wrong	
	(1)	(2)
Post-Shepard	-0.11^{***}	-0.12^{***}
	(0.02)	(0.02)
White		-0.10^{*}
		(0.04)
Woman		-0.08^{*}
		(0.03)
College		-0.17^{***}
		(0.04)
Age (18-24)		-0.24^{***}
		(0.07)
Age (25-29)		-0.20^{**}
		(0.07)
Age (30-34)		$-0.13^{\dagger}$
		(0.07)
Age (35-39)		-0.04
		(0.06)
Age (40-49)		-0.18^{**}
		(0.06)
Age (50-64)		-0.04
		(0.06)
Income (20-50k)		0.01
		(0.04)
Income (50-75k)		-0.01
		(0.06)
Democrat		$0.06^{\dagger}$
		(0.03)
Registered		-0.02
		(0.05)
R^2	0.00	0.07
N	2052	2052
State FE	N	Y
Surveys	CNN Jun/Oct '98	CNN Jun/Oct '98

Note: $^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$. HC2 robust standard errors in parentheses.

D.3.4 Falsification Tests

Table D60: Falsification Tests

Outcome	Post-Shepard Coef.	SE	p-value	N	Survey(s)
Ban Abortion	0.00	0.02	0.88	1757	CNN Jan '98/CNN Oct '98
Affirmative Action 1	-0.04	0.03	0.14	1970	CBS Dec '97/CBS Jul '00
Affirmative Action 2	0.02	0.02	0.31	2741	ANES '96-'98
Death Penalty	0.02	0.02	0.49	2557	Kaiser Jul '98/Gallup Feb '99
Black People Unintelligent	0.01	0.00	0.05	4202	GSS '98-'00
Black People Lazy	0.00	0.01	0.56	4202	GSS '98-'00
Spending 2 Aid Black People	0.00	0.02	0.96	2790	GSS '98-'00
Black/White Inequality = Discrim.	0.01	0.02	0.42	3748	GSS '98-'00
Black/White Inequality = In-Born Ability	0.03	0.01	0.02	3748	GSS '98-'00
Black/White Inequality = No Education	0.02	0.02	0.35	3748	GSS '98-'00
Black/White Inequality = No Motivation	0.03	0.02	0.11	3748	GSS '98-'00
Oppose Living w/Black People	-0.01	0.01	0.31	4202	GSS '98-'00
Black Feeling Therm.	0.04	0.01	0.00	2692	ANES '96-'98
Abortion Any Time	-0.01	0.02	0.56	3546	GSS '98-'00
Support Female Politicians	0.01	0.02	0.67	3477	GSS '98-'00
Working Women Good	-0.06	0.02	0.00	3686	GSS '98-'00
Working Women Bad 1	0.04	0.02	0.01	3615	GSS '98-'00
Working Women Bad 2	0.04	0.02	0.07	2248	GSS '98-'00

Note: HC2 robust standard errors presented.

D.3.5 Event Study (Moral Wrong)

Table D61: Event Study Characterizing Trends in Belief Homosexuality is Morally Wrong

	Moral Wrong	
	(1)	(2)
1978	0.00	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.02)
1992	0.01	−0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)
1994	−−	−−
	(−−)	(−−)
1998 (Shepard Murder)	−0.05*	−0.06*
	(0.03)	(0.03)
2001	0.02	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)
2004	−0.02	−0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)
Age (25-34)		−0.02
		(0.02)
Age (35-49)		0.05**
		(0.02)
Age (51+)		0.12***
		(0.02)
Woman		−0.06***
		(0.01)
White		−0.02
		(0.02)
College		−0.14***
		(0.02)
Democrat		−0.07***
		(0.01)
R^2	0.00	0.03
N	6130	6129

Note: $^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$. Sample is a stacked dataset of surveys with similar items on the covariates displayed on this table. Surveys included in this sample are the TIME 1978, CNN 1992, CNN 1994, CNN 1998, CNN 2001, and CNN 2004 polls. The reference category for the "year" analysis is based on the level of *moral wrong* in the CNN 1994 poll. HC2 robust standard errors in parentheses.

D.4 Alternative Outcomes

We found two other items that could serve as potential candidates for assessing the influence of Shepard's murder on attitudes toward LGBTQ+ group members, however, we do not use them for various reasons. One item measured support for *legal recognition* of "marriages between homosexuals." But, there is a 3-year interval between the two surveys including this outcome item (Gallup Mar. 1996, $N = 1008$, Gallup Feb. 1999, $N = 1054$), and there are no surveys with comparable items concerning legal recognition of marriages between homosexuals prior to the baseline time period to conduct temporal placebo tests. Nevertheless, respondents surveyed *post-Shepard* are more likely to support legally recognizing same-sex marriage, consistent with **H1** (see Section D.4.1 for details). Another item measures support for homosexuals serving in the armed forces using two surveys 7 months apart (*hire military*, Newsweek Jul. 1998, $N = 602$; Gallup Feb. 1999, $N = 1054$). Consistent with **H1**, we find respondents interviewed *post-Shepard* were more likely to support homosexuals serving in the military (Figure D38, Panel B). However, these effects may be a function of a secular attitudinal trend in support of incorporating homosexuals in the military, perhaps buttressed by Bill Clinton's efforts to implement Don't Ask Don't Tell in the 1990s. We demonstrate this is the case by showing that support for hiring gay people in the military is on an increasing trend from 1977-1996 (Figure D38, Panel C). Conversely, the *moral wrong* outcome is remarkably stable prior to Shepard's murder, making it an ideal candidate for assessing attitudinal shifts *post-Shepard* and their temporal sustainability (Figure 9).

D.4.1 Alternative Outcome: Legal Recognition



Figure D37: Influence of Shepard's Murder on Support for Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages. All estimates include population weights. All covariates are scaled between 0-1. 95% CIs displayed derived from HC2 robust standard errors.

Data are from two polls stacked together. The first poll is the Gallup March 1996 Politics Polls ($N = 1008$). It was fielded from March 15-17, 1996 and is a telephone survey. The second poll is the Gallup February 1999 Service Poll ($N = 1054$). It was fielded from February 8-9, 1999. The main outcome of interest for this analysis is *legal recognition.* Legal recognition is from a common item in these two polls that asks respondents if they "think marriages between homosexuals should or should not be recognized by the law as valid, with the same rights as traditional marriages." Respondents can choose to reply "should be valid" or "should not be recognized." The outcome is measured equal to 1 if the respondent replies with "should be valid," and 0 otherwise. Figure D37, Panel A displays covariate composition balance between the pre- (Gallup 1996) and *post-Shepard* (Gallup 1999) surveys. Panel B displays the influence of being interviewed in the *post-Shepard* survey on respondents reporting that they believe marriages between homosexual should be recognized by the law as valid. Respondents interviewed *post-Shepard* report a 8 percentage point increase in support for the belief homosexuals should have their marriages legally recognized.

D.4.2 Alternative Outcome: Hire Military



Figure D38: Influence of Shepard's Murder on Support for Hiring Gay People To Serve In The Military. Panel A displays covariate balance between the Newsweek Jul '98 and Gallup Feb '99 polls used to assess the influence of being interviewed *post-Shepard* on attitudes toward hiring gay people to serve in the military. Panel B displays a temporal placebo test assessing if mass attitudes on hiring gay people in the military shift between Nov '96 and Jul '98 in addition to coefficients with and without covariate adjustment that assess the influence of being interviewed *post-Shepard* on support for hiring gay people in the military. Panel C displays an event study assessing trends in support for hiring gay people in the military relative to a survey in Jul 1998 (hence no CIs for that survey estimate). All estimates include population weights. All covariates are scaled between 0-1. 95% CIs displayed derived from HC2 robust standard errors.

The two studies we use to assess if the belief homosexuals should be hired for the military increases after Shepard's murder are a Newsweek Jul. 30-31 1998 poll and a Gallup Feb. 8-9 1999 poll. Both are nationally representative adult telephone surveys ($N = 602$, $N = 1054$) and are population weighted to census demographic benchmarks.

