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The Direct and Indirect Effects of Immigration Enforcement on Latino Political Engagement

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ABSTRACT

How does having a loved one threatened by detention and deportation impact political participation? Drawing on extant research demonstrating the mobilizing power of a threatening immigration environment, we develop a dynamic theory of what scholars elsewhere refer to as proximal contact. We argue that individuals with proximal connections to punitive immigration policy may be politically mobilized by the belief that immigration enforcement is unfairly targeted at Latinos, but a threatening environment also structures this participation. Individuals are incentivized to withdraw from public institutions, in particular voting, even as they are incentivized to participate in other arenas. We draw on two cross-sectional surveys, one collected in 2015 with a robust oversample of noncitizens and another collected in 2018 of Latinos who are registered voters. We find evidence to support our theory, and in both datasets proximal contact is unrelated to voting, even as it is positively associated with other types of activities like protesting.

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INTRODUCTION

On February 15, 2019, President Trump declared a national emergency with respect to immigration at the nation's southern border. This use of executive power is only the latest action aggressively pursuing punitive immigration policies, which include: widening the scope of high priority targets to include immigrants without criminal backgrounds;[1] the increased use of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) raids in immigrant communities;[2] ongoing contestation of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA);[3] the introduction of quotas for immigration judges;[4] family separation as deterrence policy;[5] the deployment of troops to the U.S.–Mexico border;[6] and the longest government shutdown in America's history over budget requests to fund a border wall.[7] The Trump administration's immigration policies are built on law and order rhetoric, grafting threats to public safety and alleged criminality among non-natives onto immigration. They are nested, moreover, in an era when the foreign-born population in the United States is higher than it has been in the preceding century and when spending on immigration enforcement already outstrips federal spending on all other criminal law enforcement activities.[8]

1. RANDY CAPPS ET AL., MIGRATION POLICY INST., REVVING UP THE DEPORTATION MACHINERY 1 (2018).
2. *Id.* at 11–12.
3. *Id.* at 1–2; *see also* Rafael Bernal, *Trump Officials End Immigration Protection for 260k Salvadorans*, THE HILL (Jan. 8, 2018), https://thehill.com/latino/367892-report-trump-to-end-immigration-protection-for-200000-salvadorans [https://perma.cc/WJF5-WVWY].
4. Joel Rose, *Justice Department Rolls Out Quotas for Immigration Judges*, NAT'L PUB. RADIO (Apr. 3, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/04/03/599158232/justice-department-rolls-out-quotas-for-immigration-judges [https://perma.cc/A7UJ-EPFF].
5. Miriam Jordan et al., *Trump's Plans to Deter Migrants Could Mean New 'Voluntary' Family Separations*, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 22, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/22/us/migrant-families-crossing-border-trump.html [https://perma.cc/J468-Z96M].
6. Matthew S. Schwartz, *Pentagon Deploying 3,750 Troops to Southern Border*, NAT'L PUB. RADIO (Feb. 4, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/02/04/691222383/pentagon-deploying-3-750-troops-to-southern-border [https://perma.cc/GNL6-6W28].
7. Jacob Pramuk, *The Partial Government Shutdown Is Now the Longest Ever as Trump Border Wall Fight Rages On*, CNBC (Jan. 12, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/ 2019/01/11/government-shutdown-breaks-record-for-longest-ever-amid-border-wall-fight.html [https://perma.cc/N35Q-4PCX].
8. Jeanne Batalova & Elijah Alperin, *Immigrants in the U.S. States with the Fastest-Growing Foreign Born Populations*, MIGRATION POL'Y INST. (Jul. 10, 2018), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/immigrants-us-states-fastest-growing-foreign-born-populations [https://perma.cc/NU68-BTJ7]; Franklin Foer, *How Trump Radicalized ICE*, THE ATLANTIC (Sep. 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/09/trump-ice/565772 [https://perma.cc/R287-WAS6].

The criminalization of immigrants has widespread effects for the communities in which immigrants are embedded. The implementation of punitive policies targets even those who themselves are not threatened with detention and deportation. And the deleterious consequences of this targeting are likewise not limited to the undocumented, such that "[r]estrictive immigration policies reinforce definitions of national belonging—conflating citizenship status and race—thereby transferring stigma and racialized stressors associated with unauthorized immigration to entire groups of people."[9] Yet, at the same time that immigrants and their communities are criminalized, Latinos are becoming a political force with which parties and campaigns at both the local and national levels must contend.[10] For Latinos, immigration is potentially both a push and pull factor to public engagement. On one hand, research demonstrates the negative consequences of punitive immigration policy across nearly all aspects of one's life.[11] On the other hand, a threatening immigration environment has historically spurred widespread mobilization among this group, many of whose members participate self-defensively.[12]

In this Article, we focus on the particularly complicated positionality held by the loved ones of the undocumented, those who experience what scholars have termed proximal contact. Proximal contact refers to vicarious experiences with punitive policies via a loved one, even as one is not themself threatened by those policies. Researchers demonstrate that proximal contact has political consequences across a wide variety of policy areas, including social

9. Vanessa Cruz Nichols et al., *Policing Us Sick: The Health of Latinos in an Era of Heightened Deportations and Racialized Policing*, 51 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 293, 293 (2018) (citing Edna A. Viruell-Fuentes et al., *More Than Culture: Structural Racism, Intersectionality Theory, and Immigrant Health*, 75 SOC. SCI. & MED. 2099 (2012)).

10. *See* Jose A. Del Real, *Who Are We Talking About When We Talk About Latino Voters?* N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/24/us/latino-vote-midterm-elections.html [https://perma.cc/O5KH-DW8W] (This article discusses at length the growth of the population of Latinos who are eligible to vote, noting their presence in states like California and Texas. The article further notes that while they are not a monolith, they largely support Democratic candidates. The article concludes by noting that the sheer size of the growth of the population should give them increasing political clout.).

11. *See generally* Francisco I. Pedraza et al., *Cautious Citizenship: The Deterring Effect of Immigration Issue Salience on Health Care Use and Bureaucratic Interactions Among Latino US Citizens*, 42 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 925 (2017) (finding, for example, that Latinos avoid engaging in several daily-life activities, like going to the airport and renewing one's driver's license, when they are worried about being questioned about their citizenship status.)

12. *See generally* Matt A. Barreto et al., *Mobilization, Participation, and Solidaridad: Latino Participation in the 2006 Immigration Protest Rallies*, 44 URB. AFF. REV. 736 (2009); CHRIS ZEPEDA-MILLÁN, LATINO MASS MOBILIZATION: IMMIGRATION, RACIALIZATION, AND ACTIVISM (2017).

welfare and criminal justice.[13] A handful of researchers have also documented the secondary effects of immigration policy on families and communities where proximal contact can ultimately lead to family separation.[14] For those with proximal experiences with punitive immigration enforcement, political engagement is both perilous and promising. It is perilous insofar as interacting with government institutions increases the risk of exposing the status of a loved one. Yet, it holds promise since civic engagement is a potential pathway to change for one's family and community. We therefore ask: How does having a loved one threatened by punitive immigration enforcement impact civic participation? We argue that mobilization spurred by proximal contact is rooted in a politicized group identity and the belief that punitive immigration policies unfairly target Latinos based on group affiliation. Yet, we anticipate for those who become mobilized by proximal experiences with immigration enforcement that civic engagement will manifest in activities that do not bring one in direct contact with government institutions.

In order to assess this theory, we draw on two cross-sectional surveys of Latinos, one collected in 2015 with a sizable oversample of noncitizens and a second of registered voters collected more recently during the Trump era. We find that proximal contact has both direct and indirect effects on civic engagement, operating at least in part via perceived discrimination. Moreover, evidence supports the idea that this participation is qualified, occurring outside of formal electoral politics.

We begin in Part I of this Article with an overview of the specific targeting of Latinos for contact with law enforcement via immigration policy. In Part II,

13. *See* JAMILA MICHENER, FRAGMENTED DEMOCRACY: MEDICAID, FEDERALISM, AND UNEQUAL POLITICS 54 (2018). (Michener demonstrates the spillover effects of Medicaid on the loved ones of Medicaid clients); Joe Soss & Sanford F. Schram, *A Public Transformed? Welfare Reform as Policy Feedback*, 101 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 111 (2007); Hannah L. Walker, *Extending the Effects of the Carceral State: Proximal Contact, Political Participation, and Race*, 67 POL. RES. Q. 809 (2014) (examining the impact of experiences with the criminal justice system on political engagement among the loved ones of the incarcerated, demonstrating that policies impact not just those who have direct experiences with them, but also the wider communities of which they are a part).

