The Immigration-to-Reproduction Shift: Latino Population Growth and White Support for Legal Abortion

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Abstract

The literature on White Americans' reaction to demographic change largely focuses on immigration policy at the expense of reproductive politics. We extend past research on White backlash against ethnic diversification to the domain of reproductive policy—testing the idea that prejudiced Whites will support abortion in response to growing minority populations as a means of slowing demographic change via non-White reproduction. Using a large sample of the American public, we find that Whites residing in locales with large growth in the non-White population are more supportive of legal abortion. Consistent with demographic trends, this relationship is driven by Latino population growth. Critically, this relationship is not observed among non-Whites, is confined to racially prejudiced Whites, and is most pronounced when Latino population growth coincides with growth in the local Latino youth population—suggesting that a burgeoning population of Latino children facilitates Whites' connection of Latino growth to reproductive policy.

Introduction

The United States has become more ethnically diverse over the past 40 years, with non-Latino Whites moving from roughly 80% of the population in 1980 down to 57% in 2020. In several states (e.g., CA, MD, NV, NM and TX), the White population during this 40-year period switched from being the majority to a numerical minority, and other states (e.g., AZ, NY, NJ, MD, GA and FL) will soon follow. The ethnic diversification of the United States has been driven by immigration[1] and high birth rates among non-Whites.[2] At the forefront of this process is the Latino population, which is the largest ethnic minority group in the United States. The majority of the growth of Latinos in the United States between 1980 to 2000 was attributable to annual immigration. However, beginning in the 2000's, annual births of Latinos began outpacing annual immigration and by 2020 most of the growth of the Latino population in the country was due to reproduction.[3] The Latino youth population is visibly at the foreground of shifting racial demographics in America, with the number of Latino students in public school growing in each of the 50 states between 2010 to 2021 and forecast to comprise nearly one-third of all public school enrollment by 2030.[4] At the same time, the White population began to decline in 2016, with the primary cause being a notable contraction in the White youth population and deaths among Whites outpacing births.[5]

Accompanying these ongoing demographic shifts has been growing concern among White Americans over their loss in numerical, cultural, economic and political dominance (Craig and Richeson, 2014; Craig et al., 2018; Gest et al., 2018). One controversial embodiment of Whites' concern over demographic change is belief in the "Great Replacement": a White nationalist conspiracy theory claiming a clandestine effort by leaders across Western nations to

[1]https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/frequently-requested-statistics-immigrants-and-immigration-united-states-2022

[2]https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/2012/05/17/explaining-why-minority-births-now-outnumber-white-births/

[3]https://policycommons.net/artifacts/2679432/key-facts-about-us/3702727/

[4]https://www.usatoday.com/in-depth/news/2022/10/11/latino-student-population-us-schools/10426950002/

[5]https://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/brookings$_p$$olicybrief s_r eports$/11/

demographically and culturally replace White European populations with non-Whites through international migration and declining White birth rates.[6] This idea has been discussed for years on Fox News[7] and recent survey data indicates that roughly 30% of Americans—and over half of those identifying with the Republican Party—agree with key features of this conspiracy theory.[8] Focusing specifically on the declining White population, a national survey conducted in 2021 found that 22% of Americans view this decline as a bad thing for society[9]. Belief in this conspiracy theory served as a motivating factor for several high-profile public mass shootings targeting non-White victims, including the 2015 Charleston church shooting, the 2019 El Paso Walmart shooting, and the Tops Friendly supermarket shooting in Buffalo, NY in May of 2022.[10] These instances of acute anti-minority violence comport with longstanding evidence that exposure to non-White population growth can lead Whites to engage in anti-minority hate crime (Green et al., 1998).

Despite the shift in the source of Latino population growth from immigration to reproduction, the scholarly literature on White backlash to ethnic diversification remains dominated by studies on Whites' support for restrictive immigration policies (Abrajano and Hajnal, 2015; Branton et al., 2011; Hopkins, 2010; Maggio, 2023; Newman, 2013) and endorsement of anti-immigrant politicians (Hill et al., 2019; Newman et al., 2018; Reny et al., 2019), with little-to-no empirical research exploring possible effects on Whites' preferences over reproductive policies. This omission in the literature is notable given that growth in non-White populations—especially Latinos—is forecast to continue being driven by births[11], which would imply a shift in the locus of efforts by Whites aiming to curb demographic change from policies regulating the amount of migration to those potentially affecting the

[6]https://www.nytimes.com/live/2022/05/14/nyregion/buffalo-shooting,https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2022/05/17/great-replacement-conspiracy-theory-explained

[7]https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/05/17/great-replacement-theory-is-ignorant-both-broadly-narrowly/

[8]https://www.boston.com/news/local-news/2022/10/31/umass-poll-significant-numbers-support-great-replacement-theory-on-immigration/

[9]Pew Research Center: American Trends Panel Wave 92, July 2021

[10]https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2022/05/17/racist-great-replacement-conspiracy-theory-explained

[11]https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2020/demo/p25-1144.pdf

amount of reproduction, such as the ease of access to legal abortion. This leads to the following research question: Does exposure to non-White population growth factor into White Americans' preferences over reproductive rights and abortion policy? We find this question particularly salient in light of the June 2022 Supreme Court ruling on *Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization*, which ended the federal constitutional right to abortion in the United States, and the drastic ramping up of political conflict over state-level abortion bans in the wake of this ruling.[12] Following the *Dobbs* decision, prominent media outlets drew an explicit connection between abortion policy and growing minority populations by publicizing a report highlighting the disproportionate effect of abortion bans on the rapidly growing Latina population of childbearing age.[13]

Drawing on public opinion research on abortion and literature on racial threat and demographic change, we develop and empirically test several hypotheses linking exposure to non-White population growth to White Americans' preferences over policies concerning women's access to legal abortion. Using one of the largest national surveys of the adult American population—the Democracy Fund + UCLA Nationscape survey (N=494,796)—we demonstrate that residing in an area experiencing large growth in the non-White population is associated with heightened support for legal abortion. Consistent with the reality of demographic change in America, whereby Latinos are the largest non-Anglo group and high Latino birth rates have become a major driver of non-White population growth, we find that this relationship is entirely driven by exposure to growing Latino populations and absent when focusing on Black or Asian population growth. Critically, concern that this relationship is due to the tendency for people with liberal social views to choose to live in areas experiencing demographic change (i.e., residential selection) is mitigated by the following: first, this relationship is only observed among Whites and is *entirely absent* for

[12]https://www.guttmacher.org/2023/01/six-months-post-roe-24-us-states-have-banned-abortion-or-are-likely-do-so-roundup

[13]https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/latinas-most-impacted-abortion-bans-study-rcna54793, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2022/11/07/latinas-disproportionately-impacted-abortion-bans-study/8265533001/, https://latino.ucla.edu/research/abortion-bans-latinas/

Black, Latino and Asian respondents; second, local exposure to Latino population growth among Whites is *not associated* with holding more liberal views on gender-relevant attitudes unrelated to abortion; and third, analysis of two national panel surveys finds that holding permissive attitudes on abortion policy *does not* predict moving among Whites to areas experiencing Latino population growth.

The results from two moderation analyses strongly suggest our findings are due to an aversion to growing ethnic diversity leading White Americans to be more supportive of legal abortion. First, using several measures of racial prejudice, it is only among Whites harboring high levels of animus toward non-Whites that we observe a positive, statistically significant, and substantively large relationship between exposure to Latino population growth and support for legal abortion. Among Whites low in prejudice, we observe little to no relationship between these variables. These findings serve as a critical validity and mechanism check: prejudiced Whites tend to be more threatened by diversity (Alba et al., 2005; Newman, 2013) and avoidant of interracial contact (Pettigrew, 1997) than non-prejudiced Whites and it is only for prejudiced Whites that we observe a connection between exposure to Latino growth and heightened support for legal abortion. Second, we find that exposure to Latino growth is only associated with heightened support for legal abortion when it coincides with a large growth in the local *Latino youth* population. When Latino population growth does not coincide with a growing population of Latino children, it has a negative or null relationship to abortion attitudes. Critically, we find that this moderation effect is not observed when focusing on growth in the non-Latino White youth population or the elderly Latino population. These findings help glean what may be going on inside the minds of White respondents: a visible expansion in the population of Latino children facilitates drawing a connection between Latino-driven ethnic diversification, reproduction, and abortion policy.

Finally, we accompany these findings from the Nationscape with an original national survey of White Americans intended to assuage potential lingering skepticism about the process generating our findings. While we present an array of results that align with our

theoretical expectations, there may be persisting doubt about whether Whites exposed to Latino growth are actually thinking about abortion *as a means of population control* when endorsing legal abortion. As such, we designed a simple survey asking respondents to report (1) the level of non-White and Latino population growth in their local residential context and (2) their support for women's access to abortion when explicitly cast as a means of *slowing population growth*. Using these ancillary data, we find that, among prejudiced Whites, those reporting residing in an area with a growing non-White or Latino population are more supportive of abortion as a means of slowing population growth. Among Whites low in prejudice, we find little to no association between perceived local ethno-racial demographic change and support for abortion as population control. These auxiliary findings complement our results from the Nationscape by providing a conceptual replication using more explicit measures of phenomena of interest.

Ethnic Diversity and the Politics of Reproduction

The politics of reproduction encompasses a range of issues, from access to education, contraceptives, and healthcare to maternity leave and government aid to women with dependent children. However, one of the central arenas of political conflict in the domain of reproduction is the abortion-rights movement and policies affecting access to legal abortion. Indeed, a review of published research exploring public opinion on reproductive policy finds that the majority of scholarly attention has been given to the legality of abortion (Adamczyk and Valdimarsdóttir, 2018). As such, our focus will be on abortion policy as an epicenter of past and current conflict within the realm of reproductive politics. With this in mind, we turn to the question of what is known about the factors shaping public opinion on abortion, with an eye toward building testable hypotheses about the impact of exposure to shifting ethno-racial demographics on Whites' abortion policy preferences.

