## Living in the Shadow of Deportation: How Immigration Enforcement Forestalls Political Assimilation

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#### Abstract

Prior research demonstrates acculturated co-ethnics of immigrant groups adopt restrictive immigration policy preferences akin to that of host country dominant groups. However, a puzzle remains where acculturated Latinxs in the United States still maintain relatively open immigration policy preferences despite their distance from the canonical immigrant archetype (e.g. Spanish-speaking, immigrant). To answer the puzzle, I draw on sociological perspectives and theorize that the increased societal integration of undocumented immigrants in tandem with an expanding interior immigration enforcement apparatus generates a sense of rebuff against Anglo political norms among acculturated Latinxs. Using 6 national Latinx surveys, I corroborate my theory and find perceptibly threatening immigration enforcement contexts forestall the adoption of restrictive immigration policy preferences via acculturation. Absent deportation threat, acculturated Latinxs adopt immigration preferences similar to white Anglos. This paper suggests political assimilation is not preordained due to the unique circumstances Latinx communities face.

## Introduction

Will acculturated Latinx co-ethnics adopt restrictive immigration policy preferences like their Anglo counterparts? History is replete with examples of acculturated immigrant group co-ethnics adopting restrictive immigration policy preferences akin to their Anglo counterparts, a quintessential aspect of the assimilation process (Williamson et al., 2021). Alonso Perales, the League of United Latin American Citizens' second president (LULAC, 1930-31), while supporting immigration restrictions, indicated the Mexican-American people had to "draw a line between the American citizen of Mexican descent, and the alien of the same extraction." Some LULAC members argued new immigration undercut assimilation into the Anglo-American mainstream and stigmatized the Mexican-American population by association. Others, like Cesar Chavez, who at one point facilitated a border patrol operated by the United Farm Workers Union, argued new immigration hurt the economic prospects of immigrants already in the U.S. (Gutiérrez, 1995).

The adoption of restrictive immigration preferences among acculturated Latinxs, members of the largest U.S. immigrant-origin group who constitute 20% of the population,<sup>1</sup> is not simply historical. Contemporary evidence shows acculturated Latinxs (e.g. third-generation, English-dominant, citizens) hold more restrictive immigration policy preferences akin to Anglo whites relative to their less acculturated counterparts (e.g. immigrant, Spanish-dominant) (Rouse et al., 2010). However, other evidence shows some acculturated Latinxs still hold open immigration policy preferences despite their distance from the immigrant experience, with limited attitudinal convergence vis-a-vis Anglos (Pedraza, 2014).

I explain why some acculturated Latinxs still hold open immigration policy preferences despite pressure to adopt immigration policy attitudes akin to Anglos. I argue the contemporary interior immigration enforcement context in addition to the societal integration of a large Latinx undocumented population not only implicates immigrants but even well-acculturated

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>I refer to Latinxs as an "immigrant group" since a majority have direct connections to an immigrant experience. 66% are foreign-born or second-generation. The remaining are at least third-generation. Puerto Ricans are excluded from my analysis given their citizenship, increasing the precision of my phrasing.

Latinxs. Drawing on *segmented assimilation*, *reactive ethnicity*, and *integrative expectations* theory, I posit the expansive, threatening contemporary immigration enforcement context motivates rebuff against anti-immigrant Anglo norms and sustains political commitments to new immigrant co-ethnics via open immigration policy preferences among acculturated Latinxs worried about immigration enforcement.

Evidence from 6 national Latinx surveys (2007-2019) corroborates my theory. Acculturated Latinxs *threatened* by immigration enforcement hold immigration policy preferences akin to unacculturated Latinxs. Conversely, acculturated Latinxs *unthreatened* by immigration enforcement possess attitudes more similar to Anglos. I also demonstrate immigration enforcement threat operates net of well-established alternative mechanisms that may undercut the adoption of restrictive immigration preferences among acculturated Latinxs.

This paper complicates forecasts that Latinxs will adopt the political standards, at least on the immigration policy dimension, of Anglos like other historic immigrant origin groups as they integrate in the U.S. (Alba, 2016). Prior research suggests acculturated Latinxs reduce support for pro-immigrant policy because they are less implicated by restrictive immigration laws and may perceive benefits from undermining new immigration (Bedolla, 2003). Contrary to conventional wisdom, this paper demonstrates immigration enforcement can still frustrate political assimilation on immigration policy preferences *even among acculturated Latinxs* ostensibly protected from deportation, and maintains the distinct immigration preferences of Latinx communities (Mora and Rodríguez-Muñiz, 2017). In sum, accounting for heterogeneous exposure to a restrictive immigration context in tandem with a large undocumented Latinx population helps illuminate the segmented adoption of salient policy preferences among the largest U.S. immigrant group.

## Perspectives on Anti-Immigrant Assimilation

Immigrant group members adopt the host country's dominant group attitudes to increase their social, economic, and political status (Alba and Logan, 1992; Gans, 1992; Alba, 2009).

Accordingly, straight-line assimilation theory posits immigrant group member attitudes converge with the dominant group via acculturative mechanisms such as a higher generational status, learning the dominant language, intermarriage, or residential integration (Gordon, 1964). Politically, Latinxs adopt restrictive immigration policy preferences akin to Anglo whites as a function of generational status and exhibiting English dominance (Polinard et al., 1984; Rouse et al., 2010). Historic and contemporary evidence suggests Latinxs possess multiple motivations to adopt restrictive immigration preferences as they acculturate. Acculturated Latinxs may perceive themselves as prototypically American instead of connected to an immigrant community (Rouse et al., 2010). They may dissociate from newer Latinx immigrants due to their stigmatized attributes. They may backlash against new Latinx immigrants who critique their inability to maintain ethnic norms (e.g. speaking Spanish) (Bedolla, 2003). Economic competition, perceived or real, could also generate anti-immigrant sentiment given acculturated Latinxs may compete with new immigrants within similar occupational strata (Gutiérrez, 1995; Ochoa, 2004).

Despite the restrictive trend, Latinx immigration preferences do not fully converge with Anglos as they acculturate (Pedraza, 2014). Multiple surveys show that although later generation Latinxs are more restrictive on immigration than their immigrant counterparts, there is still a gap between third+ generation Latinx and Anglo preferences (Section A.1).<sup>2</sup>

Sociological insights may explain why acculturated Latinxs still hold open immigration policy preferences. *Segmented assimilation theory* posits group characteristics and reception contexts determine if immigrant co-ethnics assimilate across multiple dimensions (Portes and Zhou, 1993; Waters et al., 2010; Samson, 2014). Discrimination, limited intra-group social capital, and economic inequality may undercut assimilation such that segments of acculturated immigrant group members still possess attributes similar to new immigrants (Schnittker, 2002; Telles and Ortiz, 2008; Suárez-Orozco and Suárez-Orozco, 2009).

Reactive ethnicity theory posits hostile anti-immigrant contexts motivate acculturated

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>"+" denotes third generation or more (e.g. fourth generation).

co-ethnics to develop a politicized group consciousness that protects the group and dissociates from the dominant group's political commitments (Rumbaut, 2008). Likewise, research at the intersection of politics and segmented assimilation theorizes discrimination sustains proimmigrant policy preferences among third and fourth generation Mexican-Americans (Telles and Ortiz, 2008). Pedraza (2014) explicitly tests this hypothesis by forwarding an *integrative expectations* theory. They posit acculturated Latinx co-ethnics exposed to discrimination rebuff against Anglo immigration policy attitudes since expectations the host society would incorporate them are frustrated.

However, absent from the discussion on segmented political assimilation is how host country rebuff via immigration enforcement affects immigration policy preferences among acculturated Latinxs. Prior research on how immigration enforcement undermines assimilation emphasizes socio-economic outcomes (Massey and Pren, 2012; Massey et al., 2016). Other research theorizes or provides qualitative evidence immigration enforcement may motivate Latinxs to reject Anglo norms (Jones, 2019). Political science research typically focuses on political mobilization in response to immigration enforcement (Pantoja et al., 2001; White, 2016; Zepeda-Millán, 2017; Roman et al., 2021). Yet, there is no explicit and systematic test of whether the contemporary immigration enforcement context undercuts the adoption of immigration policy preferences akin to Anglos among acculturated Latinxs exposed to the threat of immigration enforcement.

# How Immigration Enforcement Stops Anti-Immigrant Assimilation

How does immigration enforcement undercut the adoption of restrictive immigration policy preferences among acculturated Latinxs? Contemporary immigration enforcement is a *salient* and *negative* aspect of the host society for Latinxs. Since the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), immigration enforcement has increased precipitously. Thresholds for revoking residency were reduced, border enforcement escalated, and interior deportations increased over 1400%. Yearly deportations increased from 19,000 to a staggering 289,000 (Figure B2, Panel F). These policies incentivized undocumented migrants to stay in the U.S. for fear of entanglement with immigration authorities via cyclical migration (Massey and Pren, 2012). Thus, the undocumented population increased from 3.5-11 million between 1990-present. Likewise, the proportion of undocumented living in the U.S. over 10 years increased from 33-66% between 1995-2017 (Figure B2, Panels A-B)

Restrictive immigration policies have had profound and disparate consequences on Latinxs regardless of acculturation level. Over 70% of undocumented are Latinx. Latin American immigrants are "over-deported" relative to their undocumented population proportion (Figure B2, Panel H). Over 40% of Latinxs know undocumented friends or family (Figure B2, Panels C-D). Social ties with undocumented immigrants among acculturated Latinxs are strong. Even 30% and 36% of 3rd generation+ and English-speaking Latinxs know undocumented friends or family. Acculturated Latinxs are integrated in communities subject to immigration enforcement. 3rd generation + Latinxs live in zipcodes that are 20% foreign-born and 10% noncitizen (12% and 6% for Anglo whites, Figure B2, Panels D-E). Acculturated Latinxs with ties to *legal* immigrants are also implicated by immigration efforcement. After IIRIRA, permanent residents and their proximate social ties (e.g. second and third-generation children) were exposed to draconian rules that strip away legal status if immigrants were not economically self-sufficient or committed an expansive set of minor crimes (Morawetz, 2000). Likewise, immigrants with liminal legal status such as Temporary Protected Status (TPS) or Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) may have second or third-generation friends and family concerned about their uncertain legal status (Menjívar, 2006).

Outside of social ties with immigrants, acculturated Latinxs are directly exposed to an expansive immigration enforcement apparatus. Latinxs are ethno-racialized as "illegal." Whites over-estimate the proportion of Latinxs they believe are undocumented by 24% (40% instead of 16%) (Barreto et al., 2012). Anglos conflate the categories "illegal" and "Latino," which may be motivated by xenophobic attitudes (Abrajano and Hajnal, 2017; Flores and Schachter, 2018). Even acculturated Latinxs are aware of their ethno-racialization as "illegal" or "foreign," which reduces their sense of belonging and motivates pro-immigrant solidarity (Ochoa, 2004; Asad, 2017). Ethno-racialization as "illegal" also motivates state-sanctioned behavior. Police may stop citizen Latinxs on the basis of immigration status (Armenta, 2017). *Even Latinx citizens have been detained by immigration authorities*. ICE wrongfully detained 3,500 Texas citizens between 2006-2017, 462 Rhode Island citizens over a 10 years, and 420 Florida citizens between 2017-2019 (Cunha, 2019). Thus, immigration enforcement does not just affect the undocumented, but many acculturated Latinxs.

Moreover, prior research shows immigration enforcement has deleterious consequences on Latinx communities, negatively affecting health (Cruz Nichols et al., 2018), child development (Dreby, 2015), wages (Fussell, 2011), social service uptake (Alsan and Yang, 2018), education (Dee and Murphy, 2020), government trust (Rocha et al., 2015), and civic incorporation (Brown and Bean, 2016). Many of these studies show consequences are not isolated to the undocumented given the strong social ties of acculturated Latinxs to immigrants.

Although prior research demonstrates immigration enforcement is more salient for unacculturated Latinxs (Asad, 2020), I posit immigration enforcement threat will have a stronger influence on acculturated Latinx immigration preferences, forestalling the adoption of restrictive preferences similar to Anglos. Human beings seek security (Huddy et al., 2007). Thus, Latinxs threatened by immigration enforcement may support open immigration policies as a protective instinct (Eadeh and Chang, 2020). However, a sense of threat from immigration enforcement may have a limited marginal influence on the immigration policy preferences of less acculturated Latinxs closer to the immigrant experience. Unacculturated Latinxs may already strongly support open immigration policies because they relatively benefit from an open immigration system (Maltby et al., 2020). Conversely, the immigration preferences of acculturated Latinxs have more space to travel in response to immigration enforcement threat since they are predisposed to adopt restrictive attitudes (Bedolla, 2003; Hetherington and Suhay, 2011).

Immigration enforcement threat may undermine acculturated Latinxs' restrictive predispositions, bringing their immigration preferences in line with new Latinx immigrants and away from Anglo political standards. Threat may increase information-seeking and reduce reliance on predispositional norms (Marcus and MacKuen, 1993). *Integrative expectations theory* suggests host society rebuff via immigration enforcement may encourage acculturated Latinxs to question their sense of host society integration despite their distance from the immigrant experience (Pedraza, 2014). Immigration enforcement threat, whether personal or proximal (e.g. via familial or friendship ties), signals rebuff from the American polity since it implies an association with illegality and a reduced sense of belonging (Mora and Rodríguez-Muñiz, 2017). Consistent with *segmented assimilation* and *reactive ethnicity* theory, acculturated Latinxs threatened by immigration enforcement may reject the dominant group's political norms (Rumbaut, 2008). In sum, acculturated Latinxs threatened by immigration enforcement may seek information concerning immigration policy (Gadarian and Albertson, 2014), identify alternative policies to amelioriate the threat (Hetherington and Suhay, 2011), and generate new preferences inconsistent with their relatively restrictive priors (Brader, 2006).

Therefore, Latinxs experience segmented political trajectories conditional on their exposure to threatening immigration enforcement contexts. **H1a:** Acculturated Latinxs threatened by immigration enforcement will continue to hold (open) immigration policy preferences similar to their new immigrant counterparts. **H1b:** Acculturated Latinxs unthreatened by immigration enforcement will adopt restrictive immigration preferences akin to Anglos.

## Data and Empirical Strategy

I use 6 nationally representative Latinx surveys to test H1. The 2007 (N = 1809), 2008 (N = 1822), 2010 (N = 1236), 2018 (N = 1794), and 2019 (N = 2427) Pew Latino Surveys (Pew '07, '08, '10, '18, '19) along with the 2016 Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey (N

= 2279, CMPS '16). Puerto Ricans are excluded from the analysis given their citizenship.<sup>3</sup> Respondents can choose to take the surveys in Spanish. Pew surveys before 2019 are cell phone/landline, use stratified sampling to target Latinxs, use random digit dialing, use multi-stage weighting procedures to ensure adherence to Census Bureau target demographics, and have error margins at 2.7% ('07), 3.4% ('08), 3.3% ('10), and 3.1% ('18) respectively. Pew '19 is derived from a national, probability-based online panel of Hispanic adults implemented by Ipsos and is weighted to account for Census target demographics and non-response via raking. The error margin is 2.9%. The CMPS is internet self-administered, weighted via post-stratification raking to 2015 1-year ACS estimates for age, gender, education, nativity, ancestry and voter registration within the national Latinx population, and has a error margin of 1%. These surveys are advantageous to test the hypothesis since they have large Latinx samples and therefore sufficient statistical power to evaluate the heterogeneous influence of immigration enforcement threat by acculturation levels. Using multiple surveys to test the same hypothesis reduces the risk results are a statistical artifact and demonstrates replicability across samples, measurement, and temporal context.

#### Outcome

Immigration policy preferences are a quintessential dimension of political assimilation among Latinxs. Open immigration is fundamentally related to ethnic interests since over 60% of Latinxs are either immigrants or second-generation. On average, Latinxs are more supportive of open immigration relative to Anglos (Telles and Ortiz, 2008). Supporting open immigration policies may suggest support for the most stigmatized subsets of the ethnic group (Ochoa, 2004). Historically, prior to the Chicanx movement, many acculturated Mexican-Americans would attempt to garner acceptance among Anglos by denigrating immigrant co-ethnics and supporting immigration restrictions (Gutiérrez, 1995). A core conflict between Chicanx and assimilationist activists was the question of labor solidarity with new Mexican immigrants

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>Including them does not change results (Table H12). I also re-analyze the results subsetting to only Mexicans given they predominate in post-1965 immigration. Results are similar (Table H11).

(Ochoa, 2004). More recently, some Latinxs voted for California's Proposition 187, which barred undocumented immigrants from social services, on the basis undocumented immigrants take resources from Latinx-American communities and increase Anglo anti-Latinx stigma (Bedolla, 2003). The 2020 election exhibited similar conflicts, where many acculturated Latinxs supported Trump despite his explicitly anti-immigrant policies (Medina, 2020).

Thus, the outcome of interest characterizing anti-immigrant assimilation for each survey is an additive index of binary items measuring *support for open immigration policies*. The indices across the surveys include support for: not reducing immigration levels (Pew '07, '18), stopping immigration raids (Pew '07, '08, '10), preventing police doing immigration enforcement (Pew '07, '08, '10), reducing border enforcement (Pew '10, '19, CMPS '16), a pathway to citizenship (Pew '10, CMPS '16), preventing employment checks (Pew '07, '08), preventing prosecution of employers hiring undocumented immigrants and undocumented employees (Pew '08), in-state tuition for undocumented students (Pew '08, '10), not increasing deportations (Pew '10, CMPS '16), drivers licenses for undocumented immigrants (Pew '07), not implementing a national identity card (Pew '10), maintaining *jus soli* for newborns of undocumented immigrants (Pew '10), and providing legal status to undocumented immigrants brought to the U.S. as children (Pew '18, '19). For item wording, see Section C.

These items comport with the theory. With the exception of reducing border enforcement, all items implicate the status of undocumented immigrants living in the U.S., who are heavily integrated in the Latinx population. Therefore, these outcomes help to test if exposure to immigration enforcement threat among acculturated Latinxs encourages support for Latinxs that are barred from or possess difficulties in fully integrating with the host society.

The additive index may reduce measurement error due to the binary nature of the individual outcomes and generates preference variation among a population highly supportive of open immigration policies (Barry et al., 2011). Although the indices do not contain the same items across surveys, consistency in associations of interest may suggest immigration

enforcement threat motivates support for a variety of immigration policies.<sup>4</sup> Regardless, the results are not driven by indexing the outcomes. The main results are similar examining the outcomes independently, with all tests in the same theoretical direction albeit with some that are statistically insignificant (Figure D3). All indices are rescaled between 0-1.