14. *See, e.g.*, Gabriel R. Sanchez et al., *Stuck Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The Relationship Between Latino/a's Personal Connections to Immigrants and Issue Salience and Presidential Approval*, 3 POL., GROUPS, & IDENTITIES 454, 456 (2015) (citing Jacqueline Hagan et al., *U.S. Deportation Policy, Family Separation, and Circular Migration*, 42 INT'L MIGRATION REV. 64 (2008)); Edward D. Vargas, *Immigration Enforcement and Mixed-Status Families: The Effects of Risk of Deportation on Medicaid Use*, 57 CHILD. & YOUTH SERV. REV. 83 (2015). Vargas examines the impact of living in a community characterized by high risk of deportation on Medicaid use in mixed-status families. *Id.* He finds that Medicaid-eligible members of mixed status families who live in such communities are less likely to use the program, demonstrating the spillover effects of a threatening immigration environment. *Id.*

we highlight the various sociopolitical consequences of proximal contact and a threatening immigration environment, developing a dynamic theory of political engagement. Finally, in Part III, we review our data and findings before concluding with directions for future research.

I. IMMIGRATION AND POLICING IN THE CURRENT ERA

Latinos are targeted by law enforcement for contact via a variety of mechanisms. Like Black Americans, they are disproportionately affected by order maintenance policing strategies like stop-and-frisk that use behavioral indicators to assess potential criminality. Young Black and Latino men, for example, comprise about five percent of New York City's population, yet they accounted for nearly 41 percent of street stops made by New York City police in 2012.[15] Preemptive policing tactics routinize the threat of criminal justice contact for the working class and people of color. Latinos are specifically targeted by law enforcement through the mechanism of immigration. Collaborative programs like 287(g) and Secure Communities deputize local police to enforce immigration policy, and, in the current era, ICE officials increasingly directly intervene in immigrant communities.[16] As a consequence, the detention of Latinos increased by a magnitude of four in the last thirty years, accounting for over half the growth in federal incarceration.[17]

Collaborative programs that employ existing infrastructure to implement immigration policy developed from the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), which established a mandate to pursue the removal of immigrants with criminal backgrounds.[18] The first of these programs is the Criminal Aliens Program (CAP), which facilitates checking documentation status in prisons and jails when individuals are held for reasons unrelated to immigration.[19] The more well-known 287(g) program trains local police to

15. N.Y. C. L. UNION, *Analysis Finds Racial Disparities, Ineffectiveness in NYPD Stop-and-Frisk Program; Links Tactic to Soaring Marijuana Arrest Rate* (May 22, 2013), https://www.nyclu.org/en/press-releases/analysis-finds-racial-disparities-ineffectiveness-nypd-stop-and-frisk-program-links [https://perma.cc/2J99-4QGV].
16. CAPPS ET AL., *supra* note 1, at 11–12.
17. *See* MARK HUGO LOPEZ & MICHAEL T. LIGHT, PEW HISP. CTR., A RISING SHARE: HISPANICS AND FEDERAL CRIME i, 7 (2009), http://www.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/reports/104.pdf [https://perma.cc/7BHD-9KNN].
18. *The Criminal Alien Program (CAP): Immigration Enforcement in Prisons and Jails*, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, (Aug. 1, 2013), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/criminal-alien-program-cap-immigration-enforcement-prisons-and-jails [https://perma.cc/VP2S-CV7F].
19. *Id.*

enforce federal immigration laws.[20] Secure Communities, established under Bush and expanded and then discontinued under Obama only to be revived by Trump, requires criminal justice officials to hold undocumented individuals to allow ICE to transfer them into immigrant detention.[21] Obama's discontinuation of Secure Communities accompanied an increased use of administrative stays for most noncriminal immigrants, reforms that dramatically reduced detentions and deportations in the final years of his administration.[22]

Tactics employed by the Trump administration mark a wholesale reversal of strategies employed by the Obama administration and broaden the scope of immigrants targeted. In addition to reinstating Secure Communities, Trump has significantly expanded the number of jurisdictions with 287(g) agreements.[23] While compliance with these programs is voluntary, ICE has responded to the withdrawal of cooperation by many localities by directly entering immigrant enclaves to conduct neighborhood sweeps, resulting in a rise in collateral arrests.[24] These tactics have dramatically increased the detention and deportation of noncriminal immigrants, many of whose only offense is the

20. DORIS MEISSNER ET AL., MIGRATION POL'Y INST., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: THE RISE OF A FORMIDABLE MACHINERY 103–07 (2013); Kevin J. Fandl, *Immigration Posses: US Immigration Law and Local Enforcement Practices*, 34 J. LEGIS. 16, 24–25 (2008); For an overview of the 287(g) program and the Immigration and Nationality Act by which it was established, see ice.gov/287g.

21. CAPPS ET AL., *supra* note 1, Leslie Berestein & Tony Manolatos, *Bush Wants to Put More Money into Training That Has Yet to Catch on Locally*, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (Jun. 23, 2006), http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1654777/posts [https://perma.cc/SG2C-N3AV].

22. Reforms made under the Obama administration that reduced deportations overall occurred largely during his second term and were issued in response to severe criticism levied by immigrant rights activists during his first term; *See generally* Memorandum from Jeh C. Johnson, Sec'y, U.S. Dep't Homeland Sec., to Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf't, on Secure Communities (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_secure_communities.pdf [https://perma.cc/UK6N-TAG4]; CAPPS ET AL., *supra* note 1.

23. CAPPS ET AL., *supra* note 1, 19–21; Claudia Flores, *Rapidly Expanding 287(g) Program Suffers from Lack of Transparency*, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Oct. 9, 2018), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/reports/2018/10/09/459098/rapidly-expanding-287g-program-suffers-lack-transparency [https://perma.cc/MD9Q-G45X]; *Deportations Under Ice's Secure Communities Program*, TRAC IMMIGRATION (Apr. 25, 2018), https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/509 [https://perma.cc/CTO4-OOHV].

24. TRAC IMMIGRATION, *supra* note 23 (noting that interior removals have grown significantly under the Trump administration, but that the growth cannot be attributed to collaborative programs like 287(g) and Secure Communities, suggesting that the growth, at least in part, is due to direct community intervention by ICE); CAPPS ET AL., *supra* note 1 (documenting that ICE has increased direct intervention in communities that are no longer cooperating with the agency through programs like 287(g) and Secure Communities).

overstay of their visa.[25] Collaborative programs distill federal immigration policy through preemptive tactics already employed by local police, and this together with direct entry by ICE into immigrant neighborhoods facilitates the widespread targeting of Latinos irrespective of status and offense.

II. PROXIMAL CONTACT, DECLINING TRUST, AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Current immigration tactics fray the fabric of immigrants' families and communities. The social and political consequences of enforcement likewise spill over to those with proximal contact. Punitive immigration policy teaches individuals to trust government less and leads them to avoid engaging with a host of government institutions.[26] Researchers demonstrate that the threat of punitive immigration policy erodes trust in the government as a source of information and deters accessing government services related to health, education, and policing.[27] In addition to its negative civic consequences, punitive policy erodes physical and mental health, public safety, and child wellbeing.[28] The collateral consequences of immigration enforcement extend to the broader communities of which the undocumented are a part.

Individuals whose families and communities are threatened by punitive immigration policies withdraw from engagement with government institutions out of fear of revealing their documentation status or the status of a loved one. In keeping with this institutional avoidance, researchers find that eligible voters

25. CAPPS ET AL., *supra* note 1, 43–44.

26. *See generally* AMY LERMAN & VESLA WEAVER, ARRESTING CITIZENSHIP: THE DEMOCRATIC CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICAN CRIME CONTROL (2014); Elizabeth Aranda et al., *The Spillover Consequences of an Enforcement-First U.S. Immigration Regime*, 58 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 1687 (2014); Pedraza et al., *supra* note 11.

27. *See* Francisco I. Pedraza & Maricruz Ariana Osorio, *Courted and Deported: The Salience of Immigration Issues and Avoidance of Police, Health Care, and Education Services Among Latinos*, 42 AZTLÁN 249, 262 (2017); *see generally* Guadalupe Vidales et al., *Police and Immigration Enforcement: Impacts on Latino(a) Residents' Perceptions of Police*, 32 POLICING 631 (2009); René D. Flores, *Living in the Eye of the Storm: How Did Hazleton's Restrictive Immigration Ordinance Affect Local Interethnic Relations?*, 58 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 1743 (2014).

