

The Partisan-Ideological Sorting of New American Citizens

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Abstract

The share of immigrants comprising the electorate will increase in the coming decades. While mass partisan-ideological sorting has been studied extensively, it remains unclear if and how immigrants sort like the general population. Using several Asian, Black, and Latinx immigrant surveys ($N = 17,400$), we observe null or weak associations between ideology and partisanship among non-citizens, but strong associations among naturalized immigrants. Notably, relative to non-citizens, citizen immigrants are partisan-ideologically sorted in a manner akin to Anglo whites, a highly sorted segment of the mass public. Our evidence suggests immigrant citizens politically assimilate on the dimension of partisan-ideological sorting and polarization may characterize the political behavior of new citizens.

Introduction

Do the ideological dispositions of immigrants match their partisan identity? The growth in partisan-ideological sorting in the past few decades is well-established (Levendusky, 2009; Mason, 2018), with significant consequences for mass American political behavior. Sorting may reflect a more engaged and sophisticated mass public (Abramowitz and Saunders, 2008; Levendusky, 2009), but may also be a core source of affective polarization and the “activism, bias, and anger” resulting from strong overlapping partisan-ideological identities (Mason, 2015; Levendusky and Malhotra, 2016; Iyengar et al., 2019). However, despite the import of partisan-ideological sorting as a mass phenomenon, most sorting research focuses on the general population. Although more work examines if and how sorting manifests among Black people and Latinos (Gay, 2014; Philpot, 2017; Jefferson, 2020; Enders and Thornton, 2022; Enders and Thornton, 2023), there is even less on the existence and determinants of sorting among immigrants, a growing and increasingly relevant segment of the American electorate (12-23m, 6-10% of electorate between 2000-2020, see Figure 1).

We posit the existence of partisan-ideological sorting among immigrants may be conditional on citizenship status. Regardless of the normative consequences of partisan-ideological sorting, we conceive of sorting as a form of immigrant *political assimilation* to the characteristics of the dominant group in the U.S. immigrant-receiving society (i.e. Anglo whites) (Gordon, 1964; Ramakrishnan, 2013). Anglo whites are highly sorted (Enders and Thornton, 2022; Enders and Thornton, 2023), in part because of their familiarity with American politics and “what goes with what” vis-a-vis party and ideology (Jefferson, 2020). Consequently, immigrants of various ethno-racial groups may be more likely to match their ideological dispositions with their partisan identity once they access citizenship, a fundamental mechanism motivating integration in, exposure to, and engagement with American politics (Wong, 2000; Hajnal and Lee, 2011; Levin, 2013; Sears et al., 2016), in addition to exposure to elite cues that could facilitate partisan-ideological sorting (Levendusky, 2009; Davis and Dunaway, 2016; Levendusky and Malhotra, 2016).

However, sorting may not follow from citizenship status for immigrants. Even with citizenship, immigrants start the political socialization process later than their US-born counterparts, may possess lower socio-economic resources vis-a-vis Anglo whites on average (at least for some subgroups), are imbued in less politically engaged social networks, and are less likely to be mobilized by elites (Wong, 2000; Michelson, 2005; Nuño, 2007; Hajnal and Lee, 2011). These barriers may undercut exposure to cues that could facilitate mass partisan-ideological sorting among immigrant citizens.

We adjudicate between these perspectives and find immigrants who are citizens politically assimilate on the dimension of partisan-ideological sorting. We use 10 surveys of Latinx, Asian, and Black immigrants and demonstrate the association between ideology and partisanship is null or smaller for non-citizens, but positive and stronger for citizens. We use Anglo white samples, a highly sorted population (Jefferson, 2020), as benchmarks, and show immigrant citizens are sorted in a manner more akin to Anglos relative to non-citizens. Finally, we also show citizenship motivates sorting net of alternative theoretical mechanisms that could encourage immigrant sorting established in the preexisting literature such as: socio-economic status, acculturation (measured by proportion of life living in the U.S.), political interest, political engagement, and knowledge concerning American political ideological structure.

Our analysis makes two contributions. First, we explain, in part, the puzzle of limited partisan-ideological sorting among immigrant groups identified in prior research (Enders and Thornton, 2023): some immigrant mass public segments are not effectively integrated in American politics via access to citizenship. Although our findings may not have positive implications for mass polarization, the sorting of immigrant citizens suggests immigrant citizens are an informed segment of the citizenry that support or identify with parties reflecting their ideological disposition (Abramowitz and Saunders, 2008; Levendusky, 2009). Our evidence suggests naturalized immigrants are capable of being effective citizens and possessing an ostensibly more accurate cognitive representation of the two political parties.