The outcome item of interest from the Newsweek poll is "Tell me if you think gays and lesbians should be hired as members of the armed forces" with response choices of 1) Should and 2) Should not. The outcome is binary, equal to 1 if the respondent indicates "Should." The outcome item of interest from the Gallup poll is "Do you think homosexuals should or

should not be hired for the armed forces" with response choices of 1) Should and 2) Should not. The weights, outcome, and baseline covariates are then stacked amongst each other across the two polls, with respondents from the Gallup Feb. 1999 poll being defined as *post-Shepard* respondents (measured as a binary indicator equal to 1 if the respondent is from the October 1998 poll, 0 otherwise) and respondents from the Newsweek Jul. 1998 poll being defined as pre-Shepard respondents.

To conduct a temporal placebo test ruling out secular trends that may drive our finding that respondents interviewed after Shepard's murder were more likely to support hiring homosexuals in the military, we use a third survey, the Gallup Nov 21-24 1996 poll. The Gallup Nov 1996 poll is a nationally representative telephone survey ($N = 1003$) and is population weighted to census demographic benchmarks. The Gallup Nov 1996 poll includes an item asking respondents if they think "homosexuals should or should be hired for the armed forces" with responses 1) Should and 2) Should not. We then compare the average level of support for whether homosexuals should be hired for the armed forces in the Gallup 1996 poll with the Newsweek 1998 poll.

Figure D38, Panel A, demonstrates that respondents interviewed before and after Shepard's murder are similar on demographic, socio-economic, and political covariates. Figure D38, Panel B demonstrates that respondents interviewed *post-Shepard* are more likely to support gay people serving in the armed forces by 5 percentage points ($p < 0.10$), equivalent to 9% of the outcome standard deviation. However, Figure D38, Panel C demonstrates that support for hiring gay people in the military is on an upward trend between 1977-1996, suggesting these results may be a function of a progressive secular trend in support of incorporating gay people in the military, perhaps the result of Bill Clinton's push for Don't Ask Don't Tell policies.

D.5 Temporal Persistence Data Details

TIME 1978 poll ($N = 1044$): Nationally representative telephone poll sponsored by TIME magazine. Fielded March 14-30, 1978. Item we use asks respondents if "do you personally think that homosexual relationships between consenting adults is morally wrong or not a moral issue. How about? 1) Morally wrong, 2) Not a moral issue" Outcome is coded 1 if respondent indicates "morally wrong."

CNN 1992 poll ($N = 1250$): Nationally representative telephone poll sponsored by TIME magazine and CNN. Fielded May 13-14, 1992. Item we use asks respondents if "do you personally think that homosexual relationships between consenting adults is morally wrong or not a moral issue. How about? 1) Morally wrong, 2) Not a moral issue" Outcome is coded 1 if respondent indicates "morally wrong."

CNN 1994 poll ($N = 800$): Nationally representative telephone poll sponsored by TIME magazine and CNN. Fielded June 15-16, 1994. Item we use asks respondents if "do you personally think that homosexual relationships between consenting adults is morally wrong or not a moral issue. How about? 1) Morally wrong, 2) Not a moral issue." Outcome is coded 1 if respondent indicates "morally wrong."

CNN 1998 poll ($N = 1036$): Nationally representative telephone poll sponsored by TIME magazine and CNN. Fielded October 14-15, 1998. Item we use asks respondents if "do you personally think that homosexual relationships between consenting adults is morally wrong or not a moral issue. How about? 1) Morally wrong, 2) Not a moral issue." Outcome is coded 1 if respondent indicates "morally wrong."

CNN 2001 poll ($N = 1000$): Nationally representative telephone poll sponsored by TIME magazine and CNN. Fielded January 10-11, 2001. Item we use asks respondents if "do you personally think that homosexual relationships between consenting adults is morally wrong or not a moral issue. How about? 1) Morally wrong, 2) Not a moral issue." Outcome is coded 1 if respondent indicates "morally wrong."

CNN 2004 poll ($N = 1000$): Nationally representative telephone poll sponsored by TIME magazine and CNN. Fielded February 5-6, 2004. Item we use asks respondents if "do you personally think that homosexual relationships between consenting adults is morally wrong or not a moral issue. How about? 1) Morally wrong, 2) Not a moral issue." Outcome is coded 1 if respondent indicates "morally wrong."

D.6 Temporal Persistence CNN Poll (Jun. 1998) Exclusion Details

We do not use the CNN June 1998 poll on Figure 9 in our assessment of temporal persistence. This is because the *moral wrong* item in the CNN June 1998 poll references "homosexual behavior" as opposed to "homosexual relationships between consenting adults." Therefore, we focus on surveys with *moral wrong* outcome items using the "consenting adults" wording for the event study. However, two concerns may arise. First, one may be concerned using the "consenting adults" item in our main analysis on Figure 8 may inflate the *post-Shepard* coefficient since it may make respondents more comfortable with "homosexual relationships." Yet, we still observe a negative, significant, *post-Shepard* coefficient (-0.06) from the event study comparing a CNN 1994 poll to the CNN October 1998 poll. Second, one may be concerned the alternative analysis comparing polls between 1994-1998 may be biased by secular attitudinal time trends. But the absence of temporal trends in the "homosexual behavior" items (Figure 8, Panel B) between 1997-1998 suggests this is unlikely. Additionally, the stability of the "consenting adults" *moral wrong* outcome from 1978-1994 suggests secular attitudinal time trends are not influencing the *post-Shepard* coefficient. However, we caveat our findings by noting the distinct possibility there is an unobserved trend that exists only for the "homosexual behavior" outcome that does not exist for the "consenting adults" outcome. But this may be unlikely because we may expect prosocial secular trends toward people engaged in "homosexual relationships between consenting adults" than toward people engaged in "homosexual behavior" because of the clarity related to "consent."

D.7 Falsification Test Details

Here, we describe in greater detail the falsification tests characterized on Figure 8, Panel C. Only 4/18 outcomes are statistically significant and the *post-Shepard* coefficient is not consistently in support of non-LGBTQ+ marginalized groups, suggesting no systematic secular trend favoring marginalized groups. The Black feeling thermometer shifts in a favorable direction for Black people *post-Shepard*. However, the mass public increasingly attributes Black-White inequality to in-born ability *post-Shepard*, not discrimination, an unfavorable position toward Black people. The mass public is also less likely to believe women can establish a warm relationship with their children and more likely to believe their children will suffer if they work ("working women good", "working women bad 1") *post-Shepard*, both unfavorable attitudinal shifts toward women. Importantly, like the falsification tests in Study 1, the null effects of post-Shepard on support for banning abortion and increasing access to abortion suggest our *post-Shepard* coefficients are not driven by independent shifts in social conservatism and/or religiosity despite their strong linkages with anti-LGBTQ+ beliefs, but rather, Shepard's murder.

D.8 Falsification Test Outcome Details

Outcome: Ban Abortion. **Surveys:** CNN Jan. '98, CNN Newsweek Oct. '98. **Pre-Shepard Outcome:** "Do you think abortions should be 1) legal under any circumstance, 2) legal under certain circumstances, or 3) illegal in all circumstances." Coded 1 if respondent indicates "legal under any circumstance" and 0 otherwise. **Post-Shepard Outcome:** Same as pre-Shepard

Outcome: Affirmative Action 1. **Surveys:** CBS Dec. '97, CBS Jul. '00. **Pre-Shepard Outcome:** "In order to make up for past discrimination, do you favor or oppose programs which make special efforts to help minorities get ahead?" 1) Favor, 2) Oppose. Coded 1 if respondent indicates favor, 0 otherwise. **Post-Shepard Outcome:** Same as pre-Shepard

Outcome: Affirmative Action 2. **Surveys:** ANES 96'-'98. **Pre-Shepard Outcome:** " Some people say that because of past discrimination, blacks should be given preference in hiring and promotion. Others say that such preference in hiring and promotion of blacks is wrong because it gives blacks advantages they haven't earned. What about your opinion – are you FOR or AGAINST preferential hiring and promotion of blacks? " 1) For preferential hiring and promotion of blacks, 2) Against preferential hiring and promotion of blacks. Coded 1 if respondent indicates for preferential hiring, 0 otherwise. **Post-Shepard Outcome:** Same as pre-Shepard

Outcome: Death Penalty. **Surveys:** Kaiser Jul. '98, Gallup Feb. '99 **Pre-Shepard Outcome:** "Do you favor or oppose the death penalty for persons convicted of murder?" 1) Favor, 2) Oppose. Coded 1 if favor, 0 otherwise. **Post-Shepard Outcome:** "Are you in favor of the death penalty for a person convicted of murder?" 1) Yes, in favor, 2) No, not in favor. Coded 1 if favor, 0 otherwise.