28. *See generally* Edward D. Vargas et al., *Latinos' Connections to Immigrants: How Knowing a Deportee Impacts Latino Health*, J. ETHNIC & MIGRATION STUD. 1 (2018); Flores, *supra* note 23; Aranda et al., *supra* note 26; Vargas, *supra* note 14; Edward D. Vargas & Maureen A. Pirog, *Mixed-Status Families and WIC Uptake: The Effects of Risk of Deportation on Program Use*, 97 SOC. SCI. Q. 555 (2016); Stephanie Potochnick et al., *Local-Level Immigration Enforcement and Food Insecurity Risk Among Hispanic Immigrant Families with Children: National-Level Evidence*, 19 J. IMMIGRANT & MINORITY HEALTH 1042 (2017).

with mixed-status families are less likely to register to vote.[29] Yet, a withdrawal from public institutions should not be interpreted as alienation or a declining investment in public life. Take, for example, mobilization among immigrants and their communities in California during the xenophobic wave of the 1990s or widespread participation in the 2006 immigration protests against draconian reform proposals at the federal level.[30] These episodes of mobilization belie electoral withdrawal rooted in alienation, instead reflecting a deep commitment to democratic principles of the preservation of human dignity and civil rights. In fact, research examining the specific consequences of proximal contact with immigrant enforcement likewise finds that individuals participate at higher rates in civic organizations and protests.[31]

The few studies that examine the relationship between proximal connections to immigration enforcement and civic engagement focus on correlational relationships, without theorizing the underlying causal mechanisms that connect the two as a steppingstone to a more robust causal analysis. Work regarding the mobilizing power of a threatening immigration environment draws heavily on theories of group consciousness and linked fate.[32] These political psychological mechanisms suggest that mobilization in response to threat results from a politicized consciousness developed from a strong link to one's racial group, made salient by policies that discriminate in purpose or practice on the basis of that group affiliation.[33] Thus, while proximal contact creates a clear stake in policy outcomes, connecting one's worries about the fate of a loved one to a larger collective struggle casts those worries as political and thus public.

29. *See generally* Catalina Amuedo-Dorantes & Mary J. Lopez, *Interior Immigration Enforcement and Political Participation of U.S. Citizens in Mixed-Status Households*, 54 DEMOGRAPHY 2223 (2017).

30. *See generally* Adrian D. Pantoja et al., *Citizens by Choice, Voters by Necessity: Patterns in Political Mobilization by Naturalized Latinos*, 54 POL. RES. Q. 729 (2001); Adrian D. Pantoja & Gary M. Segura, *Fear and Loathing in California: Contextual Threat and Political Sophistication Among Latino Voters*, 25 POL. BEHAV. 265 (2003); Shaun Bowler et al., *Earthquakes and Aftershocks: Race, Direct Democracy, and Partisan Change*, 50 AM. J. POL. SCI. 146 (2006); Barreto et al., *supra* note 12; ZEPEDA-MILLÁN, *supra* note 12.

31. *See generally* Amuedo-Dorantes & Lopez, *supra* note 29; Alex Street et al., *Political Effects of Having Undocumented Parents*, 70 POL. RES. Q. 818 (2017).

32. *See generally* Barreto et al., *supra* note 12; Pantoja et al., *supra* note 30; Pantoja & Segura, *supra* note 30; Street et al., *supra* note 31.

33. *See generally* Gabriel R. Sanchez, *The Role of Group Consciousness in Latino Public Opinion*, 59 POL. RES. Q. 435 (2006); Gabriel R. Sanchez, *The Role of Group Consciousness in Political Participation Among Latinos in the United States*, 34 AM. POL. RES. 427 (2006); Gabriel R. Sanchez & Natalie Masuoka, *Brown-Utility Heuristic? The Presence and Contributing Factors of Latino Linked Fate*, 32 HISP. J. BEHAV. SCI. 519 (2010).

To analyze this connection, we began with the questions: Do proximal experiences with immigration enforcement impact civic participation? If so, how? Building on previous research around the mobilizing power of a threatening immigration environment, we argue that the relationship between proximal contact and participation is dynamic, conditioned by perceptions of risk associated with various kinds of political activities. Proximal contact may be accompanied by heightened perceived group-based discrimination and, therefore, has the potential to politically mobilize. Yet, the risk of the detention and deportation of a loved one may be heightened by interacting with public institutions. Thus, individuals may withdraw from civic activities that bring them in direct contact with the government, like voting. But this should not be understood as diminished commitment to public life or a declining belief in the importance of pursuing change through collective action. Instead, previous research suggests that proximal contact with immigration enforcement is not connected to political efficacy, and the threat of the detention and deportation of a loved one may compel participation in other types of political activities, like attending community meetings, volunteering with civic organizations, and protesting. We now turn to an empirical assessment of these relationships.

III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY

We draw on two cross-sectional national surveys of Latinos to assess the relationship between proximal contact, perceptions of discrimination, and the independent importance of each on self-reported political participation. Although our argument provides a causal explanation for any association we may observe in our analysis, the use of cross-sectional data that does not randomly assign exposure to immigration enforcement or discrimination precludes the use of causal language in describing our results. This does not mean that our results provide no useful insight into the possibility of a substantively meaningful and causal effect of exposure to immigration enforcement and discrimination. In order to assess the implications of our causal story, we first examine the relationship between proximal contact and perceived discrimination. We then examine the direct and indirect effects of proximal contact and discrimination on participation. Our expectation is that any positive relationship between proximal contact and participation will be accounted for, at least in part, by perceived discrimination. In the Appendix we engage in a sensitivity analysis using tools developed by Chad Hazlett and Carlos Cinelli and argue that the "treatment effects" derived from our observational analysis are unlikely to be perturbed by omitted variable bias in a way that would substantively

change the conclusions of this study.[34] Moreover, we employ a series of placebo tests (also in the Appendix) which rule out the possibility that exposure to immigration enforcement is correlated with other motivations to engage in political activity.

A. Survey 1: Latino National Health and Immigration Survey

The first survey we use is the Latino National Health and Immigration Survey (LNHIS), which was fielded by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation and Latino Decisions between January 29, 2015, and March 12, 2015, via live calls with a margin of error of +/- 3.1 percentage points.[35] The survey was meant to provide a nationally representative sample of the Latino population, has 1005 respondents, and asks about various topics concerning the healthcare marketplace, immigration, and racial issues.[36] The survey was weighted to the national adult Latino population using the 2014 1-year American Community Survey from the Census Bureau. The survey includes five variables we use to measure political participation: (1) vote intention, (2) protest intention, (3) donation intention, (4) intent to attend a political meeting, and (5) intent to sign a petition.[37] These are measured in a Likert fashion from "not at all likely" to "extremely likely," which we convert into a binary variable.[38] To measure perceptions of discrimination we use a survey item that asks whether respondents feel like there was an anti-immigrant or anti-Hispanic environment present at the time the survey was fielded. The variable is scaled from 0–2, with 0 indicating that a respondent thinks "no such environment exists" and 2 indicating that a respondent thinks there was "definitely an anti-Hispanic/immigrant environment."[39]

To construct our main independent variable of interest, proximal contact with immigration enforcement, we use two items in the LNHIS. We are interested in assessing both the consequences of knowing someone who is

34. *See generally* Carlos Cinelli & Chad Hazlett, *Making Sense of Sensitivity: Extending Omitted Variable Bias* (UCLA, Working Paper, 2018).
35. LATINO DECISIONS, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., CTR. FOR HEALTH POL'Y, U.N.M., TOPLINE RESULTS: LATINO NATIONAL HEALTH SURVEY 22 (2015).
36. *See generally id.*
37. The questions ask how likely respondents will be to: (1) "Vote in the next local state or national election"; (2) "Participate in a rally march, demonstration, or protest"; (3) "Give money to an organization concerned with a political or social issue, not counting a religious organization"; (4) "Attend a meeting to talk about political or social concerns"; and (5) "Sign a petition on a political or social issue."
38. We exclude those who refuse to answer the question and those who answer, "Don't Know."
39. LATINO DECISIONS, *supra* note 35, at 12.

undocumented and the more extreme position of knowing someone who has faced detention or deportation. Proximal contact is therefore measured using a scale ranging from 0–2. First, respondents were asked whether they know someone who is undocumented (coded as 1 if they do). If the respondents know someone who has additionally faced detention and deportation, they are coded as 2. Those who do not report knowing anyone who is undocumented are coded as 0. These categories are discrete. The data indicate that 60 percent of the sample knows someone who is undocumented, and 35 percent of the sample knows someone who has been detained/deported (weighted average).