#### **Immigration Enforcement Threat**

To measure immigration enforcement threat, I use items measuring *deportation threat*. Respondents are asked across all Pew surveys how much they worry about they, close friends, or family members being deported regardless of their citizenship status on a 0-3 scale from "Not at all" to "A lot". Thus, the measure captures *threat* to oneself and important social ties. Measuring deportation exposure via close social ties is important given many acculturated Latinxs are embedded in social networks with undocumented immigrants and may not be directly exposed to immigration enforcement. For the CMPS, respondents are only asked about proximal *threat* on a 0-4 scale from "Not at all worried" to "Extremely worried." These measures are similar to others in well-established research on threat and politics (Huddy et al., 2007; Hetherington and Suhay, 2011).<sup>5</sup> I rescale *threat* between 0-1.

An alternative threat measure may be *sociotropic* instead of personal *threat*. In the context of *deportation threat*, sociotropic threat may be measured as the degree to which Latinxs perceive there are high levels of deportations against the Latinx community writ large. Sociotropic measures are available in the Pew '07 and '08 surveys (see Section O.1 for details). Consistent with prior research demonstrating personal threats supersede sociotropic threats (Hetherington and Suhay, 2011), sociotropic threat is not associated with open immigration preferences or the maintenance of open preferences among acculturated Latinxs (Table O24).

Since the *threat* measure is subjective and psychological, I validate if the measure is associated with objective measures that approximate *deportation threat*. Threat is positively

 $<sup>^4{\</sup>rm The}$  Pew '19 outcome is a binary indicator. There is only 1 immigration policy outcome measuring support for legalizing DACA recipients.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>For exact wording on threat items, see Appendix Section E.1.

associated with higher levels of county-level Secure Communities deportations, % foreign-born (zip-level), % non-citizen (zip-level), and self-reported measures of whether a respondent knows someone undocumented or a deportee. These findings suggest the subjective measure captures the concept of exposure to immigration enforcement (Section E.4).

#### Acculturation

Conceptually, *acculturation* is the degree to which immigrant groups adopt dominant host country group attributes in addition to the maintenance of their own group's attributes as they interact with the dominant group (Berry, Sam, et al., 1997). Acculturation can also occur vis-a-vis non-dominant groups (e.g. Black Americans, see Portes and Zhou (1993)). However, given later generation and English-speaking Latinxs adopt political attitudes more akin to Anglos (Branton, 2007; Rouse et al., 2010), I refer to acculturation as the process of adopting dominant group norms. Acculturation is multi-dimensional, it includes political attitudes, cultural norms, socio-economic status, and integration in dominant social networks, among other factors (Cuellar et al., 1995). Acculturation is also heterogeneous within groups. Immigrant group co-ethnics will experience different trajectories in adopting dominant group standards (Berry, Sam, et al., 1997).

Some argue specific acculturation dimensions should be measured in surveys (Cabassa, 2003). There are shortcomings to this approach. First, acculturation scales concerning cultural norms, intermarriage, co-ethnic social networks, socio-economic status, and political beliefs are time-intensive and therefore not often available across multiple immigrant group surveys (Cruz et al., 2008). Second, researchers may prefer an acculturation measure that does not directly capture specific assimilation dimensions since such dimensions may be an outcome of interest (e.g. immigration preferences). Instead, researchers may seek acculturation measures that *encourage* assimilation yet allow for the absence of assimilation along specific dimensions among immigrant co-ethnics with sustained host society interaction.

Consequently, I measure *acculturation* with an additive index of generational status (0 =

1st, 1 = 2nd, 2 = 3rd+ generation), English language-of-interview (0 = Spanish, 1 = English), and citizenship (0 = non-citizen, 1 = citizen) across all 6 surveys. Thus, the index is from 0-4 (non-citizen Spanish-speaking immigrant to third-generation+ English-speaking citizen).<sup>6</sup> This proxy acculturation scale is advantageous since it measures factors that typically encourage the adoption of dominant group attitudes *yet do not guarantee their adoption among all acculturated individuals*. Prior research demonstrates proxy acculturation scales that index language-of-interview along with generational status are reliably associated with gold-standard scales measuring specific assimilative dimensions such as language proficiency, cultural attachments, geographic integration, and ethnic identification (Cruz et al., 2008). Similar scales have been used in prior studies on Latinx immigration policy attitudes within political science and they operate consistent with the original conceptualization of acculturation (Branton, 2007; Pedraza, 2014).<sup>7</sup> Additionally, prior research suggests citizenship is a prerequisite to acculturation and is positively associated with civic integration, education, dominant language skills, inter-ethnic contact, and restrictive immigration preferences (Portes and Curtis, 1987; Liang, 1994; Yang, 1994; Just and Anderson, 2015).

I validate the *acculturation* scale by demonstrating it is associated with multiple dimensions of assimilation. The scale is linearly associated with restrictive immigration policy preferences across all surveys (Table D3). Moreover, consistent with Gordon (1964), who characterizes 7 assimilation dimensions, the index is positively associated with reduced ethnic identity salience (cultural assimilation), a stronger sense of American identity relative to Latinx identity (identification assimilation), self-categorization as American (identification assimilation), higher education (structural assimilation), higher income (structural assimilation), living in areas with less Latinxs and immigrants (structural assimilation), a higher probability of marriage with a non-Latinx (marital assimilation), and lower levels of perceived

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup>All scale components are positively associated with each other across surveys. With the exception of the CMPS, they fall within acceptable ranges of reliability (Cronbach's  $\alpha > .7$ ).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup>Branton (2007)'s acculturation measure uses an English-dominance scale instead of an English interview indicator. Cruz et al. (2008) find English interview indicators proxy for English dominance. English-dominance scales in Pew '07, '08, are strongly associated with English-interview indicators (Section D.3).

and experienced discrimination (reception assimilation, see Section D.2).<sup>8</sup> Therefore, the *acculturation* index reliably measures the concept of assimilation to dominant group attributes.

To ensure sufficient variation for assessing the heterogeneous influence of *acculturation* by levels of *deportation threat*, I demonstrate *threat* and *acculturation* are not indistinct constructs. As expected, *acculturation* is negatively correlated with *threat*. From a Pearson's  $\rho$  of -0.2 in Pew '19, to -0.46 in the Pew '08 survey, implying a low-to-moderate correlation. Across all surveys, at least 20% of the most acculturated Latinxs (third-generation+, English-dominant) indicate they are worried "some" or "alot," up to 31% in the Pew '18 survey. Likewise, across all surveys, at least 20% of the least acculturated (non-citizen immigrants, Spanish-dominant) indicate they are worried "not at all" or "not much," up to 45% in the Pew '19 survey. In sum, there are sizable proportions of unacculturated Latinxs who do not experience *deportation threat* and well acculturated Latinxs who do experience *threat*.<sup>9</sup>

#### Controls

I adjust for several theoretically motivated control covariates. These include demographic covariates such as age, gender, marital status, religion, and national origin. Socio-economic covariates such as income, education, unemployment, homeownership. Political covariates such as partisanship, ideology, experienced discrimination, perceived discrimination, Latinx identity centrality, American identity centrality, ethnic media consumption, social ties with undocumented friends/family, social ties with a deportee, being stopped due to an immigration violation. County-level covariates such as the logged total population, population density, % Latinx, % foreign-born, % non-citizen, logged median household income, % college, % unemployed, the logged number of deportations via Secure Communities, the proportion

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup>I use alternative acculturation indices to ensure results are not sensitive to coding decisions (Table I13). Including an indicator for residency status or excluding the citizenship indicator does not change the results (Table I13, Panels A, B). Including an Engish dominance index with or without the citizenship indicator does not change the results (Panels C, D). The scale's individual components also moderate the association between *threat* and support for open immigration policy (Panels A-E, Table I14).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup>See Tables E5 and E6 for more information on the correlation between threat and acculturation and the distribution of threat by acculturation level.

of deportations that are for minor misdemeanors, and the number of Secure Communities deportations normalized over the size of the foreign-born population. And, zipcode-level covariates that are the same in terms of measurement and availability as the county-level covariates with the exception of covariates related to Secure Communities deportations. Not all surveys include the entire set of aforementioned covariates. See Table G9, for an enumeration of covariate availability across surveys. For all surveys, I adjust for state fixed effects, with the exception of the Pew '07 and '19 surveys, where I adjust for Census area fixed effects in the absence of state residence data. For brevity, see Section G.2 for explanations on why each covariate was included in the models for each respective survey study.

Importantly, fully-specified models include several covariates that account for selection into *deportation threat* such as social ties with a deportee, social ties with an undocumented friend and/or family member, being stopped by police because of immigration status, the logged county-level total removals via Secure Communities,<sup>10</sup> the county-level deportation rate via Secure Communities (# removed for every 1000 foreign-born), and the proportion of removals that are "Level 3," that is, removals of individuals who have only engaged in misdemeanors or petty offenses, as opposed to felonies, suggesting expansive targeting.

#### **Estimation Strategy**

I use the following linear model to test my hypothesis:

$$Y_i = \delta_s + \beta_1(threat_i \times acculturation_i) + \beta_2 threat_i + \beta_3 acculturation_i + \sum_{k=1}^k \beta_{k+3} X_{izc}^k + \varepsilon_{izc} + \varepsilon$$

Where  $Y_i$  is the open immigration policy index for respondent i,  $\delta_s$  is a fixed effect for state/census area s, threat<sub>i</sub> is perceived threat, acculturation<sub>i</sub> is the acculturation index, and  $\sum_{k=1}^{k} X_{izc}^{k}$  are k control covariates at the individual (i), zipcode (z), and county-level (c).  $\varepsilon$  are robust errors. I present estimates with and without controls to demonstrate no suppression effects.

Since all covariates are rescaled between 0-1,  $\beta_1$  is a second difference, that is, the difference

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup>Removal data are from a public records request to ICE.

in the difference of support for open immigration policies between Latinxs at the highest and lowest level of *threat* between Latinxs at the highest and lowest *acculturation* level. Consistent with **H1**, if  $\beta_1$  is positive, it suggests *threat* has a stronger association with open immigration policy preferences among acculturated Latinxs, implying threatened Latinxs are not adopting restrictive immigration preferences as they acculturate.

A model-based design is ideal to test the hypothesis. Alternatives, like experimental designs, pose several challenges. First, external validity and weak effects. Threat may be difficult to manipulate in short-term experimental settings since, for Latinxs, threat is likely the result of predispositional pre-adult experiences rooted in strong social relationships with undocumented immigrants or national immigration policy, both of which cannot be randomized (Figure E6, Table E7). The notion *threat* is a function of predispositional, pre-adult experiences among Latinxs is well-established in qualitative literature, where Latinx children with limited investment in politics already have strong opinions about the extent to which they, their family, or friends may be implicated by immigration enforcement (Dreby, 2015). Likewise, prior research suggests Latinx immigrants are already concerned about immigration enforcement as a result of the migratory experience prior to becoming engaged with American politics (Massev and Pren, 2012). Consistent with the notion threat is predispositional for Latinxs, aggregate, cross-sectional, Pew Latino Survey data demonstrates threat is highly stable across three presidencies with vastly different immigration policy approaches (2007-2018, Figure E8, Panels A-B), with only one time period being statistically different than the first period *threat* was recorded. Latino Immigrant National Election Survey panel data also demonstrates threat doesn't shift substantially among immigrant Latinxs between two time periods when Trump implemented several anti-immigrant executive orders (e.g. sanctuary city ban, the Muslim Ban, repealing DAPA, see Figure E8, Panels C-D). Consistent with the notion *threat* is predispositional and experiments may not effectively manipulate a sense of threat, prior research attempting to experimentally induce a sense of threat from immigration enforcement on part of Trump's administration had no effect on

favorability toward Trump (Carlos et al., 2021). Second, ethics. Experiments sufficiently powerful to generate a sense of *threat* may veer on unethical given the risk of traumatizing undocumented Latinxs, who occupy a marginalized societal position (Lahman et al., 2011). Third, feasibility. The quantity of interest is an interaction with *acculturation*, a bundle of ascriptive attributes that cannot be randomized like generational status. Even if I could cue *threat* experimentally, I would still be interested in a heterogenous effect subject to selection bias like a model-based design.

Additionally, evaluating variation in threatening and/or permissive immigration policies across geographic space using available surveys may not effectively answer the research question (e.g. assessing the effect of Secure Communities, see White (2016)). Repeated cross-section and/or panel data with large Latinx samples across acculturation levels and small geographies with consistently asked comprehensive measures of open immigration preferences do not exist given most survey research prioritizes nationally representative samples.

Consequently, I opt for a model-based approach that 1) attempts to adjust for major preexisting explanations of Latinx pro-immigrant attitudes, 2) rules out alternative explanations by adjusting for multiple interactions between acculturation and theoretically relevant explanations for Latinx pro-immigrant attitudes, and 3) acknowledges the coefficient of interest cannot possess a definitively causal interpretation.

## Results

Does *deportation threat* forestall the adoption of restrictive immigration preferences among acculturated Latinxs? Across all surveys (columns 1-6) and adjusting for the full set of control covariates, going from the minimum to maximum of *threat* appears to nullify the adoption of restrictive immigration policy preferences via *acculturation*. The second difference of the *acculturation* and *threat* interaction is 0.12, 0.2, 0.15, 0.15, and 0.22 for the Pew '07, '08, '10, '18, and '19 surveys and 0.1 for the CMPS '16, equivalent to 44%, 70%, 71%, 41%, 57% and 67% of the outcome standard deviation respectively (Table 1, Panel B). The second

Table 1: Threat sustains open immigration policy attitudes among acculturatedLatinxs

	<b>Open Immigration Policy Index</b>					
Panel A: No controls	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Threat x Acculturation	$0.12^{\dagger}$	0.23***	$0.17^{***}$	$0.09^{\dagger}$	0.28***	$0.24^{**}$
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.09)
Threat	0.09***	0.09***	0.03	$0.13^{***}$	$0.06^{*}$	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Acculturation	$-0.15^{***}$	$-0.24^{***}$	$-0.17^{***}$	-0.05	$-0.20^{***}$	$-0.18^{**}$
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.06)
$\mathbb{R}^2$	0.08	0.17	0.12	0.10	0.14	0.05
Ν	1809	1822	1236	2279	1794	2427
Panel B: Yes controls	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Threat x Acculturation	$0.12^{*}$	0.20***	$0.15^{***}$	$0.09^{\dagger}$	$0.15^{**}$	$0.22^{*}$
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.09)
Threat	$0.04^{\dagger}$	0.03	0.01	$0.06^{+}$	$0.06^{*}$	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Acculturation	$-0.17^{***}$	$-0.22^{***}$	$-0.19^{***}$	-0.04	$-0.12^{**}$	$-0.16^{*}$
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.06)
$\mathbb{R}^2$	0.16	0.32	0.33	0.24	0.32	0.09
Ν	1809	1822	1236	2276	1794	2427
Survey	Pew '07	Pew '08	Pew '10	CMPS '16	Pew '18	Pew '19
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ
Political Controls	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ
County Controls	N/A	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ	N/A
Zipcode Controls	N/A	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ	N/A
Census Area FE	Υ	Ν	Ν	Ν	Ν	Υ
State FE	Ν	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ	Ν

Note: \*\*\*p < 0.001, \*\*p < 0.01, \*p < 0.05,  $\dagger p < 0.1$ . All covariates scaled between 0-1. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

differences are all significant at least at p < 0.05 (except the CMPS, p < 0.1).<sup>11</sup>

To get a stronger substantive sense of the heterogeneous influence of *acculturation* by *threat*, I plot predicted values of support for open immigration policies conditional on *acculturation* and *threat* (Figure 1). Across all studies, there are a few visual patterns consistent with **H1**. First, first-generation Spanish-dominant immigrants are highly supportive of open immigration policy regardless of perceived *threat* levels. Second, for unthreatened Latinxs, *acculturation* is negatively associated with open immigration preferences. Third, acculturated Latinxs

 $<sup>^{11}</sup>$ The *unconditional* association between *threat* and open immigration policy preferences is positive and significant (Section E.6).



Figure 1: Predicted Values of Support for Open Immigration Policies (y-axis) Conditional on Acculturation (x-axis) and Threat (min-max, denoted by color). Simulations from fully specified models with Census region fixed effects, assuming controls at means and a respondent from the Western region. 95% CIs from robust SEs displayed.

with a high *threat* level still hold immigration policy attitudes similar to unacculturated co-ethnics. In sum, *threat* is more salient in determining open immigration preferences among acculturated Latinxs, forestalling the adoption of attitudes akin to Anglo whites while maintaining attitudes similar to new Latinx immigrants.

### **Robustness Checks**

I rule out alternative mechanisms that may forestall political assimilation on immigration preferences. Prior literature finds discrimination (Pedraza, 2014), Latinx identity (Binder et al., 1997), American identity (Rouse et al., 2010), ethnic geographic context (Bedolla, 2003), ethnic media (Abrajano and Singh, 2009), age cohort (Vega and Ortiz, 2018), national origin (Mexican + Central American), and socio-economic status (Polinard et al., 1984) sustains open

immigration preferences among Latinxs. I rule out if the maintenance of open immigration preferences among acculturated Latinxs is a product of these factors in addition to exposure to the objective deportation threat measures (e.g. knowing a deportee/undocumented immigrant, exposure to an immigration stop, exposure to Secure Communities deportations). This is a strong test, since it saturates the model with interactive terms and accounts for omitted interaction bias. The results are similar to the main results (Table K19).

I rule out latent liberalism. First, partisanship and ideology is unassociated with *deportation threat* in the 2007 and 2010 Pew surveys, suggesting the results are not due to liberal ideology (Section E.5). Second, I use falsification tests on immigration-irrelevant policy preferences to rule out liberalism unaccounted for after adjusting for partisanship or ideology. The CMPS includes items on immigration irrelevant policy preferences. *Threat* is not consistently associated with liberal policy preferences or an index of all policy preferences.<sup>12</sup> Likewise, the influence of *threat* conditional on *acculturation* is not consistently statistically significantly associated with liberal policy preferences and the liberalism index. Moreover, including an interaction between *acculturation* and the liberalism index in the model does not attenuate the heterogenous influence of *acculturation* conditional on *threat* (Table L20).