Outcome: Black People are Unintelligent. **Surveys:** GSS '98-'00. **Pre-Shepard Outcome:** "Do people in these groups tend to be unintelligent or tend to be intelligent? Where you you rate Blacks in general on this scale?" 1-7 scale from 1 = unintelligent to 7 = intelligent, reverse coded and rescaled between 0-1. **Post-Shepard Outcome:** Same as pre-Shepard

Outcome: Spending Too Little on Helping Black People **Surveys:** GSS '98-'00. **Pre-Shepard Outcome:** "We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount: improving the conditions of Blacks" Coded 1 if too little, 0 otherwise. **Post-Shepard Outcome:** Same as pre-Shepard

Outcome: Black-White Inequality is Because of Discrimination. **Surveys:** GSS '98-'00. **Pre-Shepard Outcome:** "On the average (Negroes/Blacks/African-Americans) have worse jobs, income, and housing than white people. Do you think these differences are: mainly due to discrimination" 1) Yes, 2) No. Coded 1 if yes, 0 otherwise. **Post-Shepard Outcome:** Same as pre-Shepard

Outcome: Black-White Inequality is Because of In-Born Ability. **Surveys:** GSS '98-'00. **Pre-Shepard Outcome:** "On the average (Negroes/Blacks/African-Americans) have worse jobs, income, and housing than white people. Do you think these differences are: Because most (Negroes/Blacks/African-Americans) have less in-born ability to learn?" 1) Yes, 2) No. Coded 1 if yes, 0 otherwise. **Post-Shepard Outcome:** Same as pre-Shepard

Outcome: Black-White Inequality is Because of No Chance for Education. **Surveys:** GSS '98-'00. **Pre-Shepard Outcome:** "On the average (Negroes/Blacks/African-Americans) have worse jobs, income, and housing than white people. Do you think these differences are: Because most (Negroes/Blacks/African-Americans) don't have the chance for education that it takes to rise out of poverty?" 1) Yes, 2) No. Coded 1 if yes, 0 otherwise. **Post-Shepard Outcome:** Same as pre-Shepard

Outcome: Black-White Inequality is Because of No Motivation. **Surveys:** GSS '98-'00. **Pre-Shepard Outcome:** "On the average (Negroes/Blacks/African-Americans) have worse jobs, income, and housing

than white people. Do you think these differences are: Because most (Negroes/Blacks/African-Americans) just don't have the motivation or will power to pull themselves up out of poverty?" 1) Yes, 2) No. Coded 1 if yes, 0 otherwise. **Post-Shepard Outcome:** Same as pre-Shepard

Outcome: Oppose Living with Black People. **Surveys:** GSS '98-'00. **Pre-Shepard Outcome:** "Now I'm going to ask you about different types of contact with various groups of people. In each situation would you please tell me whether you would be very much in favor of it happening, somewhat in favor, neither in favor nor opposed to it happening, somewhat opposed, or verymuch opposed to it happening? Living in a neighborhood where half of your neighbors were blacks?" 1-5 scale from 1 = Strongly Favor to 5 = Strongly Oppose. Coded 1 if oppose or strongly oppose, 0 otherwise. **Post-Shepard Outcome:** Same as pre-Shepard

Outcome: Black Feeling Thermometer. **Surveys:** ANES '96-'98. **Pre-Shepard Outcome:** "How would you rate Blacks?" 0-100 scale, rescaled between 0-1. **Post-Shepard Outcome:** Same as pre-Shepard

Outcome: Abortion Any Time. **Surveys:** GSS '98-'00. **Pre-Shepard Outcome:** 'Please tell me whether or not you think it should be possible for a pregnant woman to obtain a legal abortion if the woman wants it for any reason?" 1 if yes. **Post-Shepard Outcome:** Same as pre-Shepard

Outcome: Support Female Politicians. **Surveys:** GSS '98-'00. **Pre-Shepard Outcome:** "Tell me if you agree or disagree with this statement: Most men are better suited emotionally for politics than are most women" 1 if agree, 0 otherwise. **Post-Shepard Outcome:** Same as pre-Shepard

Outcome: Working Women Good. **Surveys:** GSS '98-'00. **Pre-Shepard Outcome:** "Now I'm going to read several more statements. As I read each one, please tell me whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with it. For example, here is the statement: A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work." 1 if agree, 0 otherwise. **Post-Shepard Outcome:** Same as pre-Shepard

Outcome: Working Women Bad 1. **Surveys:** GSS '98-'00. **Pre-Shepard Outcome:** "Now I'm going to read several more statements. As I read each one, please tell me whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with it. For example, here is the statement: A preschool child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works." 1 if agree, 0 otherwise. **Post-Shepard Outcome:** Same as pre-Shepard

Outcome: Working Women Bad 2. **Surveys:** GSS '98-'00. **Pre-Shepard Outcome:** "Now I'm going to read several more statements. As I read each one, please tell me whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with it. For example, here is the statement: It is much better for everyone involved if the man is the achiever outside the home and the woman takes care of the home and family." 1 if agree, otherwise. **Post-Shepard Outcome:** Same as pre-Shepard

D.9 Assessing If Violence Against LGBTQ+ Community Segments Was Salient in 4 Months Between Surveys



Figure D39: There Was No New York Times Coverage of Hate Crimes Related to Gay People In Between June-October 1998. The x-axis is the month of 1998, the y-axis is the count of articles identified in the New York Times Historic Database (ProQuest) that are related to the following search term: ("hate crime" AND "gay") OR ("hate crime" AND "homosexual")

D.10 Other Intervening Events

Two other intervening events outside of other instances of violence against LGBTQ+ community segments during 1998 may explain our *post-Shepard* coefficient. First, Clinton signed Executive Order 13087 on May 1998, which prohibited discrimination over sexual orientation in the Federal workforce. If this explains our results, then we would expect the temporal placebo coefficient to be negative and statistically significant given the post-placebo survey is fielded on June 1998, after the executive order. The placebo coefficient is 0 and insignificant, suggesting Clinton's order does not explain our results (Figure 8, Panel B). Indeed, Clinton's order was not nearly as salient as Shepard's murder. There was no NYT coverage of his order on May or June 1998, the moment the executive order was signed (Figure D40). Second, Tammy Baldwin's 1998 House election run (the first open lesbian elected to Congress). This is unlikely because Baldwin's run was significantly less salient than Shepard's murder. There were only 2 NYT articles mentioning Baldwin during June-October 1998 but over 30 Shepard-related NYT articles on October 1998 (Figure D41).

D.10.1 Assessing If Clinton's Anti-Discrimination Executive Order Was Salient



Figure D40: There Were No New York Times Articles Related to Executive Order 13087 Near The Moment It Was Signed. The x-axis is the day, the y-axis is the count of articles identified in the New York Times Historic Database (`rtimes` package) that are related to the following search terms: "executive order 13087" OR "eeo executive order."

D.10.2 Assessing If Tammy Baldwin's Election Was Salient in 4 Months Between Surveys



Figure D41: There Were Only 2 New York Times Articles Related to Tammy Baldwin In Between June-October 1998. The x-axis is the month of 1998, the y-axis is the count of articles identified in the New York Times Historic Database (`rtimes` package) that are related to the following search term: "tammy baldwin." Annotations denote number of NYT articles for each specific month.

D.11 Evaluating Individual-Level Heterogeneity

Table D62: Heterogenous Influence of *Post-Shepard* (Study 3)

	Moral Wrong		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Post-Shepard	-0.07^{**}	-0.10^{**}	-0.02
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Post-Shepard x Non-White	-0.15^{*}		
	(0.06)		
Post-Shepard x Woman		-0.02	
		(0.05)	
Post-Shepard x Democrat			-0.20^{***}
			(0.05)
Non-White	0.10^{*}		
	(0.04)		
Woman	-0.08^{*}	-0.08^{*}	-0.08^{*}
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Democrat	0.06	0.06	0.06
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
R^2	0.07	0.07	0.07
N	2052	2052	2052

Note: $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$. All models adjust for age, white (if not assessing heterogeneity by non-white), woman, college education, partisanship, voter registration, and Florida, Texas, California, New York, and Pennsylvania residence. HC2 robust SEs in parentheses.