We also use data from other items in the survey to construct relevant control variables. These include partisan identification operationalized as binary indicators for whether a respondent reports they are a Democrat, independent, or affiliated with an "other" party, with Republicans as the reference category. Data on self-reported age are included as binary indicators for ages 18–29 and 65+. Self-reported income is included as binary indicators for incomes 20–39k, 40–59k, 60–79k, 80–99k, and 100–150k. Education binary indicators for high school and post–high school are included, as are binary variables for whether the respondent is female or foreign-born.

B. Survey 2: Latino Decisions Midterm Survey

We replicate our test of the theory using the Latino Decisions Midterm Survey of likely voters in 2018 residing in any of the 61 most competitive U.S. House districts going into the midterm elections, which asked a battery of questions concerning the midterm election and immigration.[40] Data collection was overseen by Latino Decisions, Asian-American Decisions, and the African-American Research Collaborative. Since those in battleground districts are slightly more educated, suburban, and politically moderate than the population as a whole, each racial/ethnic group was weighted on age, gender, education, and national origin to bring them in line with Census Current Population Survey (CPS) estimates for registered voters. The scope of data collection was meant to generate nationally representative samples for Latino, white, Black, and Asian Americans. Since the scope of this Article is limited to Latino political behavior, we only analyze the Latino subsample of the data. It is important to note that this sample is distinct from the LNHIS sample in that: (a) only registered voters are asked questions, (b) it was fielded three years later

40. *See generally infra* Study 2, Appendix (Latino Decisions Midterm Survey of likely voters in 2018; further information about the survey is available upon request from the authors.).

(summer 2018) in the midst of the Trump administration, and (c) it only samples respondents from competitive congressional districts. Therefore, the replication deals with two potential problems in survey research. First, it accounts for confounding factors across space and time. Second, it hedges against the possibility that the first result was simply a function of sampling variability.

The midterm survey includes two variables measuring political participation, vote intention, and protest behavior in the past year. Intent to vote concerns the 2018 midterm and is measured on a 0–10 scale. About 47 percent of the sample (weighted) responded with a 10 (100 percent likely to vote). We therefore created a binary indicator with those who were 100 percent sure they would vote coded as 1 and those less than 100 percent sure coded as 0. We only have one measure of nontraditional participation in the midterm survey, a shortcoming in comparison to the LNHIS survey, which is intent to protest. The survey asks the following: "In the past year and a half, have you taken part in any political protests, marches, or demonstrations?"[41] The variable is dichotomous, with 22 percent of respondents indicating they had attended some type of demonstration during the timeframe.[42] To measure perceived discrimination, we use a question designed to measure discriminatory immigration practices: Please indicate whether this statement describes how you feel about immigration issues in your community: Immigration officials often stop and search people solely because of their race, ethnicity, language or accent for reasons related to immigration. Responses are coded ranging from 0–3, with 0 reflecting that the respondent is in strong disagreement with the notion that immigration officials discriminate based on race/ethnicity and 3 indicating that the respondent is in strong agreement with the notion that immigration officials discriminate.

The primary independent variable of interest, proximal contact, is a 0–2 scale measured via an item that asks the respondent: Do you know anyone who has been stopped or questioned by immigration officials, or has faced detention or deportation for immigration reasons? The respondent could provide a list of restricted possibilities, including: (1) Yes, I have been stopped and questioned; (2) Yes, someone in my family has been stopped or questioned; (3) Yes, someone in my family has been detained or deported; (4) Yes, a friend or coworker has been stopped or questioned; (5) Yes, a friend or coworker has been detained or deported; and (6) No, do not know anyone. Anyone who reported that they know someone who has been stopped, questioned, detained,

41. *See generally id.*
42. *See generally id.*

or deported is coded as a 2. Elsewhere in the survey respondents were asked the following in a binary yes/no format: Now take a moment to think about all the people in your family, your friends, coworkers, and other people you know. Do you know anyone who is an undocumented immigrant? Those who report knowing someone who is undocumented but who do not also report that they know someone stopped, questioned, detained, or deported are coded as 1. Fifty-four percent of the sample know someone who is undocumented, and 36 percent of the sample has been proximally exposed to detention or deportation. These marginals are similar to the LNHIS survey. This is cause for relief because it shows that higher income, more educated, and more acculturated Latinos that are likely voters are not fundamentally distinct from a sample that includes a large number of noncitizens whom we may expect to have more undocumented people in their networks. The survey also includes relevant control variables that are the same as the ones for the LNHIS survey, including: partisanship, age, income, education, foreign-born, and female.

C. Results

1. Study 1: Latino National Health and Immigration Survey (LNHIS)

Figure 1: Partial Derivative Plot (Outcome: Discrim. Index, All Variables Standardized)



Figure 1 displays a partial derivative plot of the association between relevant covariates and perceptions of discrimination (all variables are standardized). A standard deviation increase in the proximate contact scale is

associated with a 0.2 standard deviation increase in perceptions of discrimination against immigrants and Latinos. This is substantively meaningful, given that whether a respondent is a Democrat has a partial derivative of 0.15 standard deviations, which we may expect to be a significant factor that determines perceptions of discrimination. Figure 2 shows the predicted values of anti-immigrant discrimination (unstandardized) given various degrees of contact with immigration enforcement.[43] Recall that the anti-immigrant discrimination scale is operationalized as a 3-point scale, with 0 coded as believing there is not an anti-immigrant/Latino environment, 1 coded as somewhat believing there is an anti-immigrant/Latino environment, and 2 coded as definitely believing there is an anti-immigrant/Latino environment. Latinos who have not experienced proximal exposure to immigration enforcement are likely to observe discrimination at 0.95 points on the 0–2 scale. Those who know someone undocumented but not a deportee observe discrimination at 1.15 points on the discrimination scale, and those who know a deportee observe discrimination at 1.33 points on the discrimination scale. These predicted values are all statistically distinguishable from one another and provide respective differences of 21 percent and 15 percent between 0–1 and 1–2 on the scale.

Figure 2: Predicted Value Plot (Outcome: Anti-Immigrant Discrimination)



Figure 3 explores the association between proximal exposure to immigration enforcement and different forms of political participation. Panel

43. All predicted values in this Article were derived by taking the average of the predicted values for all units within the data, holding the proximal contact covariate constant at a particular value, and then using 1000 bootstrap simulations to produce 95 percent confidence intervals.

A shows that there does not appear to be a statistically significant association between proximal exposure to immigration enforcement and voting behavior. Panels B–E, however, appear to show that proximal exposure to immigration enforcement motivates nonvoting forms of political participation such as protesting, donating to a political campaign, attending a meeting related to politics, and signing a petition for a political cause. With the exception of attending a political meeting, for which the partial derivative of one standard deviation increase in proximal exposure to immigration enforcement is roughly 0.06 standard deviations, the partial derivatives of a standard deviation increase in proximal exposure to immigration enforcement are roughly 0.1 standard deviations for the various forms of political participation studied. Figure 3 also demonstrates that perceptions of discrimination, like proximal contact, do not appear to be associated with increases in voting behavior. We do find, however, that perceptions of discrimination may be the mechanism that drives nontraditional political participation. A standard deviation increase in the perceptions of discrimination scale is associated with a 0.1, 0.07, 0.13, and 0.07 statistically significant increase in the protest, donation, meeting attendance, and petition signing outcomes, respectively.[44]

44. One may ask why we do not assess the conditional effects of proximal contact by perceptions of discrimination. To do so could generate bias if we thought that we have effectively controlled for selection bias with respect to proximal contact, but preexisting perceptions of discrimination are not randomly distributed across the sample. This is why we prefer to show the association between proximal contact and perceptions of discrimination, and then the subsequent association between perceptions of discrimination and political participation, as a way to demonstrate the possibility of perceptions of discrimination acting as a mechanism. In the Appendix, Subpart C, we assess perceptions of discrimination as a moderator with respect to proximal contact for both the LNHIS and Latino Decisions Midterm Survey. We find that the effects of proximal contact are higher for respondents who perceive a discriminatory environment, but only for the protest and petition outcome. This pattern does not translate to the Latino Decisions Midterm Survey, which is consistent with the results suggesting there is no independent association between perceptions of discriminatory immigration enforcement and political participation. Additionally, in the Appendix, Subpart F, we conduct a mediation analysis using tools developed by Tingley et al. to assess if the effects of proximate contact are mediated through perceptions of discrimination. *See* Dustin Tingley et al., *Mediation: R Package for Causal Mediation Analysis*, 59 J. STAT. SOFTWARE 1, 21–25 (2014). For the LNHIS, proximal contact appears to be mediated by perceptions of discrimination, but the partial derivatives are small in comparison to the "direct effects." For the Latino Decisions Midterm Survey, there is no statistically significant mediation effect for the protest outcome. Moreover, there may be concerns that the sequential ignorability assumption is too strong to credibly assign weight to the mediation effects, given that an omitted variable driving a relatively weak correlation ($p = 0.1$) between the mediation and outcome models could bring down the mediated effect to 0 for all models.