Second, consistent with prior work, the empirical pattern we explicate here also demon-




Figure 1: The immigrant electorate is increasing (Source: Pew Research).

strates the conditional construct validity and reliability of the ideology scale vis-a-vis partisan identity and/or preferences among understudied groups in American politics (Jefferson, 2020; Enders and Thornton, 2022; Enders and Thornton, 2023). For immigrant citizens, ideology is associated with partisanship in a manner more akin to Anglo whites, but not immigrant non-citizens. Our evidence underscores the import of evaluating how survey items operate among diverse groups in order to effectively characterize mass politics (Pérez and Hetherington, 2014; Jefferson, 2020).

Citizenship and Immigrant Partisan-Ideological Sorting

Prior research posits citizenship is a superordinate prerequisite to political engagement. Among immigrants, evidence suggests citizenship motivates higher levels of political participation (Levin, 2013), political interest (Hainmueller et al., 2015), partisan identity adoption (Wong, 2000; Sears et al., 2016), a stronger sense of belonging (Simonsen, 2017), and the adoption of policy preferences akin to the dominant group in the immigrant-receiving society (Branton, 2007; Just and Anderson, 2015; Kolbe and Crepaz, 2016).

Consistent with prior research on the politically integrating consequences of citizenship, we posit citizenship primes the ideological and partisan dispositions of immigrants, motivating immigrants to ensure their ideological dispositions match their partisan dispositions and vice-versa. Several mechanisms may motivate partisan-ideological sorting among immigrant citizens vis-a-vis their non-citizen counterparts. Foremost among these mechanisms is that

citizenship allows immigrant citizens to engage in electoral participation (Wong, 2000), which may encourage immigrants to contemplate the consistency between their partisan or ideological dispositions. Psychologically, citizenship may also motivate a sense of belonging to the polity (Simonsen, 2017), which could generate an investment in understanding the political ideological structure of the United States (Bilodeau et al., 2020). Citizenship may also increase exposure to political mobilization. Relative to non-citizens, citizens are more likely to be politically mobilized.¹ Higher rates of political mobilization among citizens is particularly relevant to the prospect of partisan-ideological sorting given prior research demonstrates elite polarization and concomitant signals have facilitated mass partisan-ideological sorting and polarization (Levendusky, 2009). Characteristics inherent to immigrant citizens relative to non-citizens may also encourage partisan-ideological sorting. Prior research suggests immigrant citizens are positively selected in terms of acculturation, socio-economic status, and political engagement, all of which may encourage a stronger degree of constraint between partisan and ideological dispositions (Hainmueller et al., 2023). Therefore, we forward the following hypothesis:

- **H1:** The association between ideology and partisanship will be stronger for immigrant citizens relative to non-citizens

Design

Data

We use several surveys of different U.S. immigrant populations to test our hypothesis: Asians, Black immigrants, and Latinxs. These are the 2006 Latino National Survey (LNS 2006, Latinx Sample, $N = 5446$), 2008 National Asian-American Survey (NAAS 2008, Asian

¹Indeed, our own estimates using 2016 and 2020 Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election data suggests rates of contact by party officials are higher for naturalized immigrants relative to non-citizens. Black/Asian/Latinx immigrants are 8-29 percentage points more likely to be contacted by a party official or community organization to register and/or vote. These differences are all statistically significant.

Sample, $N = 4568$), the 2010 and 2017 Pew Latino Surveys (Pew 2010; 2017, Latinx Sample, $N = 831; 450$), the 2016 and 2020 Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Surveys (CMPS 2016/2020; Latinx, Asian, and Black Samples; $N = 721$; $N = 1371$; $N = 1185$; $N = 1791$), and the 2016 Latino Immigrant National Election Survey (LINES 2016, Latinx Sample, $N = 1532$). These surveys are advantageous since they possess relatively large immigrant samples and are administered bilingually. We analyze multiple surveys across immigrant ethno-racial groups to demonstrate the replicability and generalizability of our results. Estimates use population weights to ensure representativeness. See Section A.1 for more survey methodological details.

Across surveys, the outcome is a *partisanship* scale where strong Democrat is the highest value. See Table A1 for *partisanship* measurement details across surveys. The independent variable is a conservative-liberal *ideology* scale where strong liberal is the highest value. See Table A1 for *ideology* measurement details across surveys. The moderator is *citizen*, an indicator equal to 1 if a respondent reports they are a citizen, 0 if non-citizen.

We adjust for several controls prognostic of partisanship, ideology, and citizenship in prior literature on immigrant political behavior. These control covariates are age, gender, religion, proportion of life spent in the U.S., national origin, marital status, income, education, unemployment status, homeowner, experienced discrimination, perceptions of discrimination against one's respective ethno-racial group, political interest, and a non-electoral political participation index. See Table A2 for control covariate inclusion details across surveys.