E Study 4: Club Q

E.1 Representativeness Discussion

Table E63: Representativeness Assessment of 2022 PI S-IAT and T-IAT

Survey	College-Educated	White	Woman	Age (18-29)	Age (30-44)	Age (45-59)	Age (60+)
2020 Census	0.32	0.57	0.51	0.20	0.26	0.24	0.30
2022 PI S-IAT	0.39	0.59	0.71	0.66	0.20	0.11	0.03
2022 PI T-IAT	0.50	0.64	0.70	0.53	0.27	0.16	0.05

Table E63 displays marginals along college-education, race, gender, and age characterizing the composition of the adult U.S. population in the U.S. Census (2020) in addition to the 2022 Project Implicit Sexuality Implicit Association Test (PI S-IAT) and 2022 Project Implicit Transgender Implicit Association Test (PI T-IAT) surveys. The 2022 PI S-IAT and T-IAT surveys are more likely to be college-educated, women, and younger. Like Study 2, we are not particularly concerned about the lack of representativeness given prior research demonstrates non-representative samples respond similarly to external stimuli as representative samples (Coppock, 2019). Moreover, the primary purpose of Study 4 is to test **H4**, which posits that less salient events will not motivate prosocial attitudes toward LGBTQ+ community segments. Given the 2022 S-IAT and T-IAT samples are more college-educated, younger, and women, they may be more likely to perceive events that implicate marginalized social groups like LGBTQ+. Therefore, the 2022 S-IAT and T-IAT samples, despite being unrepresentative, possess an advantage in that they provide a hard test for **H4**.

E.2 Anti-Trans Attitudes Outcome Measurement Details

Anti-Trans D-Score: Measured by assessing the speed by which respondents associate negative/positive attributes (words) to images of trans/cis celebrities. Higher value suggest respondents associated negative attributes to trans people faster than they associated negative attributes to cis people. See Axt et al. (2021) for more details. This outcome is rescaled between 0-1 during the analysis.

Cis Bias: Scale from 1-7 from "I strongly prefer transgender people to cisgender people" to "I strongly prefer cisgender people to transgender people." This outcome is rescaled between 0-1 during the analysis, with 1 indicating maximum preferences for cisgender people.

Ciscentrism: Measured with two scales. One scale asks respondents to rate how warm they feel toward transgender people on a scale between 1-10. The other scale asks respondents to rate how warm they feel toward cisgender people on a scale between 1-10. We subtract the scale on warmth toward transgender people from the scale on warmth toward cisgender people. Therefore, higher values suggest more relative warmth toward cisgender people than transgender people. We rescale this measure between 0-1, with 1 indicating maximum warmth toward cisgender people relative to transgender people.

E.3 Salience of Club Q Relative to Pulse and Shepard

E.3.1 New York Times



Figure E42: Number of New York Times Articles Related to Matthew Shepard's Murder, the Pulse Massacre, and the Club Q Shooting In The Two Months After The Event(s). The x-axis is the respective event, the y-axis is the number of articles published in the New York Times in the two months after the incident. Data are from the ProQuest New York Times Historic Newspaper database. Search phrases for the respective incidents are: "matthew shepard AND (murder OR death OR killed)," "pulse AND shooting", and "club q AND shooting."

E.3.2 Mediacloud



Figure E43: Count of News Articles Related to Violence Against LGBTQ+ People Six Months Before and After the Pulse Massacre and Club Q Massacre. Panels A-B, C-D, and E-F characterize the count of news articles (y-axis) over time (x-axis) containing the phrases "shooting," "LGBT," and "hate crime" respectively. Panels A, C, E and B, D, F characterize the count of articles over time 6 months before and after the Pulse and Club Q massacres respectively. Dashed vertical line denotes the moment the respective massacres occurred. The dark line characterizes a loess model fit on each side of the moment the respective massacres occurred. Data are from Mediacloud, an open-source platform for media analysis (see: `https://www.mediacloud.org/`). Annotations denote regression discontinuity-in-time estimates characterizing the effect of the respective massacres on the count of articles related to specific phrases (polynomial degree = 1, kernel = uniform, using CCT optimal bandwidth selection, see Calonico et al. (2015)).



Figure E44: Ratio of News Articles Related to Violence Against LGBTQ+ People vis-a-vis All News Articles Six Months Before and After the Pulse Massacre and Club Q Massacre. Panels A-B, C-D, and E-F characterize the ratio of news articles (y-axis) over time (x-axis) containing the phrases "shooting," "LGBT," and "hate crime" over all news articles respectively. Panels A, C, E and B, D, F characterize the count of articles over time 6 months before and after the Pulse and Club Q massacres respectively. Dashed vertical line denotes the moment the respective massacres occurred. The dark line characterizes a loess model fit on each side of the moment the respective massacres occurred. Data are from Mediacloud, an open-source platform for media analysis (see: `https://www.mediacloud.org/`). Annotations denote regression discontinuity-in-time estimates characterizing the effect of the respective massacres on the count of articles related to specific phrases (polynomial degree = 1, kernel = uniform, using CCT optimal bandwidth selection, see Calonico et al. (2015)).

Table E64: Assessing Coefficient Differences Between *Post-Pulse* and *Post-Club Q* on Media Salience

Outcome	Topic	RDiT Coef. (Pulse)	RSE (Pulse)	RDiT Coef. (Club Q)	RSE (Club Q)	Coef. Difference	Difference t stat.	Difference p value
Count	Shooting	1240.232	147.036	155.632	103.825	1084.601	6.348	0.000
Count	LGBT	369.582	44.839	46.168	7.430	323.414	7.129	0.000
Count	Hate Crime	80.012	10.373	68.077	18.824	11.935	0.596	0.553
Ratio	Shooting	0.121	0.020	0.014	0.004	0.108	5.182	0.000
Ratio	LGBT	0.042	0.007	0.004	0.001	0.038	5.420	0.000
Ratio	Hate Crime	0.008	0.002	0.008	0.001	0.000	0.013	0.989

Note: All RDiT estimates use a uniform kernel and polynomial degree equal to 1 along with the optimal bandwidth selection mechanism by Calonico et al. (2015). Robust SEs displayed.

E.3.3 Google Trends



Figure E45: Google Search Intensity On Topics Related to LGBT, Hate Crimes, and Mass Shootings Over Time (2016-2022). The x-axis is month, the y-axis is the normalized search intensity for a particular search topic between 2016-2022. From left to right, dashed vertical lines denote the moment of the Pulse massacre and Club Q shooting. Panels A, B, and C characterize search intensity for the following search terms: "LGBT," "shooting," and "LGBT hate crime."

E.4 Balance Tests

E.4.1 Project Implicit Sexuality IAT Data (2022)



Figure E46: Covariate Balance Between Project Implicit Sexuality IAT Survey-Takers Before and After Club Q Massacre. Each coefficient is from a separate model regressing a balance covariate (y-axis) on a binary indicator for taking the Sexuality IAT after the Club Q massacre (*post-Club Q*). Each panel characterizes the sample bandwidth at use (1-40 days from the Club Q massacre) and sample size. Statistically significant coefficients are black, grey otherwise. 95% CIs displayed derived from HC2 robust standard errors.

E.4.2 Project Implicit Transgender IAT Data (2022)



Figure E47: Covariate Balance Between Project Implicit Transgender IAT Survey-Takers Before and After Club Q Massacre. Each coefficient is from a separate model regressing a balance covariate (y-axis) on a binary indicator for taking the Transgender IAT after the Club Q massacre (*post-Club Q*). Each panel characterizes the sample bandwidth at use (1-40 days from the Club Q massacre) and sample size. Statistically significant coefficients are black, grey otherwise. 95% CIs displayed derived from HC2 robust standard errors.

E.5 State-Level Anti-LGBTQ+ Bills Over Time By Partisan Control



Figure E48: Number of State-Level Anti-LGBTQ+ Bills Introduced Over Time By Partisan Control. X-axis is year, y-axis is the number of anti-LGBTQ+ bills introduced. Color denotes state government partisan control of governorship, upper, and lower house. Data on bill introductions are from the American Civil Liberties Union.