Americans' preferences on abortion policy are a known function of individual-level factors

like pre-adult family socialization experiences (Pacheco and Kreitzer, 2016) and adulthood educational attainment, religious identity and beliefs, and views toward the role of women in society (Adamczyk and Valdimarsdóttir, 2018; Jelen and Wilcox, 2003; Osborne et al., 2022). Surprisingly, less is known about how factors operative in people's surrounding environment as adults shapes their abortion policy preferences. In fact, to the extent research on public opinion on abortion addresses the political environment, the focus has been on nationwide events, such as Supreme Court rulings (Brickman and Peterson, 2006; Wlezien and Goggin, 1993), or on state-level political culture (Cook et al., 1993), with few studies focusing on more localized (i.e., sub-state) environmental factors. This is notable given that a growing body of research demonstrates that a wide range of people's political beliefs, policy preferences, and behaviors are shaped by personal experiences rooted in their local residential context (Egan and Mullin, 2012; Hazlett and Mildenberger, 2020; Newman et al., 2015; Sands and Kadt, 2020; Reny and Newman, 2018). Of the handful of studies exploring the role of local residential context, the focus is on the impact of religious context (e.g., the prevalence of active churchgoers), and exposure to religious neighbors, on an individual's level of support for abortion (Olson, 2019; Adamczyk and Valdimarsdóttir, 2018). While these studies do not address local racial demographics, such as non-White population growth, they do establish an empirical precedent for the relevance of local context in shaping abortion policy preferences. This, in turn, serves as a basis for extending longstanding contextual theories of racial threat to Whites' attitudes on abortion.

Realistic group conflict theory contends that conflict between groups is a product of feelings of threat and antipathy that arise from competition over valued resources (Jackson, 1993; LeVine and Campbell, 1972). Within this theoretical tradition is a corpus of research focusing on race-relations in the United States and the role of local racial demographics in shaping White Americans' political attitudes and behavior. Referred to as "racial threat" (Key, 1949), the primary hypothesis is that the size of geographically proximate non-White groups will drive Whites' perception of threat and support for anti-minority policies and

politicians (Carsey, 1995; Giles and Buckner, 1993; Glaser, 1994). Recent research finds this theorized process to be particularly operative in instances involving drastic changes (increases or decreases) in the size of a local non-White group (Enos, 2016; Hopkins, 2012; Reny and Newman, 2018), which is consistent with subvariants of group conflict theory emphasizing the potential for anti-minority violence following the entry or growth of non-Whites in White neighborhoods (Green et al., 1998). While originally formulated to explain White-Black relations in the American South, the racial threat hypothesis has been adapted over time to reflect shifting demographic trends in the United States, such as the dramatic influx of immigrants from Mexico and Central America beginning in the 1970s and resultant rapid growth of the Latino population (Campbell et al., 2006; Citrin et al., 1990; Hopkins, 2010; Newman, 2013). As the non-White group in focus shifted from Black to Latino Americans, the hypotheses tested have been adjusted to reflect key facets of White-Latino relations that may condition the manifestation of threat among Whites, such as the legal status (Hood and Morris 1998) and level of cultural assimilation (Citrin et al., 1990; Newman et al., 2012a; Rocha and Espino, 2009) of nearby Latino populations.

Given the present juncture of demographic trends in America, where the source of Latino-driven ethnic diversification has shifted from immigration to reproduction, the grounds are ripe for yet another adaptation of longstanding racial threat theory—this time to the domain of reproductive politics and policies affecting access to legal abortion. Drastic growth in Latino populations has been linked to state level adoption of restrictive immigration laws (Newman et al., 2012b) and support among Whites' for anti-immigrant policies (Hopkins, 2010; Newman, 2013) and politicians (Newman et al., 2018). Underlying these findings is a common presumed mechanism: people support policies that are perceived to mitigate a threat (Huddy et al., 2007; Albertson and Gadarian, 2015; Brandt et al., 2021). In the case of this research, Whites threatened by growing Latino populations are theorized to favor policies believed to curb Latino-driven ethnic diversification. For decades, this policy outlet was immigration, with the locus of White backlash to Latino-driven diversification

being support for restrictive immigration policies that would slow the *entry* of Latinos into the country. However, with the *immigration-to-reproduction* shift in the source of Latino population growth, one outlet of increasing importance may be policies that affect the amount of reproduction among Latinos, such as those shaping the ease of access to legal abortion. For decades, researchers have proposed voluntarily limiting births as an obvious means to slow population growth (Mumford and Kessel, 1986). With Latino immigration slowing in the 21st century and Latino growth being primarily driven by high birth rates, it stands to reason that the desire to curb Latino growth may lead Whites threatened by Latino growth to oppose policies that create barriers to the ability of members of the Latino community to limit their own reproduction by averting unwanted childbirth.

The feasibility of this expectation hinges on the extent to which abortion is perceived by the general public as a tool for slowing population growth. Prior research probing Americans' views toward interventions to curtail population growth in developing nations offers a critical window suggesting widespread public recognition that access to birth control and legal abortion are usable policy tools to slow population growth. When asked about the reasons for high birth rates in developing nations, 89% of Americans viewed "lack of access to birth control" as an important reason. Given this, it is unsurprising that roughly 70% of Americans reported favoring providing aid for birth control to help reduce population growth in poverty-stricken countries[14]. In a study soliciting Americans' support for various policy tools to control population growth in developing nations, 85% favored providing free birth control to women and 53% favored making abortions easily available to any women who want them[15]. It is a longstanding fact that the prevalence of legal abortion is associated with lower population growth rates (Mumford and Kessel, 1986; Tietze, 1975) and the American public evinces considerable awareness of this relationship, at least when considering policy interventions in foreign nations. Having established a basis of support for the presumption that Americans make a connection between abortion and population growth, the next set of

[14]Chicago Council on Foreign Relations Poll: July 2004
[15]Gallup News Service Poll: April 1992

connections to be addressed are between race, shifting racial demographics, and abortion.

The idea that race and shifting demographics play a role in the politics of reproduction is far from new. Forced birth control via sterilization is a deplorable chapter in the history of White supremacy in the United States. By the mid 20th century, 32 of the 50 states had eugenics boards overseeing multiple sterilization operations disproportionately targeting non-White people.[16] In response to the growing Civil Rights movement, White supremacists in the American South were particularly supportive of these birth control practices to stop the "black tide which threatens to engulf us".[17] The relevance of race and shifting demographics is also evident when focusing on voluntary contraceptives and abortion. From the onset of the American birth control movement in the 1900s, impassioned claims were made by leaders in both White and Black communities about the racial ramifications of birth control. Against the backdrop of declining birth rates among native-born Whites, Former President Theodore Roosevelt wrote an article in 1911 in the New York City based weekly family magazine, *The Outlook*, expressing "contempt for the woman who shirks her primal and most essential duty," and denouncing the use of contraceptives among educated White women, or what he termed "good stock Americans," as "race suicide" (Tone 1997). These historical moments highlight that abortion policy preferences among Whites are seemingly malleable and shaped by salient changes in the size of Whites vis-a-vis non-White groups and by the ethno-racial groups envisioned as recipients of abortions.

Countering this, Black leaders from Marcus Garvey in the 1930s to prominent figures in the NAACP and Black Panther Party in the 1960s argued that efforts by the White medical establishment to promote birth control in Black communities reflected a longstanding effort by Whites to control Black sexuality and constituted a form of "Black genocide" (Dobbins-Harris, 2017). A key presumption of the Black genocide critique of birth control is that growing the Black population should result in greater political power for Black Americans, thus birth

[16]https://www.pbs.org/independentlens/blog/unwanted-sterilization-and-eugenics-programs-in-the-united-states/

[17]https://www.mississippifreepress.org/12782/the-troubling-past-of-forced-sterilization-of-black-women-and-girls-in-mississippi-and-the-south

control campaigns in Black communities represented intentional efforts by Whites to whittle down the Black population in size and power. As Marvin Davies, a leader of a Florida chapter of the NAACP put it: "Our women need to produce more babies, not less...and until we comprise 30 to 35 percent of the population, we won't really be able to affect the power structure in this country." (Ross, 1998). In this way, the notion of Black genocide overlaps with racial threat theory in that both acknowledge the potential for expanding minority population size to translate to growing electoral influence and political power.

While there is contention surrounding the racial views and motives of key White leaders of the birth control movement[18], the 20th century ideas of "race suicide" in reference to White use of birth control and "Black genocide" in reference to Black use of birth control persist in the 21st century. With respect to race suicide, the idea popularized by Roosevelt in the early 20th century has re-emerged in the White nationalist "Great Replacement" conspiracy theory. While labeled by journalists and scholars as a conspiracy theory, roughly 23% of White Americans view Blacks, Latinos and Asians comprising the majority of the American population by 2050 as a bad thing, and nearly half (46%) of Whites believe that America becoming a majority-minority country will weaken American customs and values.[19] Moreover, there is evidence that Americans who fear a majority-minority America are more likely to support far-right candidates who espouse anti-minority views (Craig and Richeson, 2014). With respect to Black genocide, this idea re-emerged in discourse surrounding the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement and recent Supreme Court decisions on abortion. For example, some Black intellectuals and commentators who are anti-abortion cast the notably higher rate of abortion among Black woman (compared to all other races) as continued evidence of efforts by Whites to achieve Black genocide, claiming that protecting Black reproduction should stand at the center of any assertion that "Black lives matter."[20] In addition, the ruling of the

[18]https://www.plannedparenthood.org/about-us/who-we-are/our-history

[19]https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/2019/03/21/public-sees-an-america-in-decline-on-many-fronts/

[20]https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/black-babies-matter-the-black-anti-abortion-movements-political-problems

Supreme Court on *Box v. Planned Parenthood of Indiana and Kentucky, Inc.* reinserted race into public discourse over abortion given the concurring opinion written by Justice Clarence Thomas where he cast abortion as a potential "tool of eugenic manipulation."[21]

Hypotheses

The immigration-to-reproduction shift in the source of Latino-led ethnic diversification of America, the imminent transition of the United States from a majority White to non-White nation, and the persisting relevance of race and racial demographics to the politics of reproduction, each provide strong impetus for an effort to adapt racial threat theory to White public opinion on abortion. In this section, we offer four predictions about the relationship of Whites' exposure to shifting ethno-racial demographics to their preferences over government policies affecting access to legal abortion.

