

# The Wages of *Latinidad*: How Immigration Enforcement Mitigates Anti-Black Assimilation

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## Abstract

Historic accounts posit immigrant ethnic groups adopt the anti-Black attitudes of their Anglo counterparts as they acculturate in the U.S. However, contemporary evidence suggests acculturated immigrant co-ethnics may not be more likely to possess anti-Black appraisals and opposite attitudes toward Black socio-political interests. Drawing from *reactive ethnicity* and *segmented assimilation* theory, we posit the threatening contemporary immigration enforcement context may undercut assimilation to Anglo anti-Black attitudes among Latinxs. Using two large nationally representative Latinx surveys, we demonstrate, relative to less acculturated Latinxs, acculturated Latinxs threatened by immigration enforcement adopt attitudes concerning Black people and Black political interests akin to Black people. Conversely, acculturated unthreatened Latinxs adopt or maintain attitudes closer to their Anglo counterparts. These findings demonstrate the extent of anti-Black assimilation among contemporary acculturated immigrant co-ethnics is conditional on the receptivity of the host society.

**Word Count:** 8998

# Introduction

Are non-Black Latinxs adopting the anti-Black beliefs of their Anglo counterparts as they acculturate? Historic accounts suggest previously racialized immigrant origin groups access psychic and material benefits of whiteness via acculturation by intensifying their derogation of Black Americans and adopting dominant group attitudes toward Black people (Warren and Twine, 1997; Ignatiev, 2012). However, contemporary evidence suggests members of the largest immigrant ethnic groups (i.e. Latinxs, Asians), are not more inclined to adopt anti-Black beliefs as they acculturate despite incentives to derogate Black Americans and exposure to anti-Black sending country ideologies (McClain et al., 2006; Ocampo and Flippen, 2021; Tokeshi, 2021).

We explain why some Latinxs are not adopting anti-Black beliefs while acculturating. We posit the contemporary threatening immigration enforcement context not only affects undocumented immigrants, but even well-acculturated Latinxs (e.g. third-generation, citizen, English-dominant). Consequently, borrowing from *reactive ethnicity* and *segmented assimilation* theory, we theorize acculturated non-Black Latinx co-ethnics threatened by immigration enforcement may feel excluded from the host society despite their integrative expectations, motivating rebuff against dominant group attitudes on Black people. Conversely, non-Black Latinx co-ethnics unconcerned with immigration enforcement may be increasingly inclined to adopt or maintain anti-Black attitudes via acculturation.

Our evidence from two representative Latinx surveys suggests perceptibly threatening immigration enforcement contexts undercut the adoption or maintenance of anti-Black appraisals and relative opposition to Black political interests as non-Black Latinxs acculturate. Conversely, non-Black Latinxs unthreatened by immigration enforcement adopt or maintain attitudes toward Black people and their political interests more similar to Anglo whites as they acculturate. Our findings operate net of well-established alternative mechanisms motivating pro-Black beliefs among acculturated Latinxs such as discrimination, Latinx linked fate, intergroup competition, skin color, and intergroup contact. In sum, acculturated non-

Black Latinxs react to perceptibly threatening immigration enforcement contexts by refusing to adopt quintessential dominant group attitudinal norms. But this process is segmented, since some Latinxs who do not feel host society rebuff continue to adopt dominant group attitudes concerning Black people via acculturation.

We provide nuance on how non-Black U.S. immigrants and their co-ethnics negotiate their standing vis-a-vis Black people. Compared to historic white ethnic immigrant groups, non-Black Latinxs, even acculturated ones, are potentially subject to a threatening interior immigration context. Consequently, we show anti-Black assimilation may not be guaranteed if non-Black Latinxs experience host society rebuff via immigration enforcement. These conclusions are important in light of increased discussions of anti-Blackness within the Latinx community in response to the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement along with open questions over whether ethno-racial demographic shifts will change overall beliefs toward Black people among the non-Black public (Corral, 2020; Beltrán, 2021).<sup>1</sup>

## Anti-Black Assimilation

*Straight line assimilation theory* posits acculturated immigrant group co-ethnics increasingly adopt dominant group attributes due to cultural exposure and motivations to attain socio-economic status while minimizing discrimination (Gordon, 1964; Alba and Nee, 2009). Indeed, prior research shows acculturated immigrant co-ethnics (e.g. citizens, later-generation, English-dominant) adopt the dominant group’s policy preferences (Branton, 2007), identity (Citrin and Sears, 2014), and immigration attitudes (Pedraza, 2014).

Likewise, relative to the less acculturated, acculturated non-Black U.S. immigrant co-ethnics may increasingly adopt or maintain anti-Black beliefs due to heightened host society exposure. Acculturated co-ethnics may increasingly interact with dominant group members with strong(er) anti-Black beliefs (Hjerm et al., 2018), integrate in relatively anti-Black dominant group social networks as they advance socio-economically (Lee and Bean, 2007), be

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<sup>1</sup>See Section A for evidence the salience of Anti-Blackness among Latinxs is increasing.

exposed to anti-Black media (Entman, 1990), and experience perceptibly negative interactions with Black Americans (Goldenberg and Saxe, 1996).

Moreover, acculturated non-Black co-ethnics may possess stronger anti-Black beliefs than less acculturated co-ethnics due to status-seeking. Psychologically, immigrant group members may derive self-esteem and group status by dissociating from and derogating Black Americans in an anti-Black society (Tajfel et al., 1979; Rochmes and Griffin, 2007). Materially, dissociation from Blackness may provide access to the benefits of whiteness and protection from the byproducts of anti-Blackness (e.g. integration in dominant group networks, less employment discrimination, protection from gratuitous policing) (Lee and Bean, 2007). Acculturated co-ethnics may be more likely to perceive themselves as rightful members of the national polity relative to the less acculturated. Thus, they may be particularly steadfast in the adoption of dominant anti-Black norms to credibly demonstrate they should be afforded a higher host society socio-political status (Warren and Twine, 1997; Roediger et al., 1999; Lee and Bean, 2007; Ignatiev, 2012; Pedraza, 2014).

History is replete with acculturated immigrant co-ethnics exhibiting anti-Black attitudes and behaviors to bolster social standing. During the Age of Mass Migration (1850-1914), Irish, Italian and Eastern European immigrant co-ethnics faced racialization and concomitant discrimination (Lee and Bean, 2007; LaGumina, 2017). However, their acculturated co-ethnics reconfigured their standing as “white” by adopting Anglo norms, shifting political alliances, socially distancing themselves from Black people, and partaking in anti-Black discrimination (Warren and Twine, 1997; Roediger et al., 1999; Lee and Bean, 2007; Ignatiev, 2012).

Anti-Black assimilation is not isolated to European groups. Acculturated Chinese, Arab, and Mexican-Americans during the early-to-mid 20th Century sought to redefine themselves as “white” in part by avoiding political alliances with Black people to ameliorate exposure to discrimination (Han, 2006; Rochmes and Griffin, 2007; Qutami, 2020). In the Latinx context, Felix Tijerina, president of the assimilationist League of Latin American Citizens

(1956-1960), infamously responded to pressure to cooperate with Black Americans in the struggle for civil rights by saying “Let the Negro fight his own battles (Behnken, 2011).” Likewise, contemporary survey evidence suggests attributes encouraging acculturation (e.g. US-born status) among Latinxs are associated with reduced support for Black Lives Matter (BLM) (Corral, 2020). Qualitative interviews also suggest Latinx immigrants experienced with living in the U.S. increasingly adopt hegemonic anti-Black beliefs and transmit them to new immigrants (Zamora, 2016).

Immigrants are not blank slates concerning anti-Black appraisals. Latinxs, the largest U.S. immigrant group, originate from anti-Black societies. Latin American countries espouse *mestizaje*, the notion racial mixture will shed the negative attributes of “undesirable” races (e.g. Black and indigenous) and decrease the salience of racial difference (Flores, 2021). *Mestizaje* informs institutional and social norms. Latin American governments implemented policies discriminating against people without or with little European ancestry (Hooker, 2005). They also pursued policies encouraging European immigration to “whiten” the population (*Blanquemento*) (Flores, 2021). Moreover, there is significant societal derogation of Black and indigenous Latin Americans in tandem with the propagation of color-blind beliefs (Patrinos, 2000). Societal and institutional marginalization has secondary consequences. Black and indigenous Latin Americans have worse life chances along multiple dimensions net of socio-economic status (Telles, 2014). Given Latinx immigrants and their acculturated co-ethnics originate from anti-Black societies, they may be predisposed to hold or adopt anti-Black beliefs via acculturation in the U.S.

## A Reactive Ethnicity Against Anti-Blackness

Although some evidence suggests acculturation is associated with anti-Black beliefs and opposition to Black political interests, other evidence complicates expectations. While acculturated contemporary immigrant group members might increase their social proximity to Anglo whites relative to less acculturated co-ethnics (e.g. intermarriage, white neighborhood

selection) (Yancey et al., 2003), they may not be more likely to adopt anti-Black appraisals (McClain et al., 2006; Ocampo and Flippen, 2021; Tokeshi, 2021). Moreover, prior evidence finds acculturated co-ethnics may not increasingly oppose Black political interests. For instance, relative to the less acculturated, acculturated Latinxs are *more likely* to support Black-targeted affirmative action and government aid (Sears and Savalei, 2006; Krupnikov and Piston, 2016). The competing evidence raises a puzzle. Why are some Latinxs, specifically non-Black Latinxs, not adopting anti-Black appraisals or attitudes opposing Black political interests as they acculturate? We answer the question with sociological insights.

*Segmented assimilation theory* posits socio-economic advancement among acculturated immigrant group co-ethnics is conditional on host country reception, intra-group social capital, and economic conditions (Portes and Zhou, 1993). Prior evidence suggests acculturated immigrant co-ethnics subject to unfavorable/favorable reception contexts tend to stagnate/progress socio-economically (Haller et al., 2011). *Reactive ethnicity theory* posits anti-immigrant environments may motivate acculturated co-ethnics to develop a politicized group consciousness that protects the in-group and dissociates from the dominant group’s (i.e. Anglo whites) political commitments (Rumbaut, 2008). Host society rebuff via discrimination shatters integrative expectations and undercuts the adoption of anti-immigrant beliefs akin to Anglos among acculturated Latinxs (Telles and Ortiz, 2008; Pedraza, 2014).

Immigration enforcement is a *salient* and *negative* aspect of the host society for Latinxs. Latinxs are 67% first or second-generation.<sup>2</sup> Thus, most Latinxs have direct connections to immigrants. 40% of Latinxs know an undocumented friend or family member. 30% of third-generation+ Latinxs, arguably acculturated, know an undocumented friend or family member (Figure B2, Panel A). Concomitantly, the undocumented population has grown from 3-12 million between 1993-2016 (Figure B2, Panel B). Over 70% of the undocumented are Latinx and they are highly integrated in Latinx communities.<sup>3</sup> 66% have lived in the U.S.

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<sup>2</sup><https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/09/24/the-ways-hispanics-describe-their-identity-vary-across-immigrant-generations/>

<sup>3</sup>See: [https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/deault/files/publications/mpi-unauthorized-immigrants-stablenumbers-changingorigins\\_final.pdf](https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/deault/files/publications/mpi-unauthorized-immigrants-stablenumbers-changingorigins_final.pdf)

over 10 years (Figure B2, Panel C). Immigration enforcement has also become increasingly draconian. Interior deportations increased 1400% since the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) (Figure C3). 90%+ of the deported are Latinx (Asad and Clair, 2018). IIRIRA also increased deportation risk for documented immigrants by increasing the conditions for nullifying permanent residency (Morawetz, 2000). At the same time, the racialization of Latinxs as “illegal” by political elites and Anglo whites has meant even acculturated Latinxs are subject to immigration enforcement (Massey and Pren, 2012). Notably, ICE wrongfully detained 3,500 Texas *citizens* between 2006-2017, 462 Rhode Island citizens over 10 years, and 420 Florida citizens between 2017-2019.<sup>4</sup>

The restrictive context has deleterious consequences on Latinxs. Immigration enforcement undermines health, child development, wages, social service uptake, education, and government trust. These consequences are not isolated to the undocumented, but even well-acculturated, later-generation, citizen, and English-dominant Latinxs given they are embedded in immigrant and/or mixed-status social networks (Amuedo-Dorantes, 2022).

In light of an unreceptive host society driven by an expansive immigration enforcement apparatus, we posit a sense of immigration enforcement threat may explain why acculturation is inconsistently associated with adopting anti-Black appraisals and relative opposition to Black political interests among non-Black Latinxs. A restrictive immigration context may be perceived by non-Black Latinxs as a referendum on the host society’s willingness to incorporate their ethnic group. The constraints immigration enforcement threat imposes on movement and socio-economic mobility may encourage non-Black Latinxs and their acculturated co-ethnics to “no longer believe in the promise of upward mobility through a prism of achievable whiteness” (Jones, 2012). Qualitative accounts suggest threatening immigration policies may motivate non-Black Latinxs to abandon the “American Dream” and perceive the U.S. as a xenophobic, racist, country (Jones, 2012; Zamora, 2018). Likewise, non-Black Latinxs threatened by immigration enforcement may question the valorization of

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<sup>4</sup><https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/12/opinion/iceraids.html>

whiteness since they may perceive Anglo whites facilitate policies that undercut immigrant rights (Jones, 2012). These feelings may be buttressed by anti-immigrant beliefs among Anglo whites (Pedraza, 2014), resulting in a rejection of dominant group norms.

Moreover, given immigration enforcement negatively affects Latinxs, perceptions of immigration enforcement threat may motivate a shared experience of marginalization with Black people. Consistent with the *Common In-Group Identity Model* (Gaertner et al., 1993), shared marginalization experiences can encourage cross-group support and political solidarity (Craig and Richeson, 2012), which may be buttressed by pro-immigrant attitudes among Black Americans (Carter et al., 2021).

Immigration enforcement threat may play an outsized role in undercutting the adoption of anti-Black appraisals and oppositional beliefs concerning Black socio-political interests among acculturated non-Black Latinxs (e.g. later-generation, citizen, English-dominant). Relative to unacculturated non-Black Latinxs, acculturated non-Black Latinxs may be hard-pressed to increasingly adopt anti-Black dominant group norms to demonstrate their integration in the host society (Yancey et al., 2003). However, acculturated non-Black Latinxs may be sensitive to threats that implicate their group since they possess expectations the host society would integrate them in light of their acculturated status (Pedraza, 2014). Immigration enforcement threat may shatter integrative expectations and motivate acculturated non-Black Latinxs to refuse the heightened adoption of anti-Black attitudes relative to unacculturated non-Black Latinxs as a means of assimilation. Conversely, unacculturated non-Black Latinxs (e.g. Spanish-dominant non-citizen immigrants) may not adopt pro-Black beliefs in response to immigration enforcement since their understanding of the U.S. as a “land of opportunity” relative to the home country may be positive even in light of anti-Black norms and a restrictive immigration context (Krupenkin, 2021). Another possibility is that unacculturated non-Black Latinxs may support Black Americans more than the acculturated regardless of immigration enforcement threat due to their shared sense of marginalization outside immigration enforcement policy (e.g. anti-immigrant rhetoric) (Corral, 2020).



In sum, consistent with *reactive ethnicity* and *segmented assimilation* theory, immigration enforcement threat may undercut the adoption of anti-Black dominant group norms as non-Black Latinxs acculturate. However, rebuff against anti-Black norms may be segmented. Non-Black Latinxs unconcerned with immigration enforcement may increasingly adopt or maintain anti-Black attitudes as they acculturate. Thus, **H1: Non-Black Latinxs *unthreatened/threatened* by immigration enforcement will either be *more/less likely* to adopt or maintain relatively anti-Black attitudes as they acculturate.**

## Data and Empirical Strategy

We test our hypothesis with two nationally representative Latinx surveys: the 2016 and 2020 Collaborative Multi-Racial Post-Election Survey (fielded 12/03/2016-02/15/2017 and 04/02/2021-08/25/2021). Both surveys are online, bilingual, and weighted to adult Latinx characteristics in the 2015 and 2019 1-year ACS for age, gender, education, nativity, and ancestry. Given non-Black Latinxs may be most likely to engage in anti-Black assimilation,<sup>5</sup> we exclude Black Latinxs from our analyses for a final  $N$  of 2538 and 3614.<sup>6</sup> When possible, we use Black Latinx (CMPS '16  $N = 471$ , CMPS '20  $N = 402$ ), white (CMPS '16  $N = 1213$ , CMPS '20  $N = 3002$ ), and Black non-Latinx (CMPS '16  $N = 3102$ , CMPS '20  $N = 4005$ ) samples to produce outcome benchmark values to compare with non-Black Latinxs along acculturation levels and exposure to immigration enforcement threat. We use two surveys to demonstrate our findings are replicable and not intrinsic to a particular temporal context or sample, at least between 2016-2020.