Data on partisan control of state government are from Grumbach (2022). Data on the introduction of anti-LGBTQ+ bills between 2018-2022 are from the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU).[58] The data include the following types of bills:

- Anti-Transgender Bills
  - Single-sex facility restrictions
  - First amendment defense actions and religious exemptions
  - Restrictions on identification documents
  - Restrictions on health care/gender-affirming care
  - Restrictions on athletics
- Broader Anti-LGBTQ bills
  - Religious exemption bills
  - Religious freedom restoration acts
  - First amendment defense acts
  - Health care access restrictions
  - Adoption and foster care restrictions
  - Marriage-related exemptions

[58] See `https://www.aclu.org/past-legislation-affecting-lgbt-rights-across-country-2018`, `https://www.aclu.org/past-legislation-affecting-lgbt-rights-across-country-2019`, `https://www.aclu.org/past-legislation-affecting-lgbt-rights-across-country-2020`, `https://www.aclu.org/legislation-affecting-lgbtq-rights-across-country-2021`, and `https://www.aclu.org/legislation-affecting-lgbtq-rights-across-country-2022` for source data.

- Restrictions on schools and student organizations
- Bills preempting local protections

E.6 Anti-LGBTQ+ Right Wing Protests Over Time



Figure E49: Number of Right-Wing Anti-LGBTQ+ Protests Over Time (2020-2022). X-axis is year, y-axis is the number of anti-LGBTQ+ protests. Data are from ACLED (see: `https://acleddata.com/`, protest keyword = "anti-LGBT")

E.7 Regression Tables

E.7.1 *Post-Club Q* Coefficients (S-IAT Dataset)

Table E65: Regression Table Characterizing *Post-Club Q* Coefficients (S-IAT Dataset)

Club Q Coef.	SE	p-val	N	Dataset	Outcome	Bandwidth	Controls
0.00	0.00	0.86	5645.00	Sexuality IAT	D-Score (Anti-Gay)	5.00	No
0.00	0.00	0.85	11068.00	Sexuality IAT	D-Score (Anti-Gay)	10.00	No
-0.00	0.00	0.77	17246.00	Sexuality IAT	D-Score (Anti-Gay)	15.00	No
-0.00	0.00	0.13	24118.00	Sexuality IAT	D-Score (Anti-Gay)	20.00	No
-0.00	0.00	0.09	28949.00	Sexuality IAT	D-Score (Anti-Gay)	25.00	No
-0.00	0.00	0.03	33221.00	Sexuality IAT	D-Score (Anti-Gay)	30.00	No
-0.00	0.00	0.06	37519.00	Sexuality IAT	D-Score (Anti-Gay)	35.00	No
-0.00	0.00	0.05	41263.00	Sexuality IAT	D-Score (Anti-Gay)	40.00	No
0.00	0.00	0.85	5645.00	Sexuality IAT	D-Score (Anti-Gay)	5.00	Yes
-0.00	0.00	0.78	11068.00	Sexuality IAT	D-Score (Anti-Gay)	10.00	Yes
-0.00	0.00	0.91	17246.00	Sexuality IAT	D-Score (Anti-Gay)	15.00	Yes
-0.00	0.00	0.19	24118.00	Sexuality IAT	D-Score (Anti-Gay)	20.00	Yes
-0.00	0.00	0.16	28949.00	Sexuality IAT	D-Score (Anti-Gay)	25.00	Yes
-0.00	0.00	0.06	33221.00	Sexuality IAT	D-Score (Anti-Gay)	30.00	Yes
-0.00	0.00	0.07	37519.00	Sexuality IAT	D-Score (Anti-Gay)	35.00	Yes
-0.00	0.00	0.03	41263.00	Sexuality IAT	D-Score (Anti-Gay)	40.00	Yes
0.00	0.01	0.74	5743.00	Sexuality IAT	Straight Bias	5.00	No
0.01	0.00	0.10	11229.00	Sexuality IAT	Straight Bias	10.00	No
0.00	0.00	0.38	17538.00	Sexuality IAT	Straight Bias	15.00	No
0.00	0.00	0.88	24542.00	Sexuality IAT	Straight Bias	20.00	No
0.00	0.00	0.97	29456.00	Sexuality IAT	Straight Bias	25.00	No
-0.00	0.00	0.68	33835.00	Sexuality IAT	Straight Bias	30.00	No
-0.00	0.00	0.69	38195.00	Sexuality IAT	Straight Bias	35.00	No
-0.00	0.00	0.68	41983.00	Sexuality IAT	Straight Bias	40.00	No
0.00	0.01	0.63	5743.00	Sexuality IAT	Straight Bias	5.00	Yes
0.01	0.00	0.11	11229.00	Sexuality IAT	Straight Bias	10.00	Yes
0.00	0.00	0.12	17538.00	Sexuality IAT	Straight Bias	15.00	Yes
0.00	0.00	0.41	24542.00	Sexuality IAT	Straight Bias	20.00	Yes
0.00	0.00	0.40	29456.00	Sexuality IAT	Straight Bias	25.00	Yes
0.00	0.00	0.73	33835.00	Sexuality IAT	Straight Bias	30.00	Yes
0.00	0.00	0.77	38195.00	Sexuality IAT	Straight Bias	35.00	Yes
-0.00	0.00	0.91	41983.00	Sexuality IAT	Straight Bias	40.00	Yes
0.00	0.00	0.77	5782.00	Sexuality IAT	Heterocentrism	5.00	No
0.00	0.00	0.56	11299.00	Sexuality IAT	Heterocentrism	10.00	No
0.00	0.00	0.92	17631.00	Sexuality IAT	Heterocentrism	15.00	No
-0.00	0.00	0.69	24691.00	Sexuality IAT	Heterocentrism	20.00	No
-0.00	0.00	0.61	29632.00	Sexuality IAT	Heterocentrism	25.00	No
-0.00	0.00	0.34	34037.00	Sexuality IAT	Heterocentrism	30.00	No
-0.00	0.00	0.62	38414.00	Sexuality IAT	Heterocentrism	35.00	No
-0.00	0.00	0.88	42225.00	Sexuality IAT	Heterocentrism	40.00	No
0.00	0.00	0.62	5782.00	Sexuality IAT	Heterocentrism	5.00	Yes
0.00	0.00	0.75	11299.00	Sexuality IAT	Heterocentrism	10.00	Yes
0.00	0.00	0.53	17631.00	Sexuality IAT	Heterocentrism	15.00	Yes
0.00	0.00	0.83	24691.00	Sexuality IAT	Heterocentrism	20.00	Yes
0.00	0.00	0.80	29632.00	Sexuality IAT	Heterocentrism	25.00	Yes
-0.00	0.00	0.77	34037.00	Sexuality IAT	Heterocentrism	30.00	Yes
0.00	0.00	0.97	38414.00	Sexuality IAT	Heterocentrism	35.00	Yes
-0.00	0.00	1.00	42225.00	Sexuality IAT	Heterocentrism	40.00	Yes

HC2 robust SEs reported

E.7.2 *Post-Club Q* Coefficients (T-IAT Dataset)

Table E66: Regression Table Characterizing *Post-Club Q* Coefficients (T-IAT Dataset)