First, we hypothesize that Whites residing in areas experiencing drastic growth in the non-White population will be more supportive of legal abortion (*H1*). This hypothesis draws from realistic group conflict and racial threat theory, but incorporates important adaptations, such as the focus on non-White population growth—versus prevailing non-White population size—given evidence that it is change in nearby non-White populations that captures the attention of Whites and generates anti-minority hostility and policy support (Green et al., 1998; Hopkins, 2010; Newman, 2013; Newman and Velez, 2014). Second, in light of the demographic reality of Latinos being the largest non-White group and driving the ethnic diversification of America, we expect that—when disaggregating non-White population growth by non-White group—abortion attitudes among Whites will be most responsive to growth in local Latino populations (*H2*). While the arrival of immigrants from Asian countries recently outpaced arrivals from Latin America[22], Latinos remain the largest non-White group and past research documents that mass media and elite discourse tends to cast Asians as "model

[21]https://www.washingtonpost.com/history/2019/05/31/clarence-thomas-tried-link-abortion-eugenics-seven-historians-told-post-hes-wrong/

[22]https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/19/us/asians-surpass-hispanics-as-biggest-immigrant-wave.html

minorities" (Kim, 1999; Zhang, 2010) while Latinos are depicted as threatening (Chavez, 2013; Huntington, 2005; Reny and Manzano, 2016). This differential process of social construction has been used to explain why past research finds that Americans' are more attuned to growth in local Latino, versus Asian, populations (Newman and Velez, 2014) and that proximity to large Latino populations augments anti-immigrant sentiment among Whites while proximity to large Asian populations reduces it (Ha, 2010; Hood and Morris, 2000).

Prior research finds that not all citizens react the same way to contact with immigrant minorities or shifting racial demographics. Individual differences in partisanship (Homola and Tavits, 2018), ideological identification (Brown et al., 2022), and authoritarian orientations (Johnston et al., 2015; Velez and Lavine, 2017) have been found to condition Americans' reactions to contact with immigrants and increasing ethnic diversity. A presumed mechanism underlying these findings is that racial prejudice—or factors highly correlated with it (e.g., partisanship, ideology, authoritarianism)—-shapes the likelihood that a member of a dominant racial or ethnic group will have an averse reaction to contact with immigrants or exposure to growing ethnic diversity. Indeed, Americans who identify with the political right and voted for Donald Trump for President—two outcomes correlated with racial prejudice—are more likely to believe in the "Great Replacement" conspiracy theory.[23] In sum, the evidence suggests that prejudiced Whites are most averse to increasing racial and ethnic diversity and most concerned about the loss of Whites' dominant status in American society. By extension, Whites who dislike racial and ethnic minorities should be the most likely to react to minority population growth with a desire to curb the growth. This desire may lead to elevated support for policy tools—such as legal abortion—that may curtail mounting ethnic diversity. Therefore, we expect prejudice toward ethnic and racial minorities to moderate the effect of local exposure to Latino population growth on Whites' abortion policy preferences. Specifically, we expect that Whites high in racial prejudice will be most likely to respond to

[23]https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/05/17/great-replacement-theory-is-ignorant-both-broadly-narrowly/,https://www.boston.com/news/local-news/2022/10/31/umass-poll-significant-numbers-support-great-replacement-theory-on-immigration/

growth in local Latino populations with heightened support for legal abortion (*H3*).

Finally, a key factor connecting growing non-White populations to abortion should be *reproduction*. When focusing on visible, local shifts in racial demographics, the extent to which Whites are encouraged to connect exposure to ethnic diversification to reproductive policy should depend on coinciding visible shifts in reproduction—namely, growth in the local non-White youth population. Lamentations over immigration, and particularly the threat posed by Latino immigration, have long highlighted high fertility rates among Latinos (Huntington, 2005) and the burden that burgeoning Latino youth populations place on public schools and welfare systems (Citrin et al., 1990; Gerber et al., 2017). Indeed, recent reports based on data from the U.S. Department of Education reveal that the Latino student population is growing rapidly in all 50 states and will comprise nearly one-third of public school enrollment by 2030.[24] As salient symbols, children and growing youth populations should play an important facilitating role in directing Whites' attention to reproduction as a source of increasing ethnic diversity and to the reality of the immigration-to-reproduction shift in Latino-led ethnic diversification. Indeed, the increasing prevalence of Latinos among the youth population in Whites' local area may arouse their concern over "replacement" and the imminence of a majority-minority America. With this in mind, our final expectation is that local exposure to Latino population growth should be associated with heightened support for legal abortion among Whites when it coincides with local growth in the Latino youth population (*H4*). When Latino population growth does not coincide with growth in the Latino youth population (e.g., it is due to growing adult or elderly Latinos via immigration or internal migration), we expect little to no association between Latino population growth and Whites' preferences on abortion.

[24]https://www.usatoday.com/in-depth/news/2022/10/11/latino-student-population-us-schools/10426950002/

Data and Methods

To test these hypotheses, we use the Democracy Fund + UCLA Nationscape survey (Tausanovitch and Vavreck, 2021)[25]. The Nationscape (NS) is one of the largest surveys of the American public, with a total sample size of nearly half a million adults ($N = 494,796$). The NS was fielded between July 2019-January 2021 in 77 weekly sample waves. The samples were provided by Lucid, a market research platform operating an online survey respondent exchange. The NS samples match national quotas for age, gender, race, ethnicity, region, income, and education. All respondents in the NS took the survey online. For the purpose of our analysis, we focus on the $N = 314,000$ respondents identifying as non-Latino White, and strategically use the responses of Black ($N = 50,860$), Latino ($N = 66,923$), and Asian ($N = 20,100$) respondents for comparison purposes. Importantly, the NS solicited attitudes on abortion policy and includes each respondents' zip code of residence.[26] The size of the NS gives us a larger number and wider swath of zip codes ($N = 25,204$ zips, full sample, N=23,455 zips, White sample) than typically found in commonly-used smaller N surveys (e.g., Cooperative Election Study).

To measure respondents' preferences on abortion, we rely on three questions appearing in all weekly NS waves. Respondents were presented with the following three policy positions: 1) never permit abortion, 2) permit abortion in cases other than rape, incest, or when the woman's life is in danger, and 3) permit late-term abortion. For each position, respondents were asked to indicate whether they agree, disagree or were unsure, and we recoded these items to range from (0)-"Disagree", (1)-"Unsure", (2)-"Agree". These are common abortion policy preference outcomes in the literature (Jelen and Wilcox, 2003). The dependent variable in our analysis is an additive index of these three recoded items, which we label the *Legal Abortion Index*. For ease of interpretation of regression results, we rescaled this index to range from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating more permissive attitudes toward government

[25]https://www.voterstudygroup.org/data/nationscape

[26]Zip codes, however, are restricted and thus are not included in the replication file.

regulation of abortion (e.g., greater support for unrestricted, legal abortion). We document in Table C11 that our main findings do not depend on analyzing these items as a scale.

Our analysis uses zip code as the measure of respondents' local context. Previous research firmly demonstrates that Americans are aware of the size of various racial and ethnic groups in their zip code of residence (Newman et al., 2015; Velez and Wong, 2017) and acutely aware of over-time growth in zip code Latino populations (Newman and Velez, 2014). As such, zip code is an empirically validated unit of aggregation for measuring Americans' local context. Our first hypothesis (*H1*) concerns the relationship of growth in non-White populations to Whites' abortion policy preferences, while our remaining hypotheses (*H2-4*) focus specifically on Latino population growth. Using the 2007-2011 and 2015-2019 American Community Survey (ACS) 5-year data files[27], we first calculated the proportion of the total population within a respondent's zip code that are (a) non-White or (b) Latino between 2007-2011 and 2015-2019, and then subtract the 2007-2011 estimates for each from their corresponding 2015-2019 estimates to capture the over-time change in each population. The resulting variables are labeled Δ *% Non-White* and Δ *% Latino*. We repeat this procedure with Black and Asian populations to generate change variables for these ethno-racial groups for comparison purposes.

With respect to *H3*, the NS includes a range of questions that afford analysts several distinct measures of Whites' animus toward ethno-racial minorities. Our first measure captures a key facet of overt or "old fashioned" racism (OFR) involving a desire for social distance between the races. This desire is typically measured by soliciting Whites' opposition to interracial marriage (Virtanen and Huddy, 1998; Tesler, 2013). The NS includes an item asking respondents if they "prefer my close relatives marry spouses from their same race". The response options range from (1)-"Strongly agree" to (5)-"Strongly disagree" and we created a variable labeled *OFR* recoded so that higher values indicate increasing opposition to interracial marriage. Our second measure is *Racial Resentment* (Kinder and Sears, 1981),

[27]The ACS provides 1- and 3-year files, but these files do not provide data for many zip codes; the 5-year files provide the most comprehensive zip code level data

which is based on respondents' agreement with the statements "Irish, Italian, and Jewish ethnicities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors" and "Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class."[28] Response options for these items were the same as those for *OFR*; we generated an additive scale with higher values indicating greater racial resentment. Our third measure of prejudice captures Whites' feelings toward Latinos relative to their own group, which is a common measure of racial prejudice (Acharya et al., 2016; Reny and Newman, 2021). Respondents reported their favorability toward Whites and Latinos on a scale ranging from (1)-"Very unfavorable" to (5)-"Very favorable." We subtracted the Latino from the White favorability score and label the resulting variable *White-Latino Favorability*, with higher values indicating increasingly greater favor toward Whites vis-a-vis Latinos. Our goal in using multiple indicators of White racial prejudice was to reflect longstanding heterogeneity over the preferred measurement of racial prejudice (Huddy and Feldman, 2009) and potentially demonstrate that our findings are robust across measures.

Finally, to test (*H4*), we created a variable labeled Δ *% Under-18 (Latino)*, which is the change between the 2007-2011 and 2015-2019 ACS 5-year files in the proportion of the total population in a respondent's zip code that are under-18 and Latino. Our expectation is that the positive relationship between Δ *% Latino* and the *Legal Abortion Index* will be stronger among Whites living in areas that have higher levels of growth in the Latino youth population. As points of comparison, we also measure growth in the zip code White youth population, labeled Δ *% Under-18 (White)*, and elderly Latino population, labeled Δ *% Over-65 (Latino)*. Growth in zip code Latino youth populations may capture residing in a locale where multiple or all ethno-racial groups are having many children. Additionally, an expanding population of older Latinos—likely due to immigration or internal migration—in theory should do little to make Latino reproduction salient compared to a burgeoning population of Latino children. In

[28]While racial resentment is typically measured using a 4-item scale, the NS survey only included these two items.

short, if Δ *% Under-18 (Latino)* moderates the relationship among Whites of Δ *% Latino* to the *Legal Abortion Index* but these alternative moderators fail to do so, it would suggest that an observed moderating effect of Δ *% Under-18 (Latino)* derives from altering the salience of Latino reproduction.