I rule out if the results are driven by *nativism*. The Pew '07, '08, '10 and CMPS '16 surveys have items measuring the perceived economic and social threat immigrants pose.<sup>13</sup> I index these measures for each survey.<sup>14</sup> I interact *nativism* with *acculturation* in addition to *threat* to rule out *nativism* as an alternative mechanism. Although the influence of *acculturation* conditional on *threat* becomes statistically null for the Pew '07 and CMPS '16 surveys, the heterogeneous influence of *acculturation* conditional on *threat* is still positive and significant for the Pew '08 and Pew '10 surveys (Table N23). Moreover, attenuation in statistical significance may be the result of post-treatment conditioning. *Nativism* is

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup>The one statistically significant association is positive between *threat* and support for banning gay marriage, suggesting *threat* is not constitutive of liberalism among Latinxs.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup>In the study of Anglo white opinion on immigration, *nativism* is typically understood as *socio-tropic* threat from immigrants. However, in this paper, socio-tropic threat is deportation threat to the Latinx community.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup>For details on measuring nativism, see Section N.1

partially a byproduct of *acculturation* (Knoll, 2012). Thus, adjusting for *nativism* adjusts for a mechanism motivated by *acculturation* that encourages restrictive immigration preferences. Indeed, *threat* undermines the conservative influence of *nativism* on restrictive preferences in the Pew '07 and CMPS studies. Additionally, the heterogenous influence of *acculturation* conditional on *threat* is statistically significant and positive in the Mexican-origin subsample for the Pew '07, '08, and '10 samples. These results suggest, in some cases, *threat* forestalls assimilation net of nativism. Where it does not, *threat* undermines the influence of nativist predispositions on restrictive preferences. It may be surprising that nativist Latinxs would feel threatened by deportation. But, prior evidence suggests Latinxs concerned about their status in the U.S. may be inclined to adopt nativist attitudes to positively distinguish themselves from new immigrant co-ethnics (Bedolla, 2003).

Finally, given the *threat* measure closely approximates the immigration policy preference measures, one concern may be that the results are driven by reverse causality. That is, acculturated Latinxs adopt a threatened disposition after developing a coherent set of immigration policy preferences. Theoretically, I posit this concern may not accurately characterize the experience of many Latinxs. Qualitative research suggests a sense of deportation threat occurs prior to political socialization. For many otherwise acculturated Latinxs (e.g. 2nd and 3rd-generation), threat develops as a function of social ties with family, friends, and community members that are immigrants, undocumented or otherwise, during pre-adult socialization (Dreby, 2015). For many Latinx immigrants, threat might develop immediately during the migratory experience prior to engagement with American politics (Fussell, 2011; Massey and Pren, 2012). As mentioned in the Estimation Strategy section, threat is relatively stable in both aggregate cross-sectional and panel data over time, suggesting threat may be predispositional as opposed to politically motivated (Figure E8). Moreover, I leverage cross-lagged panel estimates using data from the Latino Immigrant National Election Survey to show that Latinx immigrants, and acculturated Latinx immigrants (e.g. Latinx immigrant citizens) do not adopt a threatened disposition as a function of their immigration

policy preferences over time, but, consistent with the causal arrow of the theory, adopt open immigration preferences as a function of their threatened disposition between two time periods where the threat of immigration enforcement is salient due to Trump's implementation of anti-immigrant policies (e.g. repealing DAPA, sanctuary city bans, see Table M21). These findings cast doubt on the possibility the results are driven by reverse causality.

#### Does deportation threat forestall assimilation on other dimensions?

Given assimilation is multi-dimensional, I assess if *threat* undercuts assimilation to other *quintessential* Anglo white attitudinal and cultural standards as Latinxs acculturate. I do this to demonstrate the theory has broader applicability and that immigration enforcement may forestall political assimilation on dimensions outside immigration policy preferences.

I assess if threat undercuts 3 other dimensions of attitudinal assimilation: 1) adopting a stronger sense of American identity, 2) the erosion of ethnic salience, and 3) the adoption of anti-Black attitudes as Latinxs acculturate. These outcomes comport with three key assimilation dimensions Gordon (1964) identifies in his seminal text: identification assimilation (feeling bonded to the dominant culture), cultural assimilation (adopting host society customs), and civic assimilation (the absence of value conflicts and power struggles).

A strong American identity is a fundamental Anglo norm. Although liberal multicultural interpretations of American identity do not preclude maintaining an ethnic identity (Schildkraut, 2007), the absence of a strong American identity among Latinxs may suggest the liberal interpretation of American identity failed to incorporate them (Rodriguez et al., 2010). Prior evidence also suggests, implicitly and explicitly, an American identity is strongly associated with Anglo whites (Devos and Banaji, 2005; Zou and Cheryan, 2017). Indeed, whites have a stronger sense of American identity (Rodriguez et al., 2010). Moreover, Latinxs tend to have a stronger sense of American identity via acculturation (Citrin and Sears, 2014). Additionally, a strong American identity among Latinxs is associated with Anglo norms such as opposing new immigration and supporting Republicans (Hickel Jr et al., 2020). Given perceived *deportation threat* suggests Latinxs understand they or their social ties are institutionally excluded from the U.S., we may expect *threat* to similarly undercut the adoption of an American identity among acculturated Latinxs.

The CMPS '16, Pew '18, and Pew '19 surveys include American identity measures. The CMPS includes a centrality scale from 0-3. The Pew '18 includes a pride scale from 0-3. These measures are indications of psychological investment in the host country (Leach et al., 2008). Since American identity investment does not preclude an ethnic identity, I measure the difference between American centrality (or pride) and Latinx centrality (or pride) (Hickel Jr et al., 2020). The Pew '19 survey includes a binary relative American self-categorization measure, where respondents can choose to identify as an "American" (coded 1) instead of "Latino/Hispanic" or their national origin (coded 0).<sup>15</sup>

*Ethnic salience*, in this study, is defined as the absence of acculturation to the norms and cultural practices of Anglo whites along with a continued attachment to the cultural practices of Latinxs (Gordon, 1964).<sup>16</sup> It is measured using a Pew '19 item asking respondents how important they believe various cultural practices are to being Hispanic, that is: speaking Spanish, participating in Hispanic cultural celebrations, wearing attire that represents Hispanic heritage or origin, socializing with other Hispanics, having both parents of Hispanic heritage or descent, having a Spanish last name, and being Catholic. Respondents can choose that these cultural practices are essential to being Hispanic, not essential but important to being Hispanic, and not important to being Hispanic. I generate an additive index of whether respondents did not choose that each cultural practice was not important to being Hispanic from 0-7.<sup>17</sup>

Historical and empirical evidence demonstrates immigrant groups either adopt or continue to maintain *anti-Black attitudes* the longer they are exposed to an Anglo white dominated anti-Black U.S. host society (Warren and Twine, 1997; Yancey et al., 2003; Ignatiev, 2012). Many

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup>See Appendix Section J.1 for more details on *American identity* item wording.

 $<sup>^{16}\</sup>mathrm{See}$  Appendix Section J.2 for details on ethnic salience item wording.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup>The index has acceptable reliability (Cronbach's  $\alpha = .77$ )

Latin American countries are also hierarchically anti-Black, which may make Latinxs receptive to adopting or maintaining anti-Black attitudes as they acculturate (Flores, 2021). However, deportation threat may signal societal exclusion, an inability to assimilate to whiteness, and a shared sense of marginalization that generates support for other marginalized groups among acculturated Latinxs with integrative expectations (Richeson and Craig, 2011; Jones, 2012). Leveraging data from the 2016 and 2020 CMPS, I measure anti-Black attitudes using items that capture anti-Black appraisals (i.e. racial resentment, anti-Black stereotype, perceptions Black people are a threat to the nation (*black threat*), and preferences for living in white versus Black neighborhoods (*white residential preference*)) and opposition to Black political interests, specifically the Black Lives Matter movement (oppose BLM). Importantly, these outcomes are racially polarized. Black people hold anti-Black attitudes less than white people. Latinxs are in the middle (Figure J12). Thus, if *threat* undercuts the adoption of or maintenance of anti-Black attitudes as Latinxs acculturate, similar to H1, threatened acculturated Latinxs will hold attitudes concerning Black people and their political interests similar to Black people while unthreatened acculturated Latinxs will adopt attitudes concerning Black people more similar to Anglo whites. For more details on the theoretical justification for these outcomes, measurement, and model specifications, see Section J.4.

Table J15, Panel B displays the heterogeneous influence of acculturation on American centrality, American pride, American self-categorization, and ethnic salience conditional on threat adjusting for controls. All covariates are scaled between 0-1 with the exception of centrality and pride, scaled between -1 to 1 since they are the difference between American centrality/pride and Latinx centrality/pride. For the CMPS, acculturation is associated with an increase in American centrality by 0.31. However, centrality is attenuated by 0.15 for acculturated Latinxs at the maximum threat level (p < 0.05, Model 1). The Pew '18 and '19 studies are corroborative. Acculturation is associated with a 0.42 increase in American pride. Yet, this increase is attenuated for acculturated Latinxs at the maximum threat level by 0.33 (p < 0.001, Model 2). Acculturation is associated with a 47 percentage point increase in American self-categorization. But, threat attenuates the influence of acculturation on self-categorization by 44 points (p < 0.001, Model 3). Moreover, acculturation is associated with a 0.21 decrease in ethnic salience. Again, threat reverses acculturation's influence by increasing ethnic salience by 0.23 for the most acculturated Latinxs (p < 0.01, Model 4).

Figure J10 displays predicted probabilities of American centrality, pride, categorization, and ethnic salience. Visually, it is clear the adoption of an American identity via acculturation in Panels A-C is attenuated by threat such that acculturated Latinxs identify more with their ethnic identity like their new immigrant, Spanish-speaking counterparts. Moreover, ethnic salience is just as strong as unacculturated Latinxs for acculturated Latinxs threatened by deportation. Conversely, acculturated Latinxs unthreatened by deportation shed the importance they attach to Latinx cultural norms.

Likewise, *deportation threat* undercuts the adoption or maintenance of anti-Black attitudes as Latinxs acculturate. The second difference of the acculturation and threat interaction is -0.05, -0.11, -0.12, -0.24, -0.16, and -0.13 for the racial resentment, anti-Black stereotype, black threat, white residential preference, and the two oppose BLM outcomes in the '16 and '20 CMPS, suggesting threat has a stronger influence on acculturated Latinxs in reducing the adoption or maintenance of anti-Black beliefs (Table J17). These second differences are equivalent to 21%, 37%, 39%, 44%, 54% and 43% of the outcome standard deviation respectively. They are all statistically significant at least at p < .05. Predicted values characterizing anti-Black attitudes along levels of acculturation and threat demonstrate Latinxs threatened by immigration enforcement are more likely to adopt beliefs toward Black people and their political interests akin to Black people as they acculturate (Figure J13). Conversely, unthreatened Latinxs are more likely to adopt or maintain beliefs toward Black people more akin to Anglo whites as they acculturate. In sum, *threat* forestalls the adoption of political beliefs or attitudinal norms akin to Anglo whites along multiple dimensions outside immigration policy preferences, suggesting host society rebuff in the form of immigration enforcement broadly affects Latinx political assimilation.

## **Discussion and Conclusion**

This paper explains how immigration enforcement shapes Latinx immigration policy preferences. Although acculturated Latinxs adopt immigration preferences akin to Anglo whites, many acculturated Latinxs maintain political commitments similar to their new immigrant co-ethnics. This paper answers the puzzle of persistent open immigration preferences among acculturated Latinxs by demonstrating deportation threat is still salient for acculturated Latinxs and undercuts the adoption of Anglo political standards on immigration policy. Moreover, I demonstrate 1) deportation threat operates net of alternative mechanisms that may forestall political assimilation and 2) mitigates assimilation to other Anglo white political standards among acculturated Latinxs such as the adoption of an American identity, a reduction in ethnic salience, and the adoption of anti-Black beliefs.

Importantly, this paper teaches us political assimilation among Latinx immigrants and their co-ethnics is not guaranteed, but rather conditional on heterogeneous circumstances experienced by members of immigrant origin groups. Although prior research establishes the prospect of assimilation is conditional on reception context (Portes and Zhou, 1993; Telles and Ortiz, 2008), sociological work on immigration enforcement tends to focus on assimilation along socio-economic dimensions while political science work has not explicitly tested how immigration enforcement may undercut political assimilation (Massey and Pren, 2012; Pedraza, 2014). This paper systematically demonstrates perceptibly threatening immigration enforcement contexts undercut political assimilation via acculturation among Latinx co-ethnics. In contrast to many historic immigrant groups, contemporary Latinx co-ethnics contend with sustained undocumented migration, several rounds of border reinforcement, the long-term social integration of undocumented immigrants with limited civil rights, unprecedented interior immigration enforcement, and the ethno-racialized conflation of Latinx group membership with an "illegal" status. These unique circumstances of illegality in addition to their expansive net help explain why even well acculturated Latinxs have not adopted Anglo political standards on immigration policy, American identity, attachments to ethnic culture, and anti-Black attitudes. In summary, this paper problematizes new conclusions positing Latinxs will "become white" in terms of their political beliefs, norms, and practices like other historic immigrant groups (Citrin and Sears, 2014; Alba, 2016).

This study is not without limitations. The study is observational and subject to omitted variable bias despite my attempt to account for alternative explanations and multiple specifications. Future research should attempt to assess the causal effect of plausibly exogenous immigration policy changes on perceived deportation threat and immigration policy attitudes differentially among acculturated Latinxs. This is difficult, given the paucity of Latinx survey data across small geographic units and acculturation levels. One could also experimentally induce deportation threat. However, as discussed before, these interventions may be too weak in light of the predispositional qualities of *threat* among the Latinx population. Moreover, experimental inducement of *threat* raises serious ethical considerations such that any experiment approximating the characterization of *threat* in this descriptive data may be infeasible.

Additionally, the focus on Latinxs may undercut the generalizability of the theoretical framework. Although Latinxs are the largest U.S. immigrant ethnic group, future research should analyze the influence of deportation threat on Asian immigrant populations,<sup>18</sup> the fastest growing U.S. ethno-racial subgroup, or Black immigrants, who also contend with anti-Black discrimination.<sup>19</sup> Moreover, future research should extend beyond the U.S. For instance, Jamaican co-ethnics in the United Kingdom may have experienced a heightened sense of deportation threat in response to the Windrush Scandal, which may shape political assimilation in profound ways.

Likewise, future research should assess if the attitudinal dynamics explicated here extend beyond the third generation. The analysis bundles the third generation with generations after due to data limitations. It is unclear if bundling leads to over or under-estimation bias for the conditional influence of deportation threat. Although prior evidence suggests 4th generation

 $<sup>^{18}{\</sup>rm I}$  analyze how deportation threat shapes immigration preferences among Asian-Americans in a 2013 Pew Survey. See results and discussion on Section Q.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup>This is not to deny Black Latinxs in the samples, but to prescribe an explicit focus on both Latinx and non-Latinx Black immigrants.

Mexicans do not fully adopt Anglo political attitudes (Telles and Ortiz, 2008), it is unclear if deportation threat forestalls political assimilation among 4th generation+ Latinxs given their significant distance from the immigrant experience. Future research should replicate the findings with an explicit identification of 4th generation+ populations. Likewise, the findings should be replicated in the decades to come as the proportion of later-generation Latinxs grows. The influence of threat may differ as the Latinx population becomes increasingly acculturated.

Moreover, future research should examine if deportation threat relaxes other politically salient predispositions. For instance, deportation threat may relax the influence of ideological or partisan predispositions on support for restrictive immigration policies. Or, deportation threat may relax partisan predispositions on support for co-partisan candidates.

Finally, although this paper suggests the contemporary immigration enforcement context maintains support for policies benefiting new immigrants among acculturated Latinx coethnics, the findings are ultimately pessimistic for the sustainability of Latinx solidarity with new immigrants. In order for acculturated Latinxs to support policies that benefit new immigrants, they must endure a threatening immigration enforcement context. If a threatening context dissipates, then the prospect for solidarity may dematerialize as well. Although the contemporary context is still quite threatening, immigration policy is at a crossroads in a post-Trump context. It remains to be seen whether potential reversals in perceptibly threatening immigration policies may generate the conditions for Latinxs to politically assimilate further and shed their commitments to newer Latinx immigrants.

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### A Motivation Plot

#### A.1 Acculturation = Restrictive Immigration Preferences



Figure A1: Acculturation (x-axis, 1G, 2G, 3G + = 1st, 2nd, and 3rd generation or more Latinxs) is Associated With Reduced Support for Open Immigration Policies (y-axis) Across Multiple Surveys. Anglo whites are the last social category on the x-axis, separated by a vertical grey line. All outcomes rescaled between 0-1. Annotations denote mean outcome values and sample size for each social category. 95% bootstrap confidence intervals displayed.

### A.2 Outcome measurement

#### A.2.1 ANES 2008-2016

Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to come to the United States to live should be INCREASED A LOT, INCREASED A LITTLE, LEFT THE SAME as it is now, DECREASED A LITTLE, or DECREASED A LOT? [Equal to 1 and 0 otherwise if respondent DOES NOT indicate "decreased a little" or "decreased a lot."] 1) Increased a lot; 2) Increased a little; 3) Left the same as it is now; 4) Decreased a little; 5)Decreased a lot

### A.2.2 GSS 2000-2018

**Do you think the number of immigrants to America nowadays should be...** [Equal to 1 and 0 otherwise if respondent DOES NOT indicate "reduced a little" or "reduced a lot"] 1) Increased a lot; 2) Increased a little; 3) Remain the same as it is; 4) Reduced a little; 5) Reduced a lot; 6) Can't choose; 7) No answer

### A.2.3 CMPS 2016

Same as the set of measures characterized on Section C. All binary indicators are indexed on a scale from 0-2, rescaled to 0-1 on Figure A1.

### A.2.4 CAS 2004

Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to come to the United States to live should be increased, decreased or left the same as it is now? [Equal to 1 and 0 otherwise if respondent DOES NOT indicate "decreased"] 1) Increased; 2) Decreased; 3) Left the same; 4) Don't Know; 5) No answer

### A.2.5 Pew 2002

The following three items are indexed from 0-2, rescaled between 0-1 on Figure A1.