Estimation

We estimate the following linear model to test our hypotheses:

$$partisanship_i = \alpha + \beta_1 ideology_i \times citizen_i + \beta_2 ideology_i + \beta_3 citizen_i + \sum_{k=1}^k \beta_{k+3} X_i^k + \varepsilon_i$$

$partisanship_i$ is the Republican-Democrat partisanship scale for respondent i in each survey, $ideology_i$ is the conservative-liberal scale, $citizen_i$ the citizenship indicator, $\sum_{k=1}^k \beta_{k+3} X_i^k$

Table 1: Ideology is more strongly associated with partisanship among immigrant citizens relative to non-citizens

	Partisanship									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Ideology x Citizen	0.11** (0.04)	0.13*** (0.03)	0.31** (0.12)	0.30** (0.11)	0.39*** (0.08)	0.29*** (0.07)	0.40*** (0.12)	0.43*** (0.08)	0.18* (0.08)	0.36* (0.16)
Ideology	0.02 (0.02)	0.08*** (0.02)	0.05 (0.07)	0.11 (0.09)	0.27*** (0.06)	0.06 (0.05)	0.05 (0.05)	0.24*** (0.06)	0.52*** (0.07)	0.12 (0.11)
Citizen	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.06** (0.02)	-0.06 (0.07)	-0.09 (0.07)	-0.22*** (0.05)	-0.12*** (0.04)	-0.16* (0.08)	-0.23*** (0.05)	-0.13** (0.05)	-0.25* (0.11)
Controls?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Outcome SD	0.25	0.28	0.32	0.32	0.31	0.29	0.30	0.32	0.31	0.27
Survey	LNS '06	NAAS '08	Pew '10	CMPS '16	CMPS '16	LINES '16	Pew '17	CMPS '20	CMPS '20	CMPS '20
Sample	Latinx	Asian	Latinx	Latinx	Asian	Latinx	Latinx	Latinx	Asian	Black
R ²	0.05	0.12	0.13	0.27	0.24	0.13	0.12	0.24	0.33	0.20
Num. obs.	5446	4568	831	721	1371	1532	450	1185	1791	274

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$. All covariates scaled between 0-1. HC2 robust SEs in parentheses.

are k control covariates, ε_i are HC2 robust errors. β_1 , the quantity of interest, is a *second difference* given all covariates are scaled between 0-1, that is, the difference in *partisanship* going from the minimum to the maximum of *ideology* for citizens subtracted by the same quantity for non-citizens. If our hypothesis is supported and respondents partisan-ideologically sort as a function of citizenship, β_1 would be *positive*.

Results

Across all surveys, we find hypothesis-consistent evidence. Ideology is more strongly associated with partisanship for immigrant citizens versus non-citizens (Table 1, Figure 2). In some cases, the association between ideology and partisanship is completely null for immigrant non-citizens, but positive and significant for immigrant citizens (i.e. the Pew 2010, CMPS 2016 Latinx sample, LINES 2016, Pew 2017, and CMPS 2020 Black sample). The second difference of the interaction between citizenship and ideology is between 0.43-1.3 standard deviations of the partisanship outcomes across surveys, a substantively large coefficient.

We anchor these results using the 2016 and 2020 CMPS in relation to a highly sorted American mass public segment: Anglo whites (Jefferson, 2020; Enders and Thornton, 2022; Enders




Figure 2: Association between ideology (x-axis) and partisanship (y-axis) conditional on citizenship (denoted by color) among immigrants. Simulated predicted values from fully-specified models. All covariates scaled between 0-1. 95% CIs from HC2 robust SEs displayed. See Table 1 for regression table characterizing results.

and Thornton, 2023). Figure 3 characterizes the association between ideology and partisanship for non-citizen Latinx/Asian/Black immigrants, citizen Latinx/Asian/Black immigrants, US-born Latinxs/Asians/Black people, and Anglo whites. The ideology coefficients for the non-citizen Latinx/Asian/Black immigrant samples are 11-66% of the ideology coefficients




Figure 3: Immigrant citizens are partisan-ideologically sorted akin to Anglo whites relative to non-citizens. The x-axis is the sample at use. The y-axis is the ideology coefficient (partisanship outcome) adjusting and not adjusting for controls (denoted by color). All covariates scaled between 0-1. 95% CIs from HC2 robust SEs displayed.

for Anglo whites. Conversely, the ideology coefficients for the citizen Latinx/Asian/Black immigrant samples are 62-96% of the ideology coefficients for Anglo whites (adjusting for controls). These results suggest immigrant citizens are partisan-ideologically sorted in a manner more akin to the dominant ethno-racial group in the U.S. immigrant-receiving society, implying immigrant citizens are politically assimilated on the dimension of partisan-ideological sorting relative to their non-citizen counterparts.