Figure 4 provides predicted probabilities of engaging in various forms of political participation conditional on different levels of proximal contact. On the *x*-axis, 0 is no contact, 1 is knowing someone undocumented, and 2 is knowing a deportee. For voting, proximal contact does not appear to motivate any change in the probability of voting across the different levels of contact. For other, nontraditional forms of political participation, proximal exposure to immigration enforcement appears to motivate higher rates of political engagement. Unlike the results in Figure 2, however, which show that the difference in predicted values for perceptions of anti-immigrant/Latino discrimination are statistically distinguishable across the different levels of proximal contact, Figure 4 shows that most of the increase in political engagement is based on the difference in knowing someone undocumented relative to no contact. Nevertheless, there is a positive association between the different levels of contact and increases in political participation.

Figure 3: Partial Derivative Plot (Outcome: Political Participation, All Variables Standardized)



Figure 4: Predicted Value Plot (Outcome: Political Participation)



2. Study 2: Latino Decisions Midterm Survey

We replicate the results that we derive from the LNHIS using a survey of likely voters in 2018 that asked a battery of questions concerning the midterm election. This sample is distinct in that it only asks questions of registered voters, was fielded three years after the LNHIS during the Trump administration, and samples respondents from the most competitive congressional districts in the 2018 midterm.

Figure 5: Partial Derivative Plot (Outcome: Perceptions of Discrimination)



The results are similar between the midterm survey and the LNHIS. Figure 5 shows the partial derivative plot characterizing the association between relevant covariates and perceptions of discriminatory immigration enforcement. A standard deviation increase in the proximal contact scale is associated with a .165 standard deviation increase in the perceptions of discrimination scale. Furthermore, Figure 6 shows the predicted values of perceptions of discrimination for respondents along the different levels of proximal contact. These results are similar to Figure 2 in that there is a positive, linear relationship between levels of proximal contact and perceptions of discrimination. Recall that the perceived discrimination scale is between 0–3. No contact predicts a value of 1.7, knowing someone undocumented predicts a value of 1.87, and knowing a deportee predicts a value of 2.03, with differences of 10 percent and 8 percent respectively. The results in the midterm survey, however, are weaker in that the predicted values across the proximal contact scale are not statistically distinguishable from one another, and most of the difference along the scale is driven by the difference in those who know a deportee versus those that have no contact with immigration enforcement.

One reason the association between proximal exposure and a perception of discrimination regarding immigration enforcement may not be as strong in 2018 as the association between proximal exposure and a sense of a

discriminatory anti-immigrant environment is that the midterm survey was fielded between July 5 and 14, 2018, at the height of media attention over the issue of child separation.[45] Therefore, those who have not had exposure to immigration enforcement may have a higher baseline belief the immigration system is discriminatory or unjust in the presence of a politicized environment than in studies conducted during times when immigration was not as politically salient. Another reason could be sample size. The LNHIS survey includes over 1400 respondents, whereas the Latino Decisions Midterm Survey includes 400 Latino respondents, increasing the variance in the estimates.

45. Dana R. Fisher, *Who Came Out in the Brutal Heat to the 'Families Belong Together' March? Here's Our Data*, WASH. POST (July 3, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/07/03/who-came-out-in-the-brutal-heat-to-the-families-belong-together-march-heres-our-data/?utm_term=.b1cafd4479c3. The "Families Belong Together" March against Trump's family separation policy, for instance, occurred on June 30, 2018. *Id.*

Figure 6: Predicted Value Plot (Outcome: Perception of Discrimination)



We also replicate the results characterizing the association between proximal exposure to immigration enforcement and political participation from the LNHIS survey. Figure 7 shows the partial derivative plot of relevant covariates on voting and protest behavior. A similar pattern emerges as Figure 3, where proximal exposure does not motivate traditional forms of political participation such as voting but does motivate nontraditional political participation in the form of protest activity. A standard deviation increase in the proximal contact scale is associated with a .36 standard deviation increase in self-reported protest activity. Additionally, we assess whether perceptions of discrimination are independently associated with political participation. We do not find this to be the case for this sample. This could be concerning, given that it may mean other motivations are driving the impetus to protest. These concerns are assuaged, however, given that we test this directly and find that other motivations do not drive protest behavior.[46] Alternatively, it could be the case that the information from proximal exposure is diminishing the variation explained in the outcome by perceptions of discrimination. Removing proximal contact from the model increases the partial derivative of perceptions of discrimination from 0.06 to 0.11 (all variables standardized) with the protest outcome, which is also the difference between whether perceptions of discrimination as a category is statistically significant.

Figure 8 displays the predicted probabilities of protest participation conditional on different levels of proximal exposure to immigration

46. See the Appendix for placebo tests.

enforcement. Again, these results are similar to Figure 4, with statistically significant differences in the probability of protest in response to proximal contact. The predicted probability of protest is 0.02, 0.22, and 0.38 for respondents with no contact, who know someone undocumented, and who know a deportee, respectively. The positive association between degrees of contact and nontraditional participation is even stronger for the midterm survey than the LNHIS survey despite a reduction in sample size since these predicted probabilities are statistically distinguishable from one another.

Figure 7: Partial Derivative Plot (Outcome: Political Participation)



Figure 8: Predicted Value Plot (Outcome: Political Participation)



CONCLUSION

In this Article, we have examined the impact of proximal experiences with immigration enforcement on political participation. We argued that this relationship is dynamic. A punitive immigration environment, wherein the undocumented are threatened with detention and deportation irrespective of criminal offense, incentivizes institutional avoidance by those with proximal contact so that they do not risk exposing the status of a loved one. Yet, diminished trust in public institutions is not reflective of a deeper alienation from political life. Instead, the threat of exposing an undocumented loved one shapes how people civically engage. Individuals may be motivated to engage in collective action to create political change and so participate in activities outside of electoral politics. Thus, their participation in the face of the criminalization of themselves, their families, and communities reflects a commitment to democratic norms and the protection of human and civil rights.

The analysis presented here represents only the surface of the political lives of Latinos whose loved ones are threatened by detention and deportation. We have argued that mobilization catalyzed by proximal contact operates via a politicized group identity made salient by a threatening immigration environment, and we offered some support for this theory. We demonstrated that perceived discrimination is statistically associated with proximal contact, and that it partially accounts for the positive relationship between proximal contact and participation. Yet, ours is not a causal analysis. Future research should focus on untangling the underlying mechanisms that connect proximal experiences with immigration enforcement and participation outcomes.

Likewise, future research should pay close attention to the implications of participation spurred by personal and proximal experiences with punitive immigration enforcement for politics more generally and in the long term. In an era when the foreign-born population is an engine for population growth, what kind of citizens does punitive policy make? How do they view their relationship to a state by which they have been consistently vilified? What are the implications of this current punitive era for the growing political power of Latinos? Future research should also examine the cumulative effects of having multiple loved ones who are threatened by or who have experienced detention and deportation. Is there a tipping point, whereby excessive exposure to punitive policy yields deep political alienation? While we do not find one here, is there a qualitative difference between having an undocumented loved one and actually contending with family separation as a result of deportation?

These questions and scholarship documenting the linkages between immigration and criminal justice have never been more pressing.