Do you think there are too many, too few, or about the right amount of immigrants living in the United States today? [Equal to 1 and 0 otherwise if respondent DOES NOT indicate "too many."] 1) Too many, 2) Too few, 3) Right amount, 4) Don't Know, 5) Refused

Some people think the United States should allow more Latin Americans to come and work in this country LEGALLY; some people think the US should allow the same number as it does now; and others think it should reduce the number who come and work in this country LEGALLY. Which is closer to your opinion? [Equal to 1 and 0 otherwise if respondent DOES NOT indicate "reduce the number who come to work in this country legally."] 1) Allow more Latin Americans to come and work in this country legally. 2) Allow the same number as it does now, 3) Reduce the number who come to work in this country legally, 4) Don't know, 5) Refused What would you think of a proposal that would give many of the undocumented or illegal (HISPANIC/LATINO) immigrants working in the U.S. a chance to obtain legal status? Is this something you would favor or oppose? [Equal to 1 and 0 otherwise if respondent DOES NOT indicate "oppose."] 1) Favor, 2) Oppose, 3) Don't know, 4) Refused

# **B** Illegality Plot



Figure B2: Immigration Enforcement Is Salient to the Latinx Community. Panel A displays the size of the undocumented population size over time using Pew Research Center estimates (1990-2017). Panel B displays the undocumented population proportion over time using Pew estimates (1995-2017). Panel C displays the undocumented population proportion from various birth regions using Migration Policy Institute estimates. Panel D displays the proportion of Latinxs who know an undocumented close friend or family member across generational status and language-of-interview using CMPS data. Panel E displays the mean Latinx, foreign-born, and non-citizen proportion of the population for CMPS Latinx and Anglo white respondents by generational status. Panel F shows deportation removals over time using Department of Homeland Security (DHS) data (1980-2018). Panel G shows removals over time normalized over the size of the undocumented population using DHS and Pew data (1990-2017). Panel H shows the proportion of deportation removals from a specific region from DHS data tabulated by Asad and Clair (2018) (2005-2014).

# C Outcome measurement

# Table C1: Outcome Items and Measurement Across Surveys.

Survey	Item Text	Choices	Measure
Pew '07	Do you approve or disapprove of workplace raids to discourage em- ployers from hiring undocumented or illegal immigrants?	<ul> <li>1) Approve</li> <li>2) Disapprove</li> <li>3) Don't Know</li> <li>4) Refused</li> </ul>	Binary (1 = Disapprove, 0 other- wise)
	Do you approve or disapprove of states checking for immigration sta- tus before issuing driver's licenses?	<ul> <li>1) Approve</li> <li>2) Disapprove</li> <li>3) Don't Know</li> <li>4) Refused</li> </ul>	Binary (1 = Disapprove, 0 other- wise)
	Should local police take an active role in identifying undocumented or illegal immigrants, or should en- forcement be left mainly to the fed- eral authorities?	<ul> <li>1) Police take active role</li> <li>2) Enforcement left to federal authorities</li> <li>3) Don't know</li> <li>4) Refused</li> </ul>	Binary (1 = Federal authorities, 0 otherwise)
	Do you think there are too many, too few, or about the right amount of immigrants living in the United States today?	<ul> <li>1) Too many</li> <li>2) Too few</li> <li>3) Right amount</li> <li>4) Don't know</li> <li>5) Refused</li> </ul>	Binary (1 = not "Too many", 0 otherwise)
Pew '08	Should local police take an active role in identifying undocumented or illegal immigrants, or should en- forcement be left mainly to the fed- eral authorities?	<ul> <li>1) Police take active role</li> <li>2) Enforcement left to federal authorities</li> <li>3) Don't know</li> <li>4) Refused</li> </ul>	Binary (1 = Federal authorities, 0 otherwise)
	Do you approve or disapprove of the following immigration enforce- ment actions: Workplace raids to discourage employers from hir- ing undocumented or illegal immi- grants	<ul> <li>1) Approve</li> <li>2) Disapprove</li> <li>3) Don't Know</li> <li>4) Refused</li> </ul>	Binary (1 = Disapprove, 0 other- wise)
	Do you approve or disapprove of the following immigration enforce- ment actions: A requirement that employers check with a federal gov- ernment database to verify the le- gal immigration status of any job applicant they are considering hir- ing	<ul> <li>1) Approve</li> <li>2) Disapprove</li> <li>3) Don't Know</li> <li>4) Refused</li> </ul>	Binary (1 = Disapprove, 0 other- wise)
	Do you approve or disapprove of the following immigration enforce- ment actions: Criminal prosecu- tion of employers who hire undocu- mented immigrants	<ul> <li>1) Approve</li> <li>2) Disapprove</li> <li>3) Don't Know</li> <li>4) Refused</li> </ul>	Binary (1 = Disapprove, 0 other- wise)
	Do you approve or disapprove of the following immigration enforce- ment actions: Criminal prosecution of undocumented immigrants who are working without authorization	<ul> <li>1) Approve</li> <li>2) Disapprove</li> <li>3) Don't Know</li> <li>4) Refused</li> </ul>	Binary (1 = Disapprove, 0 other- wise)

	Should an illegal immigrant who graduated from a high school in your state and is accepted to a state public college qualify for the in-state college tuition rate, or shouldn't they? Thinking about immigrants who	<ul> <li>1) Should qualify</li> <li>2) Should not qualify</li> <li>3) Don't Know</li> <li>4) Refused</li> </ul>	Binary (1 = Should qualify, 0 oth- erwise)
Pew '10	are living in the U.S. (United States) illegally do you favor or oppose providing a way for illegal immigrants currently in the coun- try to gain legal citizenship if they pass background checks, pay fines and have jobs?	<ul> <li>1) Favor</li> <li>2) Oppose</li> <li>3) Don't Know</li> <li>4) Refused</li> </ul>	
	As you may know, the state of Ari- zona recently passed a law that re- quires police to verify the legal sta- tus of someone they have already stopped or arrested if they suspect that the person is in the country illegally. Do you approve or disap- prove of Arizona's new law?	<ul> <li>1) Favor</li> <li>2) Oppose</li> <li>3) Don't Know</li> <li>4) Refused</li> </ul>	Binary $(1 = Favor, 0 \text{ otherwise})$
	All things considered, which of these statements comes closer to your own views about immigrants who are in the U.S. illegally — even if none of them is exactly right	<ul> <li>1) Illegal immigrants should be deported</li> <li>2) Illegal immigrants should pay a fine, but not be deported</li> <li>3) Illegal immigrants should not be punished</li> <li>4) Don't know</li> <li>5) Refused</li> </ul>	Binary (1 = Not "should be de- ported", 0 otherwise)
	Do you approve or disapprove of the following actions aimed at en- forcing the nation's immigration laws: Workplace raids	<ul> <li>1) Approve</li> <li>2) Disapprove</li> <li>3) Don't know</li> <li>4) Refused</li> </ul>	Binary $(1 = Disapprove, 0 \text{ otherwise})$
	Do you approve or disapprove of the following actions aimed at en- forcing the nation's immigration laws: Building more fences on the nation's borders	<ul> <li>1) Approve</li> <li>2) Disapprove</li> <li>3) Don't know</li> <li>4) Refused</li> </ul>	Binary (1 = Disapprove, 0 other- wise)
	Do you approve or disapprove of the following actions aimed at en- forcing the nation's immigration laws: Increasing the number of bor- der patrol agents	<ul> <li>1) Approve</li> <li>2) Disapprove</li> <li>3) Don't know</li> <li>4) Refused</li> </ul>	Binary (1 = Disapprove, 0 other- wise)
	Do you approve or disapprove of the following actions aimed at en- forcing the nation's immigration laws: A requirement that all U.S. residents carry a national identity card	<ul> <li>1) Approve</li> <li>2) Disapprove</li> <li>3) Don't know</li> <li>4) Refused</li> </ul>	Binary (1 = Disapprove, 0 other- wise)
	Should an illegal immigrant who graduated from a high school in your state and is accepted to a state public college qualify for the in-state college tuition rate, or shouldn't they?	<ul> <li>1) Should qualify</li> <li>2) Should not qualify</li> <li>3) Don't Know</li> <li>4) Refused</li> </ul>	Binary $(1 = $ Should qualify, 0 otherwise $)$

	Should local police take an active role in identifying undocumented or illegal immigrants, or should en- forcement be left mainly to the fed- eral authorities?	<ul> <li>1) Police take active role</li> <li>2) Enforcement left to federal authorities</li> <li>3) Don't know</li> <li>4) Refused</li> </ul>	Binary (1 = Federal authorities, 0 otherwise)
	Would you favor changing the Con- stitution so that the parents must be legal residents of the U.S. in or- der for their newborn child to be a citizen, or should the Constitution be left as it is?	<ul> <li>1) Favor changing the constitution</li> <li>2) Leave constitution as is</li> <li>3) Don't Know</li> <li>4) Refused</li> </ul>	Binary (1 = not "Favor", 0 other- wise)
CMPS '16	Do you think the millions of undoc- umented [Mexican (50/50 split)] immigrants in the United States should be eligible for a pathway to citizenship, or do you think we should deport undocumented Mex- ican immigrants?	<ul> <li>1) Strongly support pathway to citizenship</li> <li>2) Somewhat support pathway to citizenship</li> <li>3) Strongly support deporting these immigrants</li> <li>4) Somewhat support deport deporting these immigrants</li> </ul>	Binary (1 = Strongly or somewhat support pathway, 0 otherwise)
	Which comes closest to your view about [undocumented/illegal (50/50 split)] immigrants who are already living and working in the U.S.?	<ul> <li>1) They should be allowed to stay in their jobs and apply for U.S. citizenship</li> <li>2) They should be allowed to stay in their jobs, but temporarily</li> <li>3) They should be required to leave their jobs and immediately leave the U.S</li> </ul>	Binary (1 = not "immediately leave", 0 otherwise)
	Below is a list of federal government programs. For each one, please in- dicate whether you would like to see federal spending increased or decreased or stay the same: Tight- ening border security to prevent [il- legal/undocumented (50/50 split)] immigration	<ul> <li>1) Decrease</li> <li>2) Increase</li> <li>3) Stay the same</li> </ul>	Binary (1 = Decrease, 0 otherwise)
Pew '18	As you may know, many immi- grants who came illegally to the U.S. when they were children now have temporary legal status that may be ending. Would you favor or oppose Congress passing a law granting them permanent legal sta- tus?	<ul><li>1) Favor</li><li>2) Oppose</li></ul>	Binary $(1 = Favor, 0 \text{ otherwise})$
	As you may know, there is a proposal to substantially expand the wall along the U.S. border with Mexico. In general, do you favor or oppose this proposal?	<ul><li>1) Favor</li><li>2) Oppose</li></ul>	Binary (1 = Oppose, 0 otherwise)
	Do you think there are too many, too few, or about the right amount of immigrants living in the United States today?	<ul><li>1) Too many</li><li>2) Too Few</li><li>3) Right amount</li></ul>	Binary (1 = Not "too many", 0 otherwise)

Pew '19	As you may know, many immi-		Binary $(1 = Favor, 0 \text{ otherwise})$
	grants who came illegally to the	• 1) Favor	
	U.S. when they were children now	• 2) Oppose	
	have temporary legal status that	,	
	may be ending. Would you favor		
	or oppose Congress passing a law		
	granting them permanent legal sta-		
	tus?		

# **D** Disaggregating outcomes



Figure D3: Coefficients Characterizing Association Between Relevant Independent Variables of Interest (x-axis) and Disaggregated Outcomes That Constitute the Liberal Immigration Policy Index (y-axis). Panel A displays coefficients for threat. Panel B displays coefficients for the threat x acculturation interaction. Color denotes survey at use, shape denotes whether the outcome is an index. All estimates from fully specified models. All covariates scaled 0-1. 95% confidence interval from robust standard errors displayed.

# D.1 Association with immigration attitudes

A coulturation I coul	Open Immigration Policy Index (by survey)							
Acculturation Level	Pew '07 $$	Pew '08 $$	Pew '10 $$	CMPS '16 $$	Pew '18	Pew '19		
Acculturation $(0)$	0.74	0.81	0.77	0.71	0.83	0.93		
Acculturation $(1)$	0.69	0.79	0.73	0.69	0.81	0.94		
Acculturation $(2)$	0.67	0.68	0.72	0.60	0.80	0.88		
Acculturation $(3)$	0.65	0.66	0.72	0.69	0.78	0.90		
Acculturation $(4)$	0.58	0.60	0.58	0.65	0.69	0.84		
Max - Min	-0.17	-0.21	-0.20	-0.06	-0.14	-0.10		
Bivariate Regression t-val	-7.77	-11.89	-9.08	-3.17	-6.71	-4.52		

Table D3: Acculturation is Negatively Associated With Open Immigration PolicyAttitudes Across Surveys



#### D.2 Demonstrating Scale Captures Concept

Figure D4: The Acculturation Scale (x-axis) is Associated With Multiple Dimensions of Assimilation (y-axis). Acculturation is associated with reduced identity salience (Panel A), higher levels of American identity relative to ethnic identity (Panel B), a higher rate of American self-categorization relative to ethnic self-categorization (Panel C), higher education (Panel D), higher income (Panel E), living in a more co-ethnic/immigrant zipcode context (Panels F-H), and lower rates of co-ethnic marriage (Panel I). Predicted values displayed on the y-axis are from bivariate regressions. Panels A uses Pew '19 data, Panels B-J use CMPS '16 data, Panel K uses Pew '18 data. All covariates rescaled between 0-1 with the exception of the American - Ethnic ID measure, which is scaled between -1 (strong identification with the ethnic group, no identification with the United States) and 1 (strong identification with the United States, no identification with the ethnic group). 95% confidence intervals displayed derived from robust standard errors. Zipcode clustered standard errors displayed for Panels F-H.

### D.3 Demonstrating English dominance = English interview

	English (1)	Interview (2)
English Dominance	$0.89^{***}$ (0.04)	$1.65^{***}$ (0.05)
Survey	Pew '07	Pew '10
$R^2$ N	$0.45 \\ 1809$	$0.64 \\ 1238$

Table D4: The English Language Interview Indicator is a Strong Proxy forEnglish-Language Dominance

Note: \*\*\*p < 0.001, \*\*p < 0.01, \*p < 0.05. All models adjust for generational status, partisanship, income, education and gender.

# E Validating deportation threat measure

#### E.1 Threat measurement

#### E.1.1 Pew 2007-2019

Regardless of your own immigration or citizenship status, how much, if at all, do you worry that you, a family member, or a close friend could be deported? Would you say that you worry a lot, some, not much, or not at all? 1) A lot 2) Some 3) Not much 4) Not at all

#### E.1.2 CMPS 2016

How worried are you that people you know might be detained or deported for immigration reasons? 1) Extremely worried 2) Very worried 3) Somewhat worried 4) A little worried 5) Not at all worried



### E.2 Threat distributions

Figure E5: Distribution (y-axis) of Deportation Threat (x-axis) Across Surveys. Annotations denote N within each threat level and the corresponding marginal in parentheses. Each panel denotes a separate survey.

### E.3 Distinctiveness of threat and acculturation

Survey	Pearson's Rho	Kendall's Tau	Spearman's Rho
Pew '07	-0.41	-0.33	-0.40
Pew '08 $$	-0.46	-0.38	-0.45
Pew '10	-0.42	-0.34	-0.41
CMPS'16	-0.26	-0.23	-0.27
Pew '18	-0.26	-0.22	-0.27
Pew '19	-0.20	-0.17	-0.20

 Table E5: Correlation Coefficients Between Deportation Threat and Acculturation

 Scale

Table E6: Distribution of Threat by Acculturation Across Surveys

Survey	Acculturation	Not at all (Not at all worried)	Not much (A little worried)	Some (Somewhat worried)	A lot (Very worried)	(Extremely Worried)	N
	Acculturation (0)	0.15	0.11	0.24	0.40	( )	761
	Acculturation $(0)$	0.15	0.11	0.24	0.49		410
Pow '07	Acculturation $(1)$	0.27	0.12	0.20	0.40		202
16w 07	Acculturation $(2)$	0.54	0.15	0.25	0.20		202
	Acculturation (5)	0.55	0.15	0.10	0.17		248
	Acculturation $(4)$	0.05	0.14	0.11	0.10		179
	Acculturation (0)	0.13	0.07	0.19	0.61		729
	Acculturation (1)	0.22	0.12	0.18	0.47		424
Pew '08	Acculturation (2)	0.39	0.11	0.21	0.29		194
	Acculturation (3)	0.51	0.13	0.17	0.19		243
	Acculturation $(4)$	0.62	0.13	0.16	0.09		232
	Acculturation (0)	0.15	0.08	0.22	0.55		375
	Acculturation (1)	0.24	0.09	0.23	0.44		287
Pew '10	Acculturation (2)	0.35	0.12	0.18	0.35		188
	Acculturation (3)	0.48	0.15	0.14	0.22		202
	Acculturation $(4)$	0.69	0.08	0.11	0.11		194
	Acculturation (0)	0.21	0.09	0.20	0.19	0.31	202
	Acculturation (1)	0.23	0.10	0.17	0.23	0.27	229
<b>CMPS</b> '16	Acculturation (2)	0.43	0.09	0.25	0.13	0.10	357
	Acculturation (3)	0.27	0.14	0.27	0.15	0.16	528
	Acculturation (4)	0.53	0.10	0.19	0.09	0.09	1173
	Acculturation (0)	0.20	0.12	0.33	0.35		484
	Acculturation (1)	0.28	0.13	0.30	0.29		322
Pew '18	Acculturation (2)	0.35	0.15	0.21	0.30		227
	Acculturation (3)	0.36	0.14	0.22	0.28		387
	Acculturation (4)	0.56	0.13	0.20	0.11		374
	Acculturation (0)	0.24	0.21	0.24	0.31		420
	Acculturation (1)	0.34	0.19	0.24	0.23		638
Pew '19	Acculturation (2)	0.49	0.17	0.21	0.13		548
	Acculturation (3)	0.41	0.19	0.22	0.18		589
	Acculturation $(4)$	0.57	0.15	0.18	0.10		232



#### E.4 Demonstrating Measure Captures Concept

Figure E6: The Psychological Measure of Deportation Threat Captures Objective Measures of the Concept. The number of county-level Secure Communities removals (Panel A), the proportion of the respondent's zipcode that is foreign-born (Panel B), the proportion of the respondent's zipcode that is non-citizen (Panel C), and whether the respondent either knows an undocumented immigrant or deportee (Panels D and E) is positively associated with deportation threat. Predicted value of deportation threat are from bivariate regressions. Panels A-D use CMPS '16 data, Panel E uses Pew '10 data. 95% confidence intervals displayed with robust standard errors displayed. Standard errors are clustered at the county-level for Panel A and zipcode-level for Panels B-C.