Robustness Checks

Our results may be driven by omitted interaction bias, that is, other mechanisms associated with citizenship-status differentially facilitating the association between ideology and partisanship. Results do not change by interacting theoretically-motivated alternative mechanisms² with ideology, suggesting citizenship acquisition is a key mechanism motivating sorting among immigrants (Figure C3). Arguably the most important factor in preexisting research that motivates partisan-ideological sorting among non-white minority groups (vis-a-vis Anglo whites) is political interest and/or knowledge of the structure of American ideology (Gay, 2014; Jefferson, 2020; Enders and Thornton, 2022; Enders and Thornton, 2023). Interestingly, we find political knowledge motivates sorting more strongly for immigrant citizens relative to non-citizens in the 2006 LNS,³ suggesting knowledge produces stronger partisan-ideological sorting when it is actionable via the possibility of full political participation through citizenship (Figure C2). Our results replicate using politician and party evaluation outcomes (Figure D3). Our results replicate using an index of policy preferences instead of the liberal-conservative ideology scale, suggesting our results are not entirely driven by lack of knowledge concerning the liberal-conservative scale in American politics (Table E4). Our choice of moderation analysis may not be theoretically sound if citizenship is independently associated with ideology, which could also induce post-treatment bias. Citizenship is not associated with ideology across our surveys (Figure B1), suggesting our theoretical causal model is appropriately characterizing immigrant partisan-ideological sorting.

Our results also replicate using the panel format of the LINES 2016 survey. Consistent with **H1**, between two time periods, ideology (at t) is significantly associated with partisanship (at $t + 1$, adjusting for partisanship at t) for citizens, but not non-citizens. Moreover, partisanship (at t) is significantly associated with ideology (at $t + 1$, adjusting for ideology at t) for citizens,

²i.e. acculturation (Wong, 2000), knowledge over the structure of American political ideology (Gay, 2014; Jefferson, 2020), political interest Pantoja and Segura, 2003, political participation, socio-economic status, group identity strength, and discrimination (Philpot, 2017)

³To our knowledge, this is the only immigrant survey with a question on political knowledge over which party is liberal/conservative.

but not non-citizens (Section F).

Conclusion

We adjudicate between two models of immigrant political assimilation. One model posits that immigrants are deeply uncertain or ambivalent about American politics and, for a variety of reasons, are limited in their capacities to effectively engage with and interpret political information (Hajnal and Lee, 2011). Alternatively, immigrants, once integrated via the reduction of barriers to political engagement (i.e. lack of citizenship), may become assimilated on relevant political dimensions like partisan-ideological sorting (Wong, 2000; Pantoja and Segura, 2003; Levin, 2013; Ramakrishnan, 2013; Sears et al., 2016; Hainmueller et al., 2015), a critical phenomenon inherent to American mass politics (Abramowitz and Saunders, 2008; Levendusky, 2009; Mason, 2015; Levendusky and Malhotra, 2016; Mason, 2018; Iyengar et al., 2019). Our evidence provides support for the latter model, and suggests that naturalized Black, Latinx, and Asian immigrants are partisan-ideologically sorted in a manner akin to the politically dominant ethno-racial group in the United States: Anglo whites. These findings suggest: 1) polarization may characterize the political behavior of immigrant citizens, a growing and increasingly relevant segment of the electorate, just like it does the general public (with concomitant negative and/or positive consequences); and 2) consistent with prior research (Gay, 2014; Jefferson, 2020), survey researchers should be cautious in the application of the liberal-conservative ideology scale to understand partisan identity and/or preferences among immigrant groups.

A core limitation with our evidence is that citizenship status assignment is not random. Although our tests ruling out alternative mechanisms that could motivate partisan-ideological sorting are helpful in that they allow us to assess the sensitivity of the relationship between ideology and partisanship conditional on factors that motivate both sorting and selection into citizenship, we cannot rule out the possibility of omitted variable or interaction bias. The

risk of omitted variable bias is particularly important in light of causal evidence suggesting citizenship may not facilitate economic integration (Hainmueller et al., 2023).⁴ However, the existence of selection bias does not invalidate the descriptive importance of our evidence. Prima facie, immigrant citizens are integrated in the electorate. Even if their status is motivated by selection, we would still want to assess if immigrants who are citizens are sorted in a manner akin to the dominant group in the immigrant receiving society because these immigrants are fundamentally part of the electorate. The risk of selection implies the need for more assessment of mechanisms and motivations that produce sorting among immigrants that are also associated with the immigrant citizenry in future research.

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⁴However, this evidence does not directly test our hypothesis.

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A Survey details

A.1 Sampling Details

LNS 2006: The Latino National Survey (LNS) contains 8,634 completed interviews (un-weighted) of self-identified Latino/Hispanic residents of the United States. Interviewing began on November 17, 2005, and continued through August 4, 2006. The survey instrument contained approximately 165 distinct items ranging from demographic descriptions to political attitudes and policy preferences, as well as a variety of social indicators and experiences. All interviewers were bilingual, English and Spanish. Respondents were greeted in both languages and were immediately offered the opportunity to interview in either language. Interviewers also provided a consent script that allowed respondents to opt out of the survey. Demographic variables include age, ancestry, birthplace, education level, ethnicity, marital status, military service, number of people in the household, number of children under the age of 18 living in the household, political party affiliation, political ideology, religiosity, religious preference, race, and sex. For the purposes of this paper, the LNS is subsetting to 5446 foreign-born respondents.