The CMPS is the best available to test the hypothesis. Large independent Latinx surveys with sufficient statistical power to assess heterogeneity along acculturation levels are rare. Major social science surveys do not include items on anti-Black attitudes, immigration

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<sup>5</sup>Only 1.2% of Latinxs self-identify as Black in the 2020 Census. However, our definition of “Black Latinx” is wider, since it allows for an “Afro-Latinx” identification.

<sup>6</sup>Black Latinxs 1) choose “Black” as one of their ethno-racial categories and/or 2) self-identify as “Afro-Latino/a” when asked if they are Afro-Latinx. We validate this measure by demonstrating it is associated with self-reported skin darkness and Black “street race” (Figure D4).

enforcement threat, and acculturation simultaneously. Moreover, the CMPS surveys also ask the same outcome items of whites and Black non-Latinxs, allowing us to demonstrate immigration enforcement threat motivates attitudes more similar to whites or Black people as non-Black Latinxs acculturate.

## Outcomes

We use two sets of outcomes. First, anti-Black appraisals from the CMPS '20. *Racial resentment* is an index of 4 5-point items between “agree strongly” to “disagree strongly.” These items ask if the respondent agrees Blacks should work without special favors, should try harder to be as well off as whites, disagrees discrimination makes upward mobility difficult for Blacks, and disagrees Blacks have gotten less than they deserve. *Resentment* was developed to measure anti-Black racism under norms against explicit anti-Black prejudice, where whites may instead express anti-Blackness by derogating Black people’s claims to government assistance (Kinder and Sears, 1981). Some posit *resentment* reflects conservative individualist principles (Carmines et al., 2011), but prior evidence shows the measure uniquely motivates policy preferences that help Black people and not other marginalized groups (Kinder and Mendelberg, 2000; Rabinowitz et al., 2009; Kam and Burge, 2019). Additionally, other research demonstrates correcting for measurement differences between ideologues on the basis of political principles does not undercut *resentment*’s explanatory power concerning pro-Black policy preferences (Enders, 2021). Moreover, individualist tenets might be how whites cloak anti-Black prejudice. Indeed, Enders (2021) finds white ideological self-identification is associated with *resentment* but not ideological principles (e.g. government spending preferences). Thus, resentful respondents may be concerned not with adherence to individualist tenets writ large, but Black adherence to individualist tenets (Simmons and Bobo, 2018).

*Anti-Black stereotype* is the difference between whether a respondent believes Blacks relative to whites are violent instead of peaceful on a 7-point scale. This item is used as a component of explicit anti-Black prejudice scales, which measure antipathy from faulty,

inflexible generalizations. This measure is associated with policy preferences negatively affecting Black people (Huddy and Feldman, 2009). Relative to *resentment*, *stereotype* is associated with anti-Black behavioral discrimination in dictator games (Peyton and Huber, 2021).

*Black threat* is the difference in two measures. The first asks respondents if Black people “support or threaten” their “vision of American society” on a 7-point scale from strongly “supports” to “threatens.” The second replaces Black with white people. The perception Black people threaten the nation may be concomitant with negative appraisals of Black people along with increased support for maintaining white political dominance (Giles and Evans, 1985). Indeed, *Black threat*, but not perceived threat from Jews or Asians, is associated with *resentment* and *stereotype* (Table S13).

*White residential preference* is the difference between white and Black neighborhoods on a 1-6 ranking asking respondents to rate what majority-group neighborhood they prefer to live in.<sup>7</sup> Conjoint experiments show white neighborhood preferences are driven by antipathy toward Black people, not ethnocentrism, neighborhood quality, crime, and/or home values (Emerson et al., 2001). We assess if anti-Black attitudes determine residential preferences net of neighborhood quality concerns. If quality and home value considerations trump anti-Blackness, *resentment* and *anti-Black stereotype* should not be correlated with *residential preference* after adjusting for objective and subjective measures of respondent neighborhood quality. Assuming individuals prefer high-quality neighborhoods, individuals living in low-quality neighborhoods may be more inclined to live in a white relative to Black neighborhood since white neighborhoods are perceptibly higher quality. We also adjust for Latinx identity importance and homeownership to rule out in-group affinity and home value concerns (assuming homeowners care more about home values (Fischel, 2005)). *Resentment* and *anti-Black stereotype* possess the strongest association with *white residential preference* after adjusting for neighborhood quality, in-group affinity, and homeownership (Figure S14),

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<sup>7</sup>The 6 choices were “white, non-Hispanic,” “Hispanic/Latino,” “Black/African-American,” “Asian-American or Pacific Islander,” “Native American,” “Middle Eastern or North African.”

suggesting anti-Black attitudes motivate *white residential preference*.

The second outcome set measures opposition to Black political interests. Consistent with prior literature (Baker and Cook, 2005), we define “opposition to Black interests” as opposing social movements or policies that disparately benefit Black Americans materially, politically, socially, or otherwise. Often, Black people support these interests more than whites (Sears and Savalei, 2006). Thus, we assess non-Black Latinx opposition to the most prominent contemporary pro-Black movement (BLM).

We focus on BLM opposition for several reasons. BLM opposition may be associated with opposition to a “bundle” of pro-Black interests. The Movement for Black Lives, an umbrella organization connected to BLM, presented a detailed policy platform that “demands investments in the education, health, and safety of Black people, instead of investments in the criminalizing, caging, and harming of Black people.” Indeed, although the CMPS does not ask Latinxs about pro-Black policies, BLM support is associated with support for policies facilitating Black welfare (Boudreau et al., 2022). Likewise, warmth toward BLM is associated with non-Black support for Black-targeted affirmative action and government aid (ANES, Figure S15). Moreover, BLM protests ostensibly facilitated Black welfare by increasing positive Black appraisals, support for reparations (Curtis, 2022), anti-racist discussion (Dunivin et al., 2022), and police restraint (Skoy, 2021).

*Oppose BLM* measures if respondents oppose BLM on a 5-point scale between “strongly support” and “strongly oppose” in the CMPS ’16. In the CMPS ’20, *Oppose BLM* is an additive index of two items. The first asks respondents if they “strongly oppose” BLM relative to “strongly support” on a 5-point scale. The second asks respondents if they “strongly disagree” relative to “strongly agree” on a 5-point scale that Latinos have a responsibility to support BLM. *BLM ineffective* measures if respondents believe BLM is ineffective at achieving its goals. In the CMPS ’16/’20, it is a 5-point scale from “not at all effective/very ineffective” to “very effective.” Although ineffectiveness perceptions are distinct from opposition, they are strongly correlated and perceived BLM effectiveness is politically

motivated (Corral, 2020).<sup>8</sup> *Anti-BLM FT* is a reverse coded 0-100 BLM feeling thermometer (CMPS '20). *No BLM Protest* is a binary indicator of self-reported non-participation in the 2020 BLM protests (CMPS '20). *No BLM protest* allows us to measure behavioral (non)commitments to BLM instead of expressive preferences. Although self-reported outcomes mean respondents may lie, protest participation is much lower than BLM support, suggesting protest non-participation is less driven by expressive preferences. *No BLM Support* is a binary indicator of self-reported non-support via social media (CMPS '20). For outcome wording, see Section O.

Outcomes are scaled between 0-1 except *Black threat* and *residential preference*, between -1-1 since they are difference measures. All outcomes are racially polarized. Black people hold weaker anti-Black appraisals and BLM opposition relative to whites. Non-Black Latinxs are in the middle (Figure E5). Even if our measures do not perfectly capture anti-Black attitudes, we can demonstrate immigration enforcement threat undercuts the adoption/maintenance of racialized attitudes akin to Anglos via acculturation while motivating attitudes akin to Black people.

## Measuring Acculturation

Acculturation is typically conceptualized as the adoption of dominant group attributes among immigrant group members.<sup>9</sup> Acculturation can occur across multiple dimensions, including political attitudes, cultural norms, socio-economic status, and social networks (Cueilar et al., 1995). Acculturation is also heterogenous within groups. Individual immigrant co-ethnics will acculturate at different paces and will adopt dominant norms along certain dimensions over others (Cruz et al., 2008). Some argue acculturative dimensions should be directly measured in surveys (Cabassa, 2003). This approach has shortcomings. First, acculturation scales concerning cultural norms, intermarriage, co-ethnic networks, socio-economic

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<sup>8</sup>Pearson's  $\rho$  between *opposition* and *ineffective* in the '16/'20 CMPS is 0.7/0.5, a moderate-to-strong correlation.

<sup>9</sup>However, acculturation may occur vis-a-vis non-dominant groups (e.g. Black Americans, see Portes and Zhou (1993)).

status, and political beliefs are time-intensive and not often available across multiple immigrant surveys (Cruz et al., 2008). Second, researchers may prefer an acculturation measure that does not directly capture specific assimilation dimensions since such dimensions may be an outcome of interest (e.g. anti-Black attitudes). Instead, researchers may seek acculturation measures that *encourage* assimilation yet allow for the absence of assimilation along specific dimensions among acculturated co-ethnics.

Consequently, we measure *acculturation* as an additive index of generational status (0 = 1st, 1 = 2nd, 2 = 3rd+ generation), English language-of-interview (0 = Spanish, 1 = English), and citizenship (0 = non-citizen, 1 = citizen). Thus, the index is from 0-4 (non-citizen Spanish-speaking immigrant to third-generation+ English-speaking citizen). The index is left-skewed. However, 478 and 888 Latinxs constitute the lower two levels of the index, sufficient for assessing *acculturation*'s influence along immigration enforcement threat levels (Figure F6). This proxy acculturation scale is advantageous since it measures factors that typically encourage adopting dominant group attitudes *yet do not guarantee adoption among all acculturated individuals*. Prior research demonstrates proxy acculturation scales indexing language-of-interview and generational status are reliably associated with specific assimilative dimensions such as language proficiency, cultural attachments, geographic integration, and ethnic identification (Cruz et al., 2008). Similar scales have been used in prior political science studies on Latinxs (Branton, 2007; Pedraza, 2014). Additionally, citizenship is a prerequisite to acculturation and is positively associated with civic integration, education, dominant language skills, and inter-ethnic contact (Liang, 1994; Yang, 1994).

We validate the index by demonstrating it is associated with multiple assimilation dimensions among non-Black Latinxs (Figure I8). Consistent with Gordon (1964), who characterizes 7 assimilation dimensions in their seminal text, the index is associated with a heightened/reduced sense of American/Latinx identity (Panels A-D, identification assimilation), reduced perceived/experienced discrimination (Panels E-H, reception assimilation), higher income/education, (Panels K-N, structural assimilation), living in neighborhoods with

less Latinxs, Black people, and immigrants (Panels Q-X, structural assimilation) and marrying whites (Panels I-J, marital assimilation). Therefore, *acculturation* reliably measures assimilation to dominant group attributes. These associations imply acculturated non-Black Latinxs may have high expectations the host society would incorporate them. Moreover, *acculturation* is not consistently associated with anti-Black beliefs, suggesting the possibility for heterogenous adoption of anti-Black beliefs as Latinxs acculturate (Figure H7). *Acculturation* is re-scaled between 0-1.

## Measuring Immigration Enforcement Threat

Immigration enforcement threat is measured from items asking respondents about perceived *deportation threat*. The CMPS '16 asks “how worried are you that people you know might be detained or deported for immigration reasons?” from “not at all worried” to “extremely worried” on a 5-point scale. The CMPS '20 asks the same on a 4-point scale from “not at all” to “a lot.” These items do not measure personal immigration enforcement exposure, but exposure via social ties. Given acculturated Latinxs are not necessarily directly exposed to immigration enforcement, this is an appropriate *deportation threat* measure. We rescale *threat* between 0-1 with 1 representing highest worry.

The measure captures the concept (Figure J9). Non-Black Latinxs who perceive *deportation threat* live in areas with more county-level Secure Communities deportations (Panels A-B), know undocumented friends or family (Panels C-D), know deportees (Panel E), and live in immigrant zipcodes (Panels F-I).

Given we are interested in assessing the heterogeneous influence of *acculturation* on anti-Black attitudes conditional on *deportation threat* levels, we demonstrate *threat* and *acculturation* are distinct. In the '16/'20 CMPS, *acculturation* is negatively correlated with *threat*, but the Pearson's  $\rho$  correlation is moderate-to-weak ( $-0.4/ -0.17$ ). In the CMPS '16/'20, 32%/24% of the most acculturated non-Black Latinxs are at least “somewhat” worried about people they know being detained or deported. Conversely, 30%/54% of the least accultur-

ated non-Black Latinxs are worried “not much” or “not at all.” In sum, sizable proportions of unacculturated/acculturated Latinxs do not/do experience *deportation threat*.

## Controls

In addition to using our understanding of the literature, we use a principled Google Scholar search criteria to find articles on Latinx attitudes toward Black people or their interests to identify controls.<sup>10</sup> Given the literature is relatively small, this search helped us identify a relatively large list of covariates that explain anti-Black beliefs or opposite attitudes toward Black interests among Latinxs (See Table L2 for a literature catalog).

To this end, we adjust for several covariates in addition to census area fixed effects that could jointly explain anti-Black attitudes, *threat*, and *acculturation*. Demographic covariates include: gender, skin color, age, marital status, Catholicism, national origin, Black spouse, perceived neighborhood % Black, perceived church % Black. Socio-economic covariates include: income, education, unemployment, homeownership, retrospective economic evaluations, personal economic evaluations, socio-tropic economic evaluations, Latinx economic evaluations. Political covariates include: experienced discrimination, perceived discrimination against Latinxs and Black people, partisanship, ideology, perceived political competition vis-a-vis Black people,<sup>11</sup> Latino identity centrality, American identity centrality, political interest, Latinx linked fate, and belief in an immigrant work ethic. Geographic covariates include the logged population (zip, county), % Latino (zip, county), % Black (zip, county), % foreign-born (zip, county), % unemployed (zip, county), logged median household income (zip, county), and objective economic competition measures between Black people and Latinxs (zip).<sup>12</sup> We also adjust for *deportation threat* selection by controlling for knowing un-

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<sup>10</sup>For more information on how we conducted this search, see Section K

<sup>11</sup>This is measured by the difference in the extent to which Latinxs perceive Hispanic men or women congressional candidates will represent their interests minus perceptions Black men or women congressional candidates will represent their interests.

<sup>12</sup>Our measure of objective economic competition follows the example of Gay (2006), where we interact the proportion of a respondent’s zipcode population that is Black with the difference in poverty and education rates between Black people and Latinxs.



documented friends/family, knowing a deportee, the logged county-level Secure Communities deportations, and the county-level Secure Communities deportation rate (deportations/1,000 foreign-born). See Table M3 for control covariate availability by survey.

For brevity, we do not discuss all controls. But we want to note we adjust for every, or at least a proxy of each, explanation for pro-Black beliefs among Latinxs specifically on Table L2. We want to highlight key controls that serve as prominent alternative explanations for anti/pro-Black Latinx beliefs. First, adjusting for perceived Latinx discrimination is critical since a prominent alternative explanation for pro-Black Latinx beliefs is that anti-Latinx marginalization generates commonality and cross-group support (Craig and Richeson, 2012). Second, we adjust for Latinx linked fate which prior literature establishes as an antecedent to pro-Black support (McClain et al., 2006). Third, we adjust for skin color, found to be associated with pro-Black Latinx beliefs (Wilkinson and Earle, 2013). Fourth, we condition on contextual measures capturing poor economic conditions (% unemployed, household income, at zip and county-level), which could serve as a basis for perceived economic competition with Black Americans and motivate anti-Black beliefs (Wilkinson, 2014).

## Estimation

We use a linear model to test **H1**:

$$Y_i = \gamma_g + \beta_1(acculturation_i \times threat_i) + \beta_2 acculturation_i + \beta_3 threat_i + \sum_{k=1}^k \beta_{k+3}^k X_{icz}^k + \varepsilon_i$$

$Y_i$  is an outcome of interest for respondent  $i$ ,  $\gamma_g$  are census area ( $g$ ) fixed effects, *acculturation* is the *acculturation* index, *threat* is the *deportation threat* scale, and  $\sum_{k=1}^k \beta_{k+3}^k X_{icz}^k$  are  $k$  control covariates at the respondent ( $i$ ), county ( $c$ ), and zipcode ( $z$ ) level. We run models with and without controls to demonstrate no suppression effects.