APPENDIX

A. Placebo Tests

One concern over the empirical validity of the results is that other motivations for nontraditional political participation that are correlated with knowing someone undocumented may be driving the result. For example, a person who is proximately exposed to immigration enforcement may also feel compelled to sign a petition or protest in the streets for the purposes of furthering some other ideological goal or policy. Although the LNHIS survey does not have independent survey items on policy preferences that may allow an assessment of whether there exists a secular ideological predisposition driving nontraditional participation, the Latino Decisions Midterm Survey asks a series of policy-related questions that could serve as placebo checks to rule out other motivations for protest behavior.[47]

All tables include all of the control covariates characterized in the data section.

47. We use eight policy preference items, beginning with the stem "Please indicate if you would be more likely, or less likely to support a candidate for Congress if they take the following stand": (1) "Calls for universal background checks before anyone can buy a gun, with no loopholes"; (2) "Calls for decreased use of force by police by raising the legal threshold for when police can use deadly force"; (3) "Wants to expand access to health care and improve and protect Obamacare"; (4) Supports raising the minimum wage to 15 per hour nationally"; (5) "Wants to stop millionaires and corporations from getting huge tax breaks"; (6) "Wants to ensure that gays and lesbians have the same legal right to get married"; (7) "Supports a law to legalize medical marijuana nationwide"; and (8) "Says we should put a justice on the Supreme Court who will strike down *Roe v. Wade* and make abortion illegal once and for all." The outcome for all of these items is a 4-point scale from "much more likely to support" to "much less likely to support," which we transform into a binary variable.

Table 1: Association Between Policy Preferences and Political Participation

	Protest	Protest	Protest	Protest	Protest	Protest	Protest	Protest
Intercept	0.15	0.14	0.15	0.13	0.14	0.11	0.09	0.16
	(0.16)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)
Prox.	0.16***	0.16***	0.16***	0.16***	0.16***	0.16***	0.16***	0.16***
Contact	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Gun	-0.00							
Control	(0.06)							
Police		0.03						
		(0.06)						
Health			-0.01					
Care			(0.06)					
Minimum				0.05				
Wage				(0.06)				
Taxes					0.01			
					(0.06)			
Gay						0.07		
Marriage						(0.05)		
Marijuana							0.14***	
							(0.04)	
Abortion								-0.01
								(0.04)
Adj. R2	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.20	0.21	0.19
Num. obs.	413	413	413	413	413	413	413	413
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05								

To rule out other motivations for protest we first rule out an association between policy preferences and political activity (conditional on covariates). Table 1 shows that policy preferences do not predict political activity after accounting for proximal contact with immigration enforcement (with the exception of preferences over whether to legalize marijuana—but it is important to note that this does not reduce the statistical and substantive significance of the proximal contact scale with respect to political participation). We also regress the policy preferences on contact with immigration enforcement (conditional on covariates). If policy preferences that could motivate political participation are randomly distributed across the population (and therefore do not bias our estimates), we would expect that immigration enforcement has no statistically significant association with the policy preferences items. We find this to be the case. Proximal contact does

not appear to be associated with any of the policy preferences, even with multiple testing (see Table 2).

Table 2: Placebo Test: Association Between Proximate Contact and Policy Preferences

	Gun Cont.	Police	Health	Min. Wage	Taxes	Gay Marr.	Marijuana	Abortion
(Intercept)	0.73***	0.21	0.23*	0.30	0.41*	0.39*	0.35*	0.87***
	(0.10)	(0.16)	(0.11)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.16)
Prox. Contact	-0.03	0.05	-0.02	0.04	-0.01	-0.05	0.01	-0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Adj. R^2	0.14	0.12	0.30	0.18	0.12	0.08	0.12	0.06
Num. obs.	413	413	413	413	413	413	413	413
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05								

B. Sensitivity Analysis

Given that this study cannot (for ethical and practical reasons) randomize exposure to immigration enforcement, there may be concerns that the estimates of the association between proximal exposure to immigration enforcement and political participation are subject to omitted variable bias. We assess the sensitivity of our results to unobserved confounders by employing a technique developed by Hazlett and Cinelli (2018), which reparameterizes omitted variable bias in terms of R-squared and allows us to determine the level of joint variance that would need to be explained to reduce the "treatment effect" of interest to 0.[48] The technique also provides us with bounds, which can help us make better determinations of the plausibility of unobserved confounders by assessing the possibility of confronting an omitted variable that is just as strong as another prognostic, yet observed, variable.

48. *See generally* Cinelli & Hazlett, *supra* note 34.

Table 3: Robustness Value of Proximate Contact (LNHIS)

Outcome	Treatment	Estimate	SE	t_statistic	Y~D|X	RV
Protest	Proximate Contact	0.05	0.01	4.00	0.01	0.10
Petition	Proximate Contact	0.06	0.01	4.22	0.01	0.11
Meeting	Proximate Contact	0.03	0.01	2.50	0.00	0.06
Donation	Proximate Contact	0.04	0.01	3.37	0.01	0.09

Table 3 shows the robustness value (RV) of the proximal contact variable, which is a measure of how much of the joint variation in the outcome and the treatment would have to be explained by a confounder to bring the partial derivative of proximal contact to 0. The RV is 0.10, 0.11, 0.06, and 0.09 on a 0–1 scale for the protest, petition, meeting, and donation outcomes respectively. Although these values seem small, they are substantively meaningless without a sense of how likely there could be a confounder that is able to explain the totality of the joint outcome and treatment variance characterized by the RV. We could use the joint variation in the outcome and treatment explained by the observed covariates to provide a benchmark for how likely such a confounder is.

Table 4: Bounding the Effect of Proximate Contact by Outcome (LNHIS)

Outcome	Bound	R2:D~Z|X	R2:Y~Z|X	Adjusted Estimate
Protest	14x Age (18–29)	0.07	0.16	-0.00
Protest	17x Income (40–60k)	0.44	0.02	-0.00
Protest	38x College	0.04	0.26	-0.00
Petition	7x Income (40–60k)	0.18	0.06	-0.00
Petition	25x Age (18–29)	0.13	0.16	-0.02
Petition	34x Foreign	0.09	0.12	-0.00
Meeting	9x Income (60–80k)	0.04	0.17	-0.01
Meeting	15x Age (18–29)	0.08	0.08	-0.01
Meeting	25x Foreign	0.07	0.07	-0.00
Donation	8x Income (40–60k)	0.21	0.03	-0.00
Donation	27x Foreign	0.07	0.10	-0.00

Table 4 displays the scenarios in which the partial derivative estimate for proximal contact would be 0. These scenarios are conditional on the covariates in the main model, and are based on inflating the variance explained by the most prognostic observable covariates. It is important to note that these observable covariates are known in the extant literature as particularly

important for predicting rates of political participation.[49] For the protest outcome, an omitted variable would have to explain as much joint variation in the treatment and outcome as 14x the joint variation in the treatment and outcome explained by age, 17x the joint variation explained by income, and 38x the joint variation explained by having a college education in order to reduce the partial derivative of proximal contact to 0. For the petition outcome, an omitted variable would have to explain as much joint variation in the treatment and outcome as 7x the joint variation explained by income, 25x the joint variation explained by age, and 34x the joint variation explained by whether a respondent is foreign-born. For the meeting outcome, an omitted variable would have to explain as much joint variation in the outcome and treatment as 9x the joint variation explained by income, 15x the joint variation explained by age, and 25x the joint variation explained by whether a respondent is foreign-born. For the donation outcome, an omitted variable would have to explain 8x the joint variation in the treatment and outcome explained by income and 27x the joint variation in the treatment and outcome explained by whether a respondent is foreign-born. That a confounder would have to explain joint treatment and outcome variance by orders of magnitude of some of the most prognostic covariates in the literature suggests our results are relatively insulated from the threat of omitted variable bias.

Table 5: Robustness Value of Proximate Contact (Latino Decisions Midterm Survey)

Treatment	Estimate	SE	t-Statistic	R2:Y~D|X	RV
Proximate Contact	0.02	0.02	1.20	0.00	0.06

The sensitivity analysis using the data from the Latino Decisions midterm survey is perhaps stronger. In order to wash out the association between proximal contact and protest behavior, an omitted variable would have to explain 30 percent of the joint variation in the treatment and outcome. Benchmarking conditional on observed covariates, this is equivalent to 20x the joint variation explained in the treatment and outcome by having a college education, 27x the observed explanation of the treatment and outcome by having a perception of discrimination with respect to the immigration enforcement apparatus, and 31x the observed explanation of the treatment and outcome by having a high income (over $150,000).