Club Q Coef.	SE	p-val	N	Dataset	Outcome	Bandwidth	Controls
0.00	0.01	0.86	2010.00	Transgender IAT	D-Score (Anti-Trans)	5.00	No
0.00	0.00	0.80	4038.00	Transgender IAT	D-Score (Anti-Trans)	10.00	No
-0.00	0.00	0.60	6185.00	Transgender IAT	D-Score (Anti-Trans)	15.00	No
-0.00	0.00	0.44	8856.00	Transgender IAT	D-Score (Anti-Trans)	20.00	No
-0.00	0.00	0.30	11013.00	Transgender IAT	D-Score (Anti-Trans)	25.00	No
-0.00	0.00	0.10	12730.00	Transgender IAT	D-Score (Anti-Trans)	30.00	No
-0.00	0.00	0.17	14453.00	Transgender IAT	D-Score (Anti-Trans)	35.00	No
-0.00	0.00	0.12	16044.00	Transgender IAT	D-Score (Anti-Trans)	40.00	No
-0.00	0.01	0.58	2010.00	Transgender IAT	D-Score (Anti-Trans)	5.00	Yes
-0.00	0.00	0.62	4038.00	Transgender IAT	D-Score (Anti-Trans)	10.00	Yes
-0.00	0.00	0.33	6185.00	Transgender IAT	D-Score (Anti-Trans)	15.00	Yes
-0.00	0.00	0.22	8856.00	Transgender IAT	D-Score (Anti-Trans)	20.00	Yes
-0.00	0.00	0.18	11013.00	Transgender IAT	D-Score (Anti-Trans)	25.00	Yes
-0.00	0.00	0.06	12730.00	Transgender IAT	D-Score (Anti-Trans)	30.00	Yes
-0.00	0.00	0.09	14453.00	Transgender IAT	D-Score (Anti-Trans)	35.00	Yes
-0.00	0.00	0.04	16044.00	Transgender IAT	D-Score (Anti-Trans)	40.00	Yes
0.01	0.01	0.21	2114.00	Transgender IAT	Cis Bias	5.00	No
0.01	0.01	0.24	4261.00	Transgender IAT	Cis Bias	10.00	No
-0.00	0.01	0.86	6516.00	Transgender IAT	Cis Bias	15.00	No
-0.00	0.00	0.66	9327.00	Transgender IAT	Cis Bias	20.00	No
-0.00	0.00	0.48	11586.00	Transgender IAT	Cis Bias	25.00	No
-0.00	0.00	0.19	13390.00	Transgender IAT	Cis Bias	30.00	No
-0.00	0.00	0.36	15189.00	Transgender IAT	Cis Bias	35.00	No
-0.00	0.00	0.47	16851.00	Transgender IAT	Cis Bias	40.00	No
0.00	0.01	0.70	2114.00	Transgender IAT	Cis Bias	5.00	Yes
0.00	0.01	0.87	4261.00	Transgender IAT	Cis Bias	10.00	Yes
-0.00	0.00	0.45	6516.00	Transgender IAT	Cis Bias	15.00	Yes
-0.00	0.00	0.38	9327.00	Transgender IAT	Cis Bias	20.00	Yes
-0.00	0.00	0.54	11586.00	Transgender IAT	Cis Bias	25.00	Yes
-0.00	0.00	0.31	13390.00	Transgender IAT	Cis Bias	30.00	Yes
-0.00	0.00	0.54	15189.00	Transgender IAT	Cis Bias	35.00	Yes
-0.00	0.00	0.65	16851.00	Transgender IAT	Cis Bias	40.00	Yes
0.01	0.01	0.08	2148.00	Transgender IAT	Ciscentrism	5.00	No
0.01	0.00	0.06	4333.00	Transgender IAT	Ciscentrism	10.00	No
0.00	0.00	0.30	6627.00	Transgender IAT	Ciscentrism	15.00	No
0.00	0.00	0.86	9479.00	Transgender IAT	Ciscentrism	20.00	No
-0.00	0.00	0.56	11764.00	Transgender IAT	Ciscentrism	25.00	No
-0.00	0.00	0.07	13590.00	Transgender IAT	Ciscentrism	30.00	No
-0.00	0.00	0.08	15412.00	Transgender IAT	Ciscentrism	35.00	No
-0.00	0.00	0.08	17095.00	Transgender IAT	Ciscentrism	40.00	No
0.01	0.01	0.28	2148.00	Transgender IAT	Ciscentrism	5.00	Yes
0.00	0.00	0.30	4333.00	Transgender IAT	Ciscentrism	10.00	Yes
0.00	0.00	0.48	6627.00	Transgender IAT	Ciscentrism	15.00	Yes
-0.00	0.00	0.84	9479.00	Transgender IAT	Ciscentrism	20.00	Yes
-0.00	0.00	0.79	11764.00	Transgender IAT	Ciscentrism	25.00	Yes
-0.00	0.00	0.18	13590.00	Transgender IAT	Ciscentrism	30.00	Yes
-0.00	0.00	0.21	15412.00	Transgender IAT	Ciscentrism	35.00	Yes
-0.00	0.00	0.22	17095.00	Transgender IAT	Ciscentrism	40.00	Yes

HC2 robust SEs reported

E.8 Evaluating Individual-Level Heterogeneity

E.8.1 Sexuality IAT

Table E67: Heterogeneous Influence of Club Q Massacre (S-IAT Dataset)

Interaction	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Dataset	Outcome	Bandwidth	N	R-Squared
Post-Club Q x Non-White	0.00	0.00	0.93	Sexuality IAT	D-Score (Anti-Gay)	20.00	24118	0.16
Post-Club Q x Woman	-0.00	0.00	0.71	Sexuality IAT	D-Score (Anti-Gay)	20.00	24118	0.16
Post-Club Q x Liberal	0.00	0.00	0.87	Sexuality IAT	D-Score (Anti-Gay)	20.00	24118	0.16
Post-Club Q x % LGBT (State)	0.00	0.00	0.59	Sexuality IAT	D-Score (Anti-Gay)	20.00	24118	0.17
Post-Club Q x SS Couple Density (County)	-0.00	0.00	0.68	Sexuality IAT	D-Score (Anti-Gay)	20.00	19057	0.17
Post-Club Q x Non-White	-0.01	0.01	0.26	Sexuality IAT	Straight Bias	20.00	24542	0.23
Post-Club Q x Woman	-0.01	0.01	0.08	Sexuality IAT	Straight Bias	20.00	24542	0.23
Post-Club Q x Liberal	-0.00	0.01	0.69	Sexuality IAT	Straight Bias	20.00	24542	0.23
Post-Club Q x % LGBT (State)	-0.00	0.00	0.78	Sexuality IAT	Straight Bias	20.00	24542	0.23
Post-Club Q x SS Couple Density (County)	-0.00	0.00	0.21	Sexuality IAT	Straight Bias	20.00	19492	0.23
Post-Club Q x Non-White	0.00	0.00	0.95	Sexuality IAT	Heterocentrism	20.00	24691	0.25
Post-Club Q x Woman	-0.01	0.00	0.15	Sexuality IAT	Heterocentrism	20.00	24691	0.25
Post-Club Q x Liberal	-0.00	0.00	0.49	Sexuality IAT	Heterocentrism	20.00	24691	0.25
Post-Club Q x % LGBT (State)	0.00	0.00	0.95	Sexuality IAT	Heterocentrism	20.00	24691	0.25
Post-Club Q x SS Couple Density (County)	-0.00	0.00	0.49	Sexuality IAT	Heterocentrism	20.00	19592	0.25

HC2 robust SEs reported. Each interaction coefficient is from a separate model.

E.8.2 Transgender IAT

Table E68: Heterogenous Influence of Club Q Massacre (T-IAT Dataset)

Interaction	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Dataset	Outcome	Bandwidth	N	R-Squared
Post-Club Q x Non-White	0.006	0.007	0.402	Transgender IAT	D-Score (Anti-Trans)	15.000	6185	0.116
Post-Club Q x Woman	-0.001	0.007	0.861	Transgender IAT	D-Score (Anti-Trans)	15.000	6185	0.116
Post-Club Q x Liberal	-0.008	0.007	0.197	Transgender IAT	D-Score (Anti-Trans)	15.000	6185	0.116
Post-Club Q x % LGBT (State)	-0.006	0.005	0.219	Transgender IAT	D-Score (Anti-Trans)	15.000	6185	0.117
Post-Club Q x SS Couple Density (County)	-0.002	0.001	0.072	Transgender IAT	D-Score (Anti-Trans)	15.000	4910	0.120
Post-Club Q x Non-White	-0.006	0.010	0.580	Transgender IAT	Cis Bias	15.000	6516	0.188
Post-Club Q x Woman	-0.024	0.011	0.035	Transgender IAT	Cis Bias	15.000	6516	0.189
Post-Club Q x Liberal	-0.007	0.010	0.512	Transgender IAT	Cis Bias	15.000	6516	0.188
Post-Club Q x % LGBT (State)	-0.007	0.006	0.216	Transgender IAT	Cis Bias	15.000	6516	0.190
Post-Club Q x SS Couple Density (County)	-0.001	0.002	0.624	Transgender IAT	Cis Bias	15.000	5179	0.183
Post-Club Q x Non-White	-0.009	0.007	0.163	Transgender IAT	Ciscentrism	15.000	6627	0.193
Post-Club Q x Woman	-0.008	0.008	0.287	Transgender IAT	Ciscentrism	15.000	6627	0.193
Post-Club Q x Liberal	-0.012	0.007	0.073	Transgender IAT	Ciscentrism	15.000	6627	0.193
Post-Club Q x % LGBT (State)	-0.004	0.004	0.276	Transgender IAT	Ciscentrism	15.000	6627	0.195
Post-Club Q x SS Couple Density (County)	0.000	0.001	0.825	Transgender IAT	Ciscentrism	15.000	5252	0.190

HC2 robust SEs reported. Each interaction coefficient is from a separate model.