Since all covariates are rescaled between 0-1,  $\beta_1$ , the interaction coefficient for *acculturation* and *threat*, is a *second difference*.  $\beta_1$  characterizes the difference in the difference of going from the minimum to the maximum of *acculturation* among non-Black Latinxs with

the *highest threat level* and the difference of going from the minimum to the maximum of *acculturation* among non-Black Latinxs with the *lowest threat level*. If **H1** is true,  $\beta_1$  will be negative, suggesting *threat* is more strongly associated with reduced anti-Black attitudes among more acculturated non-Black Latinxs.

Our model-based design is ideal to test the hypothesis. Experimental designs pose several challenges. First, external validity and weak effects. *Threat* may be difficult to manipulate in short-term experimental settings since, for Latinxs, it is likely the result of predispositional pre-adult experiences rooted in strong social relationships with undocumented immigrants or national immigration policy (see Figure J9, Panels A, C-E), both cannot be randomized. The notion threat is a function of predispositional, pre-adult experiences among Latinxs is well-established in qualitative literature (Dreby, 2015). Consistent with the notion *threat* is predispositional, aggregate, cross-sectional, Pew Latino Survey data demonstrates *threat* is highly stable across three presidencies with different immigration policies (2007-2018, Figure N10, Panels A-B), with only one period being statistically different than the first period *threat* was recorded. Latino Immigrant National Survey panel data also demonstrates *threat* doesn't shift substantially between two time periods when Trump implemented anti-immigrant executive orders (banning sanctuary cities, the Muslim Ban, rolling back DAPA, see Figure N10, Panels C-D). Our own attempt to experimentally trigger *threat* among acculturated Latinxs in a survey failed (Section P), providing more support for the notion *threat* is predispositional. Second, ethics, experiments sufficiently powerful to generate *threat* may veer on unethical given the risk of traumatizing undocumented Latinxs, who occupy a marginalized societal position (Lahman et al., 2011). Third, feasibility. Our quantity of interest is an interaction with *acculturation*, a bundle of ascriptive characteristics that cannot be randomized like generational status. Even if we could cue *threat* experimentally, we would still be interested in a heterogenous effect subject to selection bias like a model-based design.

Additionally, evaluating variation in threatening/permissive immigration policies across geographic space using available surveys may be ineffective (e.g. assessing Secure Com-

**Table 1: Deportation Threat Undercuts the Maintenance of Anti-Black Appraisals via Acculturation**

	Resentment	Stereotype	Black Threat	White Residential Pref.
Acculturation x Threat	-0.05 <sup>†</sup> (0.03)	-0.13** (0.05)	-0.11** (0.04)	-0.28*** (0.08)
Acculturation	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.05 <sup>†</sup> (0.03)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.09* (0.04)
Threat	-0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	0.03 (0.05)
Survey	CMPS '20	CMPS '20	CMPS '20	CMPS '20
R <sup>2</sup>	0.46	0.20	0.23	0.18
N	3614	3614	3614	3614
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
County/Zip Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Census Area FE	Y	Y	Y	Y


Note: \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$ , <sup>†</sup> $p < 0.1$ . HC2 robust standard errors in parentheses.

munities' effect, see White (2016)). Repeated cross-section and/or panel data over time with large Latinx samples across acculturation levels and small geographies with consistently asked measures of anti-Black attitudes do not exist given survey research prioritizes nationally representative samples.

Consequently, we opt for a model-based approach that engages in a principled attempt to catalogue and adjust for preexisting explanations of Latinx pro-Black attitudes, rules out alternative explanations by adjusting for multiple interactions between acculturation and theoretically relevant explanations for Latinx pro-Black attitudes, and acknowledges our coefficient of interest cannot possess a definitively causal interpretation.

## Results

We find evidence supporting **H1** on anti-Black appraisals. The second difference of *threat* conditional on *acculturation* after covariate adjustment is negative and significant for the *racial resentment* ( $\beta_1 = -0.05$ ), *anti-Black stereotype* (-0.13), *Black threat* (-0.11), and *white residential preference* outcomes (-0.28), equivalent to 21%-53% of the outcome standard



**Figure 1: Predicted Values of Anti-Black Appraisals (y-axis) by Deportation Threat (min/max, denoted by color) and Acculturation (x-axis).** Panels A-D characterize predicted values for the *resentment*, *stereotype*, *Black threat*, and *residential preference* outcomes. Dashed lines denote ethno-racial group means (Black = white, dark grey = Black Latinx, light grey = non-Latinx Black. 95% CIs from HC2 robust SEs displayed.

deviations (see Table 1, see Table Q5 for results without controls).

Figure 1 characterizes these second differences with predicted values. For non-Black Latinxs at the lowest *threat* level, anti-Black appraisals either remain constant or decrease slightly as *acculturation* increases. However, for non-Black Latinxs at the highest *threat* level, *acculturation* is consistently and more strongly associated with lower anti-Black appraisals.

We find evidence for **H1** for outcomes on opposition to Black political interests. The second difference of *threat* conditional on acculturation is negative and significant for the *oppose BLM* (CMPS '16: -0.17, CMPS '20: -0.15), *BLM ineffective* (CMPS '16: -0.17, CMPS '20: -0.15), *anti-BLM FT* (-0.12), *BLM no protest* (-0.17), and *BLM no support* outcomes (-0.20), equivalent to 32%-59% of the outcome standard deviations (see Table 2, see Table Q6 for results without controls).

Figure 2 displays predicted values characterizing opposition to Black political interests along *threat* and *acculturation*. Unthreatened non-Black Latinxs increasingly oppose BLM and adopt attitudes more similar to Anglo whites as they acculturate. Conversely, threatened non-Black Latinxs increasingly support BLM as they acculturate and adopt attitudes more similar to Black people (Panel A, C). Unthreatened non-Black Latinxs increasingly believe BLM is ineffective and move attitudinally closer to Anglo whites as they acculturate. Threatened non-Black Latinxs instead maintain beliefs that BLM is effective similar to Black

**Table 2: Deportation Threat Undercuts Opposition to Black Political Interests via Acculturation**

	Oppose BLM	BLM Ineffective	Anti-BLM FT	Oppose BLM	BLM Ineffective	BLM No Protest	BLM No Support
Acculturation x Threat	-0.17** (0.05)	-0.17* (0.07)	-0.12 <sup>†</sup> (0.06)	-0.15** (0.05)	-0.14** (0.05)	-0.17** (0.06)	-0.20** (0.07)
Acculturation	0.08* (0.04)	0.16*** (0.05)	-0.03 (0.03)	0.04 <sup>†</sup> (0.02)	0.10*** (0.03)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.09*** (0.03)
Threat	0.03 (0.04)	-0.00 (0.06)	0.02 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.09* (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)
Survey	CMPS '16	CMPS '16	CMPS '20	CMPS '20	CMPS '20	CMPS '20	CMPS '20
R <sup>2</sup>	0.31	0.28	0.30	0.43	0.23	0.20	0.25
N	2538	2171	3614	3614	3614	3614	3614
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County/Zip Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Census Area FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Note: \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$ , <sup>†</sup> $p < 0.1$ . HC2 robust standard errors in parentheses.


people as they acculturate (Panels B, D).

The *anti-BLM FT*, *no BLM protest*, and *no BLM support* outcomes follow a similar pattern (Panels E-G). Unthreatened non-Black Latinxs maintain relative coldness toward BLM, lower BLM protest participation, and lower social media support for BLM akin to Anglos as they acculturate. Conversely, threatened non-Black Latinxs are increasingly warm toward BLM, participatory in BLM protests, and supportive of BLM at levels more akin to Black Latinxs and Black non-Latinxs as they acculturate.

In sum, consistent with **H1**, non-Black Latinxs unthreatened by immigration enforcement either adopt or maintain anti-Black attitudes proximate to Anglos as they acculturate. Yet, non-Black Latinxs threatened by immigration enforcement adopt attitudes toward Black people and their interests more similar to their Black counterparts as they acculturate.

## Alternative Explanations

We rule out several alternative explanations for why non-Black Latinxs adopt pro-Black attitudes via acculturation. 1) Impression management via acculturation. Acculturated Latinxs may be more knowledgeable on U.S. liberal racial norms and therefore more likely to support Black people (Goldenberg and Saxe, 1996). Prior research implies more educated accultur-



**Figure 2: Predicted Values of Black Interest Opposition by Deportation Threat and Acculturation.** Panels A, C are predicted values for the *oppose BLM* outcome. Panels B, D are the same for the *BLM ineffective* outcome. Panels E-G do the same for the *anti-BLM FT*, *no BLM protest*, and *BLM no support* outcomes. Dashed lines denote ethno-racial group means (Black = white, dark grey = Black Latinx, light grey = Black. 95% CIs from HC2 robust SEs displayed).

ated Latinxs should be more likely to adopt pro-Black attitudes given they are more capable of impression management (Sears and Savalei, 2006). 2) Discrimination, perceived discrimination motivates pro-Black beliefs and cross-group empathy due to shared marginalization experiences (Richeson and Craig, 2011; Sirin et al., 2016). 3) Linked Fate, Latinx linked fate is associated with positive Black appraisals (McClain et al., 2006; Wilkinson, 2014). 4) Skin Color, darker-skinned Latinxs may feel socially proximate to Black people (Wilkinson and Earle, 2013). 5) Intergroup Competition, acculturated non-Black Latinxs may increasingly adopt anti-Black attitudes if they feel they perceive economic/political competition with Black people (Bobo and Hutchings, 1996; Wilkinson, 2014). To account for these alternative explanations, we adjust for interactions between measures approximating these alternative explanations and *acculturation*. Adjusting for interactions between *acculturation* and 1) education, 2) perceived and experienced discrimination, 3) linked fate, 4) skin color,

and 5) intergroup competition does not change our conclusions. The interaction between *threat* and *acculturation* is still negative and significant at least at  $p < 0.10$  for 43/45 of the outcome/mechanism tests (Section R).

We also interact other alternative explanations with *acculturation*, an extreme test since it adjusts for differences among Latinxs along all possible alternative mechanisms *within* each *acculturation* level. In addition to the 5 aforementioned alternative mechanisms, we adjust for interactions between *acculturation* and measures of 1) intergroup contact (McClain et al., 2006), 2) political interest (to further rule out social desirability), 3) objective *threat* measures (e.g. knowing someone undocumented, exposure to Secure Communities deportations), 4) living in immigrant contexts, 5) American/Latinx identity (Gomez-Aguinaga et al., 2021), 6) partisanship, and 7) belief in immigrant work ethic (Wilkinson, 2014). With the exception of the *resentment* and *no BLM support* outcome, the *threat/acculturation* interaction is still significant and negative (Section R.2).

## Robustness Checks

Results do not change including Black Latinxs (Section S.4), or excluding Puerto Ricans, citizens ostensibly protected from deportation (Section S.5).

We show our findings are not due to secular conservative principles, but anti-Blackness. We conduct a falsification test by assessing the association between *threat* and the interaction between *threat* and *acculturation* with an ideology scale (Table S18, Columns 5-6), liberal policy preferences irrelevant to Black interests (Table S18, Columns 1-4), and both immigrant and protestant work ethic beliefs (Table S19). The associations are null.

Our findings could be due to generalized affinity toward marginalized groups. Thus, we assess the association between *threat*, and the *threat/acculturation* interaction, with outcomes characterizing negative attitudes toward women, Muslims, and LGBTQ+ adjusting for controls (Table S20). With one exception, we find statistically null associations. The null association between our independent variables and LGBTQ+ activism opposition suggests

our BLM opposition findings are not due to opposition to anti-systemic social movements, but *Black* social movements.

Given *acculturation* is a categorical index, there may be non-linear influences of *acculturation* conditional on *threat*. Re-estimating results using a factorized *acculturation* scale demonstrates non-Black Latinxs from “higher” acculturation categories are more likely to hold pro-Black beliefs conditional on *threat*, suggesting limited non-linear *acculturation* influence (Tables S21, S22).

Our estimates are not sensitive to *acculturation* measurement choice. We re-estimate our results interacting the index components with *threat* (i.e. generational status, English interview language, citizenship). We also re-estimate our results using an index excluding the citizenship indicator. Coefficients characterizing these interactions are consistently negative and statistically significant (Table S23).

Self-reported BLM protest (non)participation may be motivated by social desirability instead of actual participation. We cannot fully rule out social desirability, but self-reported participation is associated with objective protest participation intensity within a respondent’s county, increasing confidence respondents actually participated (Figure S16).

## Conclusion

Historic accounts and straight line assimilation theory suggest immigrant group members increasingly derogate Black people and oppose their interests as they acculturate. However, other research finds acculturation is not associated with the adoption or maintenance of anti-Black beliefs. Our findings explain the puzzle of relatively pro-Black beliefs among acculturated Latinxs, members of the *largest* contemporary U.S. immigrant group. We show threatening reception contexts, in the form of a uniquely expansive immigration enforcement apparatus, undercut the prospect of anti-Black assimilation.

Our findings are important in light of the growing Latinx population in addition to increased attention to anti-Blackness within the Latinx community. Prior research posits



demographic shifts that reduce the relative position of Anglo whites do not necessarily mean the non-Black public will increasingly support Black people. Some raise concerns acculturation may result in social distancing from Black people along with sustained opposition to Black political interests among Latinxs, with long term ramifications for undercutting anti-Black racism (Yancey et al., 2003; Alba, 2020). These concerns are valid, but insights from *reactive ethnicity* and *segmented assimilation* theory suggest Latinxs may possess different assimilative trajectories on anti-Black beliefs. A key contribution inherent to this paper is that we demonstrate some otherwise acculturated Latinxs will not follow the path of historic immigrant group members in light of exposure to host society rebuff.

This paper has some limitations. First, pro-Black attitudes may not reflect behavioral commitments. Although the protest (non)participation outcome slightly mitigates this concern, respondents could still lie about participation. Future research should evaluate the association between *acculturation*, *threat*, and more externally valid anti-Black behavior (e.g. dictator games). Second, generalizability. Although Latinxs are the largest U.S. immigrant group, Asian and Black immigrant groups are growing. We focus on Latinxs to ensure theoretical precision given immigrant group differences and because Latinxs are disparately exposed to immigration enforcement. However, our theory can travel to other groups. Future research should assess if rebuff intrinsic to other non-white groups undercuts the adoption of attitudes toward Black people similar to Anglos. Third, this paper cannot further disaggregate Latinxs beyond the third+ generation. Perhaps *threat* matters for third-generation Latinxs, but not fourth generation Latinxs or beyond. Future research should develop more precise *acculturation* measures in addition to re-testing the theory as the immigrant Latinx population proportion declines.<sup>13</sup> Fourth, this paper does not evaluate other political outcomes that should be evaluated in future research, such as cross-group Latinx support for Black political candidates or specific pro-Black policies (Benjamin, 2017).

Finally, we are not optimistic about the implications of our findings for solidarity between

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<sup>13</sup>See: <https://www.pewresearch.org/hispanic/2015/09/15/the-impact-of-slowing-immigration-foreign-born-diverse-origins>

non-Black Latinxs and Black people. Perceived immigration enforcement threat decreases with acculturation. Thus, in the long-run, the most acculturated Latinxs will be less implicated by immigration enforcement. Additionally, our findings rest on a sustained restrictive immigration context. If immigration policy becomes open, commitments to Black people and their interests among acculturated non-Black Latinxs may become weaker.