Our analytic strategy involves using multivariate regression models that adjust for an extensive set of individual and "pretreatment" contextual confounders[29] potentially predictive of non-White or Latino population growth and attitudes on abortion. We enhance the rigor of this model-based approach with a critical set of ancillary analyses, including those aimed at assessing whether or not key patterns in the data conform to theoretical expectations and additional tests and data intended to mitigate concerns over residential selection bias. With respect to controls, all models include adjustments for respondent education, income, age, gender, evangelicalism and partisanship, as well as 2007-2011 ACS 5-year estimates of zip code median household income, % college educated, % unemployed, % of family households headed by a single-mother, and population density. Given the potential relevance of local political culture to Americans' abortion attitudes, all models adjust for the % of the two-party vote share in the 2008 Presidential Election for the Republican candidate estimated at the zip code level by Mummolo and Nall (2017). Past research finds that Americans' religious context may shape their preferences over abortion. As such, we adjust for county-level % evangelical (of total religious adherents) collected from the 2010 Religious Congregations and Membership Study[30]. For ease of interpretation, we recoded all non-binary independent variables to range from 0 to 1. All models include fixed effects for weekly survey wave and standard errors clustered by zip code. See Section A.1 for more information about data collection and question wording of key variables of interest.

[29]By "pretreatment" we mean contextual variables measured in 2007-2011 or earlier, prior to the time window where we measure non-White and Latino population growth (i.e., our "treatment").

[30]We retrieved this data from Social Explorer: https://www.socialexplorer.com



Figure 1: Local Exposure to Non-White Population Growth and Abortion Policy Preferences. Panels A-D present predicted values of the *Legal Abortion Index* (y-axis) along values of Δ *% Non-White* (x-axis) for White (A), Black (B), Latino (C) and AAPI (D) respondents. Annotations denote min-max influence of Δ *% Non-White*. 95% CIs displayed derived from robust SEs.

Results

Figure 1 presents the results for our test of *H1*. The figure displays the association between Δ *% Non-White* and the *Legal Abortion Index* for White (Panel A), Black (Panel B), Latino (Panel C), and Asian (Panel D) respondents. Full model results are presented in Table B1. Focusing on Whites (Panel A), we see that moving across the x-axis from zips with contracting Latino populations to those with expanding Latino populations is associated with a notable increase in support for legal abortion. The estimated coefficient for Δ *% Non-White* is highly statistically significant (0.17 ($p < 0.001$)) and substantively sizeable—representing 54% of the outcome standard deviation. This finding strongly aligns with *H1*. To put this relationship in context, the association between Δ *% Non-White* and the *Legal Abortion Index* is equivalent to 59% of the outcome's association with *partisanship*, a highly prognostic control covariate. We address the results displayed in Figure 1 Panels B-D in the subsection below discussing residential selection bias. We demonstrate in the appendix that the results in Figure 1 hold when applying survey weights (Table B2).

Having established initial evidence that exposure to non-White population growth is associated with Whites' preferences over abortion, we next focus on over-time growth in specific non-White groups. Figure 2 presents the results for our test of *H2*. We disaggregated



Figure 2: Local Exposure to Latino, Black, and Asian Population Growth and Abortion Policy Preferences Among White Respondents. Panels present predicted values of the *Legal Abortion Index* (y-axis) across zip code change in Latino (A), Black (B), and Asian (C) populations (x-axis) for White respondents. Annotations denote min-max influence of Δ % Latino, Δ % Black, and Δ % Asian. 95% CIs displayed derived from robust SEs.

non-White population growth by over-time change in Latino (Panel A), Black (Panel B) and Asian (Panel C) populations. These results focus on White respondents only. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that Whites' abortion policy preferences shift the most in response to exposure to growing local Latino populations. The coefficient estimate for Δ *% Latino* is 0.25 ($p < 0.001$), equivalent to 79% of the outcome standard deviation. Conversely, the association between Δ *% Black* and the *Legal Abortion Index* is statistically null ($\beta = 0.09, p = 0.1$), and the association between Δ *% Asian* and the *legal abortion index* is also null ($\beta = -0.02, p = 0.76$). The results in Figure 2 hold when applying survey weights (Table D13). A sensitivity analysis (Cinelli and Hazlett, 2020) indicated that, in order for the association between Δ *% Latino* and the *Legal Abortion Index* to reduce to 0, there must be an omitted covariate equivalent to 4x evangelical membership (the most jointly prognostic covariate in our model). This finding suggests our estimate for Δ *% Latino* is relatively insulated from omitted variable bias

Overall, these findings suggest that the influence of non-white population growth on support for legal abortion among Whites is primarily driven by the growth in the Latino population, not other non-white ethno-racial groups. These survey findings align with

demographic reality in the United States in that Latinos are the largest non-Anglo/White group, national population growth over the past decade was due in large part to growth in the Latino population, and the source of Latino population growth has shifted from immigration to reproduction.

Addressing Residential Selection Bias

One concern with contextual analyses such as ours is residential selection bias (Hedman and Ham, 2012). It is possible that the observed relationships of interest in Figures 1 and 2 are due to liberal Whites—who hold more permissive stances on abortion—choosing to reside in areas experiencing diversity gains (i.e., non-White and Latino population growth). This process could be the result of a direct preference for racially diverse settings or a predilection for non-racial characteristics of residential areas that are correlated with growing diversity. Either way, residential selection has a variety of observable implications, and we can test for these in our data. In this subsection, we offer a series of analyses and findings that greatly mitigate concern over residential selection in generating our results.

First, concern over left-right political orientations predicting selection into diversifying contexts highlights the importance of accounting for such orientations in regression models. All of the results presented above control for respondent partisanship, which provides some initial reduction in concern that the estimated coefficients for zip code Δ *% Non-White* or Δ *% Latino* are merely capturing Whites' left-right political orientations.

Second, we draw readers' attention to the results presented in Figure 1, Panels B-D, which reveal little-to-no relationship of non-White population growth to abortion policy preferences among non-White respondents. The estimated coefficients for Δ *% Non-White* for the Black, Latino, and Asian sample are small and statistically insignificant: -0.01 ($p = 0.79$), -0.04 ($p = 0.39$), and 0.01 ($p = 0.91$). While there may be some differences across racial and ethnic groups in the factors shaping the choice of residence, there is little a priori theoretical reason to expect that the orientations (e.g., openness to experience, novelty-seeking, liberalism)

leading Whites to gravitate toward residential spaces experiencing growing diversity would not also lead Black, Latino and Asian Americans with similar orientations to residing in comparable residential contexts. In other words, if the findings for Whites in Figures 1 and 2 are due to liberals selecting into diversifying settings, we should observe at least some trace of this for non-Whites as well. Yet, we do not, which provides a powerful piece of evidence against residential selection as an alternative explanation for the results for Whites in Figures 1 and 2. What is more, the results in Panels B-D can be viewed as theory-affirming null results insomuch as the theoretical frameworks we draw on to build our hypotheses imply that non-Whites will be less threatened by growing racial and ethnic diversity. The dynamics we theorize to be operative in shaping Whites' reactions to minority population growth, such as evoked feelings of threat to Whites' dominant status, are less applicable to members of subjugated or minoritized groups.

Third, we re-estimate the model underlying Figure 1 Panel A using several "gender-related" outcomes in the NS not having to do with abortion policy: sexism, perceived discrimination against women, and favorability toward prominent liberal female politicians (Elizabeth Warren and Kamala Harris). If Whites residing in areas experiencing diversity gains happen to be more progressive on gender, then such Whites should evince lower levels of sexism, greater awareness of gender-based discrimination, and heightened favorability toward prominent liberal female politicians. We demonstrate in Tables B3 and B4 that Δ *% Non-White* and Δ *% Latino* have statistically insignificant relationships with these alternative indicators of gender liberalism. Moreover, when performing difference tests, we find that the estimated relationship between Δ *% Latino* and the *Legal Abortion Index* is significantly larger than the relationship of Δ *% Latino* to each of these other outcomes. These additional findings suggest against our main results being due to Whites with more progressive views on gender selecting into contexts experiencing diversity gains. In contrast, it highlights a unique relationship among Whites of exposure to Latino-driven ethnic diversification and attitudes on reproductive policy.

Fourth, despite adjusting for population density in all of our models, it is possible that the effects of non-White and Latino population growth are due to comparing Whites in low-density rural areas, who tend to be conservative, to high-density urban areas, who tend to be liberal. To assuage this concern, we demonstrate in Table B8 the retention of positive and mostly significant coefficients for Δ *% Non-White* and Δ *% Latino* when separately analyzing Whites residing in low-density and high-density zip codes, suggesting the relationships between non-White or Latino growth and abortion attitudes are not due to a confound with population density. Perhaps more to the point, we demonstrate that the results in Figures 1 and 2 hold when separately analyzing White Democrats and White Republicans (Table B9), which goes some distance in alleviating the concern that the findings for Δ *% Non-White* and Δ *% Latino* are due to drawing an underlying comparison between liberal versus conservative Whites. This said, we cannot entirely rule out the possibility that, even when focusing on just Democrats or Republicans, there is variation in socio-religious conservatism operative in selection into racially diversifying environs. For example, in the analysis of White Republicans in Table B9, it is possible that Republicans residing in areas remaining non-diverse are socially conservative while those selecting into areas experiencing diversity gains are fiscally conservative but more socially liberal—what Miller and Schofield (2003) would refer to as "cosmopolitan" Republicans.

Given this, we sought to provide a direct test of whether or not Whites' more strongly favoring legal abortion select into residential spaces experiencing growth in Latino populations. We utilize two panel surveys of American adults each containing sizable samples of Whites: (1) the 2010-2014 Cooperative Election Study (CES; $N = 7993$ Whites), and (2) 2011-2016 Voter Study Group Panel (VSG; $N = 1221$ Whites). Each panel includes the zip code of residence for respondents for each survey wave, enabling us to identify those moving to a different zip code between the first and last wave. Using this data, we test for evidence of a relationship between Whites' support for legal abortion in the first survey wave and their moving to zip codes experiencing more Latino growth relative to their zip code of residence



Figure 3: Support for Legal Abortion and Selection into Increasingly Latino Zip Codes. The x-axis is the dataset at use (i.e. CES 2010-2014 panel survey, VSG 2011-2016 panel survey). The y-axis is the coefficient for attitudes characterizing support for legal abortion in 2010 and and 2011 for the CES and VSG surveys respectively. The outcome of interest is the change in the proportion of the population that is Latino between 2000-2010 for zipcodes that respondents report living in for 2014 (CES) and 2016 (VSG). 95% CIs displayed derived from robust SEs.

in the first wave. We use a simple cross-lagged approach assessing the association between Δ *% Latino* between 2000-2010 for the zip code reported in the final wave and support for legal abortion in the first wave after adjusting for Δ *% Latino* between 2000-2010 for the zip code reported in the first wave. We implement this approach for two CES and VSG subsets: (1) all White respondents, and (2) all White respondents who moved zip codes between the first and final waves. Figure 3 reports the association between support for legal abortion and selection into increasingly Latino zip codes. For both the full sample of Whites and the subsample of White movers, the legal abortion support coefficients are statistically null and substantively zero. These findings suggest support for legal abortion does not motivate selection into increasingly Latino neighborhoods among Whites, which lessens our concern that the results in Figures 1 and 2 are driven by residential selection.