# E.5 Correlates of deportation threat

$\begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $				Deportat	ion Threat		
$ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Age	$-0.25^{***}$	$-0.39^{***}$	$-0.33^{***}$	$-0.41^{***}$	$-0.34^{***}$	$-0.19^{***}$
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$		(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Woman	0.02	-0.02	-0.01	0.01	0.09***	0.01
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Married	0.01	0.04	0.01	-0.01	0.04	0.02
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Mexican/Central Am.	0.03	0.10**	0.01	$0.05^{*}$	0.02	0.03
$ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	,	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Income	$-0.12^{**}$	$-2.42^{***}$	$-0.19^{**}$	$-0.09^{*}$	$-0.12^{**}$	< <i>/</i>
$ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$		(0.05)	(0.70)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Education	$-0.16^{***}$	-0.08	-0.10	-0.02	-0.06	$-0.11^{**}$
Unemployed $-0.04$ $-0.02$ $0.02$ $-0.03$ $-0.03$ US Born $-0.12^{***}$ $-0.15^{***}$ $-0.22^{***}$ $-0.07^{***}$ $-0.07^{**}$ $-0.11$ $(0.03)$ $(0.03)$ $(0.04)$ $(0.02)$ $(0.03)$ $(0.03)$ English $-0.18^{***}$ $-0.17^{***}$ $-0.02$ $-0.08^{**}$ $-0.06$ $(0.03)$ $(0.03)$ $(0.04)$ $(0.03)$ $(0.03)$ $(0.03)$ % Non-citizen (zip) $0.16^{*}$ $0.08$ $-0.00$ $0.11$ $(0.08)$ $(0.10)$ $(0.07)$ $(0.07)$ % Non-citizen (county) $-0.09$ $0.02$ $0.13^{*}$ $0.00$ $(0.06)$ $(0.07)$ $(0.07)$ $(0.07)$ $(0.07)$ $Mon-citizen$ $(county)$ $-0.09$ $0.02$ $0.13^{*}$ $0.00$ $(0.06)$ $(0.07)$ $(0.07)$ $(0.07)$ $(0.07)$ $(0.07)$ $(0.07)$ $Mon-citizen$ $(county)$ $-0.09$ $0.22$ $(0.07)$ $(0.07)$ $Mon-citizen$ $(0.03)$ $(0.03)$ <		(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Unemployed	-0.04	-0.02	0.02	-0.03	-0.03	( )
US Born $-0.12^{***}$ $-0.22^{***}$ $-0.07^{***}$ $-0.07^{***}$ $-0.17^{***}$ $-0.17^{***}$ $-0.07^{***}$ $-0.07^{***}$ $-0.017^{***}$ $-0.00^{***}$ $-0.00^{***}$ $-0.00^{***}$ $-0.00^{***}$ $-0.00^{***}$ $-0.00^{***}$ $-0.00^{***}$ $-0.00^{***}$ $-0.00^{***}$ $-0.00^{***}$ $-0.00^{***}$ $-0.00^{***}$ $-0.00^{***}$ $-0.01^{***}$ $-0.00^{***}$ $-0.04^{***}$ $-0.00^{***}$ $-0.04^{***}$ $-0.00^{***}$ $-0.00^{***}$ $-0.03^{***}$ $0.04^{***}$ $0.02^{***}$ $0.04^{***}$ $0.02^{****}$ $0.02^{****}$ $0.02^{****}$ $0.02^{****}$ $0.02^{****}$ $0.02^{****}$ $0.02^{****}$ $0.02^{****}$ $0.02^{****}$ $0.02^{****}$ $0.02^{****}$	r J	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	US Born	$-0.12^{***}$	-0.15***	-0.22***	$-0.07^{***}$	$-0.07^{**}$	$-0.11^{***}$
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	0.0 2011	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	English	-0.18***	$-0.17^{***}$	-0.02	$-0.08^{**}$	-0.08**	-0.06*
$ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Linghion	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	% Non-citizen (zip)	(0.00)	0.16*	0.08	-0.00	0.11	(0.00)
$ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	ye from orelized (zip)		(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.07)	
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	% Non-citizen (county)		-0.09	0.10)	0.13*	0.00	
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	/ Hon cruzen (county)		(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.10)	(0.07)	
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	$Log(Doportations \pm 1)$		(0.00)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.07) -0.12*	
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Log(Deportations + 1)				(0.04)	(0.05)	
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Deportation Rate				(0.04)	0.04	
Know Deportee $0.18^{***}$ $0.24^{**}$ $(0.03)$ $(0.03)$ $(0.03)$ Know Undocumented $0.26^{***}$ $0.16^{**}$ $(0.02)$ $(0.02)$ $(0.02)$ Perceived Discrim. $0.21^{***}$ $0.12^{***}$ $0.19^{***}$ $(0.04)$ $(0.04)$ $(0.04)$ $(0.04)$ Experienced Discrim. $0.09^{***}$ $0.13^{***}$ $0.08^{***}$ $(0.02)$ $(0.02)$ $(0.03)$ $(0.02)$ Ethnic Media $0.09$ $0.16^{*}$ $0.08^{*}$ $(0.05)$ $(0.07)$ $(0.04)$ $(0.03)$ Partisanship $0.03$ $0.13^{***}$ $0.04$ $0.11^{***}$ $(0.03)$ $(0.03)$ $(0.03)$ $(0.03)$ $(0.03)$ Ideology $0.02$ $0.06$ $(0.04)$ $(0.03)$ $(0.4)$ $(0.03)$ $(0.03)$ $(0.03)$ $(0.03)$	Deportation Rate				-0.34	(0.04)	
Know Deportee $0.18$ $0.24$ (0.03)       (0.03)         Know Undocumented $0.26^{***}$ $0.16^{**}$ (0.02)       (0.02)       (0.02)         Perceived Discrim. $0.21^{***}$ $0.12^{***}$ $0.19^{***}$ $0.66^{***}$ (0.04)       (0.04)       (0.04)       (0.04)       (0.02)       (0.02)         Experienced Discrim. $0.09^{***}$ $0.13^{***}$ $0.08^{**}$ $0.36^{***}$ (0.02)       (0.02)       (0.03)       (0.02)       (0.03)         Ethnic Media $0.09$ $0.16^{**}$ $0.08^{**}$ (0.03)       (0.03)       (0.04)       (0.03)         Partisanship $0.03$ $0.13^{***}$ $0.04$ $0.11^{***}$ $0.24^{***}$ $0.18^{**}$ (deology $0.02$ $0.06$ $(0.03)$ $(0.03)$ $(0.03)$ $(0.03)$	Know Doportoo			0 19***	(0.23)	(0.11)	0.94***
$ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Know Deportee			(0.10)			(0.24)
Know Undocumented $0.26^{-4}$ $0.16^{-1}$ (0.02)       (0.02)         Perceived Discrim. $0.21^{***}$ $0.19^{***}$ $0.16^{***}$ (0.04)       (0.04)       (0.04)       (0.04)         Experienced Discrim. $0.09^{***}$ $0.13^{***}$ $0.08^{**}$ $0.36^{***}$ (0.02)       (0.02)       (0.03)       (0.02)       (0.03)         Ethnic Media $0.09$ $0.16^{*}$ $0.08^{*}$ (0.05)       (0.07)       (0.04)       (0.03)         Partisanship $0.03$ $0.13^{***}$ $0.04$ $0.11^{***}$ $0.24^{***}$ $0.18^{**}$ (deology $0.02$ $0.06$ (0.03)       (0.03)       (0.03)       (0.03)         L ti = D $0.02^{**}$ $0.00^{**}$ $0.00^{**}$ $0.00^{**}$	Wnow Unde sum onted			(0.05)	0.96***		(0.03) 0.1 <i>C</i> ***
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Know Undocumented				$(0.20^{-11})$		$(0.10^{-10})$
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	D ' ID' '	0.01***	0 10***	0 10***	(0.02)		(0.02)
$ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Perceived Discrim.	0.21	0.12	0.19	0.16		
$ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$		(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	0.00***	
$ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Experienced Discrim.	0.09***	0.13***	0.08**	0.08***	0.36***	
Ethnic Media $0.09$ $0.16^*$ $0.08^*$ $(0.05)$ $(0.07)$ $(0.04)$ Partisanship $0.03$ $0.13^{***}$ $0.04$ $0.11^{***}$ $0.24^{***}$ $0.18^*$ $(0.03)$ $(0.03)$ $(0.04)$ $(0.03)$ $(0.03)$ $(0.03)$ Ideology $0.02$ $0.06$ $(0.04)$ $(0.03)$		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Ethnic Media		0.09	$0.16^{*}$	0.08*		
Partisanship $0.03$ $0.13^{***}$ $0.04$ $0.11^{***}$ $0.24^{***}$ $0.18^{*}$ $(0.03)$ $(0.03)$ $(0.04)$ $(0.03)$ $(0.03)$ $(0.03)$ Ideology $0.02$ $0.06$ $(0.04)$ $(0.03)$ Leti       ID $0.02^{*}$ $0.02^{*}$ $0.02^{*}$			(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.04)		0.40.00
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Partisanship	0.03	0.13***	0.04	0.11***	0.24***	0.18***
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
(0.04) $(0.03)$	Ideology			0.02	0.06		
				(0.04)	(0.03)		
Latino ID 0.09 <sup>*</sup> 0.08	Latino ID				$0.09^{*}$	0.08	
(0.03) $(0.05)$					(0.03)	(0.05)	
Survey         Pew '07         Pew '08         Pew '10         CMPS '16         Pew '18         Pew '	Survey	Pew '07	Pew '08	Pew '10	CMPS '16	Pew '18	Pew '19
$R^2$ 0.24 0.32 0.29 0.42 0.25 0.25	$\mathbb{R}^2$	0.24	0.32	0.29	0.42	0.25	0.25
N 1809 1822 1238 2279 1794 2427	N	1809	1822	1238	2279	1794	2427

#### Table E7: Correlates of Deportation Threat

Note: \*\*\*p < 0.001, \*\*p < 0.01, \*p < 0.05. All covariates scaled between 0-1. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

### E.6 Association between threat and immigration preferences

	Open Immigration Policy Index					
Panel A: No controls	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Threat	0.25***	0.36***	0.29***	0.28***	0.32***	0.19***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.06	0.13	0.09	0.10	0.11	0.03
Ν	1809	1822	1238	2279	1794	2427
Panel B: Yes controls	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Threat	$0.14^{***}$	$0.17^{***}$	$0.15^{***}$	0.18***	$0.19^{***}$	$0.15^{***}$
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
$\mathbb{R}^2$	0.16	0.31	0.31	0.24	0.31	0.08
Num. obs.	1809	1822	1236	2276	1794	2427
Survey	Pew $'07$	Pew '08	Pew '10	CMPS '16 $$	Pew '18	Pew '19 $$
Demographic Controls	Υ	Y	Y	Y	Υ	Υ
Socio-Economic Controls	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ
Political Controls	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ
County Controls	N/A	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ	N/A
Zipcode Controls	N/A	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ	N/A
Census Area FE	Y	Ν	Ν	Ν	Ν	Y
State FE	Ν	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ	Ν

 Table E8: Association Between Deportation Threat and Open Immigration Policy

 Attitudes

\*\*\*p < 0.001, \*\*p < 0.01, \*p < 0.05. Geographic controls below the Census Area are not available for the Pew 2007 and Pew 2019 surveys. All covariates scaled between 0-1. Robust standard errors in parentheses.



Figure E7: Standardized Deportation Threat Coefficients on Open Immigration Policy Preferences (y-axis) Across Surveys (x-axis) and the Inclusion of Control Covariates (color). Vertical grey line separates survey estimates from meta-analytic estimates. Horizontal red line is the random-effects meta-analytic coefficient estimate. Annotations include estimate, standard error, p-value, how much joint outcome and independent variable variation must be explained by an omitted covariate to reduce the coefficient to 0 ("Robustness Value (RV)"), and how large an omitted covariate must be to reduce the coefficient to 0 based on observable bounds. 95% confidence intervals displayed derived from robust standard errors.

#### E.7 Threat = Stable



Figure E8: Deportation Threat is Relatively Stable Over Time. Panel A displays levels of self-reported *deportation threat* in the '07, '08, '10, '13, and '18 Pew Latino Surveys. Panel B characterizes period effects for the level of *threat* in the '08, '10, '13, and '18 Pew Latino Surveys relative to the '07 Pew Latino survey. Panel C displays self-reported *threat* in the Nov '16-Jan '17 and Jul '17-Sep '17 waves of the Latino National Immigrant Survey (LINES) Panel. Annotation denotes Jul '17-Sep '17 period effect, which is near zero. Panel D is the Pearson's  $\rho$  correlation coefficient (y-axis) for *threat*, ideology, and partisanship (x-axis) between the Nov '16-Jan '17 and Jul '17-Sep '17 LINES waves. Although test-retest reliability is seemingly low for *threat*, it is *relatively* high given the 6 month gap between waves and the fact *threat* is similar in reliability to ideology and approaches the reliability of partisanship, two measures that are understood as stable in preexisting literature. All covariates rescaled between 0-1. 95% CIs displayed derived from robust standard errors.

# F Descriptive plots characterizing heterogeneous influence of threat by acculturation



**Figure F9:** Association between acculturation and liberal immigration policy attitudes conditional on deportation threat across surveys. X-axis = acculturation scale. Y-axis = liberal immigration policy index. Solid line = linear fit to bivariate association. Dashed line = average on policy index conditional on acculturation category. Color denotes level of perceived deportation threat.

# G Control Covariates

### G.1 List

Table G9: Control Covariate Inclusion in Fully Specified Models by Survey

Survey	Controls
Pew '07	Acculturation, Age, Age (Missing), Woman, Married, Mexican, Salvadorean, Dominican, Cuban,
	Income, Education, Education (Missing), Unemployed, Partisanship (5pt), Perceived Discrimination,
	Experienced Discrimination, Census Region FE
Pew '08	Acculturation, Age, Age (Missing), Woman, Married, Catholic, Mexican, Salvadorean, Dominican,
	Cuban, Income, Income (Missing), Education, Education (Missing), Unemployment, Partisanship (5pt),
	Experienced Discrimination, Perceived Discrimination, Ethnic Media Consumption, Log(Total Pop.
	+ 1) (Zip), Pop. Density (Zip), % Latino (Zip), % Foreign (Zip), % Non-citizen (Zip), Log(Median
	Household Income + 1) (ZiP), % College (ZiP), % Unemployment (ZiP), Log(1otal Pop. + 1) (County),
	Pop. Density (County), % Latino (County), % Poreign (County), % Non-chizen (County), Log(Median Household Ingome + 1) (County) % College (County) & Ungmpland (County), State FF
Pour '10	Acculturation Acc. Acc. (Misring) Warman Married Married Dominion Saltadorean Cuban
16w 10	Income Income (Missing) Education Education (Missing) Unemployed Homeowner Partisanship
	(5pt). Ideology (5pt). Ideology (Missing) Experienced Discrimination Perceived Discrimination Ethnic
	Media Consumption, Know Deportee, Immigration Stop, Log(Total Pop. + 1) (Zip), Pop. Density
	(Zip), % Latino (Zip), % Foreign (Zip), % Non-citizen (Zip), Log(Median Household Income + 1) (Zip),
	% College (Zip), % Unemployment (Zip), Log(Total Pop. + 1) (County), Pop. Density (County), %
	Latino (County), % Foreign (County), % Non-citizen (County), Log(Median Household Income + 1)
	(County), % College (County), % Unemployed (County), State FE
CMPS '16	Acculturation, Age, Age (Missing), Woman, Married, Skin Color, Catholic, Mexican, Dominican,
	Cuban, Salvadorean, Income, Income (Missing), Education, Unemployed, Homeowner, Partisanship
	(7pt), Ideology (5pt), Ideology (Missing), Perceived Discrimination, Experienced Discrimination, Know
	Undocumented, Latinx identity, American identity, Log(16tal Pop. + 1) (Zip), Pop. Density (County),
	% Latino (Zip), % Poreign (Zip), % Non-citizen (Zip), Log(Meedian Housenoid income + 1) (Zip), %
	Lating (County) % Origing (County) % Non-citizen (County) Log(Median Household Income + 1)
	(County) % Follege (County) % Unemoved (County) Log(Total Removals + 1) % Level 3 Removals
	Removal Rate. State FE.
Pew '18	Acculturation, Age, Age (Missing), Woman, Married, Catholic, Mexican, Dominican, Salvadorean,
	Cuban, Income, Income (Missing), Education, Education (Missing), Unemployed, Homeowner, Expe-
	rienced Discrimination, Partisanship (5pt), Latinx identity, American identity Log(Total Pop. + 1)
	(Zip), Pop. Density (County), % Latino (Zip), % Foreign (Zip), % Non-citizen (Zip), Log(Median
	Household Income + 1) (Zip), % College (Zip), % Unemployment (Zip), Log(Total Pop. + 1) (County),
	Pop. Density (County), % Latino (County), % Foreign (County), % Non-critizen (County), Log(Median
	Household Income + 1) (County), % College (County), % Unemployed (County), Log(Total Removals
D 110	+ 1), % Level 3 Removals, Removal Rate, State FE
Pew 19	Acculturation, Age, Age (Missing), Woman, Married, Catholic, Mexican, Dominican, Salvadorean,
	unoated Know Denorthe Compare Region FF

Blue: demographic controls. Green: socio-economic controls. Red: political controls. Purple: county-level controls. Orange: zipcode-level controls.

### G.2 Justification

### G.2.1 Demographic covariates

Age: May be associated with length of stay in the United States, a measure of acculturation (Abraído-Lanza et al., 2006). Moreover, older Latinxs may be more established in the United States, and therefore perceive lower levels of deportation threat, as reflected in the regression table characterizing the correlates of deportation threat (Section E.5, Table E7). Older Latinxs may have also migrated to the US prior to key points where undocumented immigrants were regularized (e.g. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986).

**Gender:** Women may be more likely to perceive risks related to immigration enforcement (Gustafsod, 1998). Moreover, a competing theoretical perspective suggests men may perceive deportation threat more given immigration enforcement disproportionately targets men. However, women may perceive deportation threat more because they are more likely to be concerned about consequences related to the loss of a male breadwinner (Golash-Boza and Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2013).

Marriage: Marriage may offer protection from deportation threat through status regularization, which can influence both threat and support for pro-immigrant policies (Menjívar and Lakhani, 2016). Moreover, marriage may increase deportation threat since marriage implies a loss of strong familial ties through immigration enforcement (Schueths, 2012). Marriage may also motivate conservatism, generating restrictive immigration policy attitudes among Latinxs (Kingston and Finkel, 1987).

National Origin: Binary indicators for Mexican, Salvadorean, Dominican, and Cuban national origin are included in the fully specified regression models. These are the 4 largest Latinx national origin groups (Excluding Puerto Ricans, who, if included in the analysis, would make up the 5 largest national origin groups. Recall that Puerto Ricans are excluded from the analysis because they possess American citizenship.). Prior evidence suggests some national origin groups are more likely to support liberal immigration policies by virtue of their proximity to the immigrant experience (e.g. Mexicans, Central Americans) (Rouse et al., 2010). In some of the surveys, Mexican/Central-American national origin appears to be positively associated with deportation threat (Section E.5, Table E7).

**Catholic:** Catholic Latinxs may be more supportive of liberal immigration policy preferences given the Catholic Church's outspoken pro-immigration reform views (Valenzuela, 2014). Likewise, Catholic Latinxs are more likely to be compelled to engage in pro-immigrant political activism, which may jointly influence liberal immigration policy preferences and deportation threat (Barreto et al., 2009).