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# Appendices

## Contents

A The Salience of Anti-Blackness Within Latinx Communities is Increasing	3
B Illegality and Latinxs	5
C Interior Deportations Over Time	6
D Validating Black Latinx Indicator	6
E Demonstrating Racial Polarization	7
F Acculturation Distributions	8
G Demonstrating English Interview = English Dominance Proxy	8
H Acculturation Is Not Consistently Associated With Anti-Black Beliefs	9
I Acculturation Index Measures Assimilation	10
J Validating Deportation Threat	11
K Identifying Articles Via Google Scholar	12
L Control Covariates Identified in Preexisting Research on Latinx Attitudes Toward Black People	13
M Control Covariates by Survey	14
N Threat Over Time	15
O Key Survey Items	16

O.1	Deportation Threat . . . . .	16
O.2	Outcomes . . . . .	16
<b>P</b>	<b>Failure of Experimental Manipulation</b>	<b>18</b>
P.1	Design Details and Results . . . . .	18
P.2	Experimental Treatments . . . . .	19
P.2.1	Control . . . . .	19
P.2.2	Treatment . . . . .	20
P.3	Balance Tests . . . . .	21
<b>Q</b>	<b>Regression Tables</b>	<b>22</b>
Q.1	Anti-Black Appraisal Outcomes . . . . .	22
Q.2	Opposition to Black Interests Outcome . . . . .	23
<b>R</b>	<b>Ruling Out Alternative Mechanisms</b>	<b>24</b>
R.1	Established Mechanisms . . . . .	24
R.2	Accounting For All Mechanisms Simultaneously . . . . .	28
<b>S</b>	<b>Robustness Checks</b>	<b>29</b>
S.1	Ruling Out Alternative Residential Preference Motivations . . . . .	29
S.2	Validating <i>Black Threat</i> Measure . . . . .	30
S.3	Validating BLM Thermometer Measure . . . . .	30
S.4	Including Black Latinxs . . . . .	31
S.5	Excluding Puerto Ricans . . . . .	32
S.6	Ruling Out Secular Liberalism . . . . .	33
S.7	Ruling out “Conservative Principles” . . . . .	34
S.8	Ruling Out Secular Support For Marginalized Groups . . . . .	35
S.9	Factorizing Acculturation Scale . . . . .	37
S.10	Alternative Acculturation Specifications . . . . .	38

S.11 Validating BLM Protest Measure . . . . .	39
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
## A The Salience of Anti-Blackness Within Latinx Communities is Increasing

**Mediacloud Data:** Digital media articles that include the following search terms: (antiblack AND "latino") OR (antiblackness AND "latino") OR (anti-black AND "latino") OR (anti-blackness AND "latino")

**Google Scholar Data:** Google scholar academic articles that include the following terms: ("anti-blackness" AND "latinos") OR("anti-black" AND "latinos")


**YouTube Data (Pero Like):** Cumulative views of video, "What Afro-Latinos Want You To Know," a video on anti-Black discrimination within Latino communities by the "Pero Like" channel, with 1.3 million current subscribers (as of April 2022). Data on historic views from Wayback Machine.

**YouTube Data (The Grapevine):** Cumulative views of video, "THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE BLACK AND LATIN X COMMUNITY," a video on Black and Latinx relations by "The Grapevine" channel, with 201,000 current subscribers (as of April 2022). Data on historic views from Wayback Machine.




**Figure A1: The Salience of Anti-Blackness In Latinx Communities is Increasing.** Panel A characterizes the count of daily digital articles between 2011-2022 (x-axis) that includes terms related to anti-Blackness and Latinos (y-axis). Data are from Mediocloud. Panel B characterizes the number of Google Scholar hits that include terms related to anti-Blackness and Latinos (y-axis) at the yearly level (x-axis) between 2000-2021. Panel C characterizes the cumulative number of YouTube views of the video titled “What Afro-Latinos Want You To Know” (y-axis) over time (x-axis) using Wayback Machine data. Panel D characterizes the cumulative number of YouTube views of the video titled “THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE BLACK AND LATIN X COMMUNITY” (y-axis) over time (x-axis) using Wayback Machine data.

## B Illegality and Latinxs




**Figure B2: The Undocumented Population is Integrated in the Latinx Community.** Panel A displays the proportion of different Latinx subsamples (x-axis) who know an undocumented friend or family member (y-axis) (CMPS data). Panel B displays the size of the undocumented population (y-axis, in millions) between 1990-2017 (x-axis). Panel C displays the proportion of the undocumented population that has lived in the United States over 10 years (y-axis) over time between 1995-2017 (x-axis). Panel D displays the median number of years an undocumented immigrant has lived in the United States (y-axis) over time between 1995-2017 (x-axis). Data from Panels B-D are from the Pew Research Center.

## C Interior Deportations Over Time



**Figure C3: Interior Deportations (y-axis) Over Time (x-axis).** Data from Department of Homeland Security


## D Validating Black Latinx Indicator



**Figure D4: The Black Latinx Indicator Is Theoretically Sound.** The x-axis is the coefficient, the y-axis is the covariate. Panels A and B use '16 and '20 CMPS data (all Latinxs). The outcome is the Black Latinx indicator. Skin color = self-reported skin color darkness. Each panel characterizes an independent regression model. Black street race = self-reported perceived race by others on the street. All covariates rescaled between 0-1. 95% CIs displayed from HC2 robust SEs.




## E Demonstrating Racial Polarization



**Figure E5: The Outcomes Are Racially Polarized.** The x-axis is the ethno-racial category, the y-axis is the outcome average for each ethno-racial category. Each panel is a different outcome. Positive y-axis values = anti-Black appraisal or opposition to Black political interests. *BLM ineffective* is not available for whites in the CMPS '16. All covariates rescaled between 0-1 with the exception of *anti-Black stereotype*, *residential preference*, and *black threat* outcomes.

## F Acculturation Distributions



**Figure F6: Acculturation Index Distribution.** The x-axis is the acculturation index value, the y-axis is the number of Latinx respondents at each acculturation index value. Panels A and B use data from the '16 and '20 CMPS.

## G Demonstrating English Interview = English Dominance Proxy

**Table G1: English Interview Indicator Proxies for English Dominance**

English Dominance	
English Interview	0.30*** (0.01)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.39
N	2989

Note: \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$ . Data from the 2019 Pew Latino Survey. All covariates rescaled between 0-1. HC2 robust standard errors in parentheses.

The English dominance index is an additive index of the following items in the 2019 Pew Latino Survey:


How well, if at all, would you say you can carry on a conversation in SPANISH, both understanding and speaking? 1) Very well, 2) Pretty Well 3) Just a little, 4) Not at all [Max = Not at all]

How well, if at all, would you say you can read a newspaper or book in SPANISH? 1) Very well, 2) Pretty Well 3) Just a little, 4) Not at all [Max = Not at all]

How well, if at all, would you say you can carry on a conversation in ENGLISH, both understanding and speaking? 1) Very well, 2) Pretty Well 3) Just a little, 4) Not at all [Max = Very well]


How well, if at all, would you say you can read a newspaper or book in ENGLISH? 1) Very well, 2) Pretty Well 3) Just a little, 4) Not at all [Max = Very well]

# H Acculturation Is Not Consistently Associated With Anti-Black Beliefs




**Figure H7: Acculturation Is Not Consistently Associated With the Adoption of Anti-Black Appraisals Nor Attitudes Opposing Black Political Interests Among Non-Black Latinxs.** The x-axis is the acculturation scale we outline in Section . The y-axis is the predicted level of agreement with an anti-Black appraisal or opposition to Black political interests. Each panel is a separate outcome. Survey at use denoted on panel title. All covariates rescaled between 0-1 (with the exception of *anti-Black stereotype*, *Black threat*, and *white residence* between -1-1). All predicted values are from a bivariate regression. 95% CIs displayed derived from HC2 robust standard errors.

# I Acculturation Index Measures Assimilation



**Figure I8: The Acculturation Index is Associated With Several Dimensions of Assimilation.** Each panel denotes a separate outcome (survey) at use. The x-axis is the acculturation scale. The y-axis is the predicted value of the outcome at use. Respondents in these analyses are non-Black Latinxs. All covariates rescaled between 0-1. 95% CIs displayed.

## J Validating Deportation Threat



**Figure J9: Covariates That Should Motivate a Sense of *Deportation Threat* are Associated With The Deportation Threat Measure.** Each panel denotes a separate independent variable (survey) at use. The x-axis is the the independent variable denoted by the panel title. The y-axis is the predicted value of *deportation threat*. Respondents in these analyses are non-Black Latinxs. All covariates rescaled between 0-1. 95% CIs displayed.

## K Identifying Articles Via Google Scholar

We use a principled Google Scholar search strategy to find articles that identify variables that motivate higher appraisals of Black people and higher levels of support for Black socio-political interests among Latinxs.

First, we conduct three distinct searches on Google Scholar. The following searches are:

1. (race AND attitudes AND latino) OR (race AND attitudes AND hispanic)
2. (anti-black AND latino) OR (anti-black AND hispanic)
3. (black AND latino AND relations) OR (black AND latino AND relations)

Second, we look at articles that correspond to the first 20 pages of each search.

Third, we identify any paper that is about Latinx support for Black people's political interests and/or Latinx attitudes on Black people.

Fourth, we identify any factors that determine higher or lower support for Black people's political interests and/or higher or lower appraisals of Black people among Latinxs.

# L Control Covariates Identified in Preexisting Research on Latinx Attitudes Toward Black People

**Table L2: Prior Explanations for Positive Attitudes Toward Black People and Their Political Interests Among Latinxs Specifically**

Explanation	Direction	Specific Outcome(s)	Papers(s)
Latino Linked Fate	+	Black/Latinx Commonality	Wilkinson (2014) and Gomez-Aguinaga et al. (2021)
	–	Negative Black Appraisals	McClain et al. (2006)
	+	Support For Black-Targeted Aid	Sears and Savalei (2006)
	+	Support For Black-Targeted Affirmative Action	Sears and Savalei (2006)
	+	Perceived Anti-Black Discrimination	Hurwitz et al. (2015)
Latino Identity	+	Black/Latinx Commonality	Kaufmann (2003) and Gomez-Aguinaga et al. (2021)
	+	Black Affirmative Action Support	Salinas (2020)
Neighborhood Latino	% +	Anti-Black Stereotypes	Eric Oliver and Wong (2003)
Income Political Interest	+	Affirmative Action Support	Elizondo and Crosby (2004)
	+	Racial Resentment	Rhodes et al. (2017)
	+	Black/Latinx Commonality	Gomez-Aguinaga et al. (2021)
General Contact	+	Anti-Black Prejudice	Van Laar et al. (2005)
Neighborhood Contact	+	Black Neighborhood Pref.	Charles (2007)
	–	Black School Pref.	Fairlie (2002)
Friendship Contact	+	Perceived Black/Latinx Commonality	Wilkinson (2014)
Afro-Latinx ID	+	Perceived Black Commonality	Nicholson et al. (2005)
Skin Tone	+	Perceived Black/Latinx Commonality	Chavez-Dueñas et al. (2014) and Wilkinson (2014)
	–	Perceived Black/Latinx Commonality	Wilkinson (2014)
Economic Threat	+	Perceived Black/Latinx Competition	Fairlie (2002)
	–	Black Candidate Support	Kaufmann (2003)
Political Competition Discrimination	+	Perceived Black/Latinx Commonality	Sanchez (2008) and Wilkinson (2014)
	–	Negative Black Appraisals	Craig and Richeson (2012)
	+	Black Candidate Support	Adida et al. (2016)
	+	Black-Targeted Aid	Sears and Savalei (2006)
	+	Black-Targeted Affirmative Action	Sears and Savalei (2006)
	+	Generalized Anti-Black Beliefs	Wilkinson (2014)


# M Control Covariates by Survey

**Table M3: Included Control Covariates By Survey**

Control Covariate	CMPS '16 Availability	CMPS '20 Availability
Gender	✓	✓
Skin Color	✓	✓
Age	✓	✓
Married	✓	✓
Catholic	✓	✓
National Origin	✓	✓
Black Spouse	✓	✓
Perceived NHood % Black	✓	✗
Perceived Church % Black	✓	✗
Income	✓	✓
Education	✓	✓
Unemployed	✓	✓
Homeownership	✓	✓
Retrospective Econ. Evaluations	✓	✗
Personal Econ. Evaluations	✗	✓
Socio-tropic Econ. Evaluations	✗	✓
Latinx Econ. Evaluations	✗	✓
Experienced Discrimination	✓	✓
Perceived Discrimination	✓	✓
Partisanship	✓	✓
Ideology	✓	✓
Perceived Political Competition	✓	✓
Latino Identity Centrality	✓	✓
American Identity Centrality	✓	✓
Political Interest	✓	✓
Latinx Linked Fate	✓	✓
Immigrant Work Ethic Beliefs	✗	✓
Total Population (Zipcode)	✓	✓
Total Population (County)	✓	✓
% Latino (Zipcode)	✓	✓
% Latino (County)	✓	✓
% Black (Zipcode)	✓	✓
% Black (County)	✓	✓
% Foreign-Born (Zipcode)	✓	✓
% Foreign-Born (County)	✓	✓
% Unemployed (Zipcode)	✓	✓
% Unemployed (County)	✓	✓
Median HH Income (Zipcode)	✓	✓
Median HH Income (County)	✓	✓
Black/Latino Economic Competition (Zipcode)	✓	✓
Know Undocumented	✓	✓
Know Deportee	✗	✓
SC Deportations (County)	✓	✓
SC Deportation Rate (County)	✓	✓



## N Threat Over Time



**Figure N10: Deportation Threat is Relatively Stable Over Time.** Panel A displays levels of self-reported *deportation threat* in the '07, '08, '10, '13, and '18 Pew Latino Surveys. Panel B characterizes period effects for the level of *threat* in the '08, '10, '13, and '18 Pew Latino Surveys relative to the '07 Pew Latino survey. Panel C displays self-reported *threat* in the Nov '16-Jan '17 and Jul '17-Sep '17 waves of the Latino National Immigrant Survey (LINES) Panel. Annotation denotes Jul '17-Sep '17 period effect, which is near zero. Panel D is the Pearson's  $\rho$  correlation coefficient (y-axis) for *threat*, ideology, and partisanship (x-axis) between the Nov '16-Jan '17 and Jul '17-Sep '17 LINES waves. Although test-retest reliability is seemingly low for *threat*, it is *relatively* high given the 6 month gap between waves and the fact *threat* is similar in reliability to ideology and approaches the reliability of partisanship, two measures that are understood as stable in preexisting literature. All covariates rescaled between 0-1. 95% CIs displayed derived from HC2 robust standard errors.

In the Pew Latino surveys, *deportation threat* is measured using the following 4-point likert scale, rescaled from 0-1 such that “a lot” is the maximum and “not at all” is the minimum: Regardless of your own immigration or citizenship status, how much, if at all, do you worry that you, a family member, or a close friend could be deported? Would you say that you 1) worry a lot, 2) some, 3) not much, or 4) not at all?. In the LINES, *threat* is measured using the following 5-point likert scale, rescaled from 0-1 such that “extremely worried” is the maximum and “not at all worried” is the minimum: How worried are you that a close friend or family member may be deported? 1) Extremely worried, 2) very worried, 3) moderately worried, 4) a little worried, 5) or not at all worried

## O Key Survey Items

### O.1 Deportation Threat

**Deportation Threat (CMPS '16):** How worried are you that people you know might be detained or deported for immigration reasons? 1) Extremely worried, 2) Very worried, 3) Somewhat worried, 4) A little worried, 5) Not at all worried (Coded between 0-1, where maximum = extremely worried)

**Deportation Threat (CMPS '20):** How worried, if at all, are you that someone you know could be detained or deported for immigration reasons? 1) A lot, 2) Some, 3) Not much, 4) Not at all (Coded between 0-1, where maximum = a lot)

### O.2 Outcomes

**Racial Resentment (CMPS '20):** Do you [agree strongly, agree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly / disagree strongly, disagree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, agree somewhat, or agree strongly] with this statement?

- Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors (agree strongly = maximum).
- Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for Blacks to work their way out of the lower class (disagree strongly = maximum).
- Over the past few years, Blacks have gotten less than they deserve. (disagree strongly = maximum)
- It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if Blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as Whites (agree strongly = maximum, all items added up in additive scale)

**Anti-Black Stereotype (CMPS '20):** We're going to show you a seven-point scale on which the characteristics of the people in a group can be rated. In the first statement a score of '1' means that you think almost all of the people in that group tend to be 'peaceful.' A score of '7' means that you think most people in the group are 'violent.' A score of '4' means that you think that most people in the group are not closer to one end or the other, and of course, you may choose any number in between. Slide widget displayed from 1 = peaceful to 7 = violent. Where would you rate Blacks in general on this scale? (Differenced from the same question but where the question is asked about whites.)

**Black Threat (CMPS '20):** Here is a list of groups in society. For each group, please indicate if you think they support or threaten your vision of American society; Black people. 1) Strongly supports, 2) Supports, 3) Supports a little, 4) Neither supports nor threatens, 5) Threatens a little, 6) Threatens, 7) Strongly threatens. (Rescaled between 0-1 where maximum = strongly threatens).