The Moderating Effect of Prejudice

We have shown that Whites exposed to Latino population growth in their residential context are more supportive of legal abortion. If this finding is due to a desire among Whites to curtail ethnic diversification, it stands to reason that the Whites who would want this the most are those that most strongly dislike ethnic minorities. With this reasoning in mind, we now turn to the results for our tests of *H3*.

Figure 4 presents the results from moderation analyses exploring the relationship of zip code Latino growth to abortion policy preferences conditional on three different indicators of White respondents' level of racial prejudice. Across three distinct measures of prejudice—with one specific to Latinos (e.g., *White-Latino Favorability*)—we observe a striking consistency of results: Whites high in prejudice are driving the previously observed relationship between Δ *% Latino* and the *Legal Abortion Index*. The interaction between Δ *% Latino* and *OFR* ($\beta = 0.28$, SE $= 0.13$, $p < 0.05$), *Racial Resentment* ($\beta = 0.48$, SE $= 0.14$, $p < 0.001$), and *White-Latino Favorability* ($\beta = 0.82$, SE $= 0.22$, $p < 0.001$) are each positive and statistically significant (Table B5). When focusing on Whites at the lowest end of each prejudice measure, we observe statistically insignificant and substantively small changes in support for legal abortion associated with zip code Latino population growth. These results provide strong evidence in support of *H3*. While the previous subsection offers myriad findings mitigating concern over residential selection, the results in Figure 4 arguably further dispel such concerns by uncovering a critical pattern in the data that conforms to our theory. While one could conceive of potential omitted variables or untheorized processes explaining an observed relationship between Δ *% Latino* and the *Legal Abortion Index*, it becomes more difficult to identify an omitted variable or untheorized process that can explain the conditional relationships uncovered in Figure 4. As a robustness check, we demonstrate in Table B6 that the results presented in Figure 4 hold controlling for interactions between Δ *% Latino* and additional individual-level variables.



Figure 4: The Influence of Latino Population Growth on Abortion Policy Preferences Conditional on Whites' Ethno-Racial Attitudes. Panels A-C characterize predicted values of the Legal Abortion Index (y-axis) along shifts in relative zipcode non-White population (x-axis) for white respondents at the minimum (grey) and maximum (black) of Old-Fashioned Racism, Racial Resentment, and White-Latino Favorability respectively. 95% CIs displayed from robust SEs.

The Moderating Effect of a Growing Population of Latino Children

We complete our analysis of the NS data with the results from our test of *H4*. Figure 6, Panel A presents the results from our analysis of the relationship of zip code Δ *% Latino* to support for legal abortion conditional on concomitant zip code growth in the Latino youth population. The results in Panel A reveal that local exposure to Latino growth is unrelated to abortion attitudes when it is unaccompanied by growth in the local Latino youth population. However, among Whites residing in zips where the Latino youth population grew, we observe an increasingly positive and significant relationship of Latino population growth to support for legal abortion. Critically, the results in Panel B illustrate that the findings in Panel A are not due to general growth in the local youth population, as growth in the White youth population does not moderate the relationship of Δ *% Latino* to the *Legal Abortion Index*. Further, Panel C illustrates that growth in the local elderly Latino population does not moderate the relationship of Δ *% Latino* to the *Legal Abortion Index*. These findings suggest that exposure to local Latino reproduction—manifest by a burgeoning population of Latino children—facilitates the connection among Whites of their exposure to Latino population growth to their preferences over abortion.



Figure 5: The Influence of Latino Population Growth on Abortion Policy Preferences Conditional on Shifts in the Youth Population. The y-axis characterizes the min-max coefficient for Δ % Latino along levels of Δ % Latino 18 and Under (Panel A, x-axis). Δ % White 18 and Under (Panel B, x-axis), and Δ % Latino 65 and Over (Panel C, x-axis). 95% CIs displayed from robust SEs.

Ancillary Data and Findings

While the results in the previous sections conform to a range of theoretical expectations, they do not provide direct evidence that White respondents are thinking about their support for abortion in terms of curbing population growth. Moreover, our previous analysis uses objective, contextual measures of non-White and Latino population growth to capture Whites' exposure to demographic change. An alternative approach could involve directly measuring receipt of the "treatment" by asking respondents about perceived non-White and Latino population growth in their surrounding residential area. To address these issues, we designed a simple survey intended to offer a conceptual replication of the previous analysis using more explicit measures of exposure to the "treatment" and our outcome of interest.

We recruited a national sample of adult Americans via Lucid Theorem that rendered $N = 1,948$ non-Latino Whites. We measured exposure to demographic change by asking respondents to report if over the past 10 years the non-White population in the local area

where they live has decreased, stayed about the same, or increased? We then did the same but asked specifically about the growth of the Latino population. Response options for these items ranged from (1)-"Decreased a lot" to (5)-"Increased a lot". Finally, as our dependent variable, we presented respondents with the following question: "The following are some ways that have been proposed to help slow population growth in the United States. Please select if you favor or oppose each of the following: Making abortions more easily available to women who want them." Response options for this item ranged from (1)-"Strongly oppose" to (6)-"Strongly favor." See Section A.2 for more information about data collection and question wording. Akin to our analysis in Figure 2, we assess the association between perceived local demographic change and support for abortion (as a means of population control) conditional on prejudice. Old-Fashioned Racism (*OFR*) is one of the available measures of prejudice in the NS data used in our analysis in Figure 2. As such, we included opposition to interracial marriage in our Lucid survey and rely on this as our measure of White prejudice in this ancillary analysis. We adjust for several control covariates, including age, gender, education, income, evangelicalism, and partisanship. All covariates are rescaled to range between 0-1.

Figure 6 characterizes the association between perceived non-White (Panel A) and Latino (Panel B) population growth and support for abortion as population control conditional on levels of *OFR*. Consistent with *H3*, the interactions between perceived non-White growth and *OFR* ($\beta = 0.25$, SE $= 0.10$) and between perceived Latino growth and *OFR* ($\beta = 0.17$, SE $= 0.11$, see Table B10) are positive. For White respondents who are the most prejudiced, there are sizable positive associations between perceived shifts in ethno-racial demographics and support for abortion as population control. For these prejudiced whites, moving from no perceived local change in the non-white population to the greatest perceived change is associated with 0.19 (local Latino population growth) and 0.24 (local non-White population growth) point increases in support for abortion as population control. In contrast, among White respondents who are least prejudiced, we find no relationship between perceived local demographic change and support for abortion. These findings are *strikingly* similar to the



Figure 6: Perceived Local Population Growth and Support for Abortion as a Means of Population Control Conditional on Old-Fashioned Racism (White Respondents). The y-axis characterizes predicted values for favoring abortion as population control. The x-axis characterizes perceptions of local non-white (Panel A) and Latino (Panel B) population growth. Colors denote the lowest and highest levels of old-fashioned racism. 95% CIs displayed from robust SEs.

results presented in Figure 4, offering a replication using self-reported exposure to local demographic change and a measure of support for abortion that explicitly situates it within the context of population control.

Conclusion

This article explores the political consequences of a major transition in the forces driving the ethnic diversification of the United States: the *immigration-to-reproduction* shift in Latino population growth. Our findings suggest this shift may direct the perennial forces of White backlash in American society toward a policy outlet that is novel in terms of recent backlash history but firmly rooted in historical precedent: reproductive policy. We find that, among Whites who are racially prejudiced, exposure to Latino population growth is associated with heightened support for access to legal abortion. Among the American public, racial and religious conservatism tend to be correlated (Deckman et al., 2023) and attitudes on abortion

exhibit relative stability over time (Jelen and Wilcox, 2003). Given this, our findings are all the more notable in that they illustrate the power of a potent treatment—ethno-racial demographic change—in potentially shifting relatively rigid political attitudes.

Our study opens up several avenues for future research. First, future research could extend our findings analyzing opinions reported in surveys to observed behavior in the real-world using state and local ballot measures on abortion. Such measures afford an opportunity to assess if exposure to shifting ethno-racial demographics is associated with elevated pro-choice vote shares among White voters. In 2022 alone, after the *Dobbs* Supreme Court decision, there were 6 ballot measures addressing abortion in Kansas, California, Kentucky, Michigan, Montana and Vermont. However, it is important to note that data on these ballot measures is typically aggregate (e.g. precinct-level), whereas our study allows for an individual-level assessment of the link between ethno-racial context and abortion attitudes. Second, while our research focuses on abortion as a highly salient arena of reproductive policy, future research could assess the link between demographic shifts and other facets of reproductive politics, such as funding for sex education, access to birth control, subsidized health care for women, maternity leave, and the highly controversial issue of sterilization. Third, while we take great care to address omitted variable bias in our research, future scholarship could potentially leverage lab-, survey-, or field-based experimental interventions that randomly expose White Americans to demographic change treatments and measure changes in attitudinal or behavioral support for access to legal abortion relative to untreated control groups. Finally, future research could explore whether our findings extend beyond the United States to other immigrant-receiving nations with sizable immigrant communities with increasing birth rates.

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Appendices

Contents

A Data Details

A.1 Nationscape

Nationscape is a survey consisting of nearly half a million interviews conducted between July 2019 and January 2021, covering the final year of Donald Trump's presidency, 2020 U.S. presidential nominating contests, COVID-19 pandemic, Black Lives Matter movement, 2020 presidential campaign, election, and its aftermath, including the insurrection at the U.S. Capitol on January 6th, 2020, and the inauguration of Joe Biden as the 45th president of the United States. The survey began on July 10, 2019, and includes interviews with roughly 6,100 people per week. The sample is weighted to be representative of the U.S. adult population. Sample for Nationscape is provided by Lucid, a market research platform operating an online exchange for survey respondents. Nationscape samples match a set of representative demographic quotas on age, gender, race/ethnicity, region, income, and education. Respondents are sent from Lucid directly to survey software operated by the Nationscape team. All respondents take the survey online and must complete an attention check before taking the survey. The survey is conducted in English (Tausanovitch et al., 2019).