The principal investigators conducting the Latino National Survey contracted Latin Force Group LLC (formerly Geoscape(R) International) in October 2006 to enhance the survey respondent file with respondent weights for use in statistical analysis. The original weights for 8,634 records were based on a comparative analysis of the respondents' demographics versus each geographical stratum's overall Hispanic demographics. Subsequently in October 2007, the researchers requested that respondent weights reflect not only the overall demographic composition of respondents (versus state and national Hispanic demographics from Geoscape American MarketSpace DataStream 2006), but also reflect the location where the respondents reside so regional differences in opinions and attitudes may be analyzed during state and national summary analytics.

NAAS 2008: The 2008 National Asian American Survey (NAAS) contains 5,159 completed telephone interviews of self-identified Asian/Asian American residents of the United States. Interviewing began on August 12, 2008, and ended on October 29, 2008. The survey instrument included questions about political behavior and attitudes as well as personal experiences in immigration to the United States. Topics include attitudes toward government, politics and political issues, extent of political involvement, party affiliation, sources of political information, voting behavior, health and financial status, racial and ethnic identification, linked fate and discrimination, and religious and ethnic social networks. The overall length of the interview was approximately 29 minutes. The NAAS includes adults in the United States who identify any family background from countries in Asia, exclusive of countries classified as the Middle East. Survey interviews were conducted in eight languages (English, Cantonese, Mandarin, Korean, Vietnamese, Tagalog, Japanese, and Hindi) – chosen according to the interviewee's preference – and yielded sample sizes of at least 500 adult Asian American residents in the six largest national-origin groups. The final breakdown was 1,350 Chinese, 1,150 Asian Indian, 719 Vietnamese, 614 Korean, 603 Filipino, and 541 Japanese origin respondents, with 182 additional respondents who are either from other countries in Asia, or who identify as multi-racial or multi-ethnic. Overall, 40 percent of the sample chose English as

their preferred language for the interview. The sample is weighted, using a raking procedure, to reflect the balance of gender, nativity, citizenship status, and educational attainment of the six largest national-origin groups in the United States, as well as the proportion of these national-origin groups within each state. Demographic information includes age, race, language, gender, country of birth, religion, marital status, educational level, employment status, citizenship status, household income, and size of household. For the purposes of this paper, the NAAS is subsetting to 4568 foreign-born respondents.

Pew 2010: The 2010 Pew Latino Survey consists of telephone interviews conducted by Social Science Research Solutions (SSRS), an independent research company, among a nationally representative sample of 1,375 Latino respondents ages 18 and older, from August 17 to September 19, 2010. Of those respondents, 618 were registered voters. Some 542 respondents were native born (including Puerto Rico) and 833 were foreign born (excluding Puerto Rico). Of the foreign-born Latinos, a total of 309 were U.S. citizens, a total of 261 were legal residents, and a total of 218 were neither citizens nor legal residents. For the foreign-born respondents, there is a margin of error of $\pm 4.2\%$. A five-stage weighting design was used to ensure an accurate representation of the national Hispanic population. An adjustment was made for all persons found to possess both a landline and a cell phone, as they were twice as likely to be sampled as were respondents who possessed only one phone type. The sample was corrected for the likelihood of within-household selection, which depended upon the likelihood that the respondent's age group would be selected, and that within that age group, the particular respondent would be selected. Respondents in landline households with one qualifying respondent were assigned a weight of 1, those with two qualifying respondents, a weight of 2 and those with three or more qualifying respondents, a weight of 3. This weight was then balanced to have a mean value of 1 for landline respondents. All cell phone respondents received a weight of 1 in this stage, since there is no within-household selection for the cell phones. The sample was corrected to reflect the percentage that is cell-only, landline-only, or reachable by either a landline or a cell phone, based upon estimates for Hispanics from the 2009 National Health Interview Survey estimates projected to 2010. Finally, the data were put through a post-stratification sample balancing routine. The post-stratification weighting utilized national 2009 estimates from the Census' Current Population Survey, March Supplement (CPS), on gender, education, age, region, foreign/native born status, year of entry into the U.S. and Hispanic heritage.