**White Residential Preference (CMPS '20):** If you could live anywhere, in any type of community, please rank from 1 (top choice) to 6 (last choice) the racial or ethnic make up of the neighborhood you would prefer. While it might be somewhat mixed, a neighborhood in which a majority are: [ranking widget, each item is ranked 1 – 6] 1) White, non-hispanic, 2) Hispanic or Latino, 3) Black or African American, 4) Asian American or Pacific Islander, 5) Native American or Native Hawaiian, 6) Middle Eastern or North African

**BLM Opposition (CMPS '16):** From what you have heard about the Black Lives Matter movement, do you strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose, or strongly oppose the Black Lives Matter movement activism? (rescaled between 0-1 so strongly oppose = maximum)

**BLM Ineffective (CMPS '16):** How effective do you think the Black Lives Matter movement will be in helping Blacks achieve equality in this country—very effective, somewhat effective, not too effective or not at all effective? (rescaled between 0-1 to not at all effective = maximum)

**BLM Opposition 1 (CMPS '20):** Based on everything you have heard or seen, how much do you support or oppose the Black Lives Matter movement? 1) Strongly support, 2) Somewhat support, 3) Neither support nor oppose, 4) Somewhat oppose, 5) Strongly oppose (rescaled so strongly opposed = maximum, added with BLM Opposition 2 and rescaled between 0-1)

**BLM Opposition 2 (CMPS '20):** How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statements? Latinos have a responsibility to support the Black Lives Matter Movement. 1) Strongly agree, 2) Somewhat agree, 3) Neither agree nor disagree, 4) Somewhat disagree, 5) Strongly disagree (rescaled so strongly disagree = maximum, added with BLM Opposition 1 and rescaled between 0-1)

**BLM Ineffective (CMPS '20):** Regardless of your own participation in such events, how effective do you think protests and demonstrations are in bringing change on each of the following issues: Support for Black Lives. 1) Very effective, 2) Somewhat effective, 3) Neither effective nor ineffective, 4) Somewhat ineffective, 5) Very ineffective. (Rescaled between 0-1 so very effective = maximum)

**No BLM Protest (CMPS '20):** Over the past year, did you participate in a Black Lives Matter protest or a protest against police brutality? 1) Yes, 2) No (Coded where 1 = No)

**No BLM Support (CMPS '20):** Thinking about the issue of police violence and the Black Lives Matter movement, besides attending an event, did you ever engage on social media, Facebook, Twitter, Instagram or other websites either in support of BLM, in support of police, or to discuss the issue in general? (Allow multiple) 1) No, I did not engage online on this issue at all, 2) Yes, I engaged in support of BLM, 3) Yes, I engaged in support of police, 4) Yes, I engaged in general on the issue (Coded where 1 = did not indicate “engaged in support of BLM”)

# P Failure of Experimental Manipulation

## P.1 Design Details and Results

Table P4: An Experimental Manipulation of Threat Failed

	Threat
Threat Treatment	-0.05 (0.04)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.11
N	276

Note: \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$ . Model includes pre-treatment covariate adjustment for age, woman, foreign-born, Mexican national origin, income, Democratic partisanship, Republican partisanship, and ideology. The results do not change excluding covariates. These results are excluded for brevity. All covariates rescaled between 0-1.

To assess if survey experimental interventions could cue a sense of *deportation threat* among acculturated Latinxs, we ran a two-arm survey experiment on Latinx undergraduates from a large West Coast public university ( $N = 276$ ) in Spring 2021.<sup>14</sup> This sample is of particular interest given it is a highly acculturated sample. For example, the sample is mostly U.S.-born (82%), higher than the U.S.-born proportion in the national Latinx population (66%). Since the theory in the main text is primarily concerned with how threat undercuts the adoption of anti-Black attitudes among acculturated Latinxs, the experiment serves as an effective theoretical test case for whether survey experimental cues could generate a sense of *deportation threat* among acculturated Latinxs.

Prior to treatment, we asked respondents about their demographic, socio-economic, and political attributes. We adjust for these pre-treatment covariates (age, woman, foreign-born, Mexican national origin, income, partisanship, and ideology).<sup>15</sup> We randomly expose respondents to either a control or treatment vignette. The control vignette is a news story concerning the threat of alcoholism to undergraduate student performance (Figure P11). The treatment vignette is a news story concerning the threat of immigration enforcement, including the threat of immigration enforcement agencies operating on college campuses (Figure P12). We discuss the threat of immigration enforcement operating on college campuses to more strongly cue a sense of deportation threat among the sample, which is composed of undergraduate students. We attempted to keep the control and treatment vignettes similar in length, sentence structure, threatening descriptions in order to isolate the effects of inducing threat from immigration enforcement as opposed to a generalized sense of threat.

Post-treatment, respondents were asked a “manipulation check” question. This item is similar to the *deportation threat* measures in the main text. The item asks “Regardless of your own immigration or citizenship status, how worried or unworried are you that you, a family member, or a close friend could be deported?” The respondent can respond with 7 responses on a scale from “very worried” to “very unworried.” We rescale the item from 0-1 where the maximum is “very worried.” Table P4 displays the effect of the treatment vignette meant to cue *deportation threat* on the self-reported deportation threat item. The effect of the threatening treatment on the manipulation check item is nearly 0 and incorrectly signed. This suggests that the absence of a treatment effect is not simply a function of limited statistical power in light of our small sample size. This also suggests that survey experimental cues may be too weak to generate a sense of *deportation threat* among acculturated Latinxs, consistent with our theory that *threat* is very difficult to shift since it is a function of large policy changes and strong social ties with undocumented immigrants, not short-term experimental cues.

<sup>14</sup>The study was approved by the (REDACTED FOR SUBMISSION) Institutional Review Board (IRB # (REDACTED FOR SUBMISSION))

<sup>15</sup>Balance tests demonstrate there is limited statistically significant covariate imbalance between respondents in the treatment and control conditions. There is only imbalance on ideology, which we adjust for, in addition to all other covariates (see Figure P13).

## P.2 Experimental Treatments

### P.2.1 Control

#### Reports Uncover Growing Risk of Alcoholism Among College Students

- *Associated Press (AP)*



Photo Credit: Matthew Vaughn

WASHINGTON (AP)— Nearly every college student has been impacted by alcohol use during their academic career – even if they have never drank themselves. For instance, a person can witness a friend’s drinking pattern worsening over time, gradually taking over their life.

Excessive alcohol consumption can take a toll on a student’s academics. Drinking may even become a priority over attending classes, completing homework and studying for exams. An estimated one in every four college students admit to having poor grades or other academic problems because of their drinking behavior.

College students who participate in frequent drinking activities are also more likely to develop a dependency on alcohol later in life. Although alcoholism typically results from years of drinking, it can also happen during periods of heavy and frequent drinking during college. Bad drinking habits in college can evolve into other issues, like alcoholism, in the future.

Figure P11: Control Condition Vignette.

## P.2.2 Treatment

### **Reports Uncover Growing Risk of Immigration Customs & Enforcement Officers Detaining College Students**

- *Associated Press (AP)*



Photo Credit: Matthew Vaughn


WASHINGTON (AP) – While many hoped for change under the Biden administration, recent reports reveal many of the wide-reaching Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) policies for deporting immigrants remain. ICE officers are being encouraged to cast a wide net in finding immigrants, investigating family members, and even friends of immigrants. The vast majority of immigrants detained and deported are Latino, constituting over 95% of removals.

Among these policies include partnerships with universities & increased ICE presence on college campuses. ICE has been increasingly focusing its efforts on targeting college students, in particular with sting operations such as the University of Farmington where ICE created a fake university to lure students into arrest for visa fraud.

Many of these operations, while allegedly targeting undocumented immigrants, detained and deported thousands of legal residents and hundreds of U.S citizens. Not only are immigrant students at risk but any Latino person ICE officers may suspect of being an immigrant. Reporters uncovered several stories of U.S Latino students being detained by ICE despite their U.S citizenship. Even those who provided legal documentation proving the contrary were arrested for suspicion of falsifying documents.

**Figure P12: Treatment Condition Vignette.**

### P.3 Balance Tests



**Figure P13: Balance Between Treatment and Control Conditions in Experiment.** X-axis is the coefficient for the treatment condition. The y-axis is the covariate. Each estimate is from a separate regression model where the left hand side is the balance covariate and the right hand side is the experimental treatment. All covariates rescaled between 0-1. 95% CIs displayed derived from HC2 robust standard errors.

## Q Regression Tables

### Q.1 Anti-Black Appraisal Outcomes

**Table Q5: Deportation Threat Undercuts the Maintenance of Relative Anti-Black Appraisals via Acculturation Among Non-Black Latinxs**

	Racial Resentment	Stereotype	Black = Threat	White Residential Pref.
<b>Panel A: No Controls</b>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Acculturation x Threat	−0.16*** (0.03)	−0.22*** (0.05)	−0.20*** (0.05)	−0.42*** (0.08)
Acculturation	−0.01 (0.02)	−0.06* (0.02)	−0.03 (0.02)	−0.04 (0.04)
Threat	−0.03 <sup>†</sup> (0.02)	0.01 (0.03)	−0.04 (0.03)	−0.05 (0.05)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.06
N	3614	3614	3614	3614
<b>Panel B: Yes Controls</b>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Acculturation x Threat	−0.05 <sup>†</sup> (0.03)	−0.13** (0.05)	−0.11** (0.04)	−0.28*** (0.08)
Acculturation	−0.01 (0.02)	−0.05 <sup>†</sup> (0.03)	−0.02 (0.02)	−0.09* (0.04)
Threat	−0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	0.03 (0.05)
Survey	CMPS '20	CMPS '20	CMPS '20	CMPS '20
R <sup>2</sup>	0.46	0.20	0.23	0.18
N	3614	3614	3614	3614
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Zipcode Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Census Area FE	Y	Y	Y	Y

Note: \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$ , <sup>†</sup> $p < 0.1$ . Panel A characterizes coefficient estimates without adjusting for control covariates. Panel B characterizes coefficient estimates after adjusting for demographic, socio-economic, political, and contextual covariates in addition to census area fixed effects. All covariates rescaled between 0-1 for interpretability. HC2 robust standard errors in parentheses.



## Q.2 Opposition to Black Interests Outcome

**Table Q6: Deportation That Undercuts Opposition to Black Political Interests via Acculturation Among Non-Black Latinxs**

	Oppose BLM	BLM Ineffective	Anti-BLM FT	Oppose BLM	BLM Ineffective	BLM No Protest	BLM No Support
<b>Panel A: No Controls</b>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Acculturation x Threat	-0.17** (0.05)	-0.26*** (0.08)	-0.26*** (0.05)	-0.26*** (0.04)	-0.20*** (0.04)	-0.22*** (0.05)	-0.30*** (0.05)
Acculturation	0.05 (0.03)	0.21*** (0.04)	0.01 (0.03)	0.07** (0.02)	0.15*** (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	-0.05* (0.02)
Threat	-0.12** (0.04)	-0.05 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.08** (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.11** (0.03)	-0.10** (0.03)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.08	0.11	0.04	0.09	0.05	0.07	0.07
N	2538	2171	3614	3614	3614	3614	3614
<b>Panel B: Yes Controls</b>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Acculturation x Threat	-0.17** (0.05)	-0.17* (0.07)	-0.12 <sup>†</sup> (0.06)	-0.15** (0.05)	-0.14** (0.05)	-0.17** (0.06)	-0.20** (0.07)
Acculturation	0.08* (0.04)	0.16*** (0.05)	-0.03 (0.03)	0.04 <sup>†</sup> (0.02)	0.10*** (0.03)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.09*** (0.03)
Threat	0.03 (0.04)	-0.00 (0.06)	0.02 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.09* (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)
Survey	CMPS '16	CMPS '16	CMPS '20	CMPS '20	CMPS '20	CMPS '20	CMPS '20
R <sup>2</sup>	0.31	0.28	0.30	0.43	0.23	0.20	0.25
N	2538	2171	3614	3614	3614	3614	3614
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Zipcode Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Census Area FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Note: \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$ , <sup>†</sup> $p < 0.1$ . Panel A characterizes coefficient estimates without adjusting for control covariates. Panel B characterizes coefficient estimates after adjusting for demographic, socio-economic, political, and contextual covariates in addition to census area fixed effects. All covariates rescaled between 0-1. HC2 robust standard errors in parentheses.

## R Ruling Out Alternative Mechanisms

### R.1 Established Mechanisms

Here we present tables characterizing coefficients of the *acculturation* and *threat* interaction for our outcomes of interest including adjustments to account for alternative mechanisms. Each mechanism/outcome category adds additional covariate interactions with *acculturation* to the model in addition to the full set of control covariates that we explicate in the main text. Bolded lines in the table characterize the coefficients of interest (that is, the interaction between *threat* and *acculturation*).

**Table R7: Threat Undercuts The Adoption of or Maintenance of Anti-Black Beliefs As Non-Black Latinxs Acculturate Net of Established Alternative Mechanisms (Part 1)**

Dataset	Outcome	Mechanism	Name	Coef.	SE	pval
<b>CMPS '16</b>	<b>Oppose BLM</b>	<b>Social Desirability</b>	<b>Acculturation x Threat</b>	<b>-0.175</b>	<b>0.055</b>	<b>0.001</b>
CMPS '16	Oppose BLM	Social Desirability	Acculturation x Education	-0.041	0.083	0.624
<b>CMPS '16</b>	<b>BLM Ineffective</b>	<b>Social Desirability</b>	<b>Acculturation x Threat</b>	<b>-0.181</b>	<b>0.072</b>	<b>0.012</b>
CMPS '16	BLM Ineffective	Social Desirability	Acculturation x Education	-0.093	0.106	0.380
<b>CMPS '16</b>	<b>Oppose BLM</b>	<b>Discrimination</b>	<b>Acculturation x Threat</b>	<b>-0.108</b>	<b>0.058</b>	<b>0.061</b>
CMPS '16	Oppose BLM	Discrimination	Acculturation x Perceived Discrim.	-0.079	0.086	0.360
CMPS '16	Oppose BLM	Discrimination	Acculturation x Experienced Discrim.	-0.112	0.043	0.009
<b>CMPS '16</b>	<b>BLM Ineffective</b>	<b>Discrimination</b>	<b>Acculturation x Threat</b>	<b>-0.137</b>	<b>0.079</b>	<b>0.083</b>
CMPS '16	BLM Ineffective	Discrimination	Acculturation x Perceived Discrim.	-0.055	0.113	0.630
CMPS '16	BLM Ineffective	Discrimination	Acculturation x Experienced Discrim.	-0.060	0.055	0.275
<b>CMPS '16</b>	<b>Oppose BLM</b>	<b>Linked Fate</b>	<b>Acculturation x Threat</b>	<b>-0.149</b>	<b>0.055</b>	<b>0.007</b>
CMPS '16	Oppose BLM	Linked Fate	Acculturation x Linked Fate	-0.073	0.043	0.090
<b>CMPS '16</b>	<b>BLM Ineffective</b>	<b>Linked Fate</b>	<b>Acculturation x Threat</b>	<b>-0.157</b>	<b>0.077</b>	<b>0.043</b>
CMPS '16	BLM Ineffective	Linked Fate	Acculturation x Linked Fate	-0.045	0.060	0.456
<b>CMPS '16</b>	<b>Oppose BLM</b>	<b>Skin Color</b>	<b>Acculturation x Threat</b>	<b>-0.170</b>	<b>0.054</b>	<b>0.002</b>
CMPS '16	Oppose BLM	Skin Color	Acculturation x Skin Color	-0.071	0.085	0.407
<b>CMPS '16</b>	<b>BLM Ineffective</b>	<b>Skin Color</b>	<b>Acculturation x Threat</b>	<b>-0.166</b>	<b>0.074</b>	<b>0.026</b>
CMPS '16	BLM Ineffective	Skin Color	Acculturation x Skin Color	-0.127	0.122	0.300
<b>CMPS '16</b>	<b>Oppose BLM</b>	<b>Intergroup Competition</b>	<b>Acculturation x Threat</b>	<b>-0.160</b>	<b>0.056</b>	<b>0.004</b>
CMPS '16	Oppose BLM	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Income	0.148	0.092	0.109
CMPS '16	Oppose BLM	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Income (Refused)	-0.017	0.062	0.782
CMPS '16	Oppose BLM	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Unemployed	-0.082	0.052	0.114
CMPS '16	Oppose BLM	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Retro. Econ Worse	0.037	0.043	0.387
CMPS '16	Oppose BLM	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x % Unemployed (Zip)	-0.001	0.008	0.947
CMPS '16	Oppose BLM	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x % Unemployed (County)	0.016	0.269	0.952
CMPS '16	Oppose BLM	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Political Competition	0.114	0.086	0.185
CMPS '16	Oppose BLM	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Latinx College Advantage	1.179	1.089	0.279
CMPS '16	Oppose BLM	Intergroup Competition	Latinx Poverty Advantage	0.469	1.821	0.797
<b>CMPS '16</b>	<b>BLM Ineffective</b>	<b>Intergroup Competition</b>	<b>Acculturation x Threat</b>	<b>-0.163</b>	<b>0.077</b>	<b>0.033</b>
CMPS '16	BLM Ineffective	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Income	0.007	0.125	0.958
CMPS '16	BLM Ineffective	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Income (Refused)	-0.042	0.069	0.547
CMPS '16	BLM Ineffective	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Unemployed	-0.131	0.082	0.111
CMPS '16	BLM Ineffective	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Retro. Econ Worse	0.046	0.058	0.432
CMPS '16	BLM Ineffective	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x % Unemployed (Zip)	0.007	0.009	0.455
CMPS '16	BLM Ineffective	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x % Unemployed (County)	-0.494	0.326	0.129
CMPS '16	BLM Ineffective	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Political Competition	0.182	0.115	0.115
CMPS '16	BLM Ineffective	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Latinx College Advantage	-1.952	1.375	0.156
CMPS '16	BLM Ineffective	Intergroup Competition	Latinx Poverty Advantage	3.085	2.062	0.135