A.1.1 Moderator Items

Old Fashioned Racism: I prefer that my close relatives marry spouses from their same race 1) Strongly agree, 2) Somewhat agree, 3) Neither agree nor disagree, 4) Somewhat disagree, 5) Strongly disagree

Racial Resentment 1: Irish, Italian, Jewish, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors. 1) Strongly agree 2) Somewhat agree 3) Neither agree nor disagree 4) Somewhat disagree 5) Strongly disagree

Racial Resentment 2: Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for Blacks to work their way out of the lower class. 1) Strongly agree 2) Somewhat agree 3) Neither agree nor disagree 4) Somewhat disagree 5) Strongly disagree

Old Fashioned Racism: I prefer that my close relatives marry spouses from their same race 1) Strongly agree, 2) Somewhat agree, 3) Neither agree nor disagree, 4) Somewhat disagree, 5) Strongly disagree

White Feeling Thermometer: Here are the names of some groups that are in the news from time to time. How favorable is your impression of each group: Whites. 1) Very favorable 2) Somewhat favorable 3) Somewhat unfavorable 4) Very unfavorable

Latino Feeling Thermometer: Here are the names of some groups that are in the news from time to time. How favorable is your impression of each group: Latinos. 1) Very favorable 2) Somewhat favorable 3) Somewhat unfavorable 4) Very unfavorable

A.1.2 Outcome Items

Never Permit Abortion: We'd like to know whether you agree or disagree with each of the following policies: Never permit abortion. 1) Agree 2) Disagree 3) Not sure

Permit Abortion in Certain Cases: We'd like to know whether you agree or disagree with each of the following policies: Permit abortion in cases other than rape, incest, or when the woman's life is in danger. 1) Agree 2) Disagree 3) Not sure

Permit Late-Term Abortion: We'd like to know whether you agree or disagree with each of the following policies: Permit late term abortion. 1) Agree 2) Disagree 3) Not sure

A.2 Lucid Survey

The Lucid survey was approved by the Institutional Review Board at the University of Texas-Austin. Lucid theorem is an automated marketplace that connects researchers with respondents from a variety of network survey panel companies. Many of these are double opt-in panels where respondents are invited to partake in research via emails, push notifications, in-app pop-ups, or other means. Respondents are incentivized in a variety of ways depending on the supplier. Lucid takes a variety of steps to increase the quality of respondents from these survey panel providers including: 1) blocking users from taking surveys multiple times via cookies, IP addresses, or other unique identifiers; 2) screen the quality of respondents through attention check questions and open ended questions; 3) using third party bot detection services like Google's reCaptcha to block bots; and 4) publish and provide information on the quality of all their data suppliers. Existing research finds Lucid samples to be of high quality (Coppock and McClellan, 2019), and can provide samples that are similar in quality to high quality survey respondent panels like Pew's American Trends Panel (Tausanovitch et al., 2019)

A.2.1 Independent Variable Items

Non-White Population Growth: Now we'd like to ask you some questions about your perceptions of population trends. In the past 10 years in the United States, has the non-White population (e.g., Black, Latino, Asian) increased, stayed about the same, or decreased? 1) Increased a lot 2) Increased a little 3) Stayed about the same 4) Decreased a little 5) Decreased a lot

Latino Population Growth: Focusing specifically on the Hispanic/Latino population, in the past 10 years in the United States has the Hispanic/Latino population increased, stayed about the same, or decreased? 1) Increased a lot 2) Increased a little 3) Stayed about the same 4) Decreased a little 5) Decreased a lot

A.2.2 Moderator Items

Old Fashioned Racism: Please tell us how much you agree or disagree with the following statement: I prefer that my close relatives marry spouses from their same race. 1) Strongly Agree 2) Agree 3) Somewhat Agree 4) Somewhat Disagree 5) Disagree 6) Strongly Disagree

A.2.3 Outcome Items

Support for Abortion as Population Control: The United States population continues to grow. The following are some ways that have been proposed to help slow population growth in the United States. Please select if you favor or oppose each of the following: "Making abortions more easily available to women who want them" 1) Strongly Favor 2) Favor 3) Somewhat Favor 4) Somewhat Oppose 5) Oppose 6) Strongly Oppose

B Regression Tables

B.1 First-Order Association

Table B1: Association Between Non-White Population Growth and Support for Legal Abortion (By Ethno-Racial Subsample)

	Legal Abortion Index			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Δ % Non-White ('19-'11)	0.17***	−0.01	−0.04	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Age	−0.03***	0.02**	−0.09***	0.02
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Woman	−0.01***	0.01*	0.01**	0.01
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Evangelical	−0.18***	−0.09***	−0.13***	−0.16***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Education	0.08***	0.10***	0.08***	0.05***
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Income	0.03***	0.05***	0.04***	0.06***
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Partisanship	−0.29***	−0.16***	−0.19***	−0.24***
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)
% Evangelical ('10)	−0.04***	−0.08***	−0.12***	−0.16***
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.05)
MHHI ('11)	0.07***	0.07*	0.01	−0.11**
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
% College ('11)	0.10***	0.04*	0.09***	0.15***
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
% Unemployed ('11)	0.18***	0.02	0.07	−0.03
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)
% Single Mother ('11)	−0.02	−0.03	−0.04	0.05
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Pop. Density ('11)	−0.04	−0.05	−0.02	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
% McCain ('08)	−0.10***	−0.06***	−0.03*	−0.04
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Wave FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Ethnicity/Race Subset	White	Black	Latino	Asian
R^2	0.27	0.08	0.13	0.17
Num. obs.	300916	48671	63768	19243
N Clusters	22038	8451	11546	5542

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$. All models fully specified. All covariates rescaled between 0-1. Robust zipcode clustered SEs in parentheses.

B.2 First-Order Association (Weighted)

Table B2: Association Between Non-White Population Growth and Support for Legal Abortion (By Ethno-Racial Subsample)

	Legal Abortion Index			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Δ % Non-White ('19-'11)	0.19***	−0.01	0.04	0.03
	(0.05)	(0.09)	(0.15)	(0.17)
Age	−0.03***	0.05***	−0.08***	0.07**
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Woman	−0.01***	0.00	0.01	−0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Evangelical	−0.18***	−0.11***	−0.12***	−0.15***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Education	0.08***	0.08***	0.07***	0.04*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Income	0.04***	0.06***	0.07***	0.08***
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Partisanship	−0.28***	−0.19***	−0.19***	−0.22***
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
% Evangelical ('10)	−0.04**	−0.07*	−0.12*	−0.13
	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.07)
MHHI ('11)	0.07***	0.10*	0.04	−0.13*
	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.06)
% College ('11)	0.10***	0.05	0.08	0.19***
	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
% Unemployed ('11)	0.15***	0.03	0.08	0.00
	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.13)	(0.17)
% Single Mother ('11)	0.01	−0.02	−0.06	0.06
	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.12)
Pop. Density ('11)	−0.05	−0.13*	0.10	0.18**
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)
% McCain ('08)	−0.10***	−0.07***	−0.02	−0.03
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Wave FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Ethnicity/Race Subset	White	Black	Latino	Asian
R^2	0.26	0.11	0.12	0.18
Num. obs.	300916	48671	31771	19243
N Clusters	22038	8451	8469	5542

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$. All models fully specified. All covariates rescaled between 0-1. All estimates use survey population weights. Robust zipcode clustered SEs in parentheses.

B.3 Gender-Related Falsification Tests

Δ % Non-White

Table B3: Association Between Non-White Population Growth and Support for Abortion-Irrelevant Gender(ed) Attitudes

	Sexism	**Perceived Discrim.**	**Fav. Warren**	**Fav. Harris**
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Δ % Non-White ('19-'11)	−0.03	0.05	0.00	−0.02
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Age	0.05***	−0.17***	−0.18***	−0.12***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Woman	−0.06***	0.04***	0.03***	0.03***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Evangelical	0.04***	0.02***	−0.00	−0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education	−0.06***	0.07***	0.08***	0.07***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)
Income	−0.02***	−0.03***	−0.02***	0.01**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Partisanship	0.13***	−0.18***	−0.54***	−0.53***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
% Evangelical ('10)	−0.01*	0.05***	0.01	−0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
MHHI ('11)	0.04***	−0.02	−0.05**	−0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
% College ('11)	−0.06***	0.04***	0.03**	0.04***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
% Unemployed ('11)	0.02	0.01	0.04	−0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
% Single Mother ('11)	−0.01	0.09***	0.03	−0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Pop. Density ('11)	0.25***	0.13***	0.37***	0.23***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)
% McCain ('08)	−0.02***	−0.05***	−0.07***	−0.08***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Wave FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Race Subset	White	White	White	White
R^2	0.14	0.09	0.35	0.34
Num. obs.	301072	301009	163361	193511
N Clusters	22027	22025	19791	20414

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$. All models fully specified. Robust zipcode clustered SEs in parentheses. All covariates rescaled between 0-1. The vast majority of dropped observations are not due to non-response missingness, but rather different time periods in which outcome question items are asked during the fielding of the Nationscape survey.

Δ % Latino

Table B4: Association Between Non-White Population Growth and Support for Abortion-Irrelevant Gender(ed) Attitudes

	Sexism	**Perceived Discrim.**	**Fav. Warren**	**Fav. Harris**
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Δ % Latino ('19-'11)	−0.05	0.08	0.06	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Age	0.05***	−0.17***	−0.18***	−0.12***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Woman	−0.06***	0.04***	0.03***	0.03***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Evangelical	0.04***	0.02***	−0.00	−0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education	−0.06***	0.07***	0.08***	0.07***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)
Income	−0.02***	−0.03***	−0.02***	0.01**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Partisanship	0.13***	−0.18***	−0.54***	−0.53***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
% Evangelical ('10)	−0.01*	0.05***	0.01	−0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
MHHI ('11)	0.04***	−0.02	−0.05**	−0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
% College ('11)	−0.06***	0.04***	0.03**	0.04***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
% Unemployed ('11)	0.02	0.00	0.04	−0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
% Single Mother ('11)	−0.01	0.09***	0.03	−0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Pop. Density ('11)	0.25***	0.13***	0.37***	0.23***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)
% McCain ('08)	−0.02***	−0.05***	−0.07***	−0.08***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Wave FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Race Subset	White	White	White	White
R^2	0.14	0.09	0.35	0.34
Num. obs.	301072	301009	163361	193511
N Clusters	22027	22025	19791	20414

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$. All models fully specified. Robust zipcode clustered SEs in parentheses. All covariates rescaled between 0-1. The vast majority of dropped observations are not due to non-response missingness, but rather different time periods in which outcome question items are asked during the fielding of the Nationscape survey.