F Less Salient Violent Events

F.1 Salience: Search and Analysis Rules

Here, we assess the salience of several relatively prominent anti-LGBTQ+ violent events relative to the Pulse massacre, Matthew Shepard's murder, and the Club Q massacre between 2000-2022. The universe of events we assess is from this crowd-soruced list: `https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_violence_against_LGBT_people_in_the_United_States`. To assess salience, we assess the number of search hits related to each event from the New York Times.

The Google search term we use to assess salience is: site:nytimes.com "[name of victim]" AND LGBT OR LGBTQ OR gay OR lesbian OR bisexual OR queer OR transgender OR trans OR homophobic OR transphobic AND attack OR assault OR murder OR kill OR killed OR killing OR death"

In cases where a particular place is attacked (e.g. Pulse, or Club Q), we replace "name of victim" with the place the attack occurred (e.g. "Pulse," "Club Q").

F.2 Salience of Less Salient Violent Events (2000-2022)



Figure F50: Salience of Less Salient Violent Incidents Against LGBTQ+ Group Members Relative to the Pulse Massacre, Shepard's Murder, and the Club Q massacre. Panels A/B characterizes the salience (x-axis, number of NYT articles) of incidents (y-axis) from 2000-2009/2010-2022. Panel C characterizes the salience of Shepard's murder, the Pulse massacre, and the Club Q massacre. Annotations denote number of New York Times hits. See Section F.1 for information on measurement of violent incidents and salience.

F.3 Assessing Influence of Less Salient Violent Events on Prosocial Attitudes (2010-2022)



Figure F51: Influence of Less Salient Violent Incidents Against LGBTQ+ Group Members on Prosocial Attitudes Toward Gay People. Panels A/B characterize the influence of incidents on prosocial attitudes from 2010-2016/2017-2022. The x-axis is the post-incident coefficient, the y-axis is the name of victim and date of the respectively violent incident. Shape denotes outcome at use (*D-score*, *heterocentrism*, *straight bias*). Grey coefficients are statistically insignificant, black otherwise. Each panel contains two facets using data 15 days before and after the respective violent incident (left) and 20 days before and after the incident (right). 95% CIs displayed derived from HC2 robust SEs.

In this analysis, we examine the influence of less salient violent incidents against LGBTQ+ group members on prosocial attitudes toward gay people between 2010-2022 (see Figure F50, see also `https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_violence_against_LGBT_people_`

`in_the_United_States`). Similar to Studies 2 and 4, we use Project Implicit Sexuality Implicit Association Test surveys on U.S. adults from 2010-2022 to conduct this analysis. In the analysis, we exclude less salient incidents where 1) there were days of missing data 15 and 20-days before and after the onset of a particular violent incident and 2) there were not 20 days of pre-treatment data for each respective yearly survey (e.g. if an incident occurred on January 7th in a particular year, where there is only 6 days of pre-treatment data for that particular year). Like Studies 2 and 4, We assess the effect of each incident on the *D-score*, *straight bias*, and *heterocentrism*.

G Validating Outcomes Across Studies

In this section, we show our outcomes capture the same concept despite differences in measurement and temporal domain across studies. If our outcomes are measuring the same concept across time, they should meet two criteria: 1) they should be highly correlated consistently with each other *across several time periods*, 2) they should have similar correlates over time. Yearly S-IAT surveys from 2010-2018 show *SSM support* (Study 1) is consistently strongly associated with the anti-gay *D-score*, *straight bias*, and *heterocentrism* outcomes (Study 2). The min-max association between SSM support and the Study 2 outcomes is 30%-100% of the Study 2 outcome scales after covariate adjustment (Figure G53). Although we can't correlate Study 2's outcomes with the *moral wrong* (Study 3) outcome due to data limitations, we can show *SSM support* is highly correlated with *moral wrong* for nearly three decades across several surveys between 1978-2004. Those who support SSM are 35-55 percentage points less likely to believe homosexuality is immoral (Figure G54). Given *moral wrong* is consistently highly correlated with *SSM support* over several decades and *SSM support* is consistently correlated with the Study 2 outcomes for a decade, we can safely assume the outcomes from Studies 1-3 are capturing a similar concept despite measurement and temporal differences. Moreover, socio-demographic and political correlates of the Study 2 and Study 3 outcomes are the same between 2010-2018 and 1978-2004 respectively (Figures G55-G56), suggesting safety in assuming the outcomes are measuring the same concept over time.[59] Additionally, we evaluate common correlates across Studies 1-4 and show, for the most part, all outcomes are correlated similarly with particular socio-demographic and political factors (Figure G57). These findings further suggest the outcomes from Studies 1-4 are capturing a similar concept despite measurement and temporal differences. These findings also validate our theoretic approach, which is to speak to prosocial attitudes in a broad, multi-dimensional manner.

[59] This also validates our event study on Figure 9. Despite long-term differences in measuring *moral wrong*, the concept doesn't change much over time.

G.1 System 1 and System 2 = Related



Figure G52: The Explicit Anti-Gay Attitude Outcomes are Highly Correlated with the Implicit Anti-Gay Attitude Outcome (D Score). The x-axis is the coefficient for the respective explicit anti-gay attitude outcome (y-axis). Color denotes PI S-IAT dataset at use. The left and right panels characterize estimates without and with covariate adjustment (age, gender, white, college education, ideology, religious, non-metro resident, California resident, New York resident, Florida resident, and Illinois resident). All covariates rescaled between 0-1. 95% CIs displayed derived from HC2 robust SEs.

Table G69: Pearson's Rho Correlation Coefficients Characterizing Association Between D Score and Explicit Measures of Anti-Gay Attitudes

Dataset	Covariate	Pearson's ρ With D Score	p-value
S-IAT 2010	Heterocentrism	0.39	$p < 0.001$
S-IAT 2010	Straight Bias	0.42	$p < 0.001$
S-IAT 2011	Heterocentrism	0.38	$p < 0.001$
S-IAT 2011	Straight Bias	0.41	$p < 0.001$
S-IAT 2012	Heterocentrism	0.39	$p < 0.001$
S-IAT 2012	Straight Bias	0.41	$p < 0.001$
S-IAT 2013	Heterocentrism	0.38	$p < 0.001$
S-IAT 2013	Straight Bias	0.40	$p < 0.001$
S-IAT 2014	Heterocentrism	0.39	$p < 0.001$
S-IAT 2014	Straight Bias	0.41	$p < 0.001$
S-IAT 2015	Heterocentrism	0.38	$p < 0.001$
S-IAT 2015	Straight Bias	0.40	$p < 0.001$
S-IAT 2016	Heterocentrism	0.41	$p < 0.001$
S-IAT 2016	Straight Bias	0.43	$p < 0.001$
S-IAT 2017	Heterocentrism	0.43	$p < 0.001$
S-IAT 2017	Straight Bias	0.45	$p < 0.001$
S-IAT 2018	Heterocentrism	0.43	$p < 0.001$
S-IAT 2018	Straight Bias	0.45	$p < 0.001$

G.2 Demonstrating Study 2 Outcomes = Associated With SSM Support



Figure G53: The *D score*, *Straight Bias*, and *Heterocentrism* Items are Highly Correlated With *SSM Support* Over an 8-year Period. The x-axis is the coefficient characterizing the relationship between the D score, straight bias, and heterocentrism (specified on y-axis) and support for same-sex marriage. Color denotes PI S-IAT dataset at use. The left and right panels characterize estimates without and with covariate adjustment (age, gender, white, college education, ideology, religious, non-metro resident, California resident, New York resident, Florida resident, and Illinois resident). All covariates rescaled between 0-1. 95% CIs displayed derived from HC2 robust SEs.