**Table R8: Threat Undercuts The Adoption of or Maintenance of Anti-Black Beliefs As Non-Black Latinxs Acculturate Net of Established Alternative Mechanisms (Part 2)**

Dataset	Outcome	Mechanism	Name	Coef.	SE	pval
CMPS '20	<b>Racial Resentment</b>	<b>Social Desirability</b>	<b>Acculturation x Threat</b>	<b>-0.048</b>	<b>0.028</b>	<b>0.091</b>
CMPS '20	Racial Resentment	Social Desirability	Acculturation x Education	-0.022	0.038	0.566
CMPS '20	<b>Stereotype</b>	<b>Social Desirability</b>	<b>Acculturation x Threat</b>	<b>-0.124</b>	<b>0.047</b>	<b>0.009</b>
CMPS '20	Stereotype	Social Desirability	Acculturation x Education	0.112	0.061	0.064
CMPS '20	<b>Black Threat</b>	<b>Social Desirability</b>	<b>Acculturation x Threat</b>	<b>-0.124</b>	<b>0.044</b>	<b>0.005</b>
CMPS '20	Black Threat	Social Desirability	Acculturation x Education	-0.117	0.056	0.037
CMPS '20	<b>White Res. Pref.</b>	<b>Social Desirability</b>	<b>Acculturation x Threat</b>	<b>-0.269</b>	<b>0.077</b>	<b>0.001</b>
CMPS '20	White Res. Pref.	Social Desirability	Acculturation x Education	0.095	0.104	0.362
CMPS '20	<b>Anti-BLM FT</b>	<b>Social Desirability</b>	<b>Acculturation x Threat</b>	<b>-0.107</b>	<b>0.051</b>	<b>0.037</b>
CMPS '20	Anti-BLM FT	Social Desirability	Acculturation x Education	0.091	0.067	0.173
CMPS '20	Oppose BLM	Social Desirability	Acculturation x Threat	-0.099	0.038	0.009
CMPS '20	Oppose BLM	Social Desirability	Acculturation x Education	0.043	0.049	0.376
CMPS '20	<b>BLM Ineffective</b>	<b>Social Desirability</b>	<b>Acculturation x Threat</b>	<b>-0.110</b>	<b>0.043</b>	<b>0.011</b>
CMPS '20	BLM Ineffective	Social Desirability	Acculturation x Education	0.032	0.060	0.597
CMPS '20	<b>BLM No Protest</b>	<b>Social Desirability</b>	<b>Acculturation x Threat</b>	<b>-0.094</b>	<b>0.047</b>	<b>0.046</b>
CMPS '20	BLM No Protest	Social Desirability	Acculturation x Education	-0.007	0.060	0.908
CMPS '20	<b>BLM No Support</b>	<b>Social Desirability</b>	<b>Acculturation x Threat</b>	<b>-0.106</b>	<b>0.050</b>	<b>0.033</b>
CMPS '20	BLM No Support	Social Desirability	Acculturation x Education	0.111	0.062	0.074
CMPS '20	<b>Racial Resentment</b>	<b>Discrimination</b>	<b>Acculturation x Threat</b>	<b>-0.042</b>	<b>0.030</b>	<b>0.157</b>
CMPS '20	Racial Resentment	Discrimination	Acculturation x Perceived Discrim.	-0.087	0.033	0.009
CMPS '20	Racial Resentment	Discrimination	Acculturation x Experienced Discrim.	0.027	0.022	0.223
CMPS '20	<b>Stereotype</b>	<b>Discrimination</b>	<b>Acculturation x Threat</b>	<b>-0.121</b>	<b>0.048</b>	<b>0.012</b>
CMPS '20	Stereotype	Discrimination	Acculturation x Perceived Discrim.	-0.130	0.058	0.026
CMPS '20	Stereotype	Discrimination	Acculturation x Experienced Discrim.	0.016	0.035	0.651
CMPS '20	<b>Black Threat</b>	<b>Discrimination</b>	<b>Acculturation x Threat</b>	<b>-0.071</b>	<b>0.046</b>	<b>0.117</b>
CMPS '20	Black Threat	Discrimination	Acculturation x Perceived Discrim.	-0.168	0.048	0.000
CMPS '20	Black Threat	Discrimination	Acculturation x Experienced Discrim.	-0.048	0.032	0.133
CMPS '20	<b>White Res. Pref.</b>	<b>Discrimination</b>	<b>Acculturation x Threat</b>	<b>-0.251</b>	<b>0.079</b>	<b>0.002</b>
CMPS '20	White Res. Pref.	Discrimination	Acculturation x Perceived Discrim.	-0.163	0.093	0.082
CMPS '20	White Res. Pref.	Discrimination	Acculturation x Experienced Discrim.	-0.006	0.061	0.925
CMPS '20	<b>Anti-BLM FT</b>	<b>Discrimination</b>	<b>Acculturation x Threat</b>	<b>-0.111</b>	<b>0.053</b>	<b>0.036</b>
CMPS '20	Anti-BLM FT	Discrimination	Acculturation x Perceived Discrim.	-0.043	0.056	0.449
CMPS '20	Anti-BLM FT	Discrimination	Acculturation x Experienced Discrim.	0.004	0.039	0.911
CMPS '20	<b>Oppose BLM</b>	<b>Discrimination</b>	<b>Acculturation x Threat</b>	<b>-0.092</b>	<b>0.038</b>	<b>0.017</b>
CMPS '20	Oppose BLM	Discrimination	Acculturation x Perceived Discrim.	-0.097	0.044	0.027
CMPS '20	Oppose BLM	Discrimination	Acculturation x Experienced Discrim.	0.008	0.028	0.780
CMPS '20	<b>BLM Ineffective</b>	<b>Discrimination</b>	<b>Acculturation x Threat</b>	<b>-0.102</b>	<b>0.043</b>	<b>0.019</b>
CMPS '20	BLM Ineffective	Discrimination	Acculturation x Perceived Discrim.	-0.050	0.053	0.342
CMPS '20	BLM Ineffective	Discrimination	Acculturation x Experienced Discrim.	-0.012	0.033	0.726
CMPS '20	<b>BLM No Protest</b>	<b>Discrimination</b>	<b>Acculturation x Threat</b>	<b>-0.084</b>	<b>0.047</b>	<b>0.077</b>
CMPS '20	BLM No Protest	Discrimination	Acculturation x Perceived Discrim.	-0.051	0.060	0.389
CMPS '20	BLM No Protest	Discrimination	Acculturation x Experienced Discrim.	-0.007	0.036	0.836
CMPS '20	<b>BLM No Support</b>	<b>Discrimination</b>	<b>Acculturation x Threat</b>	<b>-0.078</b>	<b>0.052</b>	<b>0.131</b>
CMPS '20	BLM No Support	Discrimination	Acculturation x Perceived Discrim.	-0.108	0.061	0.075
CMPS '20	BLM No Support	Discrimination	Acculturation x Experienced Discrim.	-0.067	0.041	0.098
CMPS '20	<b>Racial Resentment</b>	<b>Linked Fate</b>	<b>Acculturation x Threat</b>	<b>-0.038</b>	<b>0.029</b>	<b>0.179</b>
CMPS '20	Racial Resentment	Linked Fate	Acculturation x Linked Fate	-0.044	0.036	0.228
CMPS '20	<b>Stereotype</b>	<b>Linked Fate</b>	<b>Acculturation x Threat</b>	<b>-0.139</b>	<b>0.047</b>	<b>0.003</b>
CMPS '20	Stereotype	Linked Fate	Acculturation x Linked Fate	0.023	0.058	0.690
CMPS '20	<b>Black Threat</b>	<b>Linked Fate</b>	<b>Acculturation x Threat</b>	<b>-0.114</b>	<b>0.045</b>	<b>0.012</b>
CMPS '20	Black Threat	Linked Fate	Acculturation x Linked Fate	0.005	0.054	0.923
CMPS '20	<b>White Res. Pref.</b>	<b>Linked Fate</b>	<b>Acculturation x Threat</b>	<b>-0.273</b>	<b>0.078</b>	<b>0.000</b>
CMPS '20	White Res. Pref.	Linked Fate	Acculturation x Linked Fate	-0.030	0.095	0.754
CMPS '20	<b>Anti-BLM FT</b>	<b>Linked Fate</b>	<b>Acculturation x Threat</b>	<b>-0.120</b>	<b>0.052</b>	<b>0.021</b>
CMPS '20	Anti-BLM FT	Linked Fate	Acculturation x Linked Fate	0.025	0.060	0.673
CMPS '20	<b>Oppose BLM</b>	<b>Linked Fate</b>	<b>Acculturation x Threat</b>	<b>-0.101</b>	<b>0.038</b>	<b>0.007</b>
CMPS '20	Oppose BLM	Linked Fate	Acculturation x Linked Fate	-0.013	0.044	0.770
CMPS '20	<b>BLM Ineffective</b>	<b>Linked Fate</b>	<b>Acculturation x Threat</b>	<b>-0.113</b>	<b>0.044</b>	<b>0.010</b>
CMPS '20	BLM Ineffective	Linked Fate	Acculturation x Linked Fate	0.000	0.052	0.998
CMPS '20	<b>BLM No Protest</b>	<b>Linked Fate</b>	<b>Acculturation x Threat</b>	<b>-0.085</b>	<b>0.049</b>	<b>0.080</b>

**Table R9: Threat Undercuts The Adoption of or Maintenance of Anti-Black Beliefs As Non-Black Latinxs Acculturate Net of Established Alternative Mechanisms (Part 3)**

Dataset	Outcome	Mechanism	Name	Coef.	SE	pval
CMPS '20	BLM No Protest	Linked Fate	Acculturation x Linked Fate	-0.050	0.055	0.358
<b>CMPS '20</b>	<b>BLM No Support</b>	<b>Linked Fate</b>	<b>Acculturation x Threat</b>	<b>-0.105</b>	<b>0.051</b>	<b>0.040</b>
CMPS '20	BLM No Support	Linked Fate	Acculturation x Linked Fate	-0.069	0.063	0.279
<b>CMPS '20</b>	<b>Racial Resentment</b>	<b>Skin Color</b>	<b>Acculturation x Threat</b>	<b>-0.048</b>	<b>0.028</b>	<b>0.090</b>
CMPS '20	Racial Resentment	Skin Color	Acculturation x Skin Color	0.042	0.053	0.428
<b>CMPS '20</b>	<b>Stereotype</b>	<b>Skin Color</b>	<b>Acculturation x Threat</b>	<b>-0.139</b>	<b>0.047</b>	<b>0.003</b>
CMPS '20	Stereotype	Skin Color	Acculturation x Skin Color	0.117	0.105	0.269
<b>CMPS '20</b>	<b>Black Threat</b>	<b>Skin Color</b>	<b>Acculturation x Threat</b>	<b>-0.116</b>	<b>0.044</b>	<b>0.008</b>
CMPS '20	Black Threat	Skin Color	Acculturation x Skin Color	0.084	0.085	0.328
<b>CMPS '20</b>	<b>White Res. Pref.</b>	<b>Skin Color</b>	<b>Acculturation x Threat</b>	<b>-0.283</b>	<b>0.077</b>	<b>0.000</b>
CMPS '20	White Res. Pref.	Skin Color	Acculturation x Skin Color	0.135	0.154	0.379
<b>CMPS '20</b>	<b>Anti-BLM FT</b>	<b>Skin Color</b>	<b>Acculturation x Threat</b>	<b>-0.111</b>	<b>0.051</b>	<b>0.030</b>
CMPS '20	Anti-BLM FT	Skin Color	Acculturation x Skin Color	-0.131	0.105	0.211
<b>CMPS '20</b>	<b>Oppose BLM</b>	<b>Skin Color</b>	<b>Acculturation x Threat</b>	<b>-0.099</b>	<b>0.038</b>	<b>0.009</b>
CMPS '20	Oppose BLM	Skin Color	Acculturation x Skin Color	-0.127	0.091	0.165
<b>CMPS '20</b>	<b>BLM Ineffective</b>	<b>Skin Color</b>	<b>Acculturation x Threat</b>	<b>-0.109</b>	<b>0.042</b>	<b>0.010</b>
CMPS '20	BLM Ineffective	Skin Color	Acculturation x Skin Color	-0.099	0.088	0.261
<b>CMPS '20</b>	<b>BLM No Protest</b>	<b>Skin Color</b>	<b>Acculturation x Threat</b>	<b>-0.094</b>	<b>0.047</b>	<b>0.047</b>
CMPS '20	BLM No Protest	Skin Color	Acculturation x Skin Color	0.011	0.115	0.925
<b>CMPS '20</b>	<b>BLM No Support</b>	<b>Skin Color</b>	<b>Acculturation x Threat</b>	<b>-0.123</b>	<b>0.050</b>	<b>0.014</b>
CMPS '20	BLM No Support	Skin Color	Acculturation x Skin Color	0.155	0.121	0.199
<b>CMPS '20</b>	<b>Racial Resentment</b>	<b>Intergroup Competition</b>	<b>Acculturation x Threat</b>	<b>-0.050</b>	<b>0.028</b>	<b>0.075</b>
CMPS '20	Racial Resentment	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Income	-0.007	0.037	0.850
CMPS '20	Racial Resentment	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Income (Refused)	0.006	0.047	0.897
CMPS '20	Racial Resentment	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Unemployed	-0.048	0.026	0.072
CMPS '20	Racial Resentment	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Prospective Pers. Econ Worse	-0.011	0.051	0.832
CMPS '20	Racial Resentment	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Prospective Socio. Econ Worse	0.148	0.053	0.005
CMPS '20	Racial Resentment	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Prospective Group Econ Worse	-0.004	0.023	0.850
CMPS '20	Racial Resentment	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x % Unemployed	-0.084	0.129	0.515
CMPS '20	Racial Resentment	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Political Competition	0.069	0.069	0.318
CMPS '20	Racial Resentment	Intergroup Competition	Latinx Poverty Advantage	0.181	0.500	0.717
<b>CMPS '20</b>	<b>Stereotype</b>	<b>Intergroup Competition</b>	<b>Acculturation x Threat</b>	<b>-0.127</b>	<b>0.048</b>	<b>0.008</b>
CMPS '20	Stereotype	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Income	0.012	0.060	0.836
CMPS '20	Stereotype	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Income (Refused)	-0.005	0.076	0.949
CMPS '20	Stereotype	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Unemployed	-0.002	0.046	0.967
CMPS '20	Stereotype	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Prospective Pers. Econ Worse	-0.001	0.093	0.989
CMPS '20	Stereotype	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Prospective Socio. Econ Worse	-0.043	0.096	0.653
CMPS '20	Stereotype	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Prospective Group Econ Worse	-0.019	0.039	0.626
CMPS '20	Stereotype	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x % Unemployed	-0.124	0.178	0.485
CMPS '20	Stereotype	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Political Competition	0.014	0.113	0.904
CMPS '20	Stereotype	Intergroup Competition	Latinx Poverty Advantage	0.627	0.886	0.480
<b>CMPS '20</b>	<b>Black Threat</b>	<b>Intergroup Competition</b>	<b>Acculturation x Threat</b>	<b>-0.110</b>	<b>0.044</b>	<b>0.013</b>
CMPS '20	Black Threat	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Income	-0.024	0.059	0.679
CMPS '20	Black Threat	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Income (Refused)	0.095	0.068	0.166
CMPS '20	Black Threat	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Unemployed	-0.087	0.045	0.053
CMPS '20	Black Threat	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Prospective Pers. Econ Worse	0.062	0.091	0.494
CMPS '20	Black Threat	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Prospective Socio. Econ Worse	0.080	0.090	0.375
CMPS '20	Black Threat	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Prospective Group Econ Worse	0.010	0.037	0.784
CMPS '20	Black Threat	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x % Unemployed	-0.523	0.167	0.002
CMPS '20	Black Threat	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Political Competition	0.072	0.109	0.510
CMPS '20	Black Threat	Intergroup Competition	Latinx Poverty Advantage	1.192	0.794	0.133
<b>CMPS '20</b>	<b>White Res. Pref.</b>	<b>Intergroup Competition</b>	<b>Acculturation x Threat</b>	<b>-0.282</b>	<b>0.078</b>	<b>0.000</b>
CMPS '20	White Res. Pref.	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Income	-0.027	0.108	0.802
CMPS '20	White Res. Pref.	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Income (Refused)	-0.042	0.128	0.743
CMPS '20	White Res. Pref.	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Unemployed	-0.052	0.078	0.505
CMPS '20	White Res. Pref.	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Prospective Pers. Econ Worse	-0.046	0.153	0.765
CMPS '20	White Res. Pref.	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Prospective Socio. Econ Worse	0.005	0.150	0.973
CMPS '20	White Res. Pref.	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Prospective Group Econ Worse	-0.020	0.069	0.777
CMPS '20	White Res. Pref.	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x % Unemployed	0.473	0.337	0.161
CMPS '20	White Res. Pref.	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Political Competition	-0.021	0.182	0.907