B.4 Heterogeneity By Racial Attitudes

Table B5: Association Between Non-White Population Growth and Support for Legal Abortion Conditional on Racial Attitudes

	Legal Abortion Index		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Δ % Latino ('19-'11) x OFR	0.29*		
	(0.13)		
Δ % Latino ('19-'11) x Resentment		0.48***	
		(0.14)	
Δ % Latino ('19-'11) x White-Latino Fav.			0.82***
			(0.22)
Δ % Latino ('19-'11)	0.11	−0.02	−0.20
	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.12)
OFR	−0.19**		
	(0.07)		
Resentment		−0.41***	
		(0.07)	
White-Latino Fav.			−0.54***
			(0.11)
Age	−0.02***	0.01*	−0.02***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Woman	−0.01***	−0.01***	−0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Evangelical	−0.18***	−0.18***	−0.18***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education	0.08***	0.06***	0.07***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Income	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Partisanship	−0.28***	−0.24***	−0.28***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
% Evangelical ('10)	−0.03**	−0.03**	−0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
MHHI ('11)	0.08***	0.09***	0.08***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
% College ('11)	0.10***	0.08***	0.10***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
% Unemployed ('11)	0.18***	0.18***	0.18***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
% Single Mother ('11)	−0.02	−0.03	−0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Pop. Density ('11)	−0.02	−0.03	−0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
% McCain ('08)	−0.10***	−0.09***	−0.09***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Wave FE	Y	Y	Y
Race Subset	White	White	White
R^2	0.27	0.28	0.27
Num. obs.	299476	299412	297279
N Clusters	22007	22005	21981

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$. All models fully specified. Robust SEs in parentheses.

B.5 Heterogeneity by Racial Attitudes Adjusting For Multiple Interactions

Table B6: Association Between Non-White Population Growth and Support for Legal Abortion Conditional on Racial Attitudes Adjusting for Other Interactions

	Legal Abortion Index		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Δ % Non-White ('19-'11) x OFR	0.21		
	(0.13)		
Δ % Non-White ('19-'11) x Resentment		0.42**	
		(0.16)	
Δ % Non-White ('19-'11) x White-Latino Fav.			0.73**
			(0.23)
Δ % Non-White ('19-'11) x Partisanship	0.07	−0.01	0.05
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Δ % Non-White ('19-'11) x Evangelical	0.25*	0.25*	0.25*
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Δ % Non-White ('19-'11) x Education	−0.13	−0.12	−0.10
	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.21)
Δ % Non-White ('19-'11)	0.10	0.02	−0.21
	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.18)
OFR	−0.15*		
	(0.07)		
Resentment		−0.38***	
		(0.08)	
White-Latino Fav.			−0.49***
			(0.12)
Age	−0.02***	0.01*	−0.02***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Woman	−0.03	−0.03	−0.03
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Evangelical	−0.31***	−0.30***	−0.31***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Education	0.14	0.12	0.12
	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.11)
Income	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Partisanship	−0.32***	−0.23**	−0.30***
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
% Evangelical ('10)	−0.03**	−0.03**	−0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
MHHI ('11)	0.08***	0.09***	0.08***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
% College ('11)	0.10***	0.08***	0.10***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
% Unemployed ('11)	0.18***	0.18***	0.18***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
% Single Mother ('11)	−0.02	−0.03	−0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Pop. Density ('11)	−0.02	−0.03	−0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
% McCain ('08)	−0.10***	−0.09***	−0.09***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Wave FE	Y	Y	Y
Race Subset	White	White	White
R^2	0.27	0.28	0.27
Num. obs.	299476	299412	297279
N Clusters	22007	22005	21981

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$. All models fully specified. Robust SEs in parentheses.

B.6 Heterogeneity by Youth Population Growth

Table B7: Association Between Non-White Population Growth and Support for Legal Abortion Conditional on Youth Population Growth

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Δ % Latino ('19-'11) x Δ % Under-18 Latino ('19-'11)	2.31**		
	(0.83)		
Δ % Latino ('19-'11) x Δ % Under-18 White ('19-'11)		−0.92	
		(1.23)	
Δ % Latino ('19-'11) x Δ % Over-65 Latino ('19-'11)			−0.70
			(1.66)
Δ % Latino ('19-'11)	−0.26	0.66	0.37
	(0.31)	(0.58)	(0.52)
Δ % Under-18 White ('19-'11)		0.43	
		(0.62)	
Δ % Over-65 Latino ('19-'11)			0.88
			(0.87)
Age	−0.03***	−0.03***	−0.03***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Woman	−0.01***	−0.01***	−0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Evangelical	−0.18***	−0.18***	−0.18***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education	0.08***	0.08***	0.08***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Income	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Partisanship	−0.29***	−0.29***	−0.29***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
% Evangelical ('10)	−0.03**	−0.03***	−0.03**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
MHHI ('11)	0.07***	0.07***	0.07***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
% College ('11)	0.11***	0.10***	0.11***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
% Unemployed ('11)	0.17***	0.18***	0.17***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
% Single Mother ('11)	−0.04	−0.03	−0.04
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Pop. Density ('11)	−0.05	−0.04	−0.06
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
% McCain ('08)	−0.09***	−0.10***	−0.09***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Wave FE	Y	Y	Y
Race Subset	White	White	White
R^2	0.27	0.27	0.27
Num. obs.	300916	300916	300916
N Clusters	22038	22038	22038

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$. All models fully specified. HC2 robust SEs in parentheses.

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$. All models fully specified. All covariates rescaled between 0-1. Robust zipcode clustered SEs in parentheses.

B.7 Population Density Subsets

Table B8: Association Between Non-White/Latino Population Growth and Support For Legal Abortion By Population Density Subsets

	Legal Abortion Index			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Δ % Non-White ('19-'11)	0.15**	0.07		
	(0.05)	(0.05)		
Δ % Latino ('19-'11)			0.19**	0.19**
			(0.07)	(0.07)
Age	−0.04***	−0.05***	−0.04***	−0.05***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Woman	−0.01***	0.00	−0.01***	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Evangelical	−0.18***	−0.18***	−0.18***	−0.18***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education	0.08***	0.08***	0.08***	0.08***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Income	0.02***	0.04***	0.02***	0.04***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Partisanship	−0.30***	−0.28***	−0.30***	−0.28***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
% Evangelical ('10)	−0.04***	0.02	−0.04**	0.02
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
MHHI ('11)	0.14***	0.04	0.14***	0.04
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
% College ('11)	0.09***	0.06***	0.09***	0.06***
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
% Unemployed ('11)	0.20***	0.14**	0.20***	0.14**
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.05)
% Single Mother ('11)	−0.01	−0.14***	−0.02	−0.15***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Pop. Density ('11)	0.98	−0.04	1.25	−0.04
	(1.15)	(0.03)	(1.15)	(0.03)
% McCain ('08)	−0.08***	−0.10***	−0.08***	−0.10***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Wave FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Race Subset	White	White	White	White
Pop. Density Subset	Below Median	Above Median	Below Median	Above Median
R^2	0.26	0.24	0.26	0.24
Num. obs.	150139	150777	150139	150777
N Clusters	15651	6388	15651	6388

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$. All models fully specified. Robust zipcode clustered SEs in parentheses.

B.8 Partisanship Subsets

Table B9: Association Between Non-White/Latino Population Growth and Support For Legal Abortion By Partisanship Subsets

	Legal Abortion Index			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Δ % Non-White ('19-'11)	0.22***	0.14**		
	(0.05)	(0.04)		
Δ % Latino ('19-'11)			0.31***	0.18**
			(0.07)	(0.07)
Age	−0.04***	−0.05***	−0.04***	−0.05***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Woman	−0.02***	0.00	−0.02***	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Evangelical	−0.17***	−0.20***	−0.17***	−0.20***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education	0.01*	0.14***	0.01*	0.14***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Income	0.04***	0.02***	0.04***	0.02***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Partisanship	−0.26***	−0.15***	−0.26***	−0.15***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
% Evangelical ('10)	−0.04**	−0.02	−0.04**	−0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
MHHI ('11)	0.12***	0.01	0.13***	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
% College ('11)	0.06***	0.14***	0.06***	0.15***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
% Unemployed ('11)	0.26***	0.12**	0.26***	0.11**
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
% Single Mother ('11)	−0.00	−0.01	−0.00	−0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Pop. Density ('11)	0.24***	−0.20***	0.24***	−0.20***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
% McCain ('08)	−0.12***	−0.06***	−0.12***	−0.06***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Wave FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Race Subset	White	White	White	White
PID Subset	Republican	Democrat	Republican	Democrat
R^2	0.13	0.16	0.13	0.16
Num. obs.	138370	129677	138370	129677
N Clusters	18730	17289	18730	17289

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$. All models fully specified. Robust zipcode clustered SEs in parentheses.

B.9 Ancillary Analysis

Table B10: Association Between Perceived Demographic Change and Support For Abortion as Population Control Conditional on Prejudice

	Model 1	Model 2
Chng Non-White Local	−0.01	
	(0.05)	
Chng Non-White * OFR	0.25**	
	(0.10)	
Chng Latino Local		0.02
		(0.05)
Chng Latino * OFR		0.17
		(0.11)
OFR	−0.25***	−0.20**
	(0.08)	(0.08)
Education	−0.03	−0.04
	(0.03)	(0.03)
Income	0.06**	0.06**
	(0.03)	(0.03)
Age	−0.12***	−0.11***
	(0.03)	(0.03)
Female	0.05***	0.05***
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Evangelical	−0.21***	−0.21***
	(0.02)	(0.02)
7-PT PID (R)	−0.44***	−0.44***
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Intercept	0.95***	0.93***
	(0.04)	(0.04)
R^2	0.33	0.33
Adj. R^2	0.33	0.32
Num. obs.	1882	1882
RMSE	0.30	0.30

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$. All models fully specified. Robust SEs in parentheses. White respondents only.