**Skin Color:** Skin color may make one susceptible to immigration enforcement or policing via racial profiling, which may increase perceived deportation threat (Romero, 2006).

### G.2.2 Socio-economic covariates

**Income:** Prior evidence suggests higher income Latinxs may be less supportive of liberal immigration policies (Polinard et al., 1984; Bedolla, 2003). Although one may think lower

income Latinxs would be less likely to support liberal immigration policies due to competition, this is not supported by prior evidence (Newton, 2000; Jiménez, 2008; Rouse et al., 2010). For the most part, rejection of liberal immigration policies appears to be a function of assimilation via economic attainment.

**Education:** A plethora of prior evidence suggests education is associated with more support for immigrants (Chandler and Tsai, 2001; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007; Cavaille and Marshall, 2019). Education could be associated with higher support for immigrants via economic or social channels. However, most evidence on the link between education and immigration attitudes analyzes attitudes among dominant groups. Other research examining Latinxs finds no association between education and immigration policy preferences (Binder et al., 1997; Newton, 2000; Rouse et al., 2010).

**Unemployment:** Evidence on the link between unemployment and immigration attitudes is mixed. Some evidence finds contextual measures of unemployment are associated with individual-level support for pro-immigrant policies (Markaki and Longhi, 2013). Other research suggests unemployment increases opposition to immigrants (Palmer, 1996). However, for Latinxs, the preexisting evidence appears to suggest both contextual and individual-level unemployment has no influence on immigration policy attitudes (Rouse et al., 2010).

**Homeowner:** In the immigrant assimilation literature, homeownership is understood as a substrate of assimilation (Alba and Logan, 1992; McConnell and Marcelli, 2007).

### G.2.3 Political covariates

**Partisanship:** Prior evidence suggests a strong association between partisanship and immigration policy attitudes. Immigration attitudes have also influenced partisan switching in recent years (Abrajano and Hajnal, 2017).

**Ideology:** Prior evidence suggests a strong association between conservative ideology and restrictive immigration policy attitudes, particularly in the U.S. context (Citrin and Sides, 2008).

**Perceived discrimination (against Latinxs):** Prior evidence suggests perceived discrimination is associated with pro-immigrant attitudes among Latinxs (Sanchez, 2006). Other research also suggests perceived discrimination forestalls attitudinal assimilation on immigration policy attitudes (Pedraza, 2014). Perceived discrimination also appears to be associated with deportation threat (Section E.5, Table E7), perhaps as a function of how illegality is conflated with the Latinx population writ large as a basis for discrimination (Flores and Schachter, 2018).

**Experienced discrimination:** Prior evidence suggests experienced discrimination is associated with pro-immigrant attitudes among Latinxs (Tucker, 2020).

Ethnic media: Prior evidence suggests ethnic media consumption among Latinxs is associated with pro-immigrant attitudes (Abrajano and Singh, 2009). It may also cue Latinxs into possible immigration enforcement threats (Zepeda-Millán, 2017). Indeed, in two of the

6 surveys, ethnic media consumption appears to be positively associated with deportation threat (Section E.5, Table E7).

**Knowing a deportee:** Whether one knows a deportee may influence deportation threat. It either cues in the prospect of oneself being deported or friends/family being deported. In all surveys with an item measuring personal contact with a deportee, knowing a deportee is highly prognostic of deportation threat (Section E.5, Table E7).

Knowing someone undocumented: Whether one knows someone undocumented (friends/family in both the CMPS and Pew 2019 surveys) may influence deportation threat given the increasingly restrictive immigration enforcement environment. It may also influence pro-immigrant attitudes via contact and the development of common interests (Cadenas et al., 2018). In all surveys with an item measuring contact with undocumented immigrants, knowing someone undocumented is highly prognostic of deportation threat (Section E.5, Table E7).

**Immigration stop:** Whether one is stopped by immigration officers may induce deportation threat via contact with the immigration enforcement apparatus. Moreover, it may induce support for liberal immigration policies given some respondents may want less restrictive policies to ensure reprieve from possible harassment on part of immigration agents.

Latino identity: Prior evidence suggests the strength of identification with the ethnic group among Latinxs is positively associated with positive attriudes toward immigrants (Binder et al., 1997; Sanchez, 2006; Rouse et al., 2010; Serrano-Careaga and Huo, 2019; Wallace and Zepeda-Millán, 2020). Moreover, Latinx identity may be associated with increased deportation threat, given high group identifiers appear to be more sensitive to anti-group threats (Sellers and Shelton, 2003; Pérez, 2015).

American identity: Prior evidence suggests the strength of identification with the ethnic group among Latinxs is positively associated with positive attriudes toward immigrants (Binder et al., 1997; Sanchez, 2006; Rouse et al., 2010; Serrano-Careaga and Huo, 2019; Wallace and Zepeda-Millán, 2020). Moreover, Latinx identity may be associated with increased deportation threat, given high group identifiers appear to be more sensitive to anti-group threats (Sellers and Shelton, 2003; Pérez, 2015).

### G.2.4 Contextual covariates

% Latino/Foreign-Born/Non-Citizen: Prior evidence suggests ethnic contexts increase support for liberal immigration policies among Latinxs (Rocha et al., 2011; Telles and Sue, 2019). However, the acculturation level of the context needs to be taken into account. Places with less acculturated Latinxs (e.g. foreign-born, non-citizens) may have individuals who are more likely to support liberal immigration policies relative to places with more acculturated Latinxs yet are still predominantly ethnic contexts (Bedolla, 2003). Moreover, places with more Latinxs and/or immigrants may be more subject to deportation threat via immigration enforcement actions or a societal concern over a precarious legal status (Maltby et al., 2020). Median Household Income/Unemployed/% College: Prior evidence suggests Latinxs from higher resourced contexts may be less supportive of liberal immigration policy preferences (Bedolla, 2003). Higher resourced areas may also be less subject to deportation threat since they're less likely to be targeted by immigration enforcement authorities.

Secure Communities Removals/Removal Rate/% Level 3 Removals: Deportation threat may be induced by Secure Communities removals and deportations. If level 3 removals occur at a higher rate (e.g. removals of people who have committed minor crimes), that may increase a sense of injustice that motivates pro-immigrant behavior (Walker et al., 2020).

# H Alternative samples

### H.1 Mexicans only

Table H11: Association between deportation threat and open immigration policy attitudes conditional on acculturation (Mexicans only)

	Open Immigration Policy Attitudes					
Panel A: No controls	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Threat x Acculturation	0.32***	0.23**	0.27***	$0.11^{\dagger}$	0.27***	$0.25^{*}$
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.12)
Threat	0.02	$0.10^{**}$	-0.00	$0.11^{*}$	$0.06^{*}$	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.07)
Acculturation	$-0.24^{***}$	$-0.24^{***}$	$-0.22^{***}$	$-0.07^{\dagger}$	$-0.20^{***}$	$-0.17^{*}$
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.08)
$\mathbb{R}^2$	0.13	0.18	0.18	0.11	0.14	0.05
Ν	1196	1220	833	1500	1197	946
Panel B: Yes controls	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Threat x Acculturation	0.30***	$0.17^{**}$	0.24***	$0.10^{\dagger}$	$0.11^{+}$	$0.25^{*}$
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.12)
Threat	-0.01	0.05	-0.02	0.06	$0.07^{\dagger}$	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.08)
Acculturation	$-0.22^{***}$	$-0.20^{***}$	$-0.21^{***}$	$-0.07^{\dagger}$	$-0.11^{*}$	$-0.16^{\dagger}$
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.08)
$\mathbb{R}^2$	0.18	0.32	0.35	0.26	0.34	0.11
Ν	1196	1220	833	1500	1197	946
Survey	Pew '07	Pew '08	Pew '10	CMPS '16	Pew '18	Pew '19
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Υ	Υ
Socio-Economic Controls	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ
Political Controls	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ
County Controls	N/A	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ	N/A
Zipcode Controls	N/A	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ	N/A
Census Area FE	Ý	Ν	Ν	Ν	Ν	Ý
State FE	Ν	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ	Ν

Note: \*\*\*p < 0.001, \*\*p < 0.01, \*p < 0.05,  $\dagger p < 0.1$ . All covariates scaled between 0-1. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

### H.2 Including Puerto Ricans

		Open In	nmigratio	on Policy A	ttitudes	
Panel A: No controls	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Threat x Acculturation	0.08	0.18***	0.16***	$0.08^{\dagger}$	0.20***	0.26**
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.08)
Threat	0.09***	$0.10^{***}$	0.04	$0.13^{***}$	$0.08^{**}$	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Acculturation	$-0.15^{***}$	$-0.23^{***}$	$-0.17^{***}$	$-0.05^{\dagger}$	$-0.15^{***}$	$-0.19^{***}$
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.06)
$\mathbb{R}^2$	0.09	0.16	0.13	0.10	0.11	0.06
Ν	1961	1975	1347	2768	2002	2675
Panel B: Yes controls	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Threat x Acculturation	$0.09^{\dagger}$	$0.15^{**}$	$0.15^{***}$	$0.08^{\dagger}$	$0.10^{*}$	0.22**
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.08)
Threat	$0.05^{*}$	0.04	0.00	$0.07^{*}$	$0.07^{*}$	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Acculturation	$-0.15^{***}$	$-0.19^{***}$	$-0.17^{***}$	-0.04	$-0.09^{**}$	$-0.17^{**}$
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)
$\mathbb{R}^2$	0.16	0.32	0.34	0.21	0.29	0.11
Ν	1961	1975	1347	2768	2002	2675
Survey	Pew '07	Pew '08	Pew '10	CMPS '16	Pew '18	Pew '19
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ
Political Controls	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ
County Controls	N/A	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ	N/A
Zipcode Controls	N/A	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ	N/A
Census Area FE	Y	Ν	Ν	Ν	Ν	Y
State FE	Ν	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ	Ν

Table H12: Association between deportation threat and open immigration policy attitudes conditional on acculturation (including Puerto Ricans)

Note: \*\*\*p < 0.001, \*\*p < 0.01, \*p < 0.05, †p < 0.1. All covariates scaled between 0-1. Panel A displays coefficients from models with no control covariates. Panel B displays coefficients from models adjusting for a full set of control covariates. Each column characterizes a different survey at use. Geographic covariates below the Census Area level are not available for the Pew 2007 and Pew 2019 surveys. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

# I Using alternative acculturation measures

### Table I13: Re-estimating Main Results Using Alternative Measures of Acculturation (part 1)

	Liberal Immigration Policy						
Panel A: Index (No citizenship)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
Threat x Acculturation	$0.12^{*}$	0.17**	0.13**	0.10*	0.18***	0.19*	
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.09)	
$\mathbb{R}^2$	0.16	0.32	0.34	0.21	0.31	0.09	
Ν	1809	1822	1236	2276	1794	2427	
Panel B: Index (with LPR)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
Threat x Acculturation	$0.13^{*}$	0.21**	0.19***	0.14*	0.19***	0.24*	
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.10)	
$\mathbb{R}^2$	0.16	0.32	0.33	0.21	0.31	0.09	
Ν	1809	1822	1236	2276	1794	2427	
Panel C: Index (w/ English-dominance)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
Threat x Acculturation	0.21**	_	$0.16^{*}$		_	0.39**	
	(0.08)	(—)	(0.07)	(—)	(—)	(0.13)	
$\mathbb{R}^2$	0.17	_	0.33			0.09	
Ν	1809	_	1236	—	—	2427	
Panel D: Index (w/ English-dom., LPR)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
Threat x Acculturation	0.21**	_	$0.17^{*}$	_	_	0.39**	
	(0.08)	(—)	(0.07)	(—)	(—)	(0.13)	
$\mathbb{R}^2$	0.17	_	0.33	_		0.09	
Ν	1809	_	1236	_		2427	
Survey	Pew '07	Pew '08	Pew '10	CMPS '16	Pew '18	Pew '19	

Note: \*\*\* p < 0.001, \*\* p < 0.01, \*p < 0.05,  $\dagger p < 0.1$ . All models are fully specified. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

### Table I14: Re-estimating Main Results Using Alternative Measures of Acculturation (part 2)

	Liberal Immigration Policy						
Panel A: Generational Status	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
Threat x 2nd Gen.	-0.07	0.02	0.04	-0.01	$-0.07^{\dagger}$	0.04	
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.07)	
Threat x 3rd Gen.	$0.16^{**}$	0.06	$0.08^{\dagger}$	0.06	$0.20^{***}$	$0.20^{*}$	
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.10)	
$\mathbb{R}^2$	0.17	0.31	0.33	0.24	0.33	0.09	
N	1809	1822	1236	2276	1794	2427	
Panel B: US Born	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
Threat x US Born	$0.07^{\dagger}$	$0.11^{*}$	$0.11^{**}$	0.04	$0.08^{*}$	0.09	
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	
$\mathbb{R}^2$	0.15	0.31	0.32	0.24	0.31	0.09	
Ν	1809	1822	1238	2276	1794	2427	
Panel C: English	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
Threat x English	0.06	0.15***	0.09**	$0.08^{\dagger}$	0.09*	0.14*	
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	
$\mathbb{R}^2$	0.15	0.31	0.32	0.24	0.32	0.09	
Ν	1809	1822	1238	2276	1794	2427	
Panel D: Citizenship	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
Threat x Citizenship	0.05	0.14***	0.09**	0.07	0.03	0.14*	
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.07)	
$\mathbb{R}^2$	0.14	0.31	0.32	0.24	0.31	0.09	
Ν	1809	1822	1238	2276	1794	2427	
Panel E: Fully Specified Components	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
Threat x 2nd Gen.	-0.07	-0.04	0.03	-0.07	-0.07	-0.07	
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.09)	
Threat x 3rd Gen.	$0.16^{*}$	-0.03	0.06	-0.00	0.20***	0.08	
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.11)	
Threat x English	0.01	$(0.11^{*})$	0.03	0.05	0.04	0.11	
Threat - Citizen	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.07)	
Threat x Chrizen	(0.02)	(0.08)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.09)	
	0.17	0.20	0.24	0.04	0.24	0.10	
N	1809	0.32	0.34 1236	0.24 2276	$0.34 \\ 1794$	0.10 2427	
Panel F: Fully Specified Components 2	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
Threat will Rom	0.08	0.02	0.00†	0.02	0.07	0.02	
Threat X US. Born	(0.08)	(0.02)	(0.09)	-0.03 (0.04)	(0.07)	-0.02 (0.08)	
Threat x English	0.02	0.09*	0.02	0.05	0.07	0.11 <sup>†</sup>	
Throw A Digitin	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.07)	
Threat x Citizen	-0.03	0.05	0.02	0.06	-0.07	0.09	
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.08)	
R <sup>2</sup>	0.16	0.32	0.33	0.24	0.32	0.10	
N	1809	1822	1238	2276	1794	2427	
Survey	Pew '07	Pew '08	Pew '10	CMPS '16	Pew '18	Pew '19	

Note: \*\*\*p < 0.001, \*\*p < 0.01, \*p < 0.05, †p < 0.1. All models are fully specified. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

# J Alternative Outcomes

### J.1 American Identity Items

American Centrality (CMPS '16): How much is being American an important part of how you see yourself? 1) Very important 2) Somewhat important 3) Not very important 4) Not at all important

Latinx Centrality (CMPS '16): How much is being Hispanic or Latino an important part of how you see yourself? 1) Very important 2) Somewhat important 3) Not very important 4) Not at all important

American Pride (Pew '18): I am proud to be an American 1) Completely agree 2) Mostly agree 3) Mostly disagree 4) Completely disagree

Latinx Pride (Pew '18): I am proud to be Hispanic/Latino 1) Completely agree 2) Mostly agree 3) Mostly disagree 4) Completely disagree

American Self-Categorization (Pew '19): People sometimes use different terms to describe themselves. In general, which ONE of the following terms do you use to describe yourself MOST OFTEN? 1) National origin answer 2) Hispanic or Latino 3) American

### J.2 Ethnic Salience Items

Ethnic Salience (Pew '19: How important is each of the following to what being Hispanic means to you? a) Speaking Spanish, b) Participating or attending Hispanic cultural celebrations, c) Wearing attire that represents your Hispanic heritage or origin, d) Socializing with other Hispanics, e) Having both parents of Hispanic heritage or descent, f) Having a Spanish last name, e) Being Catholic 1) Essential part of what being Hispanic means to me 2) Important, but not essential 3) Not an important part of what being Hispanic means to me

# J.3 American Identity/Ethnic Salience Analysis

### J.3.1 Regression Table

Table J15:	Threat	Forestalls	the A	Adoption	of an	American	Identity	$\mathbf{or}$	Erosion	of
Ethnic Sal	ience									

	U.S. Centrality	U.S. Pride	U.S. Categorization	Ethnic Salience
Panel A: No controls	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Threat x Acculturation	$-0.12^{\dagger}$	$-0.33^{***}$	$-0.44^{***}$	0.22**
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Threat	-0.07	$0.12^{*}$	0.08*	$0.08^{\dagger}$
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Acculturation	$0.27^{***}$	0.42***	$0.47^{***}$	$-0.24^{***}$
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
$\mathbb{R}^2$	0.13	0.11	0.16	0.11
Ν	2279	1794	2427	2427
Panel B: Yes controls	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Threat x Acculturation	$-0.15^{*}$	$-0.31^{***}$	$-0.43^{***}$	0.23**
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.08)
Threat	0.04	$0.15^{**}$	$0.12^{**}$	0.05
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Acculturation	$0.31^{***}$	$0.41^{***}$	$0.48^{***}$	$-0.21^{***}$
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)
$\mathbb{R}^2$	0.25	0.22	0.20	0.19
Num. obs.	2276	1794	2427	2427
Survey	CMPS '16	Pew '18	Pew '19	Pew '19
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Υ	Υ	Y	Υ
Political Controls	Υ	Υ	Y	Υ
County Controls	Υ	Υ	Ν	Ν
Zipcode Controls	Υ	Υ	Ν	Ν
Census Area FE	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ
State FE	Υ	Υ	Ν	Ν

Note: \*\*\* p < 0.001, \*\* p < 0.05,  $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$ . All covariates scaled between 0-1. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

#### J.3.2 Predicted Values



Figure J10: Predicted Values of Alternative Assimilation Measures (y-axis) Conditional on Acculturation (x-axis) and Threat (min-max, denoted by color). Simulations are from fully specified models with Census region fixed effects, assuming controls at their means and a respondent from the Western Census region. 95% confidence intervals from robust standard errors displayed.