**Table R10: Threat Undercuts The Adoption of or Maintenance of Anti-Black Beliefs As Non-Black Latinxs Acculturate Net of Established Alternative Mechanisms (Part 4)**

Dataset	Outcome	Mechanism	Name	Coef.	SE	pval
CMPS '20	White Res. Pref.	Intergroup Competition	Latinx Poverty Advantage	0.724	1.541	0.639
<b>CMPS '20</b>	<b>Anti-BLM FT</b>	<b>Intergroup Competition</b>	<b>Acculturation x Threat</b>	<b>-0.128</b>	<b>0.051</b>	<b>0.012</b>
CMPS '20	Anti-BLM FT	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Income	-0.080	0.066	0.227
CMPS '20	Anti-BLM FT	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Income (Refused)	0.007	0.079	0.927
CMPS '20	Anti-BLM FT	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Unemployed	-0.024	0.051	0.637
CMPS '20	Anti-BLM FT	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Prospective Pers. Econ Worse	-0.025	0.098	0.802
CMPS '20	Anti-BLM FT	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Prospective Socio. Econ Worse	0.197	0.103	0.056
CMPS '20	Anti-BLM FT	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Prospective Group Econ Worse	-0.046	0.041	0.259
CMPS '20	Anti-BLM FT	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x % Unemployed	-0.490	0.241	0.042
CMPS '20	Anti-BLM FT	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Political Competition	0.028	0.124	0.820
CMPS '20	Anti-BLM FT	Intergroup Competition	Latinx Poverty Advantage	-0.391	0.945	0.679
<b>CMPS '20</b>	<b>Oppose BLM</b>	<b>Intergroup Competition</b>	<b>Acculturation x Threat</b>	<b>-0.101</b>	<b>0.038</b>	<b>0.007</b>
CMPS '20	Oppose BLM	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Income	-0.002	0.050	0.967
CMPS '20	Oppose BLM	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Income (Refused)	0.006	0.058	0.920
CMPS '20	Oppose BLM	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Unemployed	-0.046	0.036	0.200
CMPS '20	Oppose BLM	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Prospective Pers. Econ Worse	0.054	0.081	0.501
CMPS '20	Oppose BLM	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Prospective Socio. Econ Worse	0.015	0.088	0.865
CMPS '20	Oppose BLM	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Prospective Group Econ Worse	-0.047	0.031	0.134
CMPS '20	Oppose BLM	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x % Unemployed	-0.471	0.158	0.003
CMPS '20	Oppose BLM	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Political Competition	0.069	0.090	0.443
CMPS '20	Oppose BLM	Intergroup Competition	Latinx Poverty Advantage	-0.383	0.660	0.562
<b>CMPS '20</b>	<b>BLM Ineffective</b>	<b>Intergroup Competition</b>	<b>Acculturation x Threat</b>	<b>-0.123</b>	<b>0.043</b>	<b>0.004</b>
CMPS '20	BLM Ineffective	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Income	-0.012	0.064	0.848
CMPS '20	BLM Ineffective	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Income (Refused)	-0.021	0.075	0.777
CMPS '20	BLM Ineffective	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Unemployed	0.013	0.040	0.751
CMPS '20	BLM Ineffective	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Prospective Pers. Econ Worse	0.020	0.088	0.820
CMPS '20	BLM Ineffective	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Prospective Socio. Econ Worse	0.174	0.086	0.043
CMPS '20	BLM Ineffective	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Prospective Group Econ Worse	-0.056	0.035	0.115
CMPS '20	BLM Ineffective	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x % Unemployed	-0.192	0.184	0.297
CMPS '20	BLM Ineffective	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Political Competition	0.190	0.098	0.052
CMPS '20	BLM Ineffective	Intergroup Competition	Latinx Poverty Advantage	-0.196	0.807	0.808
<b>CMPS '20</b>	<b>BLM No Protest</b>	<b>Intergroup Competition</b>	<b>Acculturation x Threat</b>	<b>-0.095</b>	<b>0.047</b>	<b>0.044</b>
CMPS '20	BLM No Protest	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Income	0.052	0.070	0.460
CMPS '20	BLM No Protest	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Income (Refused)	0.012	0.083	0.883
CMPS '20	BLM No Protest	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Unemployed	-0.032	0.047	0.494
CMPS '20	BLM No Protest	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Prospective Pers. Econ Worse	0.064	0.100	0.527
CMPS '20	BLM No Protest	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Prospective Socio. Econ Worse	0.039	0.095	0.682
CMPS '20	BLM No Protest	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Prospective Group Econ Worse	0.005	0.042	0.897
CMPS '20	BLM No Protest	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x % Unemployed	-0.266	0.190	0.161
CMPS '20	BLM No Protest	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Political Competition	-0.188	0.106	0.075
CMPS '20	BLM No Protest	Intergroup Competition	Latinx Poverty Advantage	0.931	0.920	0.312
<b>CMPS '20</b>	<b>BLM No Support</b>	<b>Intergroup Competition</b>	<b>Acculturation x Threat</b>	<b>-0.122</b>	<b>0.050</b>	<b>0.015</b>
CMPS '20	BLM No Support	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Income	0.065	0.077	0.400
CMPS '20	BLM No Support	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Income (Refused)	-0.086	0.084	0.305
CMPS '20	BLM No Support	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Unemployed	-0.052	0.050	0.302
CMPS '20	BLM No Support	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Prospective Pers. Econ Worse	0.048	0.095	0.615
CMPS '20	BLM No Support	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Prospective Socio. Econ Worse	0.151	0.092	0.101
CMPS '20	BLM No Support	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Prospective Group Econ Worse	0.019	0.044	0.665
CMPS '20	BLM No Support	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x % Unemployed	-0.327	0.229	0.153
CMPS '20	BLM No Support	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Political Competition	-0.207	0.116	0.075
CMPS '20	BLM No Support	Intergroup Competition	Latinx Poverty Advantage	0.982	0.912	0.281

## R.2 Accounting For All Mechanisms Simultaneously

**Table R11: Deportation Threat Undercuts the Maintenance of Relative Anti-Black Appraisals via Acculturation Among Non-Black Latinxs Even After Adjusting For Interactions Between Acculturation and Multiple Alternative Mechanisms**

	Racial Resentment	Stereotype	Black = Threat	White Residential Pref.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Acculturation x Threat	−0.04 (0.03)	−0.11 <sup>†</sup> (0.05)	−0.10 <sup>†</sup> (0.05)	−0.20* (0.09)
Acculturation	−0.19** (0.07)	0.08 (0.13)	0.13 (0.12)	−0.14 (0.20)
Threat	−0.01 (0.02)	−0.00 (0.04)	−0.00 (0.03)	−0.01 (0.06)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.48	0.21	0.24	0.19
N	3610	3610	3610	3610
Acculturation Interactions	Y	Y	Y	Y
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Zipcode Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Census Area FE	Y	Y	Y	Y

Note: \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$ , <sup>†</sup> $p < 0.1$ . Panel A characterizes coefficient estimates without adjusting for control covariates. Panel B characterizes coefficient estimates after adjusting for demographic, socio-economic, political, and contextual covariates in addition to census area fixed effects. All covariates rescaled between 0-1 for interpretability. All covariates rescaled between 0-1. HC2 robust standard errors in parentheses.


**Table R12: Deportation That Undercuts Opposition to Black Political Interests via Acculturation Among Non-Black Latinxs Even After Adjusting For Interactions Between Acculturation and Multiple Alternative Mechanisms**

	Oppose BLM	BLM Ineffective	Anti-BLM FT	Oppose BLM	BLM Ineffective	BLM No Protest	BLM No Support
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Acculturation x Threat	-0.16*	-0.16†	-0.12*	-0.10*	-0.10*	-0.11*	-0.09
	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Acculturation	0.06	0.23	-0.12	-0.10	0.22†	-0.09	-0.10
	(0.15)	(0.17)	(0.14)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.14)
Threat	0.02	-0.02	0.03	-0.03	-0.01	-0.04	-0.04
	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.34	0.31	0.31	0.44	0.25	0.22	0.26
N	2538	2171	3610	3610	3610	3610	3610
Acculturation Interactions	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Zipcode Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Census Area FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Note: \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$ , † $p < 0.1$ . Panel A characterizes coefficient estimates without adjusting for control covariates. Panel B characterizes coefficient estimates after adjusting for demographic, socio-economic, political, and contextual covariates in addition to census area fixed effects. All covariates rescaled between 0-1. HC2 robust standard errors in parentheses.

## S Robustness Checks

### S.1 Ruling Out Alternative Residential Preference Motivations



**Figure S14: Anti-Black Attitudes Are More Strongly Associated With White Residential Preference than Alternative Motivations for White Residential Preference.** The y-axis is the covariate, the x-axis is the coefficient. Estimates from a single regression model where *white residential preference* is the outcome. All covariates rescaled between 0-1. 95% CIs displayed derived from HC2 robust standard errors.


## S.2 Validating *Black Threat* Measure

Table S13: The *Black Threat* Measure Proxies for Anti-Black Appraisals

	Racial Resentment (1)	Anti-Black Stereotype (2)
Black Threat	0.34*** (0.01)	0.42*** (0.02)
Asian Threat	-0.04 (0.03)	0.02 (0.04)
Jewish Threat	-0.08** (0.03)	-0.08* (0.04)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.22	0.20
N	3614	3614

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$ . All covariates rescaled between 0-1. HC2 robust standard errors in parentheses.

## S.3 Validating BLM Thermometer Measure



**Figure S15: Warmth Toward BLM is Strongly Associated with Pro-Black Policy Preferences Among Non-Black Respondents (ANES 2020).** The y-axis is the covariate, the x-axis is the coefficient. Estimates from a single regression model where support for preferential hiring of Black people (Panel A) and support for government aid to Blacks (Panel B) is the outcome. All covariates rescaled between 0-1. 95% CIs displayed derived from HC2 robust standard errors.



## S.4 Including Black Latinxs

**Table S14: Deportation Threat Undercuts the Maintenance of Relative Anti-Black Appraisals via Acculturation Among All Latinxs**

	Racial Resentment	Stereotype	Black Threat	White Residential Pref.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Acculturation x Threat	−0.05* (0.03)	−0.11* (0.04)	−0.12** (0.04)	−0.25*** (0.07)
Acculturation	−0.00 (0.02)	−0.05* (0.03)	−0.02 (0.02)	−0.11** (0.04)
Threat	−0.00 (0.02)	0.01 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.05)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.45	0.18	0.22	0.19
N	4016	4016	4016	4016
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Zipcode Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Census Area FE	Y	Y	Y	Y

Note: \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$ , † $p < 0.1$ . All models adjust for demographic, socio-economic, political, and contextual covariates in addition to census area fixed effects. All covariates rescaled between 0-1 for interpretability. HC2 robust standard errors in parentheses.

**Table S15: Deportation threat Undercuts Opposition to Pro-Black Political Interests via Acculturation Among All Latinxs**

	Oppose BLM	BLM Ineffective	Anti-BLM FT	Oppose BLM	BLM Ineffective	BLM No Protest	BLM No Support
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Acculturation x Threat	−0.17*** (0.05)	−0.22** (0.07)	−0.13** (0.05)	−0.11** (0.04)	−0.12** (0.04)	−0.13** (0.05)	−0.12* (0.05)
Acculturation	0.07* (0.03)	0.15*** (0.04)	−0.00 (0.03)	0.04* (0.02)	0.11*** (0.02)	−0.00 (0.02)	−0.09*** (0.03)
Threat	0.02 (0.04)	0.03 (0.05)	0.03 (0.04)	−0.02 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	−0.04 (0.03)	−0.01 (0.03)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.31	0.25	0.29	0.42	0.21	0.21	0.23
N	3009	2593	4016	4016	4016	4016	4016
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Zipcode Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Census Area FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Note: \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$ , † $p < 0.1$ . All models adjust for demographic, socio-economic, political, and contextual covariates in addition to census area fixed effects. All covariates rescaled between 0-1 for interpretability. HC2 robust standard errors in parentheses.

## S.5 Excluding Puerto Ricans

**Table S16: Deportation Threat Undercuts the Maintenance of Relative Anti-Black Appraisals via Acculturation Among non-Black Latinxs (Excluding Puerto Ricans)**

	Racial Resentment	Stereotype	Black = Threat	White Residential Pref.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Acculturation x Threat	-0.06 <sup>†</sup> (0.03)	-0.14** (0.05)	-0.12** (0.05)	-0.29*** (0.08)
Acculturation	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.06* (0.03)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.10* (0.05)
Threat	-0.00 (0.02)	0.02 (0.04)	0.01 (0.03)	0.03 (0.06)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.35	0.17	0.22	0.17
N	3138	3138	3138	3138
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Zipcode Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Census Area FE	Y	Y	Y	Y

Note: \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$ , <sup>†</sup> $p < 0.1$ . All models adjust for demographic, socio-economic, political, and contextual covariates in addition to census area fixed effects. All covariates rescaled between 0-1 for interpretability. HC2 robust standard errors in parentheses.

**Table S17: Deportation threat Undercuts Opposition to Pro-Black Political Interests via Acculturation Among non-Black Latinxs (Excluding Puerto Ricans)**

	Oppose BLM	BLM Ineffective	Anti-BLM FT	Oppose BLM	BLM Ineffective	BLM No Protest	BLM No Support
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Acculturation x Threat	-0.17** (0.06)	-0.18* (0.08)	-0.13* (0.05)	-0.10** (0.04)	-0.11* (0.04)	-0.09 <sup>†</sup> (0.05)	-0.11* (0.05)
Acculturation	0.08* (0.04)	0.16*** (0.05)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.04 (0.02)	0.11*** (0.03)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.11*** (0.03)
Threat	0.03 (0.05)	-0.00 (0.06)	0.03 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.06 <sup>†</sup> (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.31	0.29	0.29	0.42	0.23	0.21	0.25
N	2215	1894	3138	3138	3138	3138	3138
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Zipcode Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Census Area FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Note: \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$ , <sup>†</sup> $p < 0.1$ . All models adjust for demographic, socio-economic, political, and contextual covariates in addition to census area fixed effects. All covariates rescaled between 0-1 for interpretability. HC2 robust standard errors in parentheses.