C Disaggregating Outcome Index

Table C11: Association Between Non-White Population Growth and Support for Legal Abortion (Disaggregating Index Outcome)

	No Abortion Ban	**Permit Abortion**	**Permit Late-Term Abortion**
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Δ % Latino ('19-'11)	0.26***	0.32***	0.16*
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Age	0.13***	0.00	−0.23***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Woman	0.02***	0.01***	−0.05***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Evangelical	−0.26***	−0.21***	−0.08***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education	0.09***	0.06***	0.09***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Income	0.04***	0.04***	0.01*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Partisanship	−0.25***	−0.32***	−0.29***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
% Evangelical ('10)	−0.09***	−0.04**	0.03*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
MHHI ('11)	0.04	0.13***	0.05**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
% College ('11)	0.09***	0.09***	0.13***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
% Unemployed ('11)	0.12**	0.24***	0.17***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
% Single Mother ('11)	−0.06*	−0.01	−0.00
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Pop. Density ('11)	−0.40***	0.07	0.19***
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
% McCain ('08)	−0.02*	−0.11***	−0.15***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Wave FE	Y	Y	Y
Race Subset	White	White	White
R^2	0.19	0.17	0.14
Num. obs.	307816	308455	308048
N Clusters	22377	22376	22371

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$. All models fully specified. "No Abortion Ban" = disagree with notion of banning abortion. "Permit Abortion" = agree with notion of permitting abortion beyond certain conditions (e.g. incest, sexual assault). "Permit Late-Term Abortion" = agree with notion of permitting late-term abortion. Robust zipcode clustered SEs in parentheses.

D Alternative Group Growth Measures

D.1 First-Order Association

Table D12: Association Between Alternative Population Growth Measures and Support for Legal Abortion

	Legal Abortion Index			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Δ % Latino ('19-'11)	0.25***			
	(0.05)			
Δ % Black ('19-'11)		0.09		
		(0.06)		
Δ % Asian ('19-'11)			−0.02	
			(0.06)	
Δ % Foreign-Born ('19-'11)				−0.06
				(0.06)
Age	−0.04***	−0.04***	−0.04***	−0.04***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Woman	−0.01***	−0.01***	−0.01***	−0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Evangelical	−0.18***	−0.18***	−0.18***	−0.18***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education	0.08***	0.08***	0.08***	0.08***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Income	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Partisanship	−0.29***	−0.29***	−0.29***	−0.29***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
% Evangelical ('10)	−0.03***	−0.04***	−0.04***	−0.04***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
MHHI ('11)	0.07***	0.08***	0.08***	0.08***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
% College ('11)	0.10***	0.10***	0.10***	0.10***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
% Unemployed ('11)	0.18***	0.18***	0.18***	0.18***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
% Single Mother ('11)	−0.03	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Pop. Density ('11)	−0.05	−0.05	−0.05	−0.05
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
% McCain ('08)	−0.10***	−0.09***	−0.09***	−0.09***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Wave FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Race Subset	White	White	White	White
R^2	0.27	0.27	0.27	0.27
Num. obs.	300916	300916	300916	300916
N Clusters	22038	22038	22038	22038

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$. All models fully specified. All covariates rescaled between 0-1. Robust zipcode clustered SEs in parentheses.

D.2 First-Order Association (Weighted)

Table D13: Association Between Alternative Population Growth Measures and Support for Legal Abortion

	Legal Abortion Index			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Δ % Latino ('19-'11)	0.27***			
	(0.07)			
Δ % Black ('19-'11)		0.10		
		(0.08)		
Δ % Asian ('19-'11)			−0.02	
			(0.06)	
Δ % Foreign-Born ('19-'11)				−0.02
				(0.07)
Age	−0.03***	−0.03***	−0.03***	−0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Woman	−0.01***	−0.01***	−0.01***	−0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Evangelical	−0.18***	−0.18***	−0.18***	−0.18***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education	0.08***	0.08***	0.08***	0.08***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Income	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Partisanship	−0.28***	−0.28***	−0.28***	−0.28***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
% Evangelical ('10)	−0.04**	−0.04**	−0.04**	−0.04**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
MHHI ('11)	0.07***	0.08***	0.08***	0.08***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
% College ('11)	0.10***	0.10***	0.10***	0.10***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
% Unemployed ('11)	0.15***	0.15***	0.15***	0.15***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
% Single Mother ('11)	0.00	0.02	0.02	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Pop. Density ('11)	−0.05	−0.05	−0.06	−0.06
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
% McCain ('08)	−0.10***	−0.10***	−0.09***	−0.09***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Wave FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Race Subset	White	White	White	White
R^2	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.26
Num. obs.	300916	300916	300916	300916
N Clusters	22038	22038	22038	22038

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$. All models fully specified. All covariates rescaled between 0-1. Robust zipcode clustered SEs in parentheses.

E Ruling Out Residential Selection

E.1 CES 2010-2014 Data

Table E14: Permissive Abortion Attitudes Do Not Determine Selection Into Zipcodes That Are Increasingly Non-White or Latino (Intensive Margin)

	Δ % Non-White ('14 Zip) (1)	Δ Δ % Non-White ('14 - '10 Zip) (2)	Δ % Latino ('14 Zip) (3)	Δ Δ % Latino ('14 - '10 Zip) (4)	Δ % Non-White ('14 Zip) (5)	Δ Δ % Non-White ('14 - '10 Zip) (6)	Δ % Latino ('14 Zip) (7)	Δ Δ % Latino ('14 - '10 Zip) (8)
Permit Abortion ('10)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Δ % Non-White ('10 - '00, '10 Zip)	0.86***				0.28***			
	(0.02)				(0.07)			
Δ % Latino ('10 - '00, '10 Zip)			0.86***				0.28***	
			(0.02)				(0.08)	
Sample	All	All	All	All	Movers	Movers	Movers	Movers
R^2	0.72	0.00	0.71	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.06	0.00
Num. obs.	7685	7685	7685	7685	1085	1085	1085	1085

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$. All data are from the CES 2010-2014 panel survey. All covariates characterizing the change in the non-white or Latino population at the zipcode level is change in the proportion of the zipcode population between 2000 to 2010. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table E15: Permissive Abortion Attitudes Do Not Determine Selection Into Zipcodes That Are Increasingly Non-White or Latino (Heterogeneity by Movers)

	Δ % Non-White ('14 Zip) (1)	Δ Δ % Non-White ('14 - '10 Zip) (2)	Δ % Latino ('14 Zip) (3)	Δ Δ % Latino ('14 - '10 Zip) (4)
Permit Abortion ('10) x Mover	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Permit Abortion ('10)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Mover	−0.00	−0.01	−0.00	−0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Δ % Non-White ('10 - '00, '10 Zip)	0.86***			
	(0.02)			
Δ % Latino ('10 - '00, '10 Zip)			0.86***	
			(0.02)	
Sample	All	All	All	All
R^2	0.72	0.00	0.71	0.00
Num. obs.	7685	7685	7685	7685

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$. All data are from the CES 2010-2014 panel survey. All covariates characterizing the change in the non-white or Latino population at the zipcode level is change in the proportion of the zipcode population between 2000 to 2010. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table E16: Permissive Abortion Attitudes Do Not Determine Selection Into Zipcodes That Are Increasingly Non-White or Latino (Extensive Margin)

	More Non-White Change (0/1) (1)	**More Latino Change (0/1)** (2)
Permit Abortion ('10)	0.00	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)
Sample	Movers	Movers
R^2	0.00	0.00
Num. obs.	1085	1085

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$. All data are from the CES 2010-2014 panel survey. Model 1 outcome is moving to a zipcode that has become more non-white between 2000-2010 by 2014 relative to the respondent's zipcode in 2010. Model 2 outcome is moving to a zipcode that has become more Latino between 2000-2010 by 2014 relative to the respondent's zipcode in 2010. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

E.2 VSG 2011-2016 Data

Table E17: Permissive Abortion Attitudes Do Not Determine Selection Into Zipcodes That Are Increasingly Non-White or Latino

	Δ % Non-White ('16 Zip) (1)	Δ Δ % Non-White ('16 - '11 Zip) (2)	Δ % Latino ('16 Zip) (3)	Δ Δ % Latino ('16 - '11 Zip) (4)	Δ % Non-White ('16 Zip) (5)	Δ Δ % Non-White ('16 - '11 Zip) (6)	Δ % Latino ('16 Zip) (7)	Δ Δ % Latino ('16 - '11 Zip) (8)
Permit Abortion ('11)	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Δ % Non-White ('11 - '00, '11 Zip)	0.78***				0.27***		0.22***	
	(0.03)				(0.07)		(0.04)	
Δ % Latino ('11 - '00, '11 Zip)			0.83***					
			(0.02)					
Sample	All	All	All	All	Movers	Movers	Movers	Movers
R^2	0.56	0.00	0.66	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.07	0.00
Num. obs.	7115	7115	7115	7115	1568	1568	1568	1568

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$. All data are from the VSG 2011-2016 panel survey. All covariates characterizing the change in the non-white or Latino population at the zipcode level is change in the proportion of the zipcode population between 2000 to 2011. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table E18: Permissive Abortion Attitudes Do Not Determine Selection Into Zipcodes That Are Increasingly Non-White or Latino (Heterogeneity by Movers)

	Δ % Non-White ('16 Zip) (1)	Δ Δ % Non-White ('16 - '11 Zip) (2)	Δ % Latino ('16 Zip) (3)	Δ Δ % Latino ('16 - '11 Zip) (4)
Permit Abortion (11) x Mover	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Permit Abortion ('11)	0.00	−0.00	0.00	−0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Mover	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Δ % Non-White ('11 - '00, '11 Zip)	0.78***			
	(0.03)			
Δ % Latino ('11 - '00, '11 Zip)			0.82***	
			(0.02)	
Sample	All	All	All	All
R^2	0.56	0.00	0.67	0.00
Num. obs.	7115	7115	7115	7115

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$. All data are from the VSG 2011-2016 panel survey. All covariates characterizing the change in the non-white or Latino population at the zipcode level is change in the proportion of the zipcode population between 2000 to 2010. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table E19: Permissive Abortion Attitudes Do Not Determine Selection Into Zipcodes That Are Increasingly Non-White or Latino (Extensive Margin)

	More Non-White Change (0/1) (1)	**More Latino Change (0/1)** (2)
Permit Abortion ('11)	−0.00	−0.04
	(0.04)	(0.04)
Sample	Movers	Movers
R^2	0.00	0.00
Num. obs.	1568	1568

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$. All data are from the VSG 2011-2016 panel survey. Model 1 outcome is moving to a zipcode that has become more non-white between 2000-2011 by 2016 relative to the respondent's zipcode in 2011. Model 2 outcome is moving to a zipcode that has become more Latino between 2000-2011 by 2016 relative to the respondent's zipcode in 2011. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

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