CMPS 2016: Methodology: A total of 10,145 completed interviews were collected online in a respondent self-administered format from December 3, 2016 to February 15, 2017. The survey (and invitation) was available to respondents in English, Spanish, Chinese (simplified), Chinese (traditional), Korean, and Vietnamese. Because of the primary interest in the 2016 election, the project started with large sample of registered voters, to provide large sample size for analyses. The data also include an adult sample of non-registered voters as well, including non-citizens. The full data are weighted within each racial group to match the adult population in the 2015 Census ACS 1-year data file for age, gender, education, nativity, ancestry, and voter registration status. A post-stratification raking algorithm was used to balance each category within ± 1 percent of the ACS estimates. Data are not weighted to their national combined racial average. For the purposes of analysis, the data are subset to

721 Latinx foreign-born individuals and 1371 Asian foreign-born individuals.

LINES 2016: The first survey wave was administered nationally by telephone to a representative sample (N=1,800). Both cellular and landlines were called. Nearly all interviews were in Spanish, by the respondent's choice. After the 2016 election, 576 immigrants took part in the second survey wave, which was fielded during the presidential transition period (November 8, 2016 – January 20, 2021, a 32 percent re-contact rate). At this time, an additional fresh sample of 260 Latino immigrants was added to the study using the same sampling procedures as the first wave. In the summer of 2017 (July through early-September), a third wave was conducted, with all 1,800 immigrants from the pre-election baseline survey being eligible for interviewing. In this period, 31 percent of these immigrants (N=554) were surveyed; this includes 321 respondents who had taken part in the second wave and 233 who had not. In addition to these respondents, 500 fresh immigrants were sampled using the same procedures as the first wave. In total, 2,560 immigrants took part in the 2016-17 LINES. We use data on 1532 foreign-born individuals from the first wave. Distributions of socio-demographic variables were compared to the American Community Survey (ACS). In most respects, the LINES sample conformed to the ACS, though significant discrepancies were found for education, age, gender, and citizenship status. Weighting values were calculated based on these variables through iterative proportional fitting (“raking”).

Pew 2017: Results for this study are based on telephone interviews conducted by SSRS, an independent research company, for Pew Research Center, among a nationally representative sample of 1,001 Hispanic respondents ages 18 and older. The interviews were conducted on cellular and landline telephones from Dec. 7, 2016, through Jan. 15, 2017. For the full sample, a total of 545 respondents were U.S born (including Puerto Rico), and 456 were foreign born (excluding Puerto Rico). For results based on the total 1,001 sample, one can say with 95% confidence level that the error attributable to sampling is plus or minus 3.6 percentage points. For this survey, SSRS used their Omnibus Survey (OS) – a dual-frame survey offered in English and Spanish which they conduct on a weekly basis. Every week, the OS produces a nationally representative sample of adults ages 18 and older. During the field period, whenever a respondent on the OS was determined to be Hispanic and 18 years of age or older, that respondent was administered the module of questions which are analyzed in this report. The analytical sample is comprised of all of the respondents who were compiled over multiple weeks of the OS. For the OS, SSRS used a staff of bilingual interviewers who, when contacting a household, were able to offer respondents the option of completing the survey in Spanish or English. A total of 302 respondents (30%) were surveyed in Spanish, and 699 respondents (70%) were interviewed in English. Any person ages 18 or older who said they were of Hispanic origin or descent was eligible to complete the survey. The OS employs a dual-frame bilingual landline/cellular telephone survey design. It includes a fully replicated, single-stage, random-digit dialing sample of landline telephone households, as well as randomly generated cell numbers. The landline sampling frame yielded 212 completed Hispanic interviews, and the cellphone sampling frame yielded 789 interviews. In order to create the nationally representative sample of the full population, SSRS implemented a multistage weighting procedure to ensure an accurate representation of the national Hispanic population. An adjustment was made for all persons found to possess both a landline and

a cell phone, as they were more likely to be sampled than were respondents who possessed only one phone type. This adjustment also took into account the different sampling rate in the landline and cellphone samples. An additional adjustment was made to account for the number of phones within the household that are actually answered by the respondent or another member of the household. The sample was corrected for within-household selection in landline interviews, which depended upon the number of Hispanic adults living in the household. The data were put through a post-stratification sample balancing routine. The post-stratification weighting utilized estimates of the U.S. adult population based on the U.S. Census Bureau's 2015 American Community Survey, on gender by age, gender by Census region, education, race/ethnicity, Hispanic nativity and marital status. The data were also weighted by population density from the 2010 census and phone usage estimates (i.e., cellphone only, landline only, both) from the January to June 2015 Center for Disease Control's National Health Interview Survey. For the purposes of analysis, the data were subset to 450 foreign-born respondents.

CMPS 2020: A total of 14,988 completed interviews were collected online in a respondent self-administered format from April 2, 2021 to August 25, 2021. The initiation date of the survey was determined, in part, in response to national events unfolding in real-time in the aftermath of the 2020 election. We sought to allow events to unfold and include respondent reactions to post-election disturbances in December 2020 and January 2021, given the unprecedented events our nation witnessed. The survey (and invitation) was available to respondents in English, Spanish, Chinese (simplified), Chinese (traditional), Korean, Vietnamese, Arabic, Urdu, Farsi, and Haitian Creole. Because of the primary interest in the 2020 election, the project started with a large sample of registered voters from online sources that were pre-matched to the voter file. In addition, the data include a sample of non-registered adults, including non-citizens. The full data are weighted within each racial group to fall within the margin of error of the adult population in the 2019 Census ACS 1-year data file for age, gender, education, nativity, and ancestry. A post-stratification raking algorithm was used to balance each category within ± 2 percent of the ACS estimates. Data are subset to the 1185, 1791, and 274 Latinx, Asian, and Black foreign-born respondents within the data.