Across all PI S-IAT studies, *SSM support* is based on an item asking respondents "Do you think marriages between homosexuals should or should not be recognized by the law as valid, with the same rights as traditional marriages?" with response options: 1) should be valid, 2) should not be valid, 3) no opinion. We code SSM support as 1 if the respondent indicates "should be valid" and 0 otherwise.

The reason we do not use the *SSM support* measure as an outcome in Study 2 is because the item was not asked between January-July 2016, preventing us from using an unexpected-event-during-survey design with the outcome. Our estimates are from respondents who took the 2016 PI S-IAT survey after July 2016.

G.3 Demonstrating Moral Wrong (Study 3) Outcome = Associated With SSM Support



Figure G54: The *Moral Wrong* Item is Highly Correlated With *SSM Support* Over 3 Decades. The x-axis is the study at use. The y-axis is the *moral wrong* coefficient where support for gay marriage is the outcome. Color denotes the inclusion/exclusion of controls (age, gender, race, college-education, partisan identification). All covariates are rescaled between 0-1. 95% CIs displayed derived from HC2 robust SEs.

Note: The TIME 1978 study does not have an explicit *SSM support* item. Instead, we use a proxy that characterizes whether respondents believe homosexual relationships are acceptable (see the measurement of SSM support across the studies characterized on Figure G53 below).

Homosexual Relationship Item (TIME 1978): Today there are many different kinds of lifestyles which people find acceptable, such as a husband staying home and caring for the children while the wife goes to work. How do you feel about this? Do you find it acceptable for other people but not for yourself, acceptable for other people and yourself, or not acceptable at all? Homosexual relationships. 1) Acceptable for others, 2) Acceptable for others and self, 3) Not acceptable. Coded 1 if response is "Acceptable for others" OR "Acceptable for others and self," 0 otherwise.

Gay Marriage Support Item (CNN 1994): Do you think marriages between homosexual men or homosexual women should be recognized as legal by the law? 1) Yes, 2) No. Coded 1 if response is "yes," 0 otherwise.

Gay Marriage Support Item (CNN 1998): Do you think marriages between homosexual men or between homosexual women should be recognized as legal by the law? 1) Yes, 2) No. Coded 1 if response is "yes," 0 otherwise.

Gay Marriage Support Item (CNN 2004): On another topic, do you think marriages between homosexual men or between homosexual women should be recognized as legal by the law, or not? 1) Yes, 2) No. Coded 1 if response is "yes," 0 otherwise.

G.4 *Moral Wrong* Outcome Correlates Between 1978-2004

Figure G55: Correlates of *Moral Wrong* Outcome Over 3 Decades. The x-axis is coefficient for the respective covariate (y-axis, fully-specified model for each study). Color denotes the survey at use. All covariates are rescaled between 0-1. 95% CIs displayed derived from HC2 robust SEs.

G.5 Study 2 Outcome Correlates Between 2010-2018



Figure G56: Correlates of *D score*, *Heterocentrism*, and *Straight Bias* Outcomes Between 2010-2018. The x-axis is coefficient for the respective covariate (y-axis, fully-specified model for each study). Color denotes the PI S-IAT dataset at use. All covariates are rescaled between 0-1. 95% CIs displayed derived from HC2 robust SEs.

G.6 Correlates Across All Studies



Figure G57: Consistent Correlates of Outcomes Across All Studies. The x-axis is coefficient for the respective covariate (y-axis, fully-specified model for each study). Color denotes the outcome and study dataset at use. All covariates are rescaled between 0-1. Unlike in the main text, the outcome for Study 1 is now reverse coded (*SSM No Support*). This is to maintain directional consistency with the outcomes from other studies. Moreover, there is no liberal ideology item in the Study 3 CNN surveys from 1998. The coefficient presented here for Study 3 is for Democratic partisan identification, which is available in the 1998 CNN surveys and is known to be highly correlated with a liberal ideology. 95% CIs displayed derived from HC2 robust SEs.

H Assessing Heterogenous Decay

In this section, we assess if there is heterogeneous decay in the effects of violence against LGBTQ+ group members on prosocial attitudes toward LGBTQ+ group members for Studies 1-3. Given Studies 1-3 posit prosocial attitudinal shifts are temporally unsustainable, it may be the case that the sustainability of these shifts are conditional on the individual-level characteristics we theorize about on Section 3.1. We do not find heterogeneity in the temporal persistence of the effects we identify in Studies 1-3. We remove all respondents 1-10 days after the Pulse massacre and assess the differential effect of *Post-Pulse* by race, gender, liberalism, and LGBTQ+ geographic context and find no evidence of heterogeneous decay in Study 1 (Table H70). We remove all respondents 40 days after the Pulse massacre and assess the differential effect of *Post-Pulse* comparing respondents interviewed in the 15 days before Pulse relative to the 15 days after 40 days after Pulse by race, gender, liberalism, and LGBTQ+ geographic context and find largely null evidence of heterogeneous decay in Study 2 (Table H71). We assess the differential effect of being interviewed in 2001 or 2004 on *moral wrong* by race, gender, and Democratic partisanship and find largely null evidence of heterogeneous decay in Study 3 Table H72). Linear terms and control covariates are included in the models but omitted from the tables in these analyses. In summary, we find limited evidence of heterogeneous decay.

H.1 Study 1

Table H70: There is no heterogeneous decay in the Post-Pulse effect

	SSM Support				
Post-Pulse x Non-White	0.06				
	(0.13)				
Post-Pulse x Female		−0.12			
		(0.12)			
Post-Pulse x Liberal			−0.01		
			(0.13)		
Post-Pulse x % LGBTQ (State)				0.02	
				(0.65)	
Post-Pulse x SS Couple Density					−0.05
					(0.53)
R^2	0.37	0.37	0.37	0.37	0.37
Num. obs.	812	812	812	812	812

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$

H.2 Study 2

Table H71: Assessing Heterogenous Decay of *Post-Pulse* (Study 2, Part 1)

	D-Score	Heterocentrism	D-Score	Heterocentrism	D-Score	Heterocentrism
Post-Pulse	−0.02**	−0.02***	−0.02†	−0.03***	−0.01	−0.02*
	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Post-Pulse x Non-White	−0.00	0.02*				
	(0.01)	(0.01)				
Post-Pulse x Woman			−0.00	0.03**		
			(0.01)	(0.01)		
Post-Pulse x Liberal					−0.01	0.01
					(0.01)	(0.01)
Non-White	0.02*	0.01				
	(0.01)	(0.01)				
Woman	−0.03***	0.00	−0.03***	−0.01*	−0.03***	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Liberal	−0.08***	−0.08***	−0.08***	−0.08***	−0.08***	−0.08***
	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
R^2	0.14	0.16	0.14	0.16	0.14	0.16
Num. obs.	3374	3360	3374	3360	3374	3360

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$

Table H72: Assessing Heterogenous Decay of *Post-Pulse* (Study 2, Part 2)

	D-Score	Heterocentrism	D-Score	Heterocentrism
Post-Pulse	0.00	−0.02	−0.00	−0.02**
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Post-Pulse x % LGBT (State)	−0.04	0.02		
	(0.04)	(0.03)		
Post-Pulse x SS Couple Density (County)			−0.07†	0.05†
			(0.03)	(0.02)
% LGBT (State)	−0.00	0.01		
	(0.03)	(0.05)		
SS Couple Density (County)			−0.03	−0.09**
			(0.03)	(0.02)
R^2	0.14	0.16	0.14	0.17
Num. obs.	3374	3360	3374	3360
N Clusters	52	52	725	721

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$

H.3 Study 3

Table H73: Heterogenous Decay of *Post-Shepard* (Study 3)

	Moral Wrong		
Non-White x 2001	0.09		
	(0.07)		
Non-White x 2004	0.10		
	(0.07)		
Woman x 2001		−0.02	
		(0.05)	
Woman x 2004		−0.06	
		(0.05)	
Democrat x 2001			−0.03
			(0.05)
Democrat x 2004			−0.03
			(0.06)
R^2	0.04	0.04	0.04
Num. obs.	6129	6129	6129

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

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