## J.4 Anti-Black Attitudes

### J.4.1 CMPS '20 Details

The 2020 Collaborative Multi-Racial Post-Election Survey (N = 4016, fielded 04/02/2021-08/25/2021) is an online, self-administered, bilingual survey weighted to adult Latinx population characteristics in the 2019 1-year ACS for age, gender, education, nativity, and ancestry. When possible, I use white (CMPS '20 N = 3002), and Black non-Latinx (CMPS '20 N = 4005) samples to produce outcome benchmark values to compare with Latinxs along acculturation levels and exposure to immigration enforcement threat.

### J.4.2 Outcome Items

**Racial Resentment (CMPS '20):** *Racial resentment* is an index of 4 5-point scale items between "agree strongly" to "disagree strongly." These items ask if the respondent agrees Blacks should work without special favors, Blacks should try harder to be as well off as whites, disagrees generations of discrimination make upward mobility difficult for Blacks, and disagrees Blacks have gotten less than they deserve.

Anti-Black stereotype (CMPS '20): Anti-Black stereotype is the difference between whether a respondent believes Blacks relative to whites are violent instead of peaceful on a 7-point scale. This item is used in prior work as a component of explicit anti-Black prejudice scales, which measure antipathy on the basis of faulty and inflexible generalizations. Prior research shows this measure is associated with policy preferences that negatively affect Black people (e.g. draconian criminal justice policies) (Huddy and Feldman, 2009). Relative to resentment, this measure is also associated with anti-Black behavioral discrimination in dictator games (Peyton and Huber, 2021).

**Black Threat (CMPS '20):** Here is a list of groups in society. For each group, please indicate if you think they support or threaten your vision of American society; Black people. 1) Strongly supports, 2) Supports, 3) Supports a little, 4) Neither supports nor threatens, 5) Threatens a little, 6) Threatens, 7) Strongly threatens. (Rescaled between 0-1 where maximum = strongly threatens).

White Residential Preference (CMPS '20): If you could live anywhere, in any type of community, please rank from 1 (top choice) to 6 (last choice) the racial or ethnic make up of the neighborhood you would prefer. While it might be somewhat mixed, a neighborhood in which a majority are: [ranking widget, each item is ranked 1 - 6] 1) White, non-hispanic, 2) Hispanic or Latino, 3) Black of African American, 4) Asian American or Pacific Islander, 5) Native American or Native Hawaiian, 6) Middle Eastern or North African

**BLM Opposition (CMPS '16):** From what you have heard about the Black Lives Matter movement, do you strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose, or strongly oppose the Black Lives Matter movement activism? (rescaled between 0-1 so strongly oppose = maximum)

**BLM Opposition 1 (CMPS '20):** Based on everything you have heard or seen, how much do you support or oppose the Black Lives Matter movement? 1) Strongly support, 2)

Somewhat support, 3) Neither support nor oppose, 4) Somewhat oppose, 5) Strongly oppose (rescaled so strongly opposed = maximum, added with BLM Opposition 2 and rescaled between 0-1)

**BLM Opposition 2 (CMPS '20):** How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statements? Latinos have a responsibility to support the Black Lives Matter Movement. 1) Strongly agree, 2) Somewhat agree, 3) Neither agree nor disagree, 4) Somewhat disagree, 5) Strongly disagree (rescaled so strongly disagree = maximum, added with BLM Opposition 1 and rescaled between 0-1)

#### J.4.3 Outcome Item Justification

**Racial Resentment:** Racial resentment was developed to measure anti-Black racism after post-Civil Rights norms against explicit anti-Black prejudice, where whites may instead express anti-Black appraisals by derogating Black people's claims to government assistance to ameliorate discrimination (Kinder and Sears, 1981). Although some posit resentment reflects conservative individualist principles (Carmines et al., 2011), some research demonstrates the measure uniquely motivates policy preferences that help Black people and not other marginalized groups (Kinder et al., 1996; Kinder and Mendelberg, 2000; Rabinowitz et al., 2009; Kam and Burge, 2019). Additionally, other research demonstrates correcting for measurement differences between ideologues on the basis of political principles does not undercut resentment's explanatory power concerning pro-Black policy preferences (Enders, 2021). Moreover, although racial resentment may approximate some individualist principles, this does not obviate the scale's capacity to measure anti-Black attitudes from a *theoretical* perspective. Individualist tenets might be how whites cloak anti-Black prejudice (Bobo et al., 1997). Indeed, Enders (2021) finds white ideological self-identification is associated with resentment but not ideological principles (e.g. government spending preferences). Thus, resentful respondents may be concerned not with adherence to individualist tenets writ large, but Black adherence to individualist tenets (Simmons and Bobo, 2018).

Anti-Black Stereotype: This item is used in prior work as a component of explicit anti-Black prejudice scales, which measure antipathy on the basis of faulty and inflexible generalizations. Prior research shows this measure is associated with policy preferences that negatively affect Black people (e.g. draconian criminal justice policies) (Huddy and Feldman, 2009). Relative to *resentment*, this measure is also associated with anti-Black behavioral discrimination in dictator games (Peyton and Huber, 2021).

**Black Threat**: *Black threat* is the difference in two measures. The first asks respondents if Black people "support or threaten" their "vision of American society" on a 7 point scale from "strongly supports" to "strongly threatens." The second is the same replacing Black people with white people. Prior research suggests the perception Black people are a threat to the integrity of the nation may be concomitant with negative appraisals of Black people along with increased support for maintaining white political dominance (Giles and Evans, 1985). Indeed, the *Black threat* measure, but not perceived threat from Jews or Asians, is associated with *racial resentment* and *anti-Black stereotype* (Table J16).

White Residential Preference: White residential preference is the difference between white and Black neighborhoods on a 1-6 ranking asking respondents to rate what kinds of majority-group neighborhood they would prefer to live in.<sup>20</sup> Conjoint experiments show preferences for white over Black neighborhoods are driven by antipathy toward Black people, not in-group affinity, neighborhood quality, crime, and/or home values (Emerson et al., 2001; Krysan et al., 2009). I assess if anti-Black attitudes determine residential preferences net of neighborhood quality concerns. If quality and home value considerations trump antipathy toward Black people, then racial resentment and anti-Black stereotype should not

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup>The 6 choices were "white, non-Hispanic," "Hispanic or Latino," "Black or African-American," "Asian-American or Pacific Islander," "Native American or Native Hawaiian," "Middle Eastern or North African."

be correlated with *white residential preference* after adjusting for objective and subjective measures of respondent neighborhood quality. Assuming all individuals want to live in high quality neighborhoods, individuals living in low quality neighborhoods may be more inclined to live in a white relative to black neighborhood since white neighborhoods are perceptibly higher quality. I also adjust for Latinx identity importance and homeownership to rule out in-group affinity and home value concerns (assuming homeowners differentially care more about home values, see Fischel (2005)). By a significant margin, *Racial resentment* and *anti-Black stereotype* possess the strongest association with *white residential preference* after adjusting for neighborhood quality, in-group affinity, and homeownership measures (Figure J11), suggesting anti-Black attitudes motivate *white residential preference*.

**BLM Opposition:** Consistent with prior literature (Baker and Cook, 2005), I define "opposition to black political interests" as opposing social movements or policies that disparately benefit Black Americans materially, politically, socially, or otherwise. Often, Black people support these interests significantly more than whites (Kinder and Winter, 2001). Thus, I assess non-Black Latinx opposition to the most prominent contemporary pro-Black movement, Black Lives Matter (BLM). I focus on BLM opposition for several reasons. BLM opposition may be associated with opposition to a "bundle" of pro-Black interests. BLM is not just concerned with police violence, but several issues. The Movement for Black Lives, an umbrella organization connected to BLM and its local chapters, presented a detailed policy platform that "demands investments in the education, health, and safety of Black people, instead of investments in the criminalizing, caging, and harming of Black people." Indeed, although the CMPS surveys do not ask Latinxs about pro-Black policies, other research suggests BLM support is not merely symbolic, but associated with support for policies that facilitate Black welfare (Boudreau et al., 2022). Likewise, warmth toward BLM is associated with support for Black-targeted affirmative action and government aid among non-Blacks in the ANES (Figure ??). Moreover, evidence suggests BLM protests have ostensibly facilitated Black American welfare. BLM protests increased positive Black appraisals and support for reparations (Curtis, 2022), decreased police killings (Skov, 2021), increased anti-racist discussion (Dunivin et al., 2022), and increased Democratic vote share (Klein Teeselink and Melios, 2021). BLM opposition measures if respondents oppose BLM on a 5-point scale between "strongly support" and "strongly oppose" in the CMPS '16. In the CMPS '20, BLM opposition is an additive index of two items. The first asks respondents if they "strongly oppose" BLM relative to "strongly support" on a 5-point scale. The second asks respondents if they "strongly disagree" relative to "strongly agree" on a 5-point scale with the notion their ethno-racial group (Latinos) has a responsibility to support BLM.
#### J.4.4 Validating Black Threat Measure

	Racial Resentment (1)	Anti-Black Stereotype (2)
Black Threat	0.33***	0.41***
	(0.01)	(0.02)
Asian Threat	-0.04	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.04)
Jewish Threat	$-0.06^{**}$	$-0.07^{*}$
	(0.02)	(0.03)
$\mathbb{R}^2$	0.21	0.19
Ν	4016	4016

#### Table J16: The Black Threat Measure Proxies for Anti-Black Appraisals

\*\*\*p < 0.001, \*\*p < 0.01, \*p < 0.05. All covariates rescaled between 0-1. Data from the 2020 CMPS. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

#### J.4.5 Ruling Out Alternative Residential Preference Motivations



Figure J11: Anti-Black Attitudes Are More Strongly Associated With White Residential Preference than Alternative Motivations for White Residential Preference. The y-axis is the covariate, the x-axis is the coefficient. Estimates from a single regression model where *white residential preference* is the outcome. All covariates rescaled between 0-1. Data from the 2020 CMPS. 95% CIs displayed derived from robust standard errors.



#### J.4.6 Demonstrating Racial Polarization

**Figure J12: The Outcomes Are Racially Polarized**. The x-axis is the ethno-racial category, the y-axis is the outcome average for each ethno-racial category. Each panel is a different outcome. Positive y-axis values = anti-Black appraisal or opposition to Black political interests. All covariates rescaled between 0-1 with the exception of *anti-Black stereotype*, *residential preference*, and *black threat* outcomes.

#### J.4.7 Regression Table

Table J17: The threat of deportation undercuts	the maintenance or adoption of
anti-Black attitudes via acculturation among Lat	tinxs

	Racial Resentment	Anti-Black Stereotype	Black = Threat	Prefer White Residence	Oppose BLM	Oppose BLM
Acculturation x Threat	$-0.05^{*}$	$-0.11^{*}$	$-0.12^{**}$	$-0.24^{***}$	$-0.16^{***}$	$-0.13^{**}$
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Acculturation	-0.00	$-0.05^{*}$	-0.02	$-0.11^{*}$	$0.07^{*}$	-0.00
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Threat	-0.00	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.03
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
$\mathbb{R}^2$	0.45	0.19	0.22	0.20	0.31	0.29
Ν	4016	4016	4016	4016	3009	4016
Survey	CMPS '20	CMPS '20	CMPS '20	CMPS '20	CMPS'16	CMPS '20
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Υ	Y	Υ	Υ
Socio-Economic Controls	Υ	Y	Y	Y	Υ	Υ
Political Controls	Υ	Y	Y	Y	Υ	Y
Zipcode Controls	Υ	Y	Y	Y	Υ	Y
County Controls	Υ	Y	Υ	Y	Υ	Y
Census Area FE	Υ	Y	Y	Y	Υ	Y

Note: \*\*\*p < 0.001, \*\*p < 0.01, \*p < 0.05, †p < 0.1. All covariates rescaled between 0-1 for interpretability. Demographic covariates include: gender, skin color, age, marital status, catholic, national origin, having a Black spouse, the perceived proportion of one's neighborhood that is Black, the perceived proportion of one's church that is Black, and whether the respondent is a Black Latinx. Socio-economic covariates include: income, education, unemployment, homeownership, retrospective economic evaluations, personal economic evaluations, socio-tropic economic evaluations, Latinx economic evaluations. Political covariates include: experienced discrimination, perceived discrimination against Latinxs and Black people, partisanship, ideology, perceived political competition vis-a-vis Black people (measured by the difference in the extent to which Latinxs perceive Hispanic men or women congressional candidates will represent their interests minus perceptions Black men or women congressional candidates will represent their interests), Latino identity centrality, American identity centrality, political interest, Latinx linked fate, and belief in an immigrant work ethic. Geographic covariates include the logged total population (zip, county), % Latino (zip, county), % Black (zip, county), % foreign-born (zip, county), % unemployed (zip, county), logged median household income (zip, county), and objective economic competition measures between Black people and Latinxs (zip) (I measure objective economic competition by following the example of Gay (2006), where I interact the proportion of a respondent's zipcode population that is Black with the difference in poverty and education rates between Black people and Latinxs). I also adjust for deportation threat selection by controlling for knowing an undocumented friend and/or family member, knowing a deportee, the logged number of county-level Secure Communities deportations, and the rate of county-level Secure Communities deportations (deportations per 1,000 foreign-born). See Table J18 for control covariate availability by survey. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

#### J.4.8 Predicted Values



Figure J13: Predicted Values Demonstrating Deportation Threat (minimum/maximum, denoted by color) Undercuts the Adoption or Maintenance of Relatively Anti-Black Beliefs (y-axis) via Acculturation (x-axis) Among Non-Black Latinxs. Panels A-F characterize predicted values for the *resentment*, *stereotype*, *Black threat*, *residential preference*, *oppose BLM* (CMPS '16), *oppose BLM* (CMPS '20) outcomes. Dashed lines denote ethno-racial group means (Black = white, light grey = Black. 95% CIs from robust SEs displayed.

## J.4.9 Control Covariates By Survey

Control Covariate	CMPS '16 Availability	CMPS '20 Availability
Gender	1	1
Skin Color	1	1
Age	1	1
Married	1	1
Catholic	1	1
National Origin	1	1
Black Spouse	1	✓
Perceived NHood % Black	1	×
Perceived Church % Black	1	×
Income	1	1
Education	1	✓
Unemployed	1	✓
Homeownership	1	1
Retrospective Econ. Evaluations	1	×
Personal Econ. Evaluations	×	1
Socio-tropic Econ. Evaluations	×	1
Latinx Econ. Evaluations	×	1
Experienced Discrimination	1	1
Perceived Discrimination	1	1
Partisanship	1	1
Ideology	1	1
Perceived Political Competition	1	1
Latino Identity Centrality	1	1
American Identity Centrality	1	1
Political Interest	1	1
Latinx Linked Fate	1	1
Immigrant Work Ethic Beliefs	×	1
Total Population (Zipcode)	1	1
Total Population (County)	1	1
% Latino (Zipcode)	1	1
% Latino (County)	1	1
% Black (Zipcode)	1	1
% Black (County)	1	1
% Foreign-Born (Zipcode)	1	1
% Foreign-Born (County)	1	1
% Unemployed (Zipcode)	1	1
% Unemployed (County)	1	1
Median HH Income (Zipcode)	1	
Median HH Income (County)	1	
Black/Latino Economic Competition (Zipcode)	1	
Know Undocumented	- -	· /
Know Deportee	x	- -
SC Deportations (County)	1	- /
SC Deportation Rate (County)	1	· •

## Table J18: Included Control Covariates By Survey

# K Ruling out alternative mechanisms

Table K19: Adoption of Restrictive Immigration Preferences via Acculturation is Forestalled By Deportation Threat Net of Alternative Mechanisms.

	Open Immigration Policy Index						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
Acculturation x Threat	$0.13^{*}$	$0.16^{**}$	$0.13^{*}$	$0.09^{\dagger}$	$0.12^{*}$	$0.27^{**}$	
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.10)	
Acculturation x Experienced Discrim.	0.09	$-0.09^{\dagger}$	-0.01	0.07*	0.03	0.08	
Acculturation & Descrived Discrim	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.06)	
Acculturation x Ferceived Discrim.	-0.02 (0.01)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.01)			
Acculturation x Latino ID	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	0.18**	$0.19^{\dagger}$		
				(0.07)	(0.10)		
Acculturation x American ID				-0.08	-0.28***		
				(0.07)	(0.06)		
Acculturation x % Latino (Zip)		-0.00	-0.20	-0.01	0.07		
		(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.12)	(0.14)		
Acculturation x % Non-citizen (Zip)		0.10	0.26	-0.10	0.20		
		(0.24)	(0.23)	(0.16)	(0.19)		
Acculturation x % Latino (County)		0.04	0.15	0.02	-0.22		
Acculturation y % Non sitizon (County)		(0.20)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.17) 0.21		
Acculturation x 76 Non-Citizen (County)		-0.02 (0.14)	-0.18 (0.14)	(0.16)	(0.21)		
Acculturation x Ethnic Media		(0.14) 0.26 <sup>†</sup>	0.26*	(0.10) -0.09	(0.15)		
Recurrentation & Lennie Wedia		(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.07)			
Acculturation x WWII Cohort	$0.18^{*}$	-0.07	0.06	0.02	0.32**		
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.11)		
Acculturation x Mex/CA	0.01	0.01	-0.01	-0.04		0.01	
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)		(0.07)	
Acculturation x Income	-0.13	-0.07	-0.10	0.10	-0.01		
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.08)	4	
Acculturation x Education	0.07	-0.04	0.08	0.04	(0.15)	0.18	
Alttiltl	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.11)	
Acculturation x Unemployed	-0.04	0.04	-0.03	(0.07)	-0.04		
Acculturation x Know Deported	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	_0.19*	
Reculturation x Rhow Deported			(0.04)			(0.09)	
Acculturation x Know Undocumented			(010-)	-0.05		-0.01	
				(0.04)		(0.07)	
Acculturation x Immigration Stop			0.10	. ,		. ,	
			(0.07)				
Acculturation x Deportation Rate				-1.69	0.36		
				(1.35)	(1.41)		
Acculturation x $Log(Deportations + 1)$				0.16	-0.14		
Acculturation of 7 Level 2 Depentations				(0.08)	(0.10)		
Acculturation x 70 Level 5 Deportations				-0.27 (0.18)	(0.03)		
D <sup>2</sup>	0.15	0.04	0.05	(0.10)	(0.12)	0.10	
R <sup>2</sup>	0.17	0.34	0.35	0.26	0.35	0.10	
Num. obs.	1809	1622	1250	2270	1794	2427	
Survey	Pew '07	Pew '08	Pew '10	CMPS '16	Pew '18	Pew '19	
Demographic Controls		V	V	Y	V	Y	
a	Y	1			1		
Socio-Economic Controls	Y Y V	Y	Y	Ŷ	Y	Y	
Socio-Economic Controls Political Controls	Y Y Y N/A	Y Y Y	Y Y Y	Y Y Y	Y Y Y	Y Y N/A	
Socio-Economic Controls Political Controls County Controls Zincode Controls	Y Y N/A N/A	Y Y Y Y	Y Y Y Y	Y Y Y Y	Y Y Y Y	Y Y N/A N/A	
Socio-Economic Controls Political Controls County Controls Zipcode Controls Census Area FE	Y Y N/A N/A Y	Y Y Y Y N	Y Y Y Y N	Y Y Y Y N	Y Y Y Y Y N	Y Y N/A N/A Y	