A.2 Partisanship and Ideology Measurement

Table A1: Measurement of Ideology and Partisanship Across Surveys

Survey	Group	Ideology Measurement	Partisanship Measurement
LNS 2006	Latinx Immigrants	7-point	7-point
NAAS 2008	Asian Immigrants	7-point	7-point
Pew 2010	Latinx Immigrants	5-point	5-point
CMPS 2016	Latinx and Asian Immigrants	5-point	7-point
LINES 2016	Latinx Immigrants	7-point	7-point
Pew 2017	Latinx Immigrants	5-point	3-point (no leaners)
CMPS 2020	Latinx and Asian Immigrants	5-point	7-point

A.3 Control Covariates Across Surveys

Table A2: Control Covariates Used Across Surveys

Survey	Group	Controls
LNS 2006	Latinx Immigrants	Age, % Life in US, Woman, Spanish interview, Catholic, Married, National origin (Mexican, Cuban, Dominican, Salvadoran), homeowner, college-educated, unemployed, income, political interest, perceived discrimination, experienced discrimination, identity centrality
NAAS 2008	Asian Immigrants	Age, % Life in US, Woman, Non-English interview, Catholic, Married, National origin (Chinese, Indian, Filipino, Vietnamese, Korean, Japanese), homeowner, college-educated, unemployed, income, political interest, experienced discrimination, non-electoral participation index
Pew 2010	Latinx Immigrants	Age, % Life in US, Woman, Spanish interview, Catholic, National origin (Mexican, Cuban, Dominican, Salvadoran), homeowner, college-educated, unemployed, income, political interest, perceived discrimination, experienced discrimination, identity centrality, non-electoral participation index
CMPS 2016	Latinx and Asian Immigrants	Age, % Life in US, Woman, Spanish (non-English) interview, Catholic, National origin (Mexican, Cuban, Dominican, Salvadoran or Chinese, Indian, Filipino, Vietnamese, Korean, Japanese for Asian sample), homeowner, college-educated, unemployed, income, political interest, perceived discrimination, experienced discrimination, identity centrality, non-electoral participation index
LINES 2016	Latinx Immigrants	Age, % Life in US, Woman, Spanish interview, Catholic, National origin (Mexican, Cuban, Dominican, Salvadoran), homeowner, college-educated, unemployed, income, political interest, perceived discrimination, experienced discrimination, non-electoral participation index
Pew 2017	Latinx Immigrants	Age, woman, Catholic, married, income, college-educated, unemployed
CMPS 2020	Latinx and Asian Immigrants	Age, % Life in US, Woman, Spanish interview, Catholic, National origin (Mexican, Cuban, Dominican, Salvadoran or Chinese, Indian, Filipino, Vietnamese, Korean, Japanese for Asian sample), homeowner, college-educated, unemployed, income, political interest, perceived discrimination, experienced discrimination, non-electoral participation index

B Demonstrating citizenship is not associated with ideology




Figure B1: Citizenship is not associated with ideology among immigrants. The x-axis is the citizenship coefficient at use. The y-axis is the sample at use. Estimates from separate fully-specified models. All covariates scaled between 0-1. 95% CIs from HC2 robust SEs displayed.

C Ruling out alternative mechanisms

Table C3: Ideology is more strongly associated with partisanship among immigrant citizens relative to non-citizens after adjusting for alternative mechanisms that may motivate partisan-ideological sorting

	Partisanship									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Ideology x Citizen	0.04 (0.05)	0.07* (0.03)	0.22† (0.11)	0.23† (0.14)	0.29** (0.11)	0.13† (0.07)	0.36** (0.13)	0.27** (0.08)	0.07 (0.08)	0.35* (0.17)
Ideology	-0.23* (0.10)	-0.14*** (0.04)	0.16 (0.15)	-0.48 (0.32)	0.12 (0.18)	-0.06 (0.12)	0.05 (0.07)	-0.00 (0.11)	0.36* (0.17)	0.12 (0.25)
Citizen	0.01 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.06)	-0.06 (0.08)	-0.16* (0.07)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.14† (0.08)	-0.15** (0.05)	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.24* (0.12)
Ideology Interactions	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Controls?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Survey	LNS '06	NAAS '08	Pew '10	CMPS '16	CMPS '16	LINES '16	Pew '17	CMPS '20	CMPS '20	CMPS '20
Sample	Latinx	Asian	Latinx	Latinx	Asian	Latinx	Latinx	Latinx	Asian	Black
R ²	0.08	0.13	0.18	0.29	0.24	0.16	0.12	0.28	0.34	0.24
Num. obs.	5446	4568	831	721	1371	1532	450	1185	1791	274

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$; † $p < 0.1$

C.1 Relationship between knowledge and sorting = conditional on citizenship




Figure C2: Political ideological knowledge motivates sorting more strongly among citizen immigrants relative to non-citizens (LNS 2006). The x-axis is ideology, the y-axis is predicted partisanship. Color denotes min-max ideological knowledge. The left panel characterizes the relationship between ideology and partisanship conditional on ideological knowledge for non-citizens. The right panel characterizes the same for immigrant citizens. Predicted values from fully specified models with control covariates set at their means. All covariates scaled between 0-1. 95% CIs from HC2 robust SEs displayed.