49. *See, e.g.*, Henry E. Brady et al., *Beyond Ses: A Resource Model of Political Participation*, 89 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 271 (1995).

Table 6: Bounding the Effect of Proximate Contact (Latino Decisions Midterm Survey)

Outcome	Bound	R2:D~Z|X	R2:Y~Z|X	Adjusted Estimate
Protest	1x post_hs	0.01	0.04	0.02
Protest	27x injustice3	0.56	0.11	-0.00
Protest	31x inc150	0.20	0.56	-0.00

We also assess the sensitivity of the association between proximal contact and perceptions of discrimination. For the LNHIS survey, the robustness value of the proximal contact scale is 0.18. If we use observables as bounds, this is roughly equivalent to 34x the variation that the income covariate (40–60k) explains in the treatment and outcome, 48x the variation that the age (60+) covariate explains in the treatment and outcome, and 70x the variation that the foreign-born covariate explains in the treatment and outcome.

Table 7: Robustness Value of Proximate Contact on Perceptions of Discrimination (LNHIS)

Treatment	Estimate	SE	t-Statistic	R2:Y~D|X
Proximal Contact	0.18	0.02	7.68	0.04

Table 8: Bounding the Effect of Proximate Contact on Perceptions of Discrimination (LNHIS)

Bound	R2:D~Z|X	R2:Y~Z|X	Adjusted Estimate	Bound
34x inc3	0.90	0.01	-0.01	34x inc3
48x age_60	0.39	0.07	-0.00	48x age_60
70x foreign	0.11	0.36	-0.00	70x foreign

We assess the sensitivity of the association between proximal contact and perceptions of discrimination for the Latino Decisions Midterm Survey. To reduce the partial derivative of proximal contact to 0, a confounder would have to explain 13 percent of the joint variation in the treatment and outcome. In terms of benchmarks, this is roughly equivalent to 6x the variation age (60+) explains in the treatment and outcome, 17x the variation college education explains in the treatment and outcome, and 19x the variation Democratic identification explains in the treatment and outcome. Given that we may think perceptions of discrimination are determined by education and partisanship, the fact that confounders several orders of magnitude larger than these prognostic factors would be necessary to reduce the size of the partial derivative

for the treatment to 0 is evidence that the mechanism that may be motivating political behavior that we described is also insulated from omitted variable bias.

Table 9: Bounding the Effect of Proximate Contact on Perceptions of Discrimination (Latino Decisions Midterm Survey)

Bound	R2:D~Z|X	R2:Y~Z|X	Adjusted Estimate
6x age_60	0.18	0.10	-0.01
17x post_hs	0.18	0.10	-0.00
19x dem	0.05	0.48	-0.01

Table 10: Robustness Value of Proximate Contact on Perceptions of Discrimination (Latino Decisions Midterm Survey)

Treatment	Estimate	SE	t-Statistic	R2:Y~D|X	RV
Proximate Contact	0.17	0.06	2.88	0.02	0.13

C. Regression Tables

1. LNHIS Survey Results

Table 11: Proximate Contact and Relevant Outcomes
(LNHIS Survey, Characterizing Figures 1–4)

	Discrim.	Vote	Protest	Donation	Meeting	Petition
Intercept	0.93***	0.39***	0.10	0.03	0.09	0.13*
	(0.11)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Prox. Contact	0.18***	0.00	0.05***	0.04**	0.03	0.06**
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Discrim		0.01	0.05**	0.04*	0.06***	0.04*
		(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Income (20–40k)	0.01	0.07	-0.00	0.02	0.01	0.08*
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Income (40–60k)	-0.03	0.19**	0.04	0.07	0.04	0.13*
	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Income (60–80k)	0.03	0.15*	0.11*	0.07	0.20**	0.15*
	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Income (80–100k)	0.06	0.21**	0.04	0.15*	0.11	0.16*
	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Income (100–150k)	-0.09	0.23***	0.09	0.20***	0.15**	0.19**
	(0.10)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Post–HS	-0.04	0.04	-0.07	-0.01	-0.04	-0.04
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
College	-0.01	0.17**	-0.08*	-0.04	-0.06	0.01
	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Age (18–29)	-0.10	-0.03	0.09**	0.01	0.06	0.08*
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Age (60+)	-0.08	0.17***	-0.04	-0.00	-0.02	-0.00
	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Democrat	0.24**	0.04	-0.03	0.06	0.03	0.06
	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Independent	0.12	0.02	-0.03	0.02	-0.00	0.00
	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Other	0.07	-0.13	-0.08*	-0.02	-0.08	-0.15**
	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Foreign	-0.12*	0.14***	0.04	-0.05	-0.04	-0.06
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Female	-0.01	0.03	-0.02	0.02	-0.03	-0.02
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Adj. R^2	0.05	0.12	0.05	0.06	0.08	0.11
Num. obs.	1425	924	1425	1425	1425	1425
$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$						

2. Midterm Survey Results

Table 12: Proximate Contact and Relevant Outcomes
(Latino Decisions Midterm Survey, Characterizing Figures 5–8)

	Injustice	Vote	Protest
(Intercept)	1.86***	0.23	0.14
	(0.31)	(0.18)	(0.15)
Prox. Contact	0.17**	-0.01	0.16***
	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Injustice		0.02	0.02
		(0.03)	(0.02)
Income 20–40k	-0.26	0.00	0.14
	(0.18)	(0.10)	(0.08)
Income 40–60k	-0.04	0.05	0.14*
	(0.17)	(0.10)	(0.07)
Income 60–80k	0.00	-0.06	0.12
	(0.18)	(0.11)	(0.07)
Income 80–100k	-0.05	0.12	0.17*
	(0.22)	(0.13)	(0.08)
Income 100–150k	-0.25	-0.13	0.18
	(0.22)	(0.11)	(0.09)
High School	-0.29	0.18	-0.24
	(0.26)	(0.15)	(0.13)
College	-0.28	0.31*	-0.27*
	(0.26)	(0.14)	(0.13)
Age (18–29)	0.00	-0.13	0.01
	(0.13)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Age (60+)	-0.42	0.05	0.01
	(0.22)	(0.11)	(0.06)
Democrat	0.43**	0.09	0.07
	(0.16)	(0.08)	(0.05)
Independent	-0.24	-0.04	0.06
	(0.19)	(0.09)	(0.10)
Other	-0.31	-0.20	-0.09
	(0.25)	(0.11)	(0.08)
Foreign Born	0.18	-0.11	-0.03
	(0.15)	(0.08)	(0.06)
Female	0.15	-0.01	-0.05
	(0.12)	(0.07)	(0.05)
R^2	0.14	0.11	0.22
Adj. R^2	0.11	0.07	0.19

Num. obs.	413	413	413
RMSE	0.90	0.44	0.34
$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$			

D. Replicating Results by Registered and Citizen Respondents

1. Replicating LNHIS Results Using Only Registered Respondents

Table 13: Proximate Contact and Relevant Outcomes (RWJF Survey, Registered Respondents Only)

	Discrim.	Vote	Protest	Donation	Meeting	Petition
Intercept	0.94***	0.39***	0.10	-0.01	0.12	0.06
	(0.13)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Prox. Contact	0.19***	0.00	0.07***	0.05*	0.06*	0.08**
	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Discrim		0.01	0.05*	0.05*	0.06*	0.05
		(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Income (20–40k)	-0.07	0.07	0.01	0.06	0.02	0.12*
	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Income (40–60k)	-0.05	0.19**	-0.00	0.02	0.04	0.15*
	(0.11)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Income (60–80k)	-0.05	0.15*	0.17*	0.10	0.21**	0.14
	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Income (80–100k)	-0.01	0.21**	0.03	0.15*	0.12	0.19*
	(0.11)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.09)
Income (100–150k)	-0.15	0.23***	0.10	0.25***	0.18**	0.21**
	(0.11)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Post–HS	-0.05	0.04	-0.08	0.02	-0.05	0.02
	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.07)
College	-0.06	0.17**	-0.09	-0.03	-0.07	0.05
	(0.09)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Age (18–29)	-0.11	-0.03	0.11*	-0.01	0.08	0.07
	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Age (60+)	-0.17*	0.17***	-0.02	-0.00	-0.03	-0.02
	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Democrat	0.28**	0.04	-0.04	0.07	0.01	0.07
	(0.09)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Independent	0.17	0.02	-0.01	0.05	-0.03	0.03
	(0.11)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.07)
Other	0.31**	-0.13	-0.10	-0.03	-0.03	-0.08
	(0.11)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Foreign	-0.00	0.14***	0.03	-0.04	-0.05	-0.03
	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)