Note: \*\*\*p < 0.001, \*\*p < 0.01, \*p < 0.05,  $\dagger p < 0.1$ . All covariates scaled between 0-1. All models are fully specified. Each column characterizes a different survey at use. Geographic covariates below the Census Area level are not available for the Pew 2007 and Pew 2019 surveys. Coefficients of interest are bold. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

# L Ruling out alternative ideological considerations

Table L20: Association Between Threat and Immigration-Irrelevant Outcomes (CMPS '16)

	Gay Marriage	Climate	Obamacare	Tax Rich	Voter ID	Liberalism Index	Immigration Index
Panel A: No Interaction	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Threat	0.08**	0.01	$0.05^{\dagger}$	-0.01	-0.03	-0.02	0.11***
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
$\mathbb{R}^2$	0.23	0.28	0.19	0.18	0.10	0.29	0.24
N	2276	2276	2276	2276	2276	2276	2276
Panel B: Interaction	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Threat x Acculturation	-0.08	-0.04	0.01	0.03	$-0.20^{***}$	-0.03	$0.09^{\dagger}$
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.23	0.28	0.19	0.18	0.11	0.29	0.25
Ν	2276	2276	2276	2276	2276	2276	2276
Liberalism Index Interactions	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Demographic Controls	Υ	Υ	Υ	Y	Y	Υ	Υ
Socio-Economic Controls	Υ	Υ	Y	Υ	Y	Y	Υ
Political Controls	Υ	Υ	Y	Υ	Y	Y	Υ
County Controls	Υ	Y	Y	Y	Υ	Y	Y
Zipcode Controls	Υ	Y	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ
State FE	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ

Note: \*\*\*p < 0.001, \*p < 0.01, \*p < 0.05, †p < 0.1. All covariates scaled between 0-1. Panel A displays the unconditional association between threat and immigration irrelevant outcomes. Panel B displays the association between the threat/acculturation interaction and immigration irrelevant outcomes. The first outcome is support for banning gay marriage. The second outcome is support for climate change legislation. The third outcome is support for Obamacare. The fourth outcome is support for taxing the rich. The fifth outcome is support for restrictive voter ID laws. The sixth outcome is an index of the immigration-irrelevant liberal policy outcomes. The seventh outcome is the liberal immigration policy index. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

#### M Ruling out reverse causality

Table M21: For Immigrant and Immigrant Citizen Latinxs, Immigration Preferences DO NOT Motivate Threat But Threat Motivates Immigration Preferences Between Two Time Periods Where Trump Implemented A Series of Anti-Immigrant Laws

	$\Delta$ Threat	Worry (W3)	Immigration Pref. (W3)	$\Delta$ Threat	Worry (W3)	Immigration Pref. (W3)
Immigration Pref. (W2)	-0.03	0.06	0.12	-0.04	0.07	0.30**
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.10)
Threat (W2)		$0.40^{***}$	0.23**		$0.41^{***}$	0.20*
		(0.05)	(0.07)		(0.07)	(0.10)
Sample	All	All	All	Citizen	Citizen	Citizen
$\mathbb{R}^2$	0.00	0.24	0.06	0.00	0.21	0.13
Ν	392	392	387	187	187	186

Note: \*\*\*p < 0.001, \*\*p < 0.01, \*p < 0.05. Data are from the 2016 Latino National Immigrant Election Survey (LINES). W2 denotes measurement of threat and immigration policy preferences during Wave 2 of the LINES (Nov '16-Jan '17) and W3 denotes measurement of threat and immigration policy preferences during wave 3 of the LINES (Jul '17-Sep '17). "Immigration Pref." is a scale measuring support for open immigration policy preferences. It is based on an item which asks respondents "Which comes closest to your view about what government policy should be toward unauthorized immigrants now living in the United States?" The respondent can choose 1 of 4 options: 1) Make all unauthorized immigrants felons and send them back to their home country, 2) Have a guest worker program that allows unauthorized immigrants to remain in the United States in order to work, but only for a limited amount of time, 3) Allow unauthorized immigrants to remain in the United States and eventually qualify for U.S. citizenship, but only if they meet certain requirements like paying back taxes and fines, learning English, and passing background checks, 4) 4. Allow unauthorized immigrants to remain in the United States and eventually qualify for U.S. citizenship, without penalties. The item is coded as a scale between 0-1 where the maximum is the 4th response and the minimum is the 1st response. Therefore, the maximum value for "immigration pref." is holding the most open view when it comes to immigration policy. Threat in the LINES is measured based on a survey item asking respondents: "How worried are you that a close friend or family member may be deported?" Respondents can respond on a 5-point likert scale from "extremely worried" to "not at all worried." This measure is rescaled between 0-1. Models 1-3 use the full Latinx immigrant sample from the LINES panel, Models 4-6 use relatively acculturated Latinx immigrants (e.g. citizens). " $\Delta$  Threat" is the difference in threat between Wave 3 and Wave 2 of the LINES. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

# N Accounting for nativism

#### N.1 Measuring nativism

For the Pew '07 survey, nativism is an index of two survey items. The first asks respondents to indicate whether "Illegal immigrants help the economy by providing low cost labor" or "Illegal immigrants hurt the economy by driving wages down" is closer to their view. This is measured as a binary indicator equal to 1 if they indicate illegal immigrants hurt the economy. The second item asks respondents to give their opinion on the effect of the growing number of undocumented immigrants on Latinos living in the U.S. They can say it is a "positive development," a "negative development," or "has had no impact one way or the other." This item is measured as a binary indicator equal to 1 if the respondent indicates undocumented immigration is a "negative development." The two binary indicators are added up to generate a nativism index.

For the Pew '08 survey, the nativism measure is built from a single item asking respondents whether they think "immigrants increase, reduce, or have no effect on crime in your community." The measure is a binary indicator equal to 1 if they indicate immigrants increase crime in their community.

For the Pew '10 survey, nativism is an additive index built from 3 items. The first asks respondents if they believe "immigrants strengthen our country because of their hard work and talents," "immigrants are a burden because they take our jobs, housing and health care," or "neither." It is measured as a binary indicator equal to 1 if they indicate "immigrants are a burden." The second asks respondents if they believe the effect of undocumented immigration on Latinos already living in the U.S. is "positive," "negative," or "has had no effect." The item is measured as a binary indicator equal to 1 if they indicate undocumented immigration's effect is "negative." The third item asks respondents if they believe one of the reasons immigrants come to the U.S. illegally is to have a child in the U.S. The measure is a binary indicator equal to 1 if they respondent is a binary indicator equal to 1 if they believe one of the reasons immigrants come to 1 if the respondent indicates "Yes."

For the CMPS '16 survey, the nativism measure is built from a single item asking respondents on a 4-point likert scale whether they agree "immigrants take jobs, housing and healthcare away from people born in the U.S."

#### N.2 First-order association

	Open Immigration Policy					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)		
Threat	0.08***	0.11***	0.06***	0.10***		
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)		
Nativism	$-0.23^{***}$	$-0.11^{***}$	$-0.16^{***}$	$-0.17^{***}$		
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)		
$\mathbb{R}^2$	0.21	0.33	0.35	0.28		
Ν	1809	1822	1236	2276		
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y		
Socio-Economic Controls	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ		
Political Controls	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ		
County Controls	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ		
Zipcode Controls	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ		
State FE	Ν	Υ	Υ	Υ		
Census Area FE	Υ	Ν	Ν	Ν		

Table N22:	Association Between	Threat and	Open Immi	gration Policy	Preferences
(Adjusting	for Nativism)				

Note: \*\*\*p < 0.001, \*\*p < 0.01, \*p < 0.05. All covariates scaled between 0-1. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

## N.3 Heterogeneity

	Open Immigration Policy						
Panel A: Full Sample	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)			
Threat x Acculturation	0.05	$0.17^{**}$	$0.12^{*}$	0.01			
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)			
Nativism x Acculturation	$-0.15^{\dagger}$	$-0.20^{**}$	-0.11	$-0.13^{*}$			
	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.06)			
Threat x Nativism	$0.14^{\dagger}$	0.00	0.11	0.20**			
	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.06)			
Acculturation	$-0.07^{*}$	$-0.16^{***}$	$-0.13^{**}$	0.05			
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)			
Threat	0.03	0.04	-0.01	0.05			
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)			
Nativism	$-0.20^{***}$	-0.03	$-0.15^{*}$	$-0.16^{**}$			
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.06)			
$\mathbb{R}^2$	0.22	0.35	0.37	0.30			
Ν	1809	1822	1236	2276			
Panel B: Mexicans Only	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)			
Threat x Acculturation	0.21***	$0.14^{*}$	0.20***	0.01			
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)			
Nativism x Acculturation	-0.03	$-0.22^{**}$	-0.11	$-0.18^{*}$			
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.08)			
Threat x Nativism	$0.23^{**}$	0.00	0.07	$0.20^{*}$			
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)			
Acculturation	$-0.13^{**}$	$-0.14^{**}$	$-0.15^{**}$	0.04			
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)			
Threat	-0.02	0.06	-0.03	0.06			
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.05)			
Nativism	$-0.30^{***}$	-0.03	-0.10	-0.12			
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)			
$\mathbb{R}^2$	0.25	0.36	0.38	0.33			
Ν	1196	1220	833	1498			
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Υ			
Socio-Economic Controls	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ			
Political Controls	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ			
County Controls	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ			
Zipcode Controls	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ			
State FE	Ν	Υ	Υ	Υ			
Census Area FE	Υ	Ν	Ν	Ν			

# Table N23: Association Between Threat and Open Immigration Policy Preferences (Adjusting for Nativism)

Note: \*\*\*p < 0.001, \*\*p < 0.01, \*p < 0.05. All covariates scaled between 0-1. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

# O Accounting for socio-tropic threat

#### 0.1 Measuring socio-tropic threat

The Pew '07 measure asks if respondents have observed "more efforts to discourage undocumented or illegal immigration" in their local community in the past year. The measure is converted to a binary indicator equal to 1 if they indicate "more efforts" instead of "no change" or "fewer efforts." The Pew '08 measure asks if respondents perceive there has been "an increase, decrease, or no change in the number of immigration enforcement actions around the country aimed at undocumented immigrants." The measure is converted to a binary indicator equal to 1 if a respondent indicates there has been an "increase."

#### O.2 Adjusting for socio-tropic threat

	Open Immigration Policy					
Personal Threat	0.09***	$0.05^{*}$	0.11***	0.03		
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)		
Socio-Tropic Threat	0.01	0.03	$0.03^{*}$	0.03		
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)		
Personal Threat x Acculturation		$0.12^{*}$		$0.20^{***}$		
		(0.06)		(0.06)		
Socio-tropic Threat x Acculturation		-0.06		0.01		
		(0.05)		(0.04)		
Survey	Pew '07	Pew '07	Pew '08	Pew '08		
$\mathbb{R}^2$	0.15	0.16	0.31	0.32		
Ν	1809	1809	1822	1822		
Demographic Controls	V	V	V	V		
	ľ	I	I	I		
Socio-Economic Controls	Y Y	Y Y	Y Y	Y Y		
Socio-Economic Controls Political Controls	Y Y Y	Y Y	Y Y	Y Y		
Socio-Economic Controls Political Controls County Controls	Y Y Y Y	Y Y Y Y	Y Y Y Y	Y Y Y Y		
Socio-Economic Controls Political Controls County Controls Zipcode Controls	Y Y Y Y Y	Y Y Y Y Y	Y Y Y Y Y	Y Y Y Y Y		

#### Table O24: Accounting for Sociotropic Threat

\*\*\*p < 0.001, \*\*p < 0.01, \*p < 0.05. All covariates scaled between 0-1. All models are fully specified. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

# P Using ordered logistic regression

#### P.1 First-order association

 Table P25: Replicating Unconditional Influence of Threat Using Ordered Logistic

 Regression

	Open Immigration Policy						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
Threat	0.65***	0.83***	0.68***	1.41***	1.17***	1.29***	
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.14)	(0.21)	
AIC	4851.63	5550.94	4710.40	4123.87	3465.04	1600.55	
BIC	4988.86	5781.69	4924.95	4380.89	3680.46	1722.23	
Log Likelihood	-2400.81	-2733.47	-2313.20	-2017.94	-1693.52	-779.28	
Deviance	4801.63	5466.94	4626.40	4035.87	3387.04	1626.11	
Ν	1789	1797	1222	2544	1851	2427	
Survey	Pew '07	Pew '08	Pew '10	CMPS '16	Pew '18	Pew '19	
Model	OLogit	OLogit	OLogit	OLogit	OLogit	Logit	
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Socio-Economic Controls	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ	Y	Υ	
Political Controls	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ	Y	Υ	
County Controls	N/A	Υ	Υ	Υ	Y	N/A	
Zipcode Controls	N/A	Υ	Υ	Υ	Y	N/A	
Census Area FE	Y	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ	Ý	

Note: \*\*\*p < 0.001, \*\*p < 0.01, \*p < 0.05. Census Area FE used to ensure identification.

## P.2 Heterogeneity

# Table P26: Replicating Conditional Influence of Threat Using Ordered Logistic Regression

	On an Investigation Delian							
	Open Immigration Policy							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)		
Threat x Acculturation	$0.94^{**}$	$1.25^{***}$	$1.58^{***}$	1.33***	$1.75^{***}$	$1.81^{***}$		
	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.37)	(0.32)	(0.35)	(0.55)		
Threat	0.32	$0.37^{*}$	-0.02	$0.65^{**}$	0.36	0.48		
	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.22)	(0.24)	(0.21)	(0.32)		
Acculturation	$-1.17^{***}$	$-1.45^{***}$	$-1.77^{***}$	$-0.64^{**}$	$-1.30^{***}$	$-1.11^{***}$		
	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.27)	(0.21)	(0.24)	(0.26)		
AIC	4844.66	5537.34	4693.48	4108.43	3441.76	1595.45		
BIC	4987.38	5773.58	4913.13	4371.29	3662.71	1722.92		
Log Likelihood	-2396.33	-2725.67	-2303.74	-2009.21	-1680.88	-775.72		
Deviance	4792.66	5451.34	4607.48	4018.43	3361.76	1615.02		
Ν	1789	1797	1222	2544	1851	2427		
Survey	Pew '07	Pew '08	Pew '10	CMPS '16	Pew '18	Pew '19		
Model	OLogit	OLogit	OLogit	OLogit	OLogit	Logit		
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		
Socio-Economic Controls	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ		
Political Controls	Y	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ		
County Controls	N/A	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ	N/A		
Zipcode Controls	N/A	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ	N/A		
Census Area FE	Y	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ	Ý		

Note: \*\*\*p < 0.001, \*p < 0.01, \*p < 0.05. Census Area FE used to ensure identification.

# **Q** Asian-American replication

 Table Q27: Replicating Influence of Deportation Threat among Asian-American

 Survey Sample

	Open Immigration Policy						
Threat	0.07	$0.11^{**}$	0.13**	0.12*			
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)			
Acculturation		$0.09^{**}$	$0.11^{**}$	$0.09^{**}$			
		(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)			
Threat x Acculturation			-0.14	-0.02			
			(0.10)	(0.10)			
$\mathbb{R}^2$	0.01	0.16	0.03	0.16			
Num. obs.	802	802	802	802			
Controls	Ν	Y	Ν	Y			

Note: \*\*\*p < 0.001, \*\*p < 0.01, \*p < 0.05. All models adjust for age, gender, national origin, education, and partisanship. Regression weights included to approximate the national Asian-American population. Robust standard errors in parentheses

Here, I present estimates characterizing the influence of deportation threat on liberal immigration policy preferences among a sample of Asian-Americans from the Pew 2013 Asian-American survey (N = 802). Liberal immigration policy preferences are an additive index of binary indicators capturing approval for 1) increasing the number of temporary work visas for agriculture and food industry workers, 2) not increasing enforcement of immigration laws at U.S. borders, 3) increasing the number of temporary work visas for highly skilled workers, 4) creating a pathway to citizenship for undocumented immigrants if they meet certain requirements, and 5) not decreasing legal immigration into the United States.

Deportation threat is the same as the measure used in the Pew Latino surveys. However, acculturation is measured differently. The Asian-American survey does not ask about whether parents are born in the United States. Therefore, I cannot identify Asian-Americans who are third-generation or more. I can only identify who is foreign-born. Moreover, I use an item measuring whether English is the only language spoken at home for the respondent as a stand-in for language-of-interview. I construct an additive index of citizenship status, whether the respondent is US-born, and whether the respondent speaks only English at home to measure acculturation.

In all estimates characterizing the influence of deportation threat using the 2013 Asian-American survey, I adjust for age, gender, national origin (binary indicators for Indian, Chinese, Filipino, and Japanese), education, and partisanship.

Table Q27 displays the unconditional and conditional association between deportation threat and liberal immigration policy preferences. After adjusting for control covariates, namely, acculturation, deportation threat is prognostic of liberal immigration policy preferences. These findings corroborate the first-order association displayed in the main text for Latinxs. However, deportation threat does not appear to have a stronger influence on motivating liberal immigration policy preferences among more acculturated Asian-Americans.

The absence of heterogeneous effects may be because acculturation appears to motivate *more liberal* attitudes among Asian-Americans. For Latinxs, deportation threat forestalls a process engendering conservative attitudes. However, for Asian-Americans, acculturation is not an intrinsically conservative process that must be forestalled by deportation threat. This interpretation of the null result begs the question: Why does acculturation generate liberal preferences among Asian-Americans but conservative preferences among Latinxs? Perhaps "forever foreigner" stereotypes along with potentially more visible phenotypical markers that serve as the basis for discrimination make it more difficult for integrated Asian-Americans to distance themselves politically from new immigrants (Zhou, 2004; Lee and Kye, 2016). Moreover, new Asian immigrant cohorts may be relatively conservative on immigration policy since they tend to be of a higher socio-economic status who migrated legally and therefore do not perceive a connection with other immigrants (Park, 2020). Prior evidence corroborates these theoretical insights, with more acculturated Asian-Americans being more likely to support liberal immigration policies and the Democratic party (Kuo et al., 2017; Park, 2020).

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