D Alternative outcomes




Figure D3: Ideology is more strongly associated with politician and party evaluations among immigrant citizens relative to non-citizens. All estimates from fully-specified models. All covariates scaled between 0-1. 95% CIs from HC2 robust SEs displayed.

E Replication with liberalism index

Table E4: Policy liberalism is more strongly associated with partisanship among immigrant citizens relative to non-citizens

	Partisanship				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Liberalism x Citizen	0.22*** (0.06)	0.12* (0.05)	0.41 [†] (0.24)	0.10 (0.13)	0.22* (0.10)
Policy Liberalism	0.09** (0.03)	0.36*** (0.04)	0.28 (0.21)	0.80*** (0.11)	0.16* (0.07)
Citizen	-0.14** (0.05)	-0.06 [†] (0.03)	-0.20 (0.16)	-0.08 (0.08)	-0.14* (0.07)
Controls?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Survey	LNS '06	NAAS '08	CMPS '16	CMPS '16	LINES '16
Sample	Latinx	Asian	Latinx	Asian	Latinx
R ²	0.06	0.16	0.26	0.22	0.13
Num. obs.	5446	4568	721	1371	1532

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$; [†] $p < 0.1$

Table E5: Liberalism Index Measurement Across Surveys

Survey	Immigrant Group	Liberalism Index
LNS 2006	Latinx Immigrants	Additive index of: a) support for government health care, b) support for in-state tuition for undocumented immigrants, c) support for reducing military intervention in Iraq, d) support for government intervention to help low-income people
NAAS 2008	Asian Immigrants	Additive index of: a) Support reducing military in Iraq, b) Support for government health care, c) Support for making abortion legal in all cases, d) Support for a path to citizenship for undocumented
CMPS 2016	Latinx and Asian Immigrants	Additive index of: a) Support for citizenship pathway for undocumented, b) Opposition to gay marriage ban, c) Support for government intervention against climate change, d) Support for taxing rich, e) Opposition to voter ID, f) Support for Obamacare, g) Opposition to death penalty, h) Support for increasing education spending, i) Support for decreasing police spending, j) Support for reducing border security spending k) Support for increasing aid to the poor spending, l) Support for healthcare spending
LINES 2016	Latinx Immigrants	Additive index of: a) Opposition to Muslim Ban, b) Support for legalizing undocumented immigrants c) Support for abortion access d) Support for increasing health and education spending

F Panel Analysis

Table F6: Ideology is more strongly associated with partisanship (and vice-versa) among immigrant citizens relative to non-citizens (LINES Panel)

	Partisanship (Time 2) (1)	Partisanship (Time 2) (2)	Ideology (Time 2) (3)	Ideology (Time 2) (4)
Ideology (Time 1)	−0.00 (0.07)	0.21*** (0.06)	0.44*** (0.08)	0.58*** (0.05)
Partisanship (Time 1)	0.46*** (0.09)	0.71*** (0.04)	0.08 (0.06)	0.12** (0.04)
Controls (Time 1)?	Y	Y	Y	Y
Survey	LINES '16	LINES '16	LINES '16	LINES '16
Sample	Latinx Non-Citizen	Latinx Citizen	Latinx Non-Citizen	Latinx Citizen
R ²	0.31	0.67	0.36	0.44
Num. obs.	304	419	304	419

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Consistent with **H1**, the difference in the ideology (time 1) coefficients for Latinx non-citizens and citizens is statistically significant ($|difference| = 0.21$, $t = 2.3$), suggesting ideology motivates the adoption of a commensurate partisan identity between two time periods (net of adjusting for partisanship at time 1) more strongly for Latinx citizens relative to non-citizens (see Models 1-2 on Table 1). However, partisanship does not necessarily motivate the adoption of a commensurate ideological disposition between two time periods (net of adjusting for ideology at time 1) more strongly for Latinx citizens relative to non-citizens. Although partisanship at time 1 is positively and significantly associated with ideology at time 2 for Latinx immigrant citizens (Model 4, Table 1), it is not statistically distinguishable from the statistically insignificant (yet positive) association between partisanship at time 1 and ideology at time 2 for Latinx non-citizens (Model 3, Table 1). These findings suggest that partisan-ideological sorting among citizen immigrants (relative to non-citizens) is driven primarily by changes in partisanship to match ideological dispositions rather than changes in ideological dispositions to match partisanship.