	Discrim.	Vote	Protest	Donation	Meeting	Petition
Female	-0.00	0.03	-0.04	-0.00	-0.06	-0.01
	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Adj. R^2	0.06	0.12	0.08	0.07	0.07	0.07
Num. obs.	924	924	924	924	924	924
$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$						

2. Replicating LNHIS Results Using Only Unregistered Respondents

Table 14: Proximate Contact and Relevant Outcomes (LNHIS Survey, Unregistered Respondents Only)

	Discrim.	Protest	Donation	Meeting	Petition
Intercept	1.08***	0.14	0.13	0.02	0.24
	(0.19)	(0.14)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.14)
Prox. Contact	0.18***	0.01	0.01	-0.01	0.03
	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Discrim		0.06*	0.02	0.07**	0.02
		(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Income (20–40k)	0.11	0.00	-0.00	0.02	0.02
	(0.10)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Income (40–60k)	0.02	0.11	0.18*	0.06	0.11
	(0.14)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.08)
Income (60–80k)	0.13	-0.05	-0.03	0.16	0.19
	(0.16)	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Income (80–100k)	0.13	0.09	0.07	0.07	-0.08
	(0.24)	(0.16)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.07)
Income (100–150k)	0.00	-0.01	-0.09*	-0.03	0.02
	(0.22)	(0.12)	(0.05)	(0.12)	(0.14)
Post-HS	-0.06	-0.05	-0.06	-0.02	-0.11
	(0.11)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)
College	0.02	-0.08	-0.06	-0.04	-0.08
	(0.10)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Age (18–29)	-0.16	0.08	0.04	0.04	0.11
	(0.10)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Age (60+)	0.07	-0.08	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.14)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Democrat	0.05	-0.05	0.03	0.11	0.03
	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Independent	-0.05	-0.09	-0.05	0.07	-0.03
	(0.16)	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Other	-0.17	-0.11	-0.06	-0.05	-0.18
	(0.15)	(0.12)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.12)

	Discrim.	Protest	Donation	Meeting	Petition
Foreign	-0.23*	0.05	-0.06	-0.02	-0.05
	(0.09)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Female	0.04	0.02	0.04	0.01	-0.05
	(0.09)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Adj. R^2	0.05	0.02	0.06	0.07	0.11
Num. obs.	501	501	501	501	501

3. Replicating LNHIS Results Using Only Unregistered Citizen Respondents

Table 15: Proximate Contact and Relevant Outcomes

	Discrim.	Protest	Donation	Meeting	Petition
Intercept	1.30***	0.05	0.19	-0.17	0.04
	(0.26)	(0.16)	(0.18)	(0.12)	(0.18)
Prox. Contact	0.19*	0.04	-0.01	0.02	0.08
	(0.08)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Discrim		0.06	0.02	0.11**	0.08
		(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.06)
Income (20–40k)	-0.03	-0.03	-0.07	0.06	-0.08
	(0.19)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.11)
Income (40–60k)	0.10	0.01	0.11	0.07	-0.03
	(0.21)	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.12)
Income (60–80k)	0.08	-0.14	-0.02	0.11	0.03
	(0.25)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.14)
Income (80–100k)	0.32	-0.08	-0.08	0.06	-0.10
	(0.31)	(0.12)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.10)
Income (100–150k)	-0.24	-0.20*	-0.16	-0.10	-0.12
	(0.25)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.15)
Post-HS	-0.17	-0.17	-0.19	-0.16	-0.11
	(0.19)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)
College	-0.13	0.01	-0.14	-0.14	-0.06
	(0.17)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.10)
Age (18–29)	-0.04	0.11	0.17*	0.10	0.09
	(0.16)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.09)
Age (60+)	-0.03	-0.01	-0.10	0.01	-0.05
	(0.27)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.11)
Democrat	-0.04	0.05	0.09	0.35**	0.23
	(0.23)	(0.13)	(0.15)	(0.11)	(0.14)
Independent	-0.18	0.08	-0.04	0.24*	0.11
	(0.24)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.10)	(0.15)

	Discrim.	Protest	Donation	Meeting	Petition
Other	-0.17	-0.07	-0.07	0.06	-0.06
	(0.23)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.08)	(0.12)
Foreign	-0.37	0.00	-0.02	-0.05	-0.11
	(0.21)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.09)
Female	-0.08	0.00	0.03	0.02	-0.00
	(0.14)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.09)
Adj. R^2	0.04	0.07	0.09	0.18	0.12
Num. obs.	176	176	176	176	176
$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$					

4. Replicating LNHIS Results Using Only Unregistered Noncitizen Respondents

Table 16: Proximate Contact and Relevant Outcomes (LNHIS Survey, Unregistered Noncitizen Respondents Only

	Discrim.	Protest	Donation	Meeting	Petition
Intercept	0.79**	0.39	0.15	0.31	0.51*
	(0.28)	(0.26)	(0.15)	(0.24)	(0.24)
Prox. Contact	0.15*	-0.02	0.00	-0.04	-0.01
	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Discrim		0.07	0.01	0.05	-0.01
		(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Income (20–40k)	0.20	0.02	0.05	0.03	0.10
	(0.12)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Income (40–60k)	-0.06	0.21*	0.24*	0.06	0.21*
	(0.19)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.09)
Income (60–80k)	0.14	0.07	-0.03	0.37	0.44
	(0.22)	(0.14)	(0.05)	(0.26)	(0.23)
Income (80–100k)	-0.12	0.45	0.30	0.26	0.08
	(0.39)	(0.26)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.12)
Income (100–150k)	0.28	0.25	-0.02	0.15	0.28
	(0.33)	(0.24)	(0.06)	(0.25)	(0.26)
Post–HS	-0.05	0.03	-0.00	0.04	-0.11
	(0.15)	(0.09)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.07)
College	0.15	-0.20***	-0.06	-0.04	-0.11*
	(0.13)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Age (18–29)	-0.26	0.04	-0.05	-0.03	0.06
	(0.14)	(0.08)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.08)
Age (60+)	0.11	-0.09	0.02	-0.02	0.01
	(0.17)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Democrat	0.17	-0.29	-0.06	-0.20	-0.32
	(0.22)	(0.25)	(0.13)	(0.25)	(0.23)

	Discrim.	Protest	Donation	Meeting	Petition
Independent	0.17	-0.34	-0.10	-0.18	-0.32
	(0.22)	(0.24)	(0.12)	(0.25)	(0.23)
Other	-0.10	-0.30	-0.11	-0.28	-0.46*
	(0.21)	(0.24)	(0.12)	(0.25)	(0.22)
Foreign	-0.09	0.04	-0.03	0.01	0.04
	(0.18)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Female	0.11	-0.00	0.05	-0.02	-0.07
	(0.11)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Adj. R^2	0.05	0.06	0.05	0.07	0.14
Num. obs.	325	325	325	325	325
$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$					

E. Assessing Heterogeneity

Table 17: Assessing Heterogeneity by Perceptions of Discrimination (LNHIS Survey)

	Vote	Protest	Donation	Meeting	Petition
Proximal Contact	-0.02	-0.01	0.02	-0.01	-0.00
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Discrimination	-0.01	0.00	0.02	0.03	-0.01
	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Contact x Discrimination	0.02	0.05**	0.02	0.04	0.05*
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Adj. R^2	0.12	0.06	0.06	0.08	0.11
Num. obs.	924	1425	1425	1425	1425
$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$					

Table 18: Assessing Heterogeneity by Perceptions of Discrimination (Latino Decisions Midterm Survey)

	Vote	Protest
Proximal Contact	-0.03	0.17**
	(0.07)	(0.05)
Discrimination	0.02	0.07**
	(0.04)	(0.03)
Contact x Discrimination	0.01	-0.00
	(0.04)	(0.03)
Adj. R^2	0.15	0.20
Num. obs.	413	413
$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$		

F. Mediation Analysis

Figure 9: Mediation Analysis (LNHIS)



Figure 10: Mediation Analysis (Latino Decisions Midterm Survey)