## S.6 Ruling Out Secular Liberalism

**Table S18: Threat Does Not Motivate the Adoption of Race-Irrelevant Liberal Attitudes Nor Does It Do So More Strongly Among Acculturated Latinxs**

	Ban SSM	Obamacare	Taxes	Climate	Ideology	Ideology
<b>Panel A: No Interaction</b>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Threat	-0.06 (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.02)	0.04 (0.03)	0.08 (0.07)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.26	0.19	0.18	0.27	0.20	0.50
N	2538	2538	2538	2538	2538	3614
<b>Panel B: Interaction</b>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Acculturation x Threat	0.04 (0.07)	0.02 (0.06)	0.06 (0.06)	0.00 (0.06)	0.01 (0.07)	0.01 (0.16)
Acculturation	0.07 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.01 (0.04)	0.08 (0.09)
Threat	-0.08 (0.05)	0.04 (0.04)	-0.06 (0.05)	0.03 (0.05)	0.03 (0.06)	0.08 (0.12)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.26	0.19	0.18	0.27	0.20	0.50
N	2538	2538	2538	2538	2538	3614
Sample	CMPS '16	CMPS '16	CMPS '16	CMPS '16	CMPS '16	CMPS '20
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Zipcode Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Census Area FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Note: \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$ . Ban SSM = support banning gay marriage, Obamacare = support not repealing Obamacare, Taxes = support taxes on wealthy, Climate = support for laws to combat climate change, Ideology = 7 point liberal/conservative scale. All covariates rescaled between 0-1. HC2 robust SEs in parentheses.

## S.7 Ruling out “Conservative Principles”

**Table S19: Threat Does Not Motivate the Adoption of Conservative Principles Nor Does It Do So More Strongly Among Acculturated Latinxs**

Panel A: No Interaction	Immigrant Work Ethic (1)	Protestant Work Ethic (2)
Threat	−0.02 (0.01)	−0.02 (0.01)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.23	0.27
N	3611	3611
Panel B: Interaction	Immigrant Work Ethic (1)	Protestant Work Ethic (2)
Acculturation x Threat	−0.04 (0.03)	−0.01 (0.03)
Acculturation	−0.03 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)
Threat	−0.01 (0.02)	−0.02 (0.02)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.23	0.27
N	3611	3611
Demographic Controls	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y
Zipcode Controls	Y	Y
County Controls	Y	Y
Census Area FE	Y	Y

Note: \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$ . All models adjust for demographic, socio-economic, political, and contextual covariates in addition to census area fixed effects. All covariates rescaled between 0-1 for interpretability. All estimates use CMPS '20 data. HC2 robust standard errors in parentheses.

Immigrant Work Ethic is an additive index (rescaled between 0-1) of the following items with 5 responses from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree:” 1) Most people who want to get ahead can make it if they are willing to work hard (max = strongly agree). 2) It is possible to start out poor in this country, work hard, and become well-off (max = strongly agree). 3) Government should provide income support to those who try to provide for themselves but who cannot adequately do so? (max = strongly disagree) 4) It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income between people with high incomes and those with low incomes? (max = strongly disagree)

Protestant Work Ethic is an additive index of the following items with 4 responses from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree” rescaled between 0-1. 1) If you earn a lot of money, you should give most of it away and live modestly (max = strongly disagree). 2) People should be allowed to compete to ensure the best person wins (max = strongly agree), 3) I’ve benefited from working hard, so there’s no reason others can’t. (max = strongly agree). 4) A problem with government social programs is that they get in the way of personal freedom (max = strongly agree).

## S.8 Ruling Out Secular Support For Marginalized Groups

**Table S20: Association Between Threat, and Threat Interacted With Acculturation, With Attitudes Toward Marginalized Groups Without Explicit Reference to Blackness**

	Oppose LGBTQ+ Activism	Sexism Scale 1	Sexism Scale 2	Muslim Resentment
<b>Panel A: No Interaction</b>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Threat	0.01 (0.03)	0.00 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.02)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.33	0.34	0.20	0.18
N	2538	3614	3614	3614
<b>Panel B: w/ Interaction</b>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Threat x Acculturation	-0.08 (0.06)	0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.08* (0.04)
Acculturation	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.06*** (0.01)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)
Threat	0.06 (0.05)	-0.00 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.03 (0.03)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.33	0.34	0.20	0.18
N	2538	3614	3614	3614
Survey	CMPS '16	CMPS '20	CMPS '20	CMPS '20
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Zipcode Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Census Area FE	Y	Y	Y	Y

Note: \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$ . All covariates rescaled between 0-1. HC2 robust standard errors in parentheses.

**Oppose LGBTQ+ activism** is based on an item in the 2016 CMPS asking “How strongly do you support or oppose gay, lesbian, and bisexual rights activism?” with response options for 1) Strongly support, 2) Somewhat support, 3) Neither support or oppose, 4) Somewhat oppose, 5) Strongly oppose. Rescaled between 0-1 such that 1 = strongly oppose and 0 = strongly support.

**Sexism scale 1** is based on an index of three items. The first item asks respondents if they “agree with the following: in the best kind of government, about half of all elected officials would be women.” The second asks if they agree with whether “men make better political leaders than women do.” The third asks if they agree “discrimination against women is no longer a problem in the U.S. The responses are 1) strongly agree, 2) somewhat agree, 3) neither agree nor disagree, 4) somewhat disagree, and 5) strongly disagree. The first item is rescaled where strongly disagree is the maximum, and the second and third items are rescaled where strongly agree is the maximum. The items are added to one another in an additive index, and are rescaled between 0-1.

**Sexism scale 2** is based on an index of 6 items. 1) “Many women interpret innocent remarks or acts as being sexist,” 2) “Most women fail to appreciate fully all that men do

for them,” 3) “Women seek to gain power by getting control over men,” 4) “Once a woman gets a man to commit to her, she tries to put him on a tight leash,” 5) “Women should be cherished and protected by men,” 6) “Men are incomplete without women.” Responses are 1) agree strongly, 2) agree somewhat, 3) neither agree nor disagree, 4) disagree somewhat, 5) disagree strongly. All items are rescaled so that “agree strongly” is the maximum. These items are added to one another in an additive index, and are rescaled between 0-1.

**Muslim resentment** is based on an index of 4 items. 1) “Most Muslims integrate successfully into American culture,” 2) “Most Muslim Americans reject jihad and violence,” 3) “Most Muslim Americans are not terrorists,” 4) “Muslim Americans do a good job of speaking out against Islamic terrorism.” Responses are 1) Strongly disagree, 2) Somewhat disagree, 3) Neither agree nor disagree, 4) Somewhat agree, 5) Strongly agree. All items are rescaled such that “strongly disagree” is the maximum. These items are added to one another in an additive index, and are rescaled between 0-1.

## S.9 Factorizing Acculturation Scale

**Table S21: Deportation Threat Undercuts the Maintenance of Relative Anti-Black Appraisals via Acculturation Among non-Black Latinxs (w/ Factorized Acculturation Scale)**

	Racial Resentment	Stereotype	Black = Threat	White Residential Pref.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Acculturation (1) x Threat	0.01 (0.04)	-0.08 (0.06)	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.19* (0.10)
Acculturation (2) x Threat	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.10)
Acculturation (3) x Threat	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.10* (0.05)	-0.09 <sup>†</sup> (0.05)	-0.28*** (0.08)
Acculturation (4) x Threat	-0.06 (0.03)	-0.15** (0.05)	-0.12* (0.05)	-0.31*** (0.09)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.36	0.18	0.22	0.17
N	3614	3614	3614	3614
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Zipcode Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Census Area FE	Y	Y	Y	Y

Note: \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$ , <sup>†</sup> $p < 0.1$ . Linear terms for acculturation and threat are omitted to save space. All models adjust for demographic, socio-economic, political, and contextual covariates in addition to census area fixed effects. All covariates rescaled between 0-1 for interpretability. HC2 robust standard errors in parentheses.

**Table S22: Deportation threat Undercuts Opposition to Pro-Black Political Interests via Acculturation Among non-Black Latinxs (w/ Factorized Acculturation Scale)**

	Oppose BLM	BLM Ineffective	Anti-BLM FT	Oppose BLM	BLM Ineffective	BLM No Protest	BLM No Support
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Acculturation (1) x Threat	0.05 (0.08)	-0.15 (0.11)	0.06 (0.07)	0.03 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.06)	-0.12* (0.06)	0.08 (0.06)
Acculturation (2) x Threat	-0.24** (0.08)	-0.35*** (0.10)	0.01 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.06 (0.06)	-0.05 (0.06)	0.06 (0.06)
Acculturation (3) x Threat	-0.10 (0.08)	-0.19 <sup>†</sup> (0.10)	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.12** (0.04)	-0.12* (0.05)	-0.06 (0.05)
Acculturation (4) x Threat	-0.17** (0.06)	-0.31*** (0.09)	-0.12* (0.06)	-0.11* (0.04)	-0.12** (0.05)	-0.12* (0.05)	-0.05 (0.05)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.32	0.30	0.29	0.42	0.23	0.21	0.25
N	2538	2171	3614	3614	3614	3614	3614
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Zipcode Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Census Area FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Note: \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$ , <sup>†</sup> $p < 0.1$ . Linear terms for acculturation and threat are omitted to save space. All models adjust for demographic, socio-economic, political, and contextual covariates in addition to census area fixed effects. All covariates rescaled between 0-1 for interpretability. HC2 robust standard errors in parentheses.

## S.10 Alternative Acculturation Specifications


**Table S23: Alternative Acculturation Specifications**

Specification	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Outcome	Survey
US-Born x Threat	-0.09	0.04	0.03	Oppose BLM	CMPS '16
Citizen x Threat	-0.15	0.05	0.00	Oppose BLM	CMPS '16
English x Threat	-0.14	0.05	0.01	Oppose BLM	CMPS '16
Second Gen x Threat	-0.06	0.06	0.33	Oppose BLM	CMPS '16
Third Gen x Threat	-0.12	0.04	0.01	Oppose BLM	CMPS '16
New Acculturation x Threat	-0.16	0.05	0.00	Oppose BLM	CMPS '16
US-Born x Threat	-0.08	0.05	0.13	BLM Ineffective	CMPS '16
Citizen x Threat	-0.18	0.07	0.01	BLM Ineffective	CMPS '16
English x Threat	-0.20	0.08	0.01	BLM Ineffective	CMPS '16
Second Gen x Threat	-0.04	0.07	0.55	BLM Ineffective	CMPS '16
Third Gen x Threat	-0.15	0.06	0.01	BLM Ineffective	CMPS '16
New Acculturation x Threat	-0.14	0.07	0.05	BLM Ineffective	CMPS '16
US-Born x Threat	-0.03	0.02	0.10	Racial Resentment	CMPS '20
Citizen x Threat	-0.02	0.03	0.37	Racial Resentment	CMPS '20
English x Threat	-0.05	0.02	0.05	Racial Resentment	CMPS '20
Second Gen x Threat	-0.02	0.02	0.32	Racial Resentment	CMPS '20
Third Gen x Threat	-0.05	0.03	0.06	Racial Resentment	CMPS '20
New Acculturation x Threat	-0.07	0.03	0.01	Racial Resentment	CMPS '20
US-Born x Threat	-0.09	0.03	0.00	Stereotype	CMPS '20
Citizen x Threat	-0.05	0.04	0.19	Stereotype	CMPS '20
English x Threat	-0.10	0.04	0.01	Stereotype	CMPS '20
Second Gen x Threat	-0.08	0.04	0.03	Stereotype	CMPS '20
Third Gen x Threat	-0.12	0.04	0.00	Stereotype	CMPS '20
New Acculturation x Threat	-0.17	0.04	0.00	Stereotype	CMPS '20
US-Born x Threat	-0.07	0.03	0.03	Black Threat	CMPS '20
Citizen x Threat	-0.02	0.04	0.62	Black Threat	CMPS '20
English x Threat	-0.13	0.03	0.00	Black Threat	CMPS '20
Second Gen x Threat	-0.06	0.04	0.11	Black Threat	CMPS '20
Third Gen x Threat	-0.08	0.04	0.04	Black Threat	CMPS '20
New Acculturation x Threat	-0.16	0.04	0.00	Black Threat	CMPS '20
US-Born x Threat	-0.21	0.05	0.00	White Residential Preference	CMPS '20
Citizen x Threat	-0.09	0.06	0.14	White Residential Preference	CMPS '20
English x Threat	-0.26	0.06	0.00	White Residential Preference	CMPS '20
Second Gen x Threat	-0.21	0.06	0.00	White Residential Preference	CMPS '20
Third Gen x Threat	-0.22	0.07	0.00	White Residential Preference	CMPS '20
New Acculturation x Threat	-0.35	0.07	0.00	White Residential Preference	CMPS '20
US-Born x Threat	-0.08	0.03	0.02	Anti-BLM FT	CMPS '20
Citizen x Threat	-0.03	0.04	0.46	Anti-BLM FT	CMPS '20
English x Threat	-0.08	0.04	0.08	Anti-BLM FT	CMPS '20
Second Gen x Threat	-0.05	0.04	0.20	Anti-BLM FT	CMPS '20
Third Gen x Threat	-0.14	0.04	0.00	Anti-BLM FT	CMPS '20
New Acculturation x Threat	-0.16	0.05	0.00	Anti-BLM FT	CMPS '20
US-Born x Threat	-0.07	0.03	0.00	Oppose BLM	CMPS '20
Citizen x Threat	-0.08	0.03	0.01	Oppose BLM	CMPS '20
English x Threat	-0.04	0.03	0.18	Oppose BLM	CMPS '20
Second Gen x Threat	-0.05	0.03	0.06	Oppose BLM	CMPS '20
Third Gen x Threat	-0.11	0.03	0.00	Oppose BLM	CMPS '20
New Acculturation x Threat	-0.10	0.04	0.00	Oppose BLM	CMPS '20
US-Born x Threat	-0.07	0.03	0.01	BLM Ineffective	CMPS '20
Citizen x Threat	-0.09	0.03	0.01	BLM Ineffective	CMPS '20
English x Threat	-0.08	0.04	0.02	BLM Ineffective	CMPS '20
Second Gen x Threat	-0.07	0.03	0.04	BLM Ineffective	CMPS '20
Third Gen x Threat	-0.08	0.04	0.03	BLM Ineffective	CMPS '20
New Acculturation x Threat	-0.10	0.04	0.02	BLM Ineffective	CMPS '20
US-Born x Threat	-0.06	0.03	0.06	BLM No Protest	CMPS '20
Citizen x Threat	-0.05	0.04	0.25	BLM No Protest	CMPS '20
English x Threat	-0.08	0.04	0.04	BLM No Protest	CMPS '20
Second Gen x Threat	-0.06	0.04	0.12	BLM No Protest	CMPS '20
Third Gen x Threat	-0.08	0.04	0.09	BLM No Protest	CMPS '20
New Acculturation x Threat	-0.11	0.05	0.02	BLM No Protest	CMPS '20
US-Born x Threat	-0.13	0.04	0.00	BLM No Support	CMPS '20
Citizen x Threat	-0.04	0.04	0.32	BLM No Support	CMPS '20
English x Threat	-0.03	0.04	0.42	BLM No Support	CMPS '20
Second Gen x Threat	-0.14	0.04	0.00	BLM No Support	CMPS '20
Third Gen x Threat	-0.11	0.05	0.02	BLM No Support	CMPS '20
New Acculturation x Threat	-0.15	0.05	0.00	BLM No Support	CMPS '20

Note: Each specification is from a separate fully-specified regression model with the exception of the estimates for *SecondGeneration* × *Threat* and *ThirdGeneration* × *Threat*, which are from the same model. The “New Acculturation” index excludes citizenship status. HC2 robust standard errors presented.



## S.11 Validating BLM Protest Measure



**Figure S16: Objective Protest Measures Are Associated With Self-Reported BLM Protest Participation.** Panel A is the association between the BLM protest rate (x-axis, number of protests normalized over county population, then multiplied by 10,000 inhabitants) and self-reported BLM protest participation (y-axis,  $\beta = 1.06$ ,  $SE = .61$ ,  $p < 0.10$ ). Panel B is the association between the logged BLM protest rate (x-axis) and self-reported BLM protest participation (y-axis,  $\beta = 0.86$ ,  $SE = .42$ ,  $p < 0.05$ ). All covariates scaled between 0-1. 95% CIs displayed derived from HC2 robust standard errors clustered at the county-level. Protest data are from ACLED (see <https://acleddata.com/data-export-tool